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The main aim of this dissertation has been to examine the 
creation, organisation and work of the Red Army's Civil War 
political apparatus and assess its overall contribution to the 
Bolshevik war effort. To this end the dissertation itself 
cons~s~s of 4 main chapters and a ~umber of appendices, 
deta1l1ng not only the war~ of the main political organs of the 
Red Army, but also the main personalities involved. 
The first chapter is an introductory chapter, examining the 
organ, which many Soviet historians have for a long time 
considered to be the Bolsheviks' first attempt at the creation 
of a centralised political organ for the Red Army, namely the 
Organisation~agitation department of the All-Russian Collegiate 
for the Formation and Organisation of the Red Army. 
The work carried out for the first chapter then leads to a 
discussion of the work of arguably the first real attempt by 
the Bolsheviks to create a properly functioning political organ 
specifically for the Red Army, namely the All-Russian Bureau of 
Military Commissars (VBVK). The chapter has been sub-divided 
into a number of sections, in order to allow a greater detailed 
examination of the work, personalities and difficulties that 
the central political apparatus faced in its attempts to exert 
some sort of control over the various constituent parts of the 
front political apparatus-the military commissars, the Party 
cells and the ever-increasing important political departments 
in the period 1918-1919. 
That VBVK was not to be a crowning success is revealed by 
the necessity that the Bolsheviks felt towards the beginning of 
1919 to abolish VBVK and create arguably the centralised 
political organ of the Red Army during the Civil War period-the 
Political Administration of the Revolutionary Military Soviet 
of the Republic (PUR). Created in May 1919, PUR was to face 
many of the same problems that had beset VBVK a year or so 
earlier but, on the whole, coped with them better and political 
and cultural-educational work in the Red Army proceeded apace. 
The final, conclusive chapter brings all the threads 
together and assesses the claims made for the political work 
carried out in the front-line Red Army units during 1918-1920 
and, whilst admitting that the Bolsheviks did spend much time 
on promoting the apparatus in a number of ways, the assertions 
made by generations of Soviet historians concerning the overall 
value of the political and cultural-educational work carried 
out in the Red Army are still too grandiose and that there is a 
lack of concrete evidence available, proving the worth of the 




CC RKP(B)-Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks); 
CEC-Central Executive Committee; 
PUR-Politicheskoe upravleni Revvoensoveta Respubliki, trans. 
the Political Administration of the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of the Republic; 
RKKA-Raboche-Krestianskaya Krasnaya Armiya, trans. the 
Worker's-Peasants' Red Army; 
RMS-Revolutionary Military Soviet; 
RVSR-Revoliutsionniy Voenniy Soviet Respubliki, trans. the 
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic; 
VBVK-Vserossiiskoe buro voennykh komissarov, trans. the All-
Russian Bureau of Military Commissars; 
VVS-Vysshiy Voenniy Soviet, trans. the Higher Military Soviet. 
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The theme for this dissertation topic arose out of an 
earlier MA dissertation, which I wrote in 1983, on 
analysing the relationship between the Communist Party of 
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the Civil War, 1918-1920. Although the latter was a 
relatively small work, in terms of the number of words, it 
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nature of the links between the Communist Party and the 
Red Army's political apparatus during the Civil War 
period. Due to restrictions of length, I ~as not in a 
position to say much about the exact nature of the links 
between the two, nor was I in a position to write too much 
about the actual creation of the Red Army's political 
apparatus, its structure, the main personalities involved, 
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However, on completion of the dissertation, I was 
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Army's political apparatus came into being or examining 
the nature of the relationship between the central 
political apparatus and the Red Army's political 
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apparatus, serving the needs of the Red Army soldiers at 
the front. Try as hard as I could, I simply could not 
find the answers I sought in the relevant Western 
literature on the Civil War. Although the Soviet 
literature on the topic is not inconsiderable, for reasons 
of politics, I found that Soviet historians tended to make 
too many uncritical claims about the importance and role 
of the Red Army's political apparatus during the Civil 
War. These statements compelled me to seriously think 
about whether or not there was, in actual fact, any truth 
in the assertions made about the role of the Red Army's 
political apparatus during 1918-1920 and I therefore 
decided that it was an area worthy of further research, 
for which material did exist, but which,· for a variety of 
reasons, Western historians had pa~d little attention to 
in the past. There was also the added interest that a 
number of the prominent personalities involved in the 
running of the main political organs created specifically 
to serve the Red Army were later to be found in the 
political opposition movement in the 1920s and later 
purged by Stalin in the 1930s-people like I.T.Smilga, 
Ch.G.Rakovsky, A.G.Beloborodov, V.D.Kasparova, etc., about 
whom relatively little was known- and it was also true 
that very, very few people who had been in charge of a 
Army or Front political department outlived the General 
Secretary. This implied that amongst those who actually 
(vii) 
served in the Red Army's political apparatus during 1918-
1920 were life-long Bolshevik Party members, some of whom 
would later be included in the group of Party veterans 
which became known as the "Old Bolsheviks", selfless men 
and women who had served the Party's interests long before 
the 1917 October Revolution itself and had played a 
significant role in the 1917 October Revolution. I 
thought that this, in itself, was a strong indication, 
from the outset, that the Bolshevik Party did attach great 
importance to the organisation and workings of the Red 
Army's Civil War political apparatus. 
Thus, the more I looked into the whole question of the 
creation, organisation and work of the Red Army's 
political apparatus during the Civil War, the more I 
became convinced that the whole issue had been too long 
neglected and that the time was ripe for a proper analysis 
to be undertaken. Thus, this dissertation will have very 
little to say about the military history of the Red Army-
it has not been my intention to examine the battle history 
of the various units that went to make up the Red Army 
during 1918-1920-nor has it been my intention to write a 
purely political history of the Red Army at this time 
either. The main object of this dissertation has been to 
detail the history and workings of the Red Army's 
political apparatus and examine its contribution to the 
overall war effort of the Bolsheviks at this time. 
(viii) 
Certainly, if one examines Soviet sources on this 
particular topic, then the Western historian would be in 
little doubt that the Red Army's political apparatus did 
play a significant role in the achievement of Bolshevik 
victory in the Civil War. However, given the political 
nature of the regime and, until very recently, the 
dutifully acknowledged commanding role of the CP in Soviet 
society, one has to treat such a view with a great deal of 
respect, if not salt! After all, one would expect Soviet 
historians to heap praise on the role of the CP during a 
prolonged period of crisis like the Civil War, especially 
as it occurred not long after the heroic days of the 1917 
October Revolution. It is also the case that, as has 
happened countless times in historical writing before, the 
Civil War history of both the Communist Party and the Red 
Army has been written from the point of view of the 
victors and that, certainly again until fairly recently, 
it has been incumbent on Soviet historians to be fulsome 
in their praise for the CP's political apparatus in the 
Red Army at this time. 
However, the work undertaken for this dissertation, 
would appear to show that Soviet historians have been very 
careful in their selection of the available evidence and 
presentation of the "facts", as they have detailed them. 
Whilst it is true, for instance, thar between 1918-1920, 
the CC passed 40 special resolutions on political work in 
(~) 
the Red Army units; that every single Party Congress and 
Party conference, held during 1918-1920, did debate 
political work in the Red Army or, at least, the work of 
those parts of the apparatus actually carrying out 
political work in the Red Army, it is also true to say 
that, by the end of 1920, the Red Army's political 
apparatus had become, in its own way, a fairly large 
bureaucratic machine, which could supply exact figures on 
the amount of newspapers sent to each of the individual 
fronts, but still ran into significant problems in dealing 
with the local political apparatus, serving the needs of 
the men at the front. Thus, as has happened countless 
times in the past, historical truth would appear to have 
been the victim of political necessity and, in general, I 
thought that it was about time that the claims and 
assertions made by Soviet historians in this whole area be 
subjected to as thorough analysis as the source materials 
would allow. 
To a certain extent, what has happened in the USSR, as 
regards the whole question of analysing the role of -the 
Red Army's political apparatus during the Civil War, is 
that Soviet historians have been faced with a bit of a 
quandary in their attempts to examine the issues connected 
with the creation, organisation and work of the political 
apparatus. Since the Red Army's political apparatus was a 
creation of the Party and all institutions created by the 
(x) 
Party have, for a long time now, been beyond reproach, 
Soviet historians have had to adopt a fairly uncritical 
approach to the work and achievements of the Red Army's 
political apparatus during the Civil War. However, it has 
also been the case that, for a long time, the actual 
leaders of the Red Army's political apparatus, as stated 
before, became "non-people" and even after Khrushchev's 
"Secret Speech", Soviet historians, whilst still having to 
praise the role and achievements of the Red Army's Civil 
War political apparatus, still found it largely 
uncomfortable to talk about the real issues involved in 
the creation of the Red Army's political apparatus or 
discuss the importance of the people directly involved in 
the creation and organisation of the Red Army's political 
apparatus. As a result, they have tended to gloss over a 
lot of the more unpal atable features of the development 
of the Red Army's political apparatus during this period, 
as well as the role of each of the individual Bolshevik 
Party members who played a not inconsiderable part in the 
organisation and work of the Red Army's political 
apparatus in 1918-1920. 
For too long now, Soviet historians have tended not to 
discuss such important issues as the lack of centralised 
coordination between the central political apparatus and 
the political apparatus at the front; the very serious 
debates that went on in the Red Army and the CP itself 
(XI) 
about the future utility, for instance, of that previous 
bastion of the Red Army's political apparatus, the 
military commissars; ignore discussing the importance of 
the top people involved in the control of the Red Army's 
centralised political organs, namely the All-Russian 
Bureau of Military Commissars and the Political Department 
of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic; not 
discuss the failings of the Red Army's top political 
organs in not being able to establish the necessary 
coordination of work, so desired by the central political 
authorities; ignore the see-saw that took place, in terms 
of personnel, in the running of the Party's most important 
Civil War political organ for the Red Army-the Political 
Administration of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the 
Republic, etc., etc. These and other issues have never 
been fully addressed by Soviet historians in the past and, 
on the basis of a lot of previously unused primary source 
materials, including a number of very rare newspapers and 
journals actually published by the various Army and Front 
political departments themselves, this dissertation will 
address all these previously taboo areas and judge 
whether, or not, the Red Army's political apparatus did 
play the role allotted to it by generations of Soviet 
historians. 
In general, it should be noted here that the term, 
"political apparatus", is used throughout this 
(xii) 
dissertation to denote those organs, or personnel, either 
working directly in the political structure of the field 
Red Army units on the front, e.g. the Party cells, the 
military commissars, the political departments, etc., as 
well as the centralised political organs, specifically 
created to take charge of political work in the Red Army. 
As regards the chronology of the dissertation, it 
begins with an examination of what a number of historians 
have considered as the Red Army's first centralised 
political organ-the Organisation-agitation department of 
the All-Russian Collegiate for the Organisation and 
Administration of the Red Army-and ends in November 1920, 
when the then main political organ for the Red Army, the 
Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Soviet 
of the Republic, was partial~y absorbed by_the newly-
created Main Political-Educational Committee for Political 
Education. Thus, this dissertation will consist of four 
main chapters-split up further into a number of sub-
sections and sub-divisions, in order to allow the better 
use of the materials presented-and a number of appendices, 
detailing the structure of the Red Army's political 
apparatus at various times throughout 1918-1920, as well 
as the structure of the Political Department of the 
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic in May 1919 
and a biographical appendix, containing the biographies of 
those most important personalities involved in the 
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FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A RED ARMY POLITICAL 
APPARATUS (JANUARY-MARCH 1918). 
In general, it has to be said that prior to the 
creation of the Red Army in January 1918, very little 
attention had been paid by the Bolsheviks to the 
possibility of creating a political apparatus, indeed, as 
Professor J.Erickson has shown, even the idea of a 
standing army itself was treated with a great degree of 
initial distrust and caution. 1 Prior to the creation of 
the Red Army itself, there was no one single, centralised 
organ which could even claim to be the forerunner of the 
main Red Army political organs that were to eventually 
develop-neither the Petrograd Military Revolutionary 
Committee's Bureau of Military Commissars nor the Central 
Executive Committee's Military department can be 
considered as early attempts by the Bolsheviks to begin 
creating the necessary political apparatus for the Red 
Army, as both organs were concerned with a wide variety of 
other tasks other than either purely military or 
political. 2 Not too surprisingly, given the military 
urgency of the situation, the Bolsheviks were more 
concerned with building up the necessary agitational 
apparatus for the Red Army, thereby ensuring that a 
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sufficient number of recruits were passing into the ranks 
of the Red Army, than overtly worrying about what happened 
to them once they got there. However, even though a 
definite political apparatus for the Red Army did not take 
shape right away, certainly in this period, there were 
signs that some of the agitational activity was giving 
rise to the need for a properly functioning political 
organ for the Red Army to be created. 
The first real political organ for the Red Army-the 
All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, hereinafter 
referred to simply by the English transliteration of its 
Russian abbreviation, i.e. VBVK-was created just outwith 
the period of this particular chapter (in April 1918, in 
actual fact), and did have a predecessor, of sorts, in the 
activity and functions of one organ actually operating 
during this early period, namely the Organisation-
agitation department of the All-Russian Collegiate for the 
Organisation and Administration of the Red Army. 3 Before 
going on to discuss the work of this organ in detail, as 
well as the work of the other future important parts of 
the Red Army's political apparatus, it should be noted 
that, as will be shown in the chapters ahead, the Red 
Army's political apparatus gradually developed throughout 
1918-1919 due to a mixture of centralised dictate and 
experience born on the front itself. This was evident 
even in the early organisation of the Soviet armed forces-
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both Party cells and the commissars were operating in Red 
Army units long before either the CC or the relevant 
military authorities did anything about defining their 
functions. Thus, despite the lack of apparent activity at 
the centre, it could well have been the case that some 
very rudimentary campaigns of political work were being 
carried out either by the Party cells, left over after the 
1917 October Revolution, or by individual military 
commissars, appointed to the military units. It is, 
however, impossible to speculate further, as the lack of 
archival material on this particular question prevents us 
from examining this matter in any detail. Thus, all that 
this chapter will do is detail the work of the organs and 
bodies, relev~nt to the future development of the Red 
Army's political apparatus, even if the work that they 
initially carried out may seem trivial, in comparison with 
the work of the future political organs of the Red Army. 
Bearing the latter in mind, it is now possible to begin 
this work by examining the aforementioned organ-namely, 
the Organisation-agitation department of the All-Russian 
Collegiate. 
The Organisation-agitation department of the All-
Russian Collegiate was created on 7th February 1918 and, 
according to one source, its chief was L.M.Kaganovich. 4 
Although it has not been possible to trace the exact date 
of his appointment, it is known that on the 12th February, 
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he did address a special meeting of the Organisation-
agitation department of the All-Russian Collegiate as its 
chief. Unfortunately, Klyatskin's account of the meeting 
does not go into any great detail about what Kaganovich is 
supposed to have said at the meeting, but Kaganovich 
apparently developed a series of points about the general 
tasks of the Organisation-agitation department of the All-
Russian Collegiate. All that Klyatskin did note was the 
following two points, namely that in Kaganovich's address, 
the tasks of the department were: 
the extension of a broad campaign of agitation on the 
question of organising the Red Army and satisfying §he 
cultural-educational demands of the Red Army units. 
Unfortunately, there is no further detail provided on how 
these tasks were supposed to be carried out. However, in 
a report prepared by the Organisation-agitation department 
of the All-Russian Ccillegiate and sent to the Supreme 
Military Soviet in May 1918, the department did detail the 
activity of its two main sub-departments for the period, 
January-April 1918, thus providing us with some idea of 
what the department actually did during this important, 
formative period in the history of the Red Army. 6 
The two main sub-departments of the Organisation-
agitation department of the All-Russian Collegiate were 
the organisation and agitation-education sub-departments. 
As stated earlier, the initial emphasis in the creation 
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and organisation of the Red Army was simply getting enough 
men into uniform and quickly dispatch them to the front to 
do the fighting. As is shown by the reports of these two 
sub-departments, there was no complex, sophisticated 
programme of cultural-educational work being carried out; 
after all, even by May 1918, the Red Army was still a very 
small organisation, numbering some 196,000 men.7 The 
priority for the Bolsheviks was building a army large 
enough to withstand the military onslaught of the enemies 
of the new regime. Thus, the work of these two sub-
departments consisted largely in agitating for recruitment 
into the Red Army: between February-April 1918, the sub-
departments trained and sent out a grand total of 393 
"organisers-agitators" to aid recruitment in the towns and 
localities, 386 of whom were Bolshevik Party members. 8 
However, compared to the courses that were later to be 
developed for and in the Red Army itself, these courses 
were purely for agitational and recruitment purposes only 
and bore very little resemblance to the future cultural-
educational and political courses. 
In its cultural-educational activity, the agitation-
education sub-department was also equally modest in the 
work that it carried out. Whilst it is true to say that 
it did open the first Red Army club in Petrograd, it is 
impossible to say just how important this club was to the 
future development of the club network in the Red Army. 
Page 5 
Its achievements were, to say the least, very modest-a 
library, facilities for the men to play dominoes and the 
likes, instead of cards, a membership that ran into 
hundreds, not thousands, etc. It is also true to say that 
this sub-department had p ublished 15 different pamphlets 
and brochures on various subjects and distributed them to 
the localities, in a total volume of circulation of 
2,406,000 copies. It would appear, however, that they 
were purely of an agitational nature than anything else.9 
Thus, on the face of things, there would appear to be 
very little evidence for including such an organ, i.e. the 
Organisation-agitation department of the All-Russian 
Collegiate for the Organisation and Administration of the 
Red Army, in a history of the Red Army's Civil War 
political apparatus and yet, for mo~e than eight decades, 
a number of Soviet historians, despite the very meagre 
evidence presently available, insist on doing just that. 
As early as 1922, the historical line, so to speak, was 
laid about the Organisation-agitation department of the 
All-Russian Collegiate: 
the Organisation-agitation department of the All-Russian 
Collegiate was t~0 first centralised political apparatus of the Red Army. 
A couple of years after the latter remark, this 
statement was further expanded upon by another article 
which appeared in "Politrabotnik", written by a former 
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political worker in the Red Army during the Civil War, 
Vladimir Faydysh: 
it is possible to consider the Organisation-agitation 
departm:nt of.t~e All-Russian Collegiafe as the first 
central1sed m1l1tary-political organ.l 
Unfortunately, neither of the two articles produced 
any evidence to support their views-why should the 
Organisation-agitation department of the All-Russian 
Collegiate be considered as the Red Army's first political 
organ? Certainly, in 1930, a group of prominent Soviet 
military historians published a work in which they stated 
that the Organisation-agitation department of the All-
Russian Collegiate.could not be considered as the Red 
Army's first poltical organ, as they latter was not able 
to encompass("okhvatyvat")the political leadership of the 
Red Army.1 2 They further went on to argue that the 
political leadership of the army was split and 
decentralised and concentrated, mainly, "in the hands of 
the local Party organs." 13 
However, regardless of the accuracy of the above view, 
the older view still continued to hold sway. For instance 
in 1939, an article was published in the USSR's main 
military-historical organ, "Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal", 
stating that: 
the Organisation-agitation department y~s effectively the 
first political organ of the Red Army. 
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This view has continued to dominate in more recent 
historical writing: in 1984, two Soviet hi~torians, 
V.Portnov and M.Slavin, wrote in their history of the 
development of the Soviet armed forces that: 
the first specialised political organ for the Red Army, 
operating in the centre, was created on 7th February 1918 
and was the Organisation-agitation department of the All-~n 
Russian Collegiate for the Organisation of the Red Army.1~. 
Again, though, no real evidence is produced to support 
this view. On the strength of the available material, it 
would be pushing historical facts to the limit to say that 
the Organisation-agitation department of the All-Russian 
Collegiate for the Organisation of the Red Army was the 
direct forerunner to the Red Army's two main Civil War 
political organs, namely, the All-Russian Bureau for 
Military Commissars and its replacement, the Political 
Administration of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the 
Republic, analysed and detailed in the chapters ahead. 
There is no available evidence showing that the organ 
carried out nothing but purely agitational or recruitment 
type functions. There is no proof that the organ was in 
charge of, or exercised control over, the military 
commissars or the Party cells, such as they existed. In 
fact, there is no evidence showing that the organ was 
involved in any way with the work of the military 
~ 
commissars or the Party cells during its brief existence. 
However, it could be the case that a new wave of research 
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into the origins of the Red Army and its political 
apparatus will support the contention of yet another group 
of distinguished Soviet military historians who, in 1984, 
published a historical analysis of the Soviet Army's 
political apparatus, in which they had the following 
interesting comments to make on Organisation-agitation 
department of the All-Russian Collegiate for the 
Organisation of the Red Army: 
it is not possible to agree with a number of aufhors ... who 
have considered the Organisation-agitation department to 
have been the first centralised political organ of the Red 
Army. It would be more accurate to consider it to have 
been a prototype for the central political organs. In the 
first place, the organ was not the sole central organ. 
Along with it carrying out work were the CC's All-Russian 
Bureau of Military Organisations, which did a lot of work 
in creating the Red Army, also the CEC's Agitational 
collegiate, which conducted agitational work for 
recruitment into the Red Army. Secondly, the 
Organisation-agitation department carried out work not so 
much amongst the.troops, as amongst the workers and the 
poorer peasantry, agitating and enlisting v£5unteers for 
recruitment into the ranks of the Red Army. 
Why it should have been the case that for so long the 
view has been held that the organisation-agitation 
department was the Red Army's first political organ is 
almost impossible to explain, other than, perhaps, it 
was/is a case of historical neatness, i.e. Soviet 
historians looking for the beginning of the Red Army's 
political apparatus and picking on this organ, as it came 
into being virtually at the same time as the creation of 
the Red Army itself. Regardless of the motives, however, 
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it cannot be said that the Organisation-agitation 
department was the Red Army's first political organ: as 
stated in 1930 and again in 1984, the organ was not really 
concerned with either working amongst the troops or 
carrying out any form of political-agitational work 
amongst the men themselves. It was the creation of the 
All-Russian Bureau for Military Commissars in April 1918 
that was to represent the first real attempt by the 
Bolsheviks to create a single, centralised political organ 
for the Red Army. The Organisation-agitation department 
of the All-Russian Collegiate for the Organisation of the 
Red Army can, at best, be only viewed as a prototype for 
what was to follow, not as a fully-fledged political organ 
in its own right. 
As stated earlier, despite the existence of the 
Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee's Bureau of 
Military Commissars, the latter cannot be regarded as the 
embryo of a future political organ for the Red Army. Just 
after the revolution had begun in Petrograd, commissars 
were appointed by the Petrograd Soviet's Military 
Revolutionary Committee, "in the interests of the defence 
of the revolution and its gains from attempts on the part 
of counter-revolutionary forces." 16 Thus, commissars were 
appointed not only to ensure the loyalty of military units 
in Petrograd and its immediate environs, but also to 
ensure that the Bolsheviks held control of the key 
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civilian institutions in the city. In other words, in the 
immediate aftermath of the revolution, commissars were 
appointed to ensure that the revolution was defended 
against attempts by counter-revolutionary forces to throw 
the revolution back on its heels. In the military units 
in which they served, carrying on from the previous policy 
of the Provisional Government, the military commissars 
were viewed as political representatives of the 
government/Party in power. 1 7 However, as yet, they were 
not necessarily viewed as all being Party-political 
representatives of the regime-as will be discussed later, 
a significant number of military commissars, who served in 
the ranks of the Red Army in 1918, were not members of the 
Bolshevik Party-and it is also true that it would appear 
that they did not carry out any form of cultural-
educational work amongst the troops, but at least, the 
commissars in 1917 did bear some resemblance to what they 
were to become in the months ahead. In general, the 
initial role of the military commissar in the army was to 
induce some confidence in the work of the command staff; 
as one Soviet historian pointed out, (himself a former 
commissar in the army during this period): 
as between the commander (who only a few days before had 
been in 'faith and truth' serving the Tsar) and the Red 
soldiers their hung a 'precipice', the role of the 
commissa~ as the political organ of the Soviet government 
in the ar~y, had to be reduced to the esta£gishment of the 
necessary bond of confidence between them. 
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Thus, despite the elimination of the Petrograd 
Military Revolutionary Committee in December 1917, the 
commissars were retained and the special Bureau of 
Military Commissars enhanced. 19 All military commissars 
who had previously served under the control of the 
Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee were now 
transferred to the control of the CEC's Military 
department; they were also requested to send in details of 
their work to the latter organ by the end of December 
1917. 20 However, it is not yet known how the Bureau 
actually discharged its functions vis a vis the military 
commissars, how it was expected to control them and ensure 
that they worked in the best interests of the regime. 
Whilst the Bureau would appear to have had no specific 
political rol~ to perform in the Red Army, nevertheless it 
would be interesting to find out a little bit more of what 
it actually did during this period. All that is known, 
other than what has already been described, is that its 
activity was confined to a specific geographical area, 
i.e. that of Petrograd and its immediate environs, it was 
not required to work further afield. This would have 
reduced its impact to a fairly "localised" character, in 
effect. In concluding an article on the origins of the 
military commissars, one authoritative Soviet source 
stated the following: 
the commissars of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary 
Committee, including those in the units of the old army, 
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and the military commissars of the Red Army were two 
entirely different institutions and it is incorrect to mix 
the two ... only by order of 8th April[a reference to the 
creation of the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, 
VBVK-SM]was created the central organ for the unification 
and leadersh~£ of their[the military commissars-
SM]activity. . 
The actual role of the military commissar, however, 
was being gradually developed and modified. Given the 
need that the Bolsheviks felt for a properly organised 
military force to defend the interests of the new regime 
and the distinct lack of trust towards the former Tsarist 
officer corps, the eventual role of the military commissar 
evolved from ensuring the best interests of the Soviet 
state to cooperating with the former command staff to 
ensure that proper military order was maintained and that 
the soldiers re~learnt to trust the command staff. Years 
of military failure, incompetence, agitation and 
revolution had all successfully combined to reduce the 
eventual resistance to the Bolsheviks when they seized 
power in October 1917, now, however, they had to use an 
institution of the former Provisional Government to begin 
re-creating the new military might of the regime. The 
military commissars, as will be shown below, were to play 
an important role in all of this. 
In January 1918, N.V.Krylenko, (then Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army), issued a special set 
of instructions, stating that: 
in each army a responsible commissar is to be appointed 
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who, jointly with the command personnel and the army 
committees, will decide all questions connected with the 
formation of the army.z2 
This would seem to be a clear indication of the 
cooperative nature of the relationship that was to exist 
between the command personnel and the commissar-both men 
were to be made equally responsible for the military 
efficacy of their unit. Later on, however, the commissar 
was to assume the extra mantL~ of responsibility of having 
to watch and control the activities of the command 
personnel in a wide range of activities. In itself, 
though, Krylenko's order was not enough and, not long 
after the appointment of Trotsky to the post of Commissar 
for War, the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs 
published a new statute entitled, "political control", 
("politicheskii kontrol"), on 21st March 1918, in which 
the basic functions and role of the military commissars 
were outlined: 
political control over the whole organisation and life of 
the army is entrusted to the military commissar. The post 
of military commissar is one of the most responsible and 
honoured in the Soviet Republic. The commissar maintains 
the closest possible internal link between the army and 
the Soviet regime. The commissar personifies the 
embodiment of revolutionary duty and unbreakable 
discipline. The commissar countersigns all important 
orders. With all the strength of his authority and power, 
the commissar will ensure the swift and unquestioning 
fulfilment of the gperational and military orders of the 
military leaders. 2 
In a article written by Trotsky at round about this 
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time, Trotsky stated that: 
the military specialists will direct the technical end of 
the work, purely military matters, operation work and 
combat activities. The political side of the 
organisation, training and education, should be entirely 
~ubordinated to the representat~4es of the Soviet regime 
1n the person of its commissar. 
Thus, within the space of less than two months, the 
Bolsheviks had fully come round to both realising and 
publicly stating the importance of the military commissars 
in the construction of the Red Army and, more importantly 
for this particular work, also stating. that political 
organisational activity was to be left in the hands of the 
military commissars. Certainly, both the order just 
quoted and the extract from Trotsky's article would appear 
to show that, as far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, 
political control over the whole life and activity of the 
army was to be left in the hands of the military 
commissars and not entrusted to someone else, eg, the 
soldiers' committees, the Party cells, local soviets, etc. 
However, even before the month was to be done, the role of 
the military commissars was to be further analysed, this 
time, however, not by another governmental body or even by 
Trotsky himself, but by the Party's CC. 
A plenum of the Party's CC was held on 31st March 1918 
to discuss, "the role of the commissars in the Army and 
the Fleet." 2 5 The outcome of this particular plenum of 
the Party's highest and most authoritative body was to be 
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made obvious a week after the actual plenum itself. In 
accordance with a decision of the plenum, on 6th April 
1918, both the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs 
and the Supreme Military Soviet published a joint order, 
entitled "on the Milit~ry Commissars and the Members of 
the Military Soviets", in which, as will be detailed in 
the next chapter, the rights and duties of the military 
commissars were further expanded upon. Overall, though, 
the new order increased the responsibilities of the 
commissars still more.26 
Even if the regulations were still a bit vague on the 
exact nature of the duties of the military commissars in 
the political sphere, still there was little doubt that, 
gradually throughout January-March 1918, the Party picked 
the commissars to be at the centre of the political life 
of the Red Army units, in preference to the other organs 
still operating in the Red Army. This part of the early 
history of the Red Army's political apparatus, in many 
respects, came to an end and a new beginning just two days 
after the new order had been issued-on 8th April 1918, the 
All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars was created and, 
although not perfect, the real process of building the Red 
Army's political apparatus had begun. 
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CHAPTER TWO (SECTION ONE):-
THE CREATION OF THE BOLSHEVIKS' FIRST CENTRALISED 
POLITICAL ORGAN FOR THE RED ARMY: THE FORMATION AND 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN BUREAU OF 
MILITARY COMMISSARS (APRIL 1918-MARCH 1919). 
The creation of the All-Russian Bureau of Military 
Commissars (hereinafter referred to by the English 
transliteration of the Russian abbreviation, VBVK) in 
April 1918 has to be viewed against the background of a 
relatively newly-formed socialist government, trying to 
find the correct organisational apparatus for controlling 
a newly-created military force. After all, it should not 
be forgotten.that, at the end of 1917-beginning of 1918, 
the Bolsheviks had carried out a policy of demobilising 
the old army, in order to create the necessary basis for 
the creation of a new, more able, fighting force, more 
able in the sense that the new army would be more keen to 
serve the new political power in the land. 
Throughout March 1918, demobilisation gathered apace-
both on 2nd and 30th March, the People's Commissariat of 
Military Affairs issued further orders on the continuing 
demobilisation of the old army, a process that was due to 
be completed by 12th April 1918. 1 Another important 
factor in understanding the background to the creation of 
VBVK was the decision, by the Party's Central Committee 
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(CC) to abolish the Party's military organisations which 
had previously operated in the old army units.2 This 
decree was put into effect as of 15th March and further 
heightened the need for a reappraisal of the role of the 
military commissars in the new army. 
As the continued reorganisation of the military 
apparatus gathered force, the role of the military 
commissars began to assume an ever greater importance, 
especially as the regime decided to establish a network of 
local military commissariats all over the Republic, with 
the passing of the relevant decree on 8th April 1918. 3 On 
the exact same date as the local commissariats came into 
being, the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs also 
issued the order which created VBVK. The original decree 
is reproduced below in full: 
No.270 c.Moscow 8th April 1918 
In the interests of coordinating and unifying the work of 
the military commissars and establishing control over them 
on a nationwide scale, the People's Commissariat of 
Military Affairs has decided to create, under its control, 
the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars. 
The organisation and leadership of the Bureau is entrusted 
to the mem~er of the Military Commissariat-comrade 
I.Yurenev. 
The "I.Yurenev" in the order was the Party pseudonym 
for K.K.Krotovsky, a former journalist who had wide 
experience of propaganda-agitational work amongst soldiers 
during the First World War. At the beginning of 1918, 
Yurenev was appointed to both the All-Russian Collegiate 
Page 20 
for the Organisation and Formation of the Red Army and the 
People's Commissariat of Military Affairs, therefore in 
its Chairman, VBVK would appear to have had a trusted and 
tried member of the Party, with plenty of agitational and 
growing military experience. 5 
Although VBVK had been created in April 1918 and its 
Chairman appointed, the first published statement on the 
actual staff of VBVK did not appear until lOth May 1918: 
Post No. of Personnel Monthly pay --
1. SECRETARIAT 
Secretary 1 700 
Typist 1 450 
2.GENERAL CLERICAL 
DEPARTMENT 
Head of Department 1 700 
Journalist 2 500 
Filing clerk 1 300 
Typist 1 450 
Messenger boy 1 300 
3.ADMINISTRATIVE DEPT. 
Head of Department 1 700 
Journalist 1 500 
Typist 1 450 
4.INSPECTOR-INSTRUCTOR 
DEPARTMENT 
Head of Department 1 700 
Clerk 1 600 
Adviser 1 450 
Typist 1 450 
Inspector 6 700 
Messenger boy 1 300 
6 
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According to the above, VBVK, by early May 1918, only 
had a total staff of 22 people, split between the 4 
departments. Given this size, it would appear that VBVK 
was initially no more than a skeleton organisation, 
performing a not particularly wide range of functions. It 
is very difficult to believe that, despite the words of 
the original order of 8th April 1918 which created VBVK, 
that with only a staff of 22, it could possibly unify the 
activities of all the commissars serving in all the 
regions of the Republic. 
In his speech to the First All-Russian Congress of 
Military Commissars in June 1918, Yurenev briefly touched 
upon the functions both of VBVK, in a general sense and of 
a few of the departments previously listed: 
the Bureau has the task of unifying the volost, uezd, 
guberniya and okrug military commissars, scattered all 
over the provinces into one harmonious whole for the joint 
leadership of the Red Army. The Bureau is composed of the 
following departments: administrative-for supervising 
personnel; instructor-for directing and instructing the 
activity of the military commissars on all matters and the 
inspectorate-for checking on results ach~eved and their 
correct implementation in the provinces. 
Although it is not listed in the May 1918 statement on 
the staff of VBVK nor in Yurenev's June 1918 statement, 
according to another order of the People's Commissariat of 
Military Affairs, dated 23rd April 1918, VBVK was supposed 
to have one other department in its organisational 
structure, namely an agitational-educational department. 8 
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However, there would appear to be a significant body of 
evidence, most of it culled from primary source materials 
of the time, which would seem to show that the order of 
23rd April remained, in effect, on paper, rather than one 
which was put into in practise right away. One of the 
strongest pieces of evidence in favour of a later date for 
the creation of VBVK's agitation-education department 
comes from a report on the activity of VBVK and its 
agitation-education department, first published in 1918. 9 
In this report can be found the following extract: 
after the disbandment of the All-Russian Collegiate for 
the Organisation of the Red Army [a process which began in 
April 1918 and was not completed until May 1918-SM], it 
was proposed that the organisation-agitation department 
reorganise to become the All-Russian Agitational Bureau of 
the Red Army under the control of the Central Executive 
Committee. On the 27th April, a organisational meeting of 
the bureau took place at which it was properly 
constructed ... Having lasted about a month, by order of 
the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs the bureau 
was renamed the agitation-education de£5rtment of the All-
Russian Bureau of·Military Commissars. 
Given the latter statement plus the fact that the 
department was not mentioned in the May 1918 staff 
statement nor in Yurenev's speech to the First All-Russian 
Congress of Military Commissars in June 1918, there 
certainly would appear to be very strong grounds for 
believing that the original order of the People's 
Commissariat of Military Affairs was left lying on the 
shelf, so to speak. This begs the question of whether or 
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not this was a common practice at the time? 
The Soviet military press of the period did, however, 
note the existence of yet another two departments of VBVK 
in this period-on 17th May 1918, the People's Commissariat 
of Military Affairs issued an order creating a 
"communications' services" department, attached to VBVK 
(total sta£f number of 48) 11 and, a week later, on 24th 
May 1918, the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs 
also ordered the creation of a financial department of 
VBVK. 12 In comparison with the communication services 
department, the financial department was relatively small, 
numbering only three people.l3 
Even with these two new departments, VBVK would still 
appear to have been run largely on a skeletal basis. 
Looking through the S~viet military and political press of 
the period from July-September 1918, there is very little 
indication of VBVK's activity and whilst, as will be 
detailed later, VBVK did help to organise the First All-
Russian Congress of Military Commissars, nevertheless it 
certainly was not in a particularly strong position to do 
too much about unifying or coordinating the activities of 
the military commissars. 
However, by the autumn of 1918, things began to 
change. On the basis of the decision of the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee to turn the Republic into an 
"armed camp", the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the 
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Republic was duely created on 6th September 1918 
(hereinafter referred to simply by the English 
transliteration of its Russian abbreviation, RVSR).14 
RVSR was to be the centralised, operational military 
centre for the young Republic in its fight for survival, 
against the combined military might of external 
intervention and internal counter-revolution. By the end 
of S~ember 1918, RVSR was further strengthened by the 
decision to abolish the Supreme Military Soviet and 
transfer its not inconsiderable operational powers to 
RVSR. This change in the military structure of the 
Republic soon found expression in the organisational 
structure and general position of VBVK in the overall 
military and political structure of the Republic. 
On the 25th September 1918, the Peopleis Commissariat 
of Military Affairs decided·that VBVK should establish 
training courses for military commissars and, needless to 
say, a new department had to be created to take charge of 
them. 15 Although it is not the place to discuss these 
courses here, suffice it to say that the new department 
that was created to look after them added a further 22 
people to VBVK's overall staff numbers.1 6 
Despite the creation of this new department, however, 
VBVK was still far from being the undisputed leading organ 
' for the control of political work being carried out in the 
Red Army units at the front. On 2nd October 1918, a 
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Political department, attached to RVSR, was created. 1 7 
The creation of this "alternative" leader has prompted one 
prominent Soviet military historian to write the 
following: 
another attempt was made to divide the leadership of 
political work in the Red Army. For leading and directing 
political work and the actvity of the military commissars 
in the army, in the field and in the central military 
establishm&nts, a Political department of the 
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic was created. 
The All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars was now left 
with leading the commi~sars of the rear units and issuing 
instructions to them. 1TA 
The head of this Political department was I.N.Smirnov, 
a Bolshevik with a Party record that stretched back to 
long b~fore the 1917 October Revolution. 19 Similar to 
Yurenev in the sense that he had also agitated in the 
ranks of the old Imperial Army during the First World War, 
Smirnov also had one big advantage over Yurenev-his Party 
card stretched back way beyond 1913; Smirnov had been a 
member of the Bolshevik Party since 1907 and had not been 
mixed up in any way in any fractional activity either 
within or without the Party. In establishing, or at leat 
in attempting to establish relations with Chiefs of 
political departments at front-and army-level, this could 
well have been no mean advantage. 
This division of the central political apparatus of 
the Red Army in two-the Political department in charge of 
the front political apparatus and VBVK left in charge of 
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the rest-shows that the Party's CC was still very unsure 
as to what organisational structure was needed at the 
centre to take effective control of the Red Army's 
political apparatus, both at the centre and in the rear. 
Only one Soviet historian has even remotely attempted to 
explain why this division occured: 
uniformity and centralisation were lacking in the area of 
leading the activity of the political departments 
themselves ••. basically, the leading role of the All-
Russian Bureau of Military Commissars influenced political 
work in the rear military districts; in relation to the 
~ro~t ~o~iticat 9departments, its influence was 1ns1gn1f1cant. 
In other words, the decision to create RVSR's 
Political department was taken in response to the 
situation which was then developing at the front. The 
lack of influence of VBVK at the front, where it mattered 
most, had compelled the Bolsheviks at the centre to re-
examine the whole situation and this eventually led to the 
decision to create a Political department, in charge of 
the front political apparatus. 
Again though, events were to move swiftly and the Red 
Army's central political apparatus was to be thrown into 
new turmoil. On 9th October 1918, just one week after the 
original decision to create RVSR's Political department, 
RVSR published a new set of regulations, increasing the 
size and functions of VBVK. 20 In the new order, it was 
also made clear that VBVK was no longer subordinate to the 
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People's Commissariat of Military Affairs but was, in the 
words of the original order, "one of the central organs of 
the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic."21 In 
general, the decree listed all the commissars who were now 
subject to the control of VBVK-these included all the 
commissars operating in the military commissariats, 
created by the decree of 8th April 1918; all commissars 
operating in the main okrug administrations; commisars of 
the internal security troops, etc. 22 What has to be said 
here right away is that the new set of regulations would 
not appear to have touched upon the relationship between 
the commissars serving on the front and VBVK-all the 
commissars listed in the new set of regulations were 
serving in the·rear of the Red Army, not at the front. 
This new order also discussed the new organisational 
structure of VBVK, as well as the actual Chairmanship of 
VBVK. 23 As regards the latter, the order simply stated 
that the Chairman was a member of RVSR-following the 
reorganisational shake-up of RVSR, carried·out on 30th 
September 1918, this had already occured. 24 The order 
also stated that "members of the Bureau were departmental 
chiefs" 25 and that "at the head of the departments of the 
Bureau is a directorate and a secretariat." 26 Other than 
this new directorate and secretariat, VBVK was also to 
consist of the following departmnents: inspectorate-
instructorate; field counter-espionage; administrative; 
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agitational-educational; military communications; 
finance/accounts; courses for military commissars and, 
finally, communication services["sluzhba svyazi"-SM].27 
With reference to this order, on 28th October 1918, RVSR 
issued another order which showed how many members of 
staff were to be in each of the new departments: thus, the 
secretariat was to consist of 4 people; the directorate 
was to consist of 19 people; the finance and 
administration departments-15 people; the inspectorate-
instructorate department-36 people; the department of 
courses for the military commissars-22 people; the 
department of military communications-36 people; the 
agi~4tion-education department-13 people; the agitation-
organisation sub-department-6 people; the educational sub-
department-16 people; the literary-library sub-department-
12 people; the sub-department for agitators and 
organisers-16 people; the department of communication 
services-55 people and, finally, the department in charge 
of the publication of VBVK's own Bulletin-16 people. 28 
This represented an overall staff total of 281 people-a 
massive increase on the original staff list of May 1918 
and probably an indication of things to come. 
Unfortunately, there is no such information available 
on the organisational complexity of RVSR's Political 
department: looking through the papers of the period, 
there simply is nothing there which would help to throw 
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light on the work or the structure of RVSR's Political 
department. In many respects, this similar to the 
previous situation previously described for VBVK between 
July-September 1918. 
Further to the relevant orders on the October 
organisational shake-up of VBVK, another announcement 
appeared in the Soviet military press about a number of 
the newly-appointed departmental chiefs of VBVK: 
IN execution of the order of the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of the Republic No.49 of 9th October 1918, the 
following are appointed members of the All-Russian Bureau 
of Military Commissars: 
in charge of the Bureau's directorate, com.Sovkin, L.S.; 
secretary to the Chairman of the Bureau, com.Khitev, V.K.; 
chief of the administration department, com.Kulyabko, 
N.N.; chief of the inspectorate-instructorate department, 
corn. Ananin, I.A.; chief of the department of military 
communications, corn. Arnoldov, A.M.; chief of the 
department of
2
9ourses for the military commissars, corn. 
Aksenov, I.A. 
In this context, it should be noted that, according 
to an earlier order, Kulyabko had been appointed Yurenev's 
deputy, whilst the latter was out of Moscow in October 
1918.3° Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find 
any biographical information on any of these figures. In 
addition to the above personnel list, another of the 
departmental posts was filled on 26th october 1918: 
in addition to order No.57 of 15th October of this year of 
the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, the chief
31 of the agitation-education department is corn. Kasparova. 
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That is a a name that we will come across in various 
future sections and for which there is, thankfully, some 
biographical information on. However. one thing that 
should be said about her here and now is that of all the 
people identified as having worked with VBVK during 1918-
1919, only one name is then subsequently clearly 
identified as proceeding to work in the organ that 
succeeds VBVK, namely the Political administration of the 
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic (PUR) and 
that is Kasparova. 
Thus, by the end of October 1918, VBVK was bigger and 
organisationally more complex than it had been previously 
in its history, but it was still far from being recognised 
as the leading organ for the condu~t of political work in 
the Red Army units at the front. After all, there was 
still the looming presence of RVSR's Political department, 
as well as the political department of the Supreme 
Military Inspectorate. 32 However, this was all to change 
fairly quickly when the CC decided, at long last, to bite 
the bullet and officially confirm that VBVK was now to be 
viewed as the leading organ for the political work both at 
the front and in the rear of the Red Army. 
On 13th November 1918, RVSR issued an order "on the 
merger of the Political department of RVSR with the All-
Russian Bureau of Military Commissars". 33 The order is 
far from complete and, other than stating that the two 
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departments were to be fused, simply stated that VBVK, in 
order to handle the new work being placed on it, was to 
create a front department 34 and that VBVK was now in 
charge of all the commissars who had earlier been 
controlled by RVSR's Political department.35 Fast on the 
heels of that order, on 14th November 1918, RVSR issued 
yet another order fusing VBVK and the Supreme Military 
Inspectorate's Political department, taking over its staff 
and, no doubt, its main function of inspecting political 
work being carried out on the front.36 
Thus, within the space of a couple of days, VBVK had 
effectively become the leading organ for political work in 
the Red Army-all other contenders had been eliminated. On 
the same day as the announcemnet came through of the 
merger of RVSR's Political department and VBVK, it was 
also announced that VBVK's Front department had been duly 
created. 3 7 This was probably to ensure that the 
continuity of the work being undertaken remained unbroken. 
However, even so, the relationship bewteen VBVK and the 
front political apparatus, despite all the reorganisation 
and merging of the central political apparatus, was still 
to remain a very serious problem for VBVK to tackle. 
As will be detailed in the sections ahead, VBVK was to 
suffer a great deal from the lack of a properly defined 
relationship with the military commissars, the Party cells 
and the ever-increasingly powerful political departments. 
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In December 1918, a further two departments were 
created for VBVK-on 5th December 1918, the records-
assignment and information departments were brought into 
being. 38 The records-assignment department was to consist 
of 11 people and the information department was to consist 
of 26 people. 39 Although no functions are actually listed 
in the original order creating these two departments, 
according to one secondary source, the records-assignment 
department would appear to have been a potentially very 
important department indeed. Apparently, this department 
was concerned with "sending out Party workers to the 
fronts, as well as the appointment of military 
commissars."40 Given the nature of the department, it is 
very surprising that it took so long for such a department 
to be created! Its functions were nothing but vital for 
the new work of VBVK. 
A week after the creation of these two new 
departments, VBVK issued an order on "the organisational 
set-up for cultural-educational work in the Red Army units 
located at the front."41 The opening sentence of the 
order stated the following: 
the leading centre for the organisation and leadership of 
cultural-educational work in the whole of the Red Army is 
the Agitation-education department of the All-Russian 
Bureau of Military Commissars; the closest leading organ 
for the troops, at the front, is t~z Political department, 
attached to the Staff of the Army. 
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In one single statement, VBVK virtually announced the 
organ that was effectively to become its real challenger 
to its position as the leading organ for poltical work in 
the Red Army units, especially at the front. The Army and 
Front political departments, as will be described in 
various places of this dissertation, were to become the 
leading organs for political work at the front, with 
almost the minimum of interference from VBVK. 
Although VBVK had 4 months of activity left, in many 
resepcts, it was an organ that was ill-equipped for the 
burdens and duties that lay ahead of it. According to one 
soyrce, VBVK was reorganised "10 times", and this in just 
a year of existence.43 From a staff of less than 25 in 
May 1918, it had grown enormoulsy by the end of autumn 
1918 but, form the evidence presently available, it 
certainly would appear that VBVK was simply not up to 
taking on all the extra work that becoming the leading 
organ for political work in the Red Army meant. Its 
Achilles heal was its relationship with the front 
political apparatus and despite the increase in staff and, 
no doubt, budget allocation, VBVK's relationship with the 
front political apparatus was never really properly worked 
out. 
In the sections that follow, VBVK's delicate 
relationship with the Red Army's front political apparatus 
will be both detailed and analysed and, on the basis of a 
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lot of primary source material, some of which has never 
been seen outside the USSR, it will be possible for the 
first time in the West to critically analyse and evaluate 
the nature of the relationship between the central and 
front political apparatus. 
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CHAPTER TWO(SECTION TWO): 
VBVK AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY COMMISSARS IN THE RED 
AR!1Y (APRIL 1918-APRIL 1919). 
Before examining the role of the military commissar in 
the Red Army and his relationship to VBVK in 1918-1919, it 
would be worthwhile,initially at least,to look at the 
various definitions of the term, "military commissar". 
After all, the various definitions on offer, varying in 
their complexity and accuracy, do reveal one important 
point about the nature of the role of the military 
commissars at this time-without the use of a long and 
detailed definition of the term, it is almost impossible 
to pinpoint exactly the powers and duties of the military 
commissars. Al~hough VBVK was supposed to ensure a 
general degree of coordination and unity in the work of 
the military commissars, it was never able to ensure an 
effective measure of control over the activities of the 
military commissars, en mas~and, in some respects, in 
this its primary duty, has to be judged as having failed. 
However, what this section will hopefully show is that 
VBVK had to face an immense task in trying to establish 
some form of control over the total activities of the 
military commissars in the Red Army, given the complexity 
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of the functions of the latter and, more importantly, the 
fact that, for a time at least, their powers were almost 
unlimited. VBVK found it impossible to enforce a 
commonly-agreed set of general statutes on the work of the 
military commissars in the Red Army, due, in no small 
part, to the fact that the military commissars were more 
powerful without a commonly-agreed set of general 
instructions than with such a set. As will be shown 
below, one of the explanations for the power and influence 
of the military commissars in the Red Army units, at this 
time, was the fact that their powers were so ill-defined 
that they could encroach on a whole range of spheres of 
activity. If their range of activity had been properly 
defined and regulated, then, obviously, their power and 
influence would also have been limited. Given its lack of 
influence at the front, VBVK had very little choice but to 
accept this state of affairs and let it continue. 
Thus, in the section that follows, the overall role of 
the military commissar in the Red Army and the 
relationship with VBVK will be examined and analysed. 
VBVK's role in the appointment, training and despatch of 
commissars to the front will be detailed, as well as the 
general work of the commissars in the Red Army, at this 
time. 
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(i) What was a"military commissar"? 
However, as stated in the introduction, the section 
will begin by looking at the variousdefinitions of the 
term, "military commissar", in order to arrive at some 
sort of general understanding of the nature of the role of 
the military commissars in the Red Army. 
A very general definition of the term is to be found in 
the relevant volume of the "Sovetskaya Voennaya 
Entsiklopediya": 
a figure in the armed forces, endoyed by the government or 
ruling Party, with special powers. 
In itself, this particular definition does not say too 
much, but, in its vagueness, curiously enough, lies part 
of the explanation behind an understanding of the power 
and influence ofthe military commissars in the Red Army. 
As already stated, the military commissars were more 
powerful without a strict series of regulations and rules, 
than they would have been had VBVK been able to enforce a 
generally-agreed set of regulations. Such a definition, 
as above, would also cover the work of the commissars in 
the army, who existed, in one form, whilst the Provisional 
Government was in power, in March 1917.2 Although it 
should be said that the military commissars, who operated 
in the Red Army in 1918-1919 were not only greater in 
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number, but also had more power to wield. Thus, the 
definition, as noted, is adequate to a certain extent:it 
is true that commissars were agents of a particular ruling 
Party, operating in the Red Army. However, in terms of 
the militaryand political experience of the young Soviet 
Republic, such a definition gives no real indication of 
the influence or power, held by the military commissars in 
the Red Army during the latter's formative period. In 
effect, the definition is too slight, too clinical. In 
order to better understand the role of the military 
commissar in the Red Army and, therefore, appreciate his · 
overall importance, it is necessary to examine yet one 
more definition of the term, this time taken from an 
encyclopaedia, devoted to the history of the Civil War 
itself: 
official-representatives of the Communist Party and Soviet 
power in the Red Army and Fleet ..• the institution of 
military commissars was introduced in the spring of 1918, 
with the aim of securing the leading role of the Communist 
Party in the Army and in the Navy, organising Party-
political work amongst the troops ... and also controlling 
the activity of the military specialists ... for 
coordinating and uniting the activity of the military 
commissars and establishing control over them on a 
nationwide scale, on the basis of a directive of the 
People's Commissariat of Military Affairs of 3rd April 
1918 .•. on 8th April ~as created the All-Russian Bureau of 
Military Commissars. 
Obviously, this definition of the term is more accurate 
and detailed and gives a greater impression of the 
functions and duties of the military commissars. However, 
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on saying that part of this definition has to be treated 
with a degree of caution; after all, as will be detailed 
below, the idea that all military commissars, serving in 
the Red Army at that time, were busy beavering away to 
secure the Bolshevik Party leadership of the Red Army 
would be, to say the least, somewhat of an exaggeration, 
especially in the early stages of the development of the 
Red Army(even as late as September 1918, VBVK still in-
sisted that compulsory Communist Party membership was not 
necessary for military commissars).4 Therefore, Khromov's 
definition, whilst being more detailed and accurate, still 
does not portray a full picture of the position and work 
of the commissars in the Red Army in 1918. 
Not too surp~isingly, the single, most comprehensive 
"definition" of the role and functions of the military 
commissars appeared in an order of the People's 
Commissariat of Military Affairs, dated 6th April 1918, it 
was the first time that the People's Commissariat of 
Military Affairs had actually published an order on the 
duties of the military commissars, although in March 1918, 
it had approved a series of "basic statements" on the role 
and the activity of the military commissars, 5 which were 
then subsequently writ large, so to speak, in the April 
1918 order. The most important part of the April 1918 
order was the following: 
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the military co~rnissar is the direct political organ of 
Soviet PO\ver in the army ••. Commissars are appointed frora 
t :1 e numb e r o f i r re pro a c ha b 1 e rev o 1 ut ion a r i e s , c a o ab le i n 
the most difficult of ~ircumstances of carrying ~ut their 
revolutionary duty. The person of the commissar is 
inviolable ••• force against a co1mnissar is equivalent to 
the most severe crime against Soviet po~.;er. The military 
commissar sees that the army does not isolate itself from 
the whole Soviet system and that se~arate military 
institutions do not become conspiratorial centres ••• the 
c o mm i s sa r t a!< e s part in a 11 t he a c t i v i t y o f t he m i l i tar y 
leaders ••• only those orders of the ~1ilitary Soviets are 
valid which are signed by, other than the military leader, 
at least one military commissar. All work is conducted 
under the eyes of the commissars, but leadership in the 
specific military arena belon3s not to the commissar bug, 
working hand in hand with him, the military specialist. 
Compared with the previous definitions, the description of 
the powers of the commissar and his not compulsory 
Bolshevik Party status, contained in this eAtract from the 
order of 6th April, gives us a truer indication of how th~ 
role of the military commissar was then viewed. 
Contrary to Khromov' s definition, the commissars ~ve re not 
necessarily conducting any campaigns of agitational-
propaganda work in favqur of the Bolshevik Party alone; 
the commissars ,.,ere representatives of Soviet po~ver-as 
yet, the two were still not the same thing. His main duty 
lay in ensuring that the army did not become a hc=1ven for 
conspiratorial plots to be ~atched against the new 
revolutionary regime. This was crucial if the Bolsheviks 
were serious in their desire to create an army, that was 
not only capable of fighting the enemy, but also loyal 
to the re~ime; the conmissars had to carefully r..;a tch the 
activities of the military specialists in their units. In 
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this ~articular respect, it is even possible to see a 
slight link between the comnissars appointed by the 
P r o v i s i o n a 1 Go v e r n men t i n ~,1 a r c h 1 91 7 , t he c o m r.1 i s sa r s 
appointed by the Petrograd ~filitary Revolutionary 
Committee in the inmediate aftermath of the 1917 October 
Revolution and the latest set of comnissars serving in 
the units of the Red Army in the sprino of 1918:as reoards 
0 •..> 
ensuring the loyalty of the army to the regime, all three 
sets of commissars had a control function to perform, in 
making sure that the military specialists, they were 
designed to cooperate with, did nothing that endangered 
the regime. 
Again contrary to Khromov's definition, there is no 
mention in the order of the commissars carrying out any 
programme of p o 1 i t i c a 1 work in the ~ e d Army u n i t s no ~v , o r 
in the future. The control function of the commissars was 
the most important function that the commissars had to 
perform and, judging by the lack of even a mention of the 
necessity, or the desire, that the commissars should 
p e r f o r :n some f o r m of p o l i t i c a 1 ~.,or k a m on g s t t he so 1 d i e r s , 
the control function of the commissars must have been 
uppermost in the minds of the leading Bolshevik Party 
members, who drew up the order. Given the conditions of 
the time,the above approach would have made sense. After 
a 11 , V l3 VK s t i 11 did no t for m a 11 y ex is t and , even l;v lt en i t 
did, it would take quite some time, before it could even 
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attempt to impose some form of control over the military 
commissars. 
(ii) The initial experience of VBVK and the military 
commissars (April-May 1918) 
Towards the end of the above order, there is a mention 
of a "Burl~au of Hili tary Commissars" that was to be 
created under the control of the Supreme Military Soviet, 
"to unite the activity of the commissars, r2spond to their 
requests, work out instructions for them and, in cas2 of 
necessity, convene Congresses of commissars." 7 To all 
intents and purposes, this would seem a reference to VBVK, 
except for the fact that, according to the order, the 
Bureau was supposed to be subordinated to the Supreme 
Military Soviet and not the People's Commissariat of 
r-lilitary Affairs. One likely explanation is that events 
overtook the order, ie, that the order was published 
before any final decision had been made on the 
organisation or function of VBVK, or its relationship 
to the other military organs, operating in the Sovie~ 
Republic. After all, it should be remembered that VBVK 
was created just two days after the publication of the 
order, so there would appear to be a strong case for 
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arguing that the two events were obviously linked. 
As detailed in the order, the single nost important 
fun c t ion o f the c o mm i s sa r s , serving in t 11 e u n i t s o f the 
Red Army, at this time, was ensurin~; that the necessary 
commands of the commanders were carried out to the best of 
everyone's ability-and that the commanders themselves were 
loyal to the regime. In both of these duties, 
pronouncements from VBVK were not required; indeed, even 
if they were, VBVK would not appeared to have issued any 
such statements. In the early days of the operation of 
VBVK, it would appear t~at the latter did not enjoy a 
particularly strong relationship with the commissars at 
the front. In fact, if one examines the earliest known 
statement on the organisational structure of VBVX 
(published in May 1918-see previous section), then there 
is no specific department, designed to handle the affairs 
of the commissars at the front, as a specific group. Of 
course, the situation was not helped much by the 
relatively small number of personnel at VDVK's disposal 
( on 1 y 3 0 i n ! 1a y 1 91 8 ) , and i t w o u 1 d :1 a v e ~ e en 
difficult for VBVK to devote any ~articularly real time, 
or effort, instructing and/or coordinating the work of the 
commissars at the front. 
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(iii) VBVX and the work of the First All-Russian Congress 
o f ri i 1 i t a r y C o m m i ss a r s ( June 1 918 ) 
Hence , the firs t r ·~a 1 si 3 n of act i vi t y , on VB V K ' s p a c t 
that is, between the commissars and VDVK took place a few 
months after the formal creation of VBVK, in June 1918 to 
be exact, when VBVK announced the convening of the First 
All-Russ ian Congress of r·1i 1 i tary Co::1missars, to be held in 
Moscow. 8 As will be shown below, this was an important 
con~ress, representing the first real attempt by VBVK to 
impose a degree of coordinated activity on the total work 
of the commissars, on a nationwide scale. Needless t0 
say, the whole work of the con3ress has been virtually 
ignored by Soviet historians and, other than a few 
re f e re n c e s t o i t he re and the re , \¥ha t f o 11 o '\¥ s ne x t has had 
t o be g 1 ea me d vi r t ua 11 y en t i re 1 y fro m ne~¥ spa p e r a cc o u n t s 
of the period, with all the attendant advantages and 
disadvantages. In an announcement which appeared in the 
ne\vspa;Je r, "I zves t iya Save tov ra:,ochikh i kre :3 tyans ki kh 
deputatov gor. Hoskvy i ~Ioskovskoi oblasti", the basic 
aims of the congress were sat out: 
with the aim of coordinating the activities of the 
military commissars and the elucidation of the state of 
affairs in the localities~ on 6th June in Hoscow \¥ill be 
9 convened the All-Russian Congress of Hili tary Co.nnissars. 
The announcement then went on to state who would attend 
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the congress and the conditions that the commissars would 
have to face, as well as a number of other points to do 
with the work of the congress: 
at the congress will attend okrug, guberniya, uezd and 
u n i t c o 1:1 m i s sa r s • In those p 1 a cc s ,., !1. e re the r c a re t Ho 
commissars operatin~, only one need attend the con;1ress. 
To all who will attend the congress, it is suggested that 
they bring with them a supply of food for the entire 
length of the congress, so as not to overburden Moscow. 
Accordinci to available evidence, at the request of the 
Bureau have replied commissars from many parts of 1ussia; 
only comnissars from Vladivostok are still due to respond. 
At the present moment, work is going at a feverish pace in 
preparation for the con 3 res s , w hi c i1 ~., i 11 no t have a 
p~~lit-f8al character about it, but he purely business-
ll.<e. 
The latter statement is, arguably, the most interestin3 in 
the uhole announcement, as it probably t:vas an attempt to 
hide the growing difficulties that were being experienced 
in the political and governmental alliance between the 
Bolsheviks and the Left SRs, at this time. As will be 
described below, both political parties had the greatest 
number of delegates at the congress and, had their been an 
open split between the two parties at the congress, this 
would possibly have seriously impaired the work of the 
congress, if not ruined it altogether. :1~1a t VBVK seems to 
have been hinting at in the latter statement, in 
particular, is the wish that the congress was not to ~e a 
political forum, with the two main political parties 
present scoring political points off one another, but more 
an open, serious discussion of views and ideas on the work 
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o f the c o ::1 miss a r s , b o t h serving a t the front and in the 
rear. 
As shown in the last section, VBVK was not an avowedly 
Party organ, t~at is, it was not subordinated, unlike its 
successor, PUR, to the Party's Central Comi:tittce or any 
other high-ranking political organ of the state. 
Initi~lly, it was subordinated io the People's 
Commissariat of Military Affairs, and then RVSR, both 
predominantly military organs. Therefore, at this time, 
and later, VBVK would appear to have been ~ore keen in 
achieving practical results in the ~ork of the military 
commissars than, for instance, ensuring their total 
ideological rurity to the Bolshevik Party. VBVK \vanted 
the congress to be a proper forum, where each of the 
delegates could comment on their experiences and su3gest 
areas for improvement, rather t~an allowing the congress 
to deteriorate into "Bolshevik-bashing" or "Left SI~-
:,ashing". \·lhether or not VBVK succeeded in its ,.,ish will 
be sho\vn belo~v. 
In a report, published in "Izvestiya Sovetov 
r a b o c hi ~< h • • • 11 , on t he f i r s t day ' s ~., o r k o f t he c on g re s s , i t 
stated t:1at 11 275 okrug, 3uberniya, etc., 
11 d d h . . 11 commissars atten e tie open1ng sess1on. 
The Party-affiliation of these delegates, rounded up to 
the nearest ten, was given as 100 Communists, 30 Left SRs 
and t he res t we re e i the r non-Par t y tn em be r s , o r t he i r 
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P o 1 i t i c a 1 s t a t us r11 as no t known • 1 2 How eve r , research by 
one Soviet histor-ian of the Red Army's political apparatus 
during the Civil War allows us a more comprehensive 
picture as regards the total number of delegates anct their 
political allegiance. According to Yu.P.Petcov, there 
were 359 delegates, of whom 271 were members of the 
Bolshevik Party, 55 were Left SRs, 8 represented various 
other political parties and the remaining 25 either 
represented no political party or their political 
affiliation was unclear. 13 Thus, according to these 
figures, the 3olsheviks had the overwhelming majority of 
delegates,(more than 75%) ~ut, even so, this still left a 
sizable minority of delegates who did not owe their 
political allegiance to the Bolshevik Party. Within this 
particular faction, over 62% of the delegates belonged to 
the Left SRs. If these figures were indicative of the 
state of affairs at the front and in the rear, as regards 
the political composition of the military commissars on 
the whole, then VBVK's desire that the congress remain 
non-political was well-grounded. Unfortunately, without 
access to the proper archival sources, it is presently 
impossible to even speculate on the political composition 
of all the military commissars in the Republic at this 
time. 
According to another newspaper report of the opening 
day of the congress, the latter was chaired by Yurenev, 
/'[oli'§ 
~







who announced the composition of the congress' praesidiurn, 
reflecting the political composition of the majority of 
the dele3ates at the congress, being divided into 
B o 1 s !1 e v i ~< and Le f t S R fa c t i on s • 1 4 "Re p re s e n t i n g t !1 e 
Bolsheviks on the praesidium Here Dzcvaltovsky, Yurenev 
himself, Pyzhov, Muralov and Yaroslavsky.lS The faction 
then decided to elect the following as secretaries to the 
praesidium-Pavlov, Arioldov and Bayl.cov.l6 :.'or their part, 
t he Le f t S R s appoint e d to the p r a e si d i urn t ~., o me m be r s-
Yegorov and Poplavsky-and one secretary-Zhitev. 17 As 
regards biographical information on the main r.1e1:1ber-s of 
the praesidium, then the situation on the 9ols~evik 
membership is not too bad, but a different picture emer-ges 
when trying to find details on the Left SR membership. 
The possible sole exception arises with the identity of 
the Yegorov listed as belonging to the Left SR faction of 
the praesidium. One ver-y prominent member- of the Left SR 
Party, at this time, was a former colonel in the Tsarist 
Army, A.I.Yegorov, and it could well be that the Yegorov 
listed as bein3 a rae1aber of the congr-ess' praesidium ~:.;as 
the self-same colonel. 
If this was the case, then it would repr-esent an 
interesting parallel with one of the Bolshevik me~bers of 
the praesidium-Dzevaltovsky, himself a former staff 
. f d. . t . h ld T- . t 18 capta1n o a g.rena 1er reg1men 1n tie o ~ar1s ar~y. 
This would seem to indicate that both the Bolsheviks and 
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the Left SRs felt it necessary to include the views and 
experience of the military specialists directly on the 
conQ.~...~ess' praes;d;um. T' d d ~ ~ ~ nus, even at a congress evote to 
analysing the work and experience of the military 
cor~missars, the vie 1.vS of the military specialists ~vere not 
to be ignored or left out, thereby displaying a certain 
degree of reciprocity in the relationship between the two. 
The congress began its opening session with a fairly 
lengthy speech by Trotsky. Trotsky began his speech by 
stressing the importance of the congress: 
Comrades! He are attending a congress here of exceptional 
importance, the Parties, represented at this con3ress, 
have a great revoluti~nary past. At this present moment 
in time, we are learning and we must learn how to build 
our own revolutionary socialist ar~y ••• a task •.. or~anised 
on the basil9of comradely trust anrl ••. revolutionary 
discipline. · 
In stating that the political parties at the congress 
had a " g re a t rev o 1 ut ion a r y ~as t " and t ha t t he army :1 ad to 
be built on the principle of "comradely tr-ust", Trotsky 
was, in actual fact, re-emphasising the non-par-tisan 
nature of the conJress, that it was to be an open forum 
foe the discussion of various ideas and views on the work 
of the commissars in the Red Army. His first direct 
comment on the work of the commissars may, on first sight, 
seem odd: 
one of the most important tasks which has fallen to the 
lot of the military commissar is, by means of ideological 
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u p:opag~nda, {;() · the labouring masses (" t rudovye ma~ay") 
w1to tne need for revolutionary order and discipline.-
In itself, this could easily h<1ve been a .reference to the 
work of t~e military commissars working either at the 
front or in the rear. After all, both sats of comnissars 
would ~ave to be involved in such propaganda work, 
convincing those both in the ~ed Army and those joinin3 
the Red Ar!ny to do their socialist, revolutionary duty. 
F o 11 o ~-~ i n g on fro m t his s t a t em en t , T r o t s k y t hen 1 o o le~ d jack 
somewhat at a slightly earlier period in the history of 
the Red Army and discussed the disorder that had existed 
in the Red Ar~y before the creation of the local 
c o mini ss a r i a 1 s y s t em in t he So vie t Rep u b 1 i c i n A p r i 1 1 9 1 8 : 
everyone ~nows t~at before[April 1918-SM] in the 
localitias, chaos reigned which, in its tucn, created 
terrible disorder for us at the centre. :.Je know t:1at many 
of our military commissars often expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the central authority, in ~articular 
the Military Commissariat .•. Very often, we received ... 
telegrams demandi~f money, but no estimates were attached 
to the telegrams. 
Chaos and disorder would appear to hnve reigned in the 
system before the creation of the military comnissariats, 
' . ,rhich \.,rere introduced not only to help raise the necessary 
manpower, in order to organise an effective defence 
against the forces of internal counter-revolution and 
foreign intervention, but also, it would seem from 
Trotsky's speech, to help introduce a vital degree of 
organisational stability and discipline in the military 
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apparatus, as a whole. In attempting to introduce a 
measure of control over the work of the military 
commissars, V13VK \vould also seem to ;13V2 had a role to 
play in the disciplininz of the military apparatus itself. 
Ho'" e v e r , i t s h o u 1 d no t !) e f o r go t t e n t ;, a t t h e l a t t e r c o u 1 d 
only have been DUt into proper effect, when VHVK harl. 
managed to i n t rod u c e a de g re e o f con t r o 1 o v e r the \v or k o f 
the commissars, both those working at the front and those 
working in the local com~issariats. 
In another comment on the work of the military 
c o 1 i1 m i s sa r s a t the fro n t , T r o t s k y made t he f o 11 o ~·7 in 8 .s in el e 
reference, in his entire speech, to something approaching 
t he t e r m , 11 c u 1 tu r a 1-e d u c a t ion a 1 11 ~.,or k • I t i s a 1 m os t a 
casual reference to the latter, in actual fact: 
on the responsibility of the con~issar is the unremitting 
work ••• of rai~~ng the level of consciousness in the midst 
o f the Ar !·n y • 
There is no mention of the role of VEV:(, as ret:sards the 
work of the commissars, no mention either of the role of 
VBVK in helpinJ the commissars to raise the level of 
consciousness in the aed Army. Instead, Trotsky spent a 
large part of his speech discussing the really key issue 
of the day-the relationship of the military conmissac to 
the military specialist in the Red Army. Reminiscent of 
the earlier order of 6th April 1918, Trotsky ~ad this to 
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say about the general position of the cornmissar in the !{ed 
Army: 
the commissar is the direct represen:ative of Soviet power 
in the ar~y, the defender of the interests of th~ working-
class. If he does not interfere in military operations, 
this is only because he is standing over every military 
s p e c i a 1 is t , ~-~a t chin g the i r a c t i vi t i e s , con t r o 11 in;-:; each o f 
their steps. The commissar is a political figure, a 
revolutionary. The military specialist answers with his 
head for every move of his, for the outcome of military 
operations. If the commissar sees the threat of danger to 
the revolution from the military specialist, then the 
commissar has the right to mercilessly deal with the 
counter-revolutionary, including execution. 2J 
As stated above, Trotsky's speech contained a number 
o f c o rnme n t s t ha t re f 1 e c t e d Yv ha t :1 ad been p rev i o us 1 y i s sued 
in the order of 6th April 1918. Again, the e~phasis was 
not emphasising the predominantly 9olshevik-nature of the 
majority of the comnissars. Trotsky was obviously aware 
t~at a significant minority of the delegates were not 
Bolshevik Party members and that, similar to the situation 
both at the front and in the rear, the 9olsheviks would 
have to rely on commissarial work being carried out by 
non-3olshevik Party members for some time to come. No 
harm could be ~vrought if Trots~y, or anyone :.=lse for that 
matter, .dubbed the commissars as being representatives of 
Soviet power in the aed Army-at the time, saying that did 
not imply that the commissars were automatically working 
in the best interests of the Bolshevik Party; Soviet power 
was still not the sole preserve of the Bolshevik Party. 
After Trotsky's speech, the con6ress then proceeded to 
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vote on a number of honorary chairmen-namely, Lenin, 
Adler, Liebknecht, Trotsky and Spiridonova.24 Yurenev 
then announced the agenda for the rest of the work of the 
congress: 
reports from the localities, the duties ann 
responsibilities of the military col:-tmissars and the 
comrilittees of the R.ed Army units, cultural-educational 
k . , d "5 wor 1n tne ae Army.~ 
Thus, despite Trotsky's virtual ignorance of the topic in 
his speech, the congress did decide to discuss the 
position of cultural-educational work in the ~ed Army but, 
given the overall importance of the duties of the military 
commissars, it was the latter topic that was to dominate 
the rest of the debate at the congress. Following 
Yu re ne v ' s announce men t and H u r a 1 o v ' s s p e e c h ( ~ 1 u r a 1 o v ~.,a .s 
f . . '>6) then Chief o the Moscow Military District at th1s t1me~ 
according to the relevant newspaper report of the period, 
the rest of the first day of the congress was spent 
listenin~ to a number of reports from the provinces: 
from all the reports, it is obvious that, in the 
provinces, a strong lack of experienced workers is felt 
and that it is necessary to adopt swift measures for the 
planned organisation of the revolutionary army 89 the 
~asis of comradely discipline and mutual trust ..... 
Obviously, it would have been much more useful harl the 
newspaper noted a few of t~e details of the various 
reports read at the congress, on the first day's ~ork. 
How eve r , be f o re 1 ea vi n g the firs t day ' s ~.,or k o f the 
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congress altogether, it would be worthwhile to look back 
at the final statement again, in order to arrive at a 
understanding of what was meant by the latter. ~as the 
phrase, "the planned organisation of the revolutionary 
ar!ny on the basis of comradely discipline and mutual 
trust" code for something? Given the political nature of 
the delegates and the probability t,at a significant 
minor i t y o f t he c o mm i ss a r s e 1 sew he re tl e re no t s t a 1 ~.,a r t 
members of the Bolshevik Party, the phrase was probably a 
code, designed to keep everyone ha)py, so to speak. All 
the delegates had to be agreed on the necessity for the 
creation of a unified, disciplined military force, in 
order to defend the newly-created Soviet Republic. 
The second day of the cong~ess (8th June) was devoted 
entirely to reports from representatives of the provincial 
military commissariats. Judgin~ from the newspaper 
reports, it would appear t~at the military co~missars who 
spoke at the congress discussed the problem of the 
organisation of the Red Army and the difficulties that 
were beinJ encountered. 28 The newspa~er extracts 
contained the following interesting statements on the 
latter: 
a number of the speakers expressed the desire of 
broadening the rights of the military comwissars. ~rany 
representatives of the provincial military commissariats 
ad he red to this view, arguing t :1a t the moment ~ad come 
,.,; hen i t "!as 1 ~me t o break a~., ay fro m the p r in c i p 1 e o f 
voluntar1.sm. 
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The latter principle referred to in the extract-
"voluntarism"-,vas th~t period in Red Army history ·.vl1en the 
peasants and workers of the ~epublic were not compelled to 
join the Red Army, but volunteered to carry out their 
military service. It could well ~ave been the case t~at 
the commissars were indirectly condemnin3 the indiscipline 
and ~artizanshchina that was prevalent ina number of the 
military units. In another newspa~er report of the second 
day's work of the congress, this argument was further 
clarified: 
representatives of the front-line military districts, in ~ 
number of reports, noted the extreme difficulty of or3ani-
sational work in conditions when daily new yeits ~ere 
be i n g s e n t f o r . i r:1 i;l e d i a t e m i 1 i t a r y a c t i v i t y • ,_ 
It was also stated, at the congress, that the Urals okru3 
military cor:1missariat ~ad passed a resolution on the 
"uselessness of cofl'lmittees in the socialist army." 30 
Unfortunately, the statement itself does not ma~e clear 
exactly \v(}at committees the military commissariat had in 
mind-the most likely candidate were the soldiers' 
conmitt2es oper~ting in various units of the Red Ar:.1y, at 
the time. As will be discussed below, the soldiers' 
committees were not viewed in a particularly favourable 
light, by a number of the local and centralised political 
organs of t~e time. 
A number of the speakers at the congress also talked 
about the need for the "creation of a cadre of instructors 
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from the very mass of the people"Jl in order to cut do~·7n 
on the confusion betw~en the military specialists and the 
ordinary ran~ and file soldier. As the relevant section 
of the newspaper report stated: 
the specialists, who come to serve in the Red Ar~y, 
understand poorly the spirit and tasks of the socialist 
army. In sending out such specialists, confusion does 
.sometime arise, such as happened in Tsaritsyn uezd, ~v!1ere 
individual instructors began their courses by teaching t~e 
soldiers to 3~ng ••• 'Our Fatherland' [the old Tsarist 
an t he m- S 1·1] " • 
Oddly ·=nou3h, the commissars themselves did not see1n 
to ~ave grasped the fact that they, to all intents and 
pur p o s e s , ~v ~ re t o a c t a s t he i n t e r: 11 e d i ::1 r i e s , t he b r id.:-; e , 
so to speak, between th2 soldiers and the military 
specialists. One other point, as regards the above 
statement, whilst there was an o~vious need for 
instructors to train and discipline the men, it would have 
been difficult to obtain sufficient enough numbers of such 
instructors from the working and peasant classes. It was 
also on this day, that the decision was taken to split the 
work of the congress into a ~umber of sections, eg, 
cultural-educational, working out the necessary 
instructions on the rights of the military comnissars, the 
, h . 1. . 1 . t 32 relationship witn t e m1 1tary spec1a 1sts, e c. 
The third day of the congress(lOth June)was very much 
si m i 1 a r to the previous day ' s ~v or k o f the con g re s s-m o re 
reports from the provinces, in other words. Financial, 
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transport and supply proble8s were discussed, as well as a 
decision ~·las t a ~<en to under t a ~e "a much more careful 
selection of instructor-rnilitary leaders."JJ 
Unfortunately, the relevant news~aper report did not 
detail any of the problems or the content of 
the speeches, in which the problems were raised. 
It \vas pro~ably on this day that a sma 11 mei:J~ership 
change in the composition of the congress' praesidium took 
place, as well. In the composition of the Left SR 
faction, Poplavsky wasreplaced by one of the le3ders of 
t ~ e Le f t S R s in ~I o s c o ~-~ , Yu . V • Sa b l in , a f u t u r e ~< e y f i ~~ u r e 
o f t. he Le f t S ~1 J ul y up r i s i n g in ~·1 o s c o ~·l ! 3 4 No r 2 a s o n i s 
given as to why such a personnel change took place. After 
Yu re ne v :1 ad in for :ne d. the con g re s s o f the c ha n (~ e i n 
personnel, he then addressed the congress himself. 
Unfortunately, his speech to the congress is only 
available ina ~araphrased form but, even so, is worth 
examining. In his speech, Yurenev talked about the 
organisation of VBVK: 
in conclusion, comrade Yurenev talked about the 
organisation of the All-2-ussian 3ureau of nilitary 
Commissars. The Bureau has the task of uniting, scattered 
all over t~e provinces, volost, uezd, guberniya and okru~ 
commissars into one harmonious whole for the joint 
l·=adership of th2 Red Ar;~y ••• comrade Yurenev called on all 
commissars to harmonious, joint work for the erection of a 
~o~.;erful, socialist Red Ar!ny ..• devoting to it all their 
stren3th, and with stern decisiveness ••• mercilessly 
crushin::; all encroachments on the r35olution and its 
gains, wherever they may come from. 
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Yu re ne v ' s use o f the ~.,or d " j o i n t " re f e r s t o ~.,ha t he 
probably envisaged as the union between VBVX and the 
mi 1 i tary COinmi s sa r s in building the Red Ar!ny and ensuring 
that it remained loyal to the Soviet regime. Again, since 
the congress was apolitical, Yurenev's statement on 
uniting the commissars into "one harmonious ~vhole" \·7as 
i n t ended t o em ph as i se t ha t a 11 the c o 11 n i s :3 a r s- re g a r d 1 e ss 
of their political persuasion-had an important role to 
p 1 ay i n the cons t ru c t ion an 1 ea de r s hi p o f t he ~( e d A r :n y • 
In other words, Yurenev's speech, like Trots~y's and 
~1uralov's before it, was a conciliatory one, especially in 
p o 1 i t i c a 1 t e r rn s • The 1 a c ~ o f any rile n t ion o f c u 1 tu r a 1-
educational or political tasks of the military co1:1r.1is.3ars 
was probably not accidental either; the Bolsheviks ~ere 
probably still more inclined to the view t~at it would be 
safer to concentrate on the relationship of the military 
commissar to the military specialist, t'1an analyse th:.= 
tasks of the military commissars in other, more sensitiv~, 
areas. 
It has not been possible to track down any record of 
the work of the fourth day of the congress(lOth Jun2)or 
its activity; the last day of the congress was the 11th 
June when, amongst other things, the congress heard the 
reports from the earlier created sections, including what 
~ad been worked out concerning the rights of the military 
commis sa r s. As one ne~vspa per report stated: 
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a f t e r pro l on 8 e d se c t ion a 1 me e tin g s , during ~.,hi c h we re 
~orked.out _in detail the most important questions, 
lncl~dlng.the plans for the organisation of the military 
comm1~sar1ats,. the plans of order [ "plany iJOryadka"-S>I] 
for t~e.formatlon of the ~ed Aruy and, also. instructions, 
expla1n1ng the duties of the military comnissars •.• and 
also questions of a cultural-educational nature-the 
con~ress .::1et at a ;>lenary sess~9n to hear the reports of 
the sect1ons about their ~ork. 0 
Accordin~ to another newspaper report, "all projects, 
wor~ed out by the section[on the rights and duties of the 
1nilitary commissars-SM] ••• were approved by the plenum 
\vi thou t de b a t e • " 3 7 Before d is cuss in g the se d r a f t 
proposals, on the rights and duties of the military 
commissars in detail, a number of other points have to be 
made concerning the last day of t~e congress itself. The 
actual organisational allegiance, so to speak, of VBV~ ~as 
debated on the last day of the congress. According to one 
newspaper report, there were two proposals up for debate: 
as the Bureau ~.,as e 1 e c t e d by the congress ; i t s h o u 1 d 
become, so to speak, its standin3 organ. The other 
suggestion was to retain .•• the existing or3anisational 
order of the All-Russian Bureau in the centre, in the 
People's Commissariat of Military Affairs; in such a way, 
the Eu~eau is one of the departments of the Commissariat. 
After the speeches of two delegates, one in favour of the 
first proposal, and the other in favour of the secon~, the 
latter pro§gsal was adopted by the majority of the 
delegates. 
This extract could well have been an example of the sign 
of an or ("Tani sat ional dilemma, be t\veen the need for 
Q 
centralisation and popular control, with the need for 
centralisation being the victor. Unfortunately, it is im-
p os s i b 1 e t o say , a t p re se n t , ,., he the r I3 o 1 she vi k and Le f t SR. 
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delegates split on the issue, with Bolsheviks baing more 
inclined to accept the need for centralisation thnn, 
Perhaps, the Left SR. dole~atas - '- 6 ..... • However, it is also not 
inconceivable that a number of the Left SR deleR~t2s found 
themselves supportin3 the measure that VBVK should remain 
a part of the centralised military apparatus, rather than 
being a creature of a congress. llithout access to the 
relevant archival information, it is simply impossible to 
say how the congress delegates split on the issue. 
There was also a report from the cultural-educational 
section, but w~at was actually in the report is still a 
mystery. All that can be found on the repot"t is the 
following terse statement: 
the basic regulations worked out by the section, on · 
political and socialist education for the soldiers ••• were 
a~?pted wi§~out debate and will form the basis of work in 
tnJ.s at"ea. 
The con3ress ended with Yurenev ma~ing the closin3 speech, 
"to thunderous applause" and all the delegates stood up to 
sing "The International" 40 • And yet Hithin one month of 
this rousing chocus of "The Inte=national" and an api:)arent 
s~ow of unity amon3st the delegates on many of the 8ajor 
points at the congress, the Left SRs staged their uprising 
in i.fosco~vr, assassinating the German ambassador there, 
Ilir~ach, and almost caused the young Soviet Republic to be 
even more heavily embroiled in the struggle for its 
survival. Following the July uprising, the position of 
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the Left Sll CO~lmissars in the Red Artily ~vrould appear to 
have b e e n a n a r11 k \1 a r d o 11 e , on t '1 e fa c e o f 1.· t 
l ' 
but, in a 
rare re f e re n c e to the 1 a t t er , one So vie t his tor i an '1 as 
pointed out their position would appear to have been rela-
tively strai2htforward: 
the majority of the Left SR com1aissars continued to ~-1ork 
with the Solsheviks even after the July Left SR uprising 
and a large part of them, within seveEil weeks of the 
u p r i s i n g , f i n a 11 y b r o ~< e ~·7 i t h the S R s • 
~ l i t h the a ~parent em p :1 as i s o f the con :s re s s t o 1 i s t en 
to the reports ~ade by the commissars, operatii1g either in 
the local military comnissariats or at the front itself, 
then the congress can be judged to ~ave been a success, at 
least in terms of the fact that the con3ress did achieve a 
practical forum for the debate of the actual work of the 
commissars. The con~ress did not la~se, as far as can be 
told, into a forum for each of the political ~arties 
present to attempt to score political points off one 
another. Given the political co~plexity of the congress 
delegates and, more importantly, what was to ha~pen in the 
next month or so, this was, by no means, a insiJnificant 
achieve c1 en t . The fa c t t ha t the de 1 e g a t e s ~., o u 1 d appear t o 
~1 a v e sa t do ~-1n and de b a t e d the ~.,or k o f the c o mm i s sa r s i n a 
relatively calm and orderly fashion is all credit to the 
pre~aratory work of VBVK and its top leadership. 
There can be little doubt, as previously noted, that 
in the speec~es of the main Bolshevik spokesmen-Trotsky, 
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Y u re ne v , i·1 u r a 1 o v , e t c-no t hi n g ~.,as said t ~1 a t c o u 1 d ups e t 
the political sensitivities of the non-Bolshevik Party 
dele3at2s. Conciliation would appear to ~ave baen the 
order of the day, none of the main ·Speakers-includinJ the 
firebrand, Trotsky-ap~arently risked saying anything too 
controversial, in case it hampered the work of the 
congress, with potentially disastrous effects for the 
continuing process of the creation of the ~ed Army. 
Certainly, the Bolshevik delegates qould appear to ~ave 
been wary of the large minority of non-Bols~evik Party 
delegates; no one seens to have been pre;Jared to take the 
risk of isolatin~ the support of the other delegates in 
the disc~ssion of the work or the functions of the 
m i 1 i t ~ r y c o 1:1 1~1 i s s a r s • 
The most important work of the con3ress, other than 
the achievement of a proper forum for the de~ate of t~e 
~.; o r k o f t he m i 1 i t a r y c o m m i s s a r s , ,., a s t he d r a f t i n :5 and t he n 
publication of a set of "instructions on the military 
commissariats and the 
/, ') 
commissars."..,. ... Compared to all 
other previous statements on the r-ights and duties of the 
military commissars, these instructions were much more 
detailed, although, on saying that, it should also be said 
t~at, like all other previous statements on the work of 
the military commissars, there was also a certain degree 
f b t ~ r of t 1L1~- areas of o va3ueness a ou a num,Je  the ~o1ork of 
the commissars. In effect, this meailt that the inst-
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ructions could be used for the e~ploy of all and every 
military commissar in the aed Army, irrespective of the 
latter's political persuasion, so lon3 a~ he reco3nised 
Soviet power. This was a useful tool in ensurin3 that all 
the military commissars worked to strengthen and 
consolidate the military units in the 2.2d Army. The 
ins t r u c t ions \.;re re made up o f five se c t ions : " a gene r a 1 
t " "t' . h d d par ; ne r1.g. ts an uties of the military comr:-tissars"; 
"the .inter-relationship of the military-administrative 
commissariats and the military soviets"; "statutes on the 
formation, administration and command of ths superior 
military units" and, finally, "statutes on the oilitary 
commissars. uL+J 
In order to cut down on extraneous detail, only those 
sections of the instructions most relevant to the general 
body of the dissertation will be anAlysed and discussed 
be 1 o ~., • The " genera 1 p a r t " o f the ins t r u c t ions con t a i n s a 
numb e r o f p o in t s , con c e r n i n 3 t he n a tu re o f t he 1:1 i l i tar y 
commissars, his relationship to the military specialist, 
I I 
,is responsibility to VBVl~, etc.·-t"+ ~Ieedless to say, the 
general part included a number of previously published 
statements on the general nature of the role of the 
;ni li tary commissar: 
l.The military comnissar is the direct political organ of 
Soviet power, attached to the Army, and is a defender of 
the gains of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. 
2.0n the conmissar is placed all the burden for the 
creation of the Red Army. Therefore, the military 
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commissar must be an irreproachable revolutionary 
man of exceptional capabilities. 
3.The military co~missar is an inviolable person. 
or worse, force used against a military commissar 
fu~fillin3.his mil~tary duty/will he equal to the 





These first points are al~ost, word for word, a carbon 
copy of previous orders and statements on the ~eneral 
..._) 
position of the commissar in the ~ed Army. Again, the 
emphasis is on stating that the commissar is, first and 
foremost, a representative of Soviet power and that, in 
the fulfilment of his duty, his person is inviolable. The 
com1:1issars are to be a;:>pointed from the number of 
i r re p .r o a c, ab 1 e rev o 1 ut ion a r i e s , c a ~ab 1 ~ men , ~., h o 1:1 us t 
carry the heavy burden of playin2 a ~9Y role in the 
creation of the 1ed Army. All of these statements, in one 
form or another, we have met \vith earlier in our previous 
discussion of the role of the military co1·1missars. 
The next important series of points in this particular 
section immediately follows the points just quo~ed: 
4.the main task of every military commissar is th.'lt he put 
h i s m i 1 i tar y e s tab 1 ish oe n t i n t :1 a t p 1 ace , p re d. e t 2 r ::1 in e d by 
the 3eneral plans of the state. 
S.The military commissar answers for t~e trustworthiness 
of the worl< of the military leaders and the whole comnand 
staff. 
6.The r.1ilitary commissar must skilfully use the military 
specialist for the purposes of the Soviet republic. ~or 
this, closely watching their work, he must not prevent 
them from carrying out their duty within the limits of 
their assigned powers. 
7 • C o mm i s s a r s an ( 1 a 1 l m i 1 i t a r y 1 ea de r s . • • mu s t m a i n t a i n i n 
the Red Army units and in the military institutions 
established order and strict revolutionary discipline, 
carrying out in practise the progranmes of the People's 
Commissariat of t·ri li tary Affairs and the decrees and 
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to filaintain the necessary stability an<i discio1l·ne 1·n t' ~ . ~-
Red Army units and in the military a?~aratus of the 
Republic, as a whole. 
(iv) The changing military situation and the role of the 
~n i. 1 i t a r y c on m i s s a r s ( June - Se p t em be r 1 9 1 3 ) 
However, due to the changing military situation, the 
role anct functions of the iililitary commissars ~.;ere to h~~ 
brought into still sharper focus. Th2 armed resistnnce of 
the Czech legion in Siberia was, as far as the Bolsheviks 
were concerned, the forces of internal counter-revolution 
raising their ugly head and the Bolsheviks reacted 
accordingly. In order to combat this threat, the Council 
of People's Comnissnrs created the Revolutionary Uilitary 
So vie t [ ab b r ·2 vi a t e d to s imp 1 y , lU 1 S-S r l ] o f t 11 e Z as t e r n 
Front on 13th June 1918. 4 9 ~-lith the creation of 
this ~articular organ, all the relevant political and 
~ilitary organs were supposed to be combined in an 
e f f e c t i v e "·73. y t o c o m b a t t he m i 1 i t a r y t h re a t , p o s e d o y t he 
Czech le3ion. At the time, the Eastern front comprised 
the ~orth-Urals-Siberian Front, the Urals Front, military 
units operating in the areas of Simbirsk-Surzan-Samara-
Penza -1 d !1" • 50 ant aroun c\.azan. The latter detail is by no 
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means irrel2vant; after all, it should be noted that t~e 
J( e d An :1 y ' s f i r s t-eve r p o 1 i t i c a 1 de par t 1:1e n t ~.;as c re a t e d 
and subordinated to the staff ~IQ of t:1e ~·rorth-Urals-
Siberian ~rant on 20th June 1913, just a few weeks after 
t he c r ·-=a t ion o f t t12 IU iS o f the Ea s t e r n F r o n t • 5 1 As ,., i 11 
be s~own in the relevant section of this chapter, t~e Red 
AriJY' s political departfilents \vould !_)lay a si:~nificant role 
in the development of the ~ed Army's political apparatus-
however, t~at is for description and analysis later on in 
this chapter. 
no t 1 on::; a f t er the c re a t ion of the ~~·1 S of t he ~a .s t e L:" n 
Front, the latter issued a series of instructions to the 
1:1 i 1 i t a r y c o m m i s s a r s , en :: i t 1 e d " t he s t r u g g 1 e ~., i t h t he 
uprising of the Czech corps" on 27th June 1918.5 2 
Representing, as they do, the first field instructions 
issued to the r.1ilitary comwissars by a lU!S r1nd \lithin a 
comparatively short time of the publication of the 
congress' instructions on t~e duties of the military 
comli1issars, these instructions, although hrief, are 
i n t e L:" e s t i ~ 1 ~ a n d ':.; o r t l1 y o f ex a m i ~a t i on • 
CoQpared to the instructions issued by the con2ress, 
t he se i n s t ru c t ions o f the Rli S o f the Ea s t e .r n Fro n t ~.; e re 
tauch rilOrc simple and direct: 
2 • The t as k o f t he o o 1 i t i c a 1 commissa r s [ no t e t he use o f t :1 e 
term, "political corilmissar"-S~·I]and agitators is to ensure, 
by !:1ea::1s of agitational, organisational and repressive 
me as u re s , s t r i c t f u 1 f i 1 men t o f the orders o f the I·i i 1 i tar y-
revolutionary soviet. 
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3 • t o t :1 e corn iJ i s sa r s i s gran t e d the r i ,3 h t o f sun m a r y 
punishment [of counter-revolutionaries-St1]and solvinry 
<::> 
problems in t~e areas of their work. 
I n t he m i 1 i t a r y a n d p o 1 i t i c a 1 s p :1 e re s , t h e m i 1 i t a r y-
p o 1 i t i c a 1 c on n i s s a r s :1 :1 v e no r e s t r i c t i o us • 
4 • The c o 1;1 m i s sa r s r:1 us t c :1 os e fro m the u n i t s , fro o r ~ 1 i ab 1 e 
Party Red Ar~y soldiers, shock grou~s, qho will ensure 
the i r [ t he :n i 1 i t a r y c o mm i s sa r s - S ~·1] p e r son a 1 sa f e t y and the 
force for t~e fulfilment of these and other measures. 
5 • The c o m 1:1 i .s sa r s mu s t p 1 ay a v e ~ 3 vi t a 1 and d i re c t par t in 
the organisation of the staffs. 
S i m i 1 a r t o t he i n s t r u c t i on s i s s u e d i) y t he c o n :~ r e s s , 
this set of instructions emp~asises the military nature of 
the duties of the military commissars, even their power of 
sunmar y execution, ~vhen and 1vhe re necessary. Again, the re 
is no 1:1 en t ion o f any for m o f p o 1 i t i c a 1 o r c u 1 t u r a 1-
educational work to be carried out by the military 
com:Jissars in the perfocnance of their duties. it is 
interestin3 that ·for the personal safety of the connissars 
themselves, they are to rely on Party ~embers-were 
3ol3h·2vik Party soldiers safeguarding Left SR conrnissars? 
Round about the same time, an interestin3 article appeared 
in one of the central military newspapers of the period, 
in which the author analysed the experience of the 
soldiers' co~::1i t tees in t~1e '1ed Arny and found the;n 
~.;antin::;.54 Although the article ~vas primarily about the 
uselessness of the soldiers' committees the author 
(A.Poltavts2v) discussed the role of the military 
c o m m i ss a r s in the Red Ar r:1 y a r1 d made the f o 11 o ~.,in g 
interesting statements: 
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the p o 1 i t i c a 1 d i re c t ion o f the Ar !n y \·7 i 11 b ~ g i v en by p a r t y 
commissars .•• in their \-7ork, the PARTY[emphasis as in the 
original article-S~·1]commissars will rely on PAl~TY 
?rganisat~o~s and o~ly those of the Comnunist Party Hhic:1, 
1 t go e s \·ll t no u t sa y 1 n ~ , mu s t be f o r 8 e d i i:1 a 11 ::1 i 1 i t a r y 
units at ~11 levels •.• 
A 11 t he t h r e a d s o f P A~ T 5 
5 
Ho r k :a us t be p 1 a c e d i 11 t he :1 ::1 n d s 
o f t he P a r t y c o rll m i s sa r . 
This article would se2m to be a fairly direct call for 
the increased politicisation of the oilitary com~issars 
and, not only that, but a total reliance on Coo!nunist 
Party military commissars. Given t:1e fact t:1at the Left 
SR uprisin3 had only taken place some two weeks before the 
a r t i c 1 e ~"a s p u b l i s he d , i t i s p e F :1 a p s no t t o o sur p r i s i n ~~ 
that, at lea.st, one comr.1entator should have called for the 
conmissars to be used in t~e future to be of only one 
political persuasion. It is inter:=stin,:s, t:1ous:1, that 
there was such a strident call for the politicisation of 
the military commissars in the Red Army at such a, 
relatively speaking, early stage of the Civil ~ar-an 2arly 
indication of vie'(·7inz the comnissars as being more than 
mere watchdogs of the be~aviour of the military 
specialists and the soldiers themselves. 
0 n the 2 8 t h J u 1 y 1 91 8 , R t·l S o f the Ea s t er 71 Fro n t i s sued 
yet another order on the responsibilities of the 
conr:1issars, this tim2 as bein8 models of "coura.~e and 
~1 e r o is :a" • 5 6 The order s t a t e d the f o 11 o ~"in 3 : 
as political figures, revolutionaries, the military 
c o m1:1 i s sa r s by the i r o \vn person a 1 con d u c t mu s t p re se n t a 
living example of revolut~9nary heroisn, courage and 
steadfastness to the end. 
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In issuing this order, RUS of the Eastern Front must 
have had grounds for complaint, concerning the past 
exar:1ple s o £ the courage o £ the rni 1 i tary cor;)mi s sar s. 
Thin.rss at the front must hav·2 sho~·Tn that a number of the 
cor11missars were peri1aps not as brave as they '1ad to be, in 
order to inspire the men on to greater sacrifice. 
E 1 s er;~ he r e on t he fro n t , t h i n g s \v e r e :1 a p pen i n g , J. s re g a r d s 
the duties of the military comnissars. On 24th July 1918, 
the North-Caucasus Military District published a set of 
instructions on the creation of Party cells and the 
organisation of t~e Party in the military units.58 
Although there is a lot of detail in thes2 instructions, 
which will be discussed later, the instructions did ma~e 
r1ention of a selection procedure for military COiTii:ti~ssars 
within the district. Apparently, the Party cells were to 
select the com::1issars: 
4.Each Party cell selects, from its midst, the best Party 
workers and sends them to the military organ for trainin3 
in the \vork of the military commissars; after such 
training, a conference is to be convened with the 
city[Party-S~I]committee and the confer~§ce s2lects from 
th2se \vorkers the military co:'lmissars. 
Uh e the r t his ~.,as a s tan d a r d form for s e 1 e c t in~ the 
military commissars in all the other military districts is 
difficult to say. Given the lack of standardisation in 
other areas of the work of the military ap?aratus, it 
would be unlikely that there was only one method for the 
selection and training of military commissars. Certainly, 
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as will be described below, VBVX also pl3yed a role in t~e 
trainin::; of a nu1:1ber of military comnissars and that 
should not be i3nored. This ~as probably a selection 
procedure for one ~ilitary district and, without access to 
the relevant archival source, it is impossible to gauge 
h o \l s u c c e s s f u 1 t h i s par t i c u 1 a r 111 e t hod ~.,as • Ho \v e v e r , \V ha t 
it does show is t~at, at least on t~e front, t~ere was a 
steady and gradual process in the ~oliticisation of the 
military corJrnissars;they were gradually being viewed as 
creatures of the Bolshevik Party, despite VBVK 1 s September 
protestation that commissars did not necessarily ~ave to 
be Bolshevik Party members. 
A further important step in the development of t;1e ~ed 
Ar u1 y 1 s p o 1 i t i c a 1 a pp a r a tu s a t t he fro n t r.v as the 
appointment of a "main political coMmissar" to 3rd Army 
(Eastern Front) on 1st September 1918-the man in question 
being the former Urals ~lilitary District 1 s :ni litary 
. . k' I r: 1 , ' k. 60 COI1m.1ssar.1at, .L •• JO osncne . .1n. According to the 
original order: 
the main political commissar of the 3rd Army is ans~verable 
for all ~;lork in the area of 3rd Ar:.1y, including in the 
rear up to Vyatka;to him is subordinate the political 
department of the staff of 3rd Ar~y and, also, all other 
political departments and commissars in the region of 3rd 
Army, o? all_pobftical matters, it is necessary to turn to 
c.Golosnch-=k.1n. 
Thus, jud3ing by this order, the main political 
commissar was in charge of not only political work in 3rd 
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Ar:;1y, but also in the region surrounding 3rd Ar~:1y. All 
political de})artments and cor.l:ilissars ~·7~re subordinrlted to 
his a u t h or i t y and , in the even t o f any p o 1 i tic 8.1 pro b 1 e :1 s , 
t he y ! 1 n d. t o a ,J 9 e a 1 t o h i 1:1 f o r i1 e 1 ~ and ad v i c e • 
also in c:1arse of t:1e appointr:leot of CO!Vlissars to his 
army or, at least, such apk)ointr:tents had to be r:1ade 
t h r o u 3 h hi m ; e i t he r fiJ3 y , he ~vas a f i 3 u re o f fa i r 1 y 
extensive political power. It is unfortunate that nothin3 
is mentioned concerning the authority and power of the 
local civilian Party a)~aratus, in sue~ a case. Did 
Go 1 o s h c he kin :1 a v e rep o r t t o hi s 1 o c a 1 P a r t y II Q o r so v i e t ? 
If so, how often? If a dispu~e arose ~etween these 
or~ans, \vho ~.,ras allo\ved to pr2vail? T~1e ::1ili tary or 
civilian power? One other important point about 
Goloshchekin's a9pointment is the appointoent itself-it 
~vas no t rn ad e b 1 VB V:< , b u t t 1-} e r e 1 e v a n t R ~ IS i t s e 1 f • I n 
general, this followed a distinct ~attern, where Front and 
Army ;{>IS a p l) o i n t e d the i r o ~·7n ? r on t and Army -1 eve 1 
commissars, 'vhereas VBVK appointed the co:'lnissars serving 
"') 
in the r ·=a r or in t:, e r ·=a r r:1 i 1 i tar y d is t r i c t s • 0 4- This 
would ~e an indication that, once again, the power of the 
centre at the front was very weak. VBVK simply did not 
seem to have the necessary resources to be a~le to impose 
its will on the political or3ans, working at the front. 
Further development of the powers of the commissars 
came in anot~er series of instructions issued on t~e 
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Eastern Front-on this occasion by the 2nd Army-"not 
earlier than the 9th September 1918."63 According to the 
footnotes supplied with the instructions, S.I.Gusev is 
credited with drafting this particular set if 
instructions, a figure who was to become very prominent in 
the future development of the Red Army's political 
apparatus. At that time, Gusev was simply a member of the 
RMS of 2nd Army, working in its political department.64 
The instructions concern the responsibilities of the 
regimental commissars and detail the political functions 
of the iegimental commissars. However, as usual, they 
begin with a number of platitudes about the "honoured" 
position of the commissar: 
the regimental political commissar is the.most honoured 
title in the regiment. For all Red Army soldiers, he must 
be an example of revolutionary and military valour, 
discipline, loyalty to military duty, first in battle, 
last to retreat-in a word, the spiritual leader of the 
regiment, the political, military and vital banner of the 
proletarian revolution. In his capacity as leader of the 
regiment, the politig~l commissar must be irreproachable 
in his private life. 
This opening paragraph virtually repeats what had 
previously been thought of as being the general position 
of the military commissar, although in these instructions, 
there does seem to be a greater emphasis on the commissar 
setting an example to the men, both on and off the field, 
so to speak. 
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The next part of the instructions then went on to list 
the·various responsibilities of the regimental commissars: 
!.Supervising the command staff of the regiment ••. the 
commissar must pay particular attention to watching the 
command staff for signs of possible treachery ••• 
3.The regimental political commissar must tirelessly 
develop in the soldiers an understanding of military duty 
and loyalty to Soviet power. The commissar must 
especially firmly fight agg~nst desertion, drunkenness, 
attacks on the population. 
These two points encompass the basic functions of the 
commissar in any unit, arguably. It was still the case 
that the first function of the commissar, as perceived by 
a number of army political departments, was watching over 
the activities of the military specialists. There was 
still a fair amount of distrust between the military 
specialists and the ordinary rank and file ~oldier, after 
all. The commissars, in watching over the activities of 
the military specialists ensured or, at least,gave greater 
confidence to the soldiers who simply did not trust the 
former Tsarist officers. However, the third point listed 
in these instructions was also necessary, as will be 
detailed later. The commissars had to ensure that strict 
observance of the military and civilian law was properly 
carried out and, certainly, a number of the Red Army units 
did carry out a number of illegal activities whilst 
serving in the Red Army. 
The instructions then went on to list the structures 
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that the commissar was supposed to use, in the performance 
of his duties: 
4.In his capacity as political leader of the regiment, the 
commissar must work in the closest contact with the 
collective of Communists in the regiment, not only in 
organising the collective and taking .•. part in its work, 
but also in drawing .the collective to his own commissarial 
work ••• in all his activities in the regiment, the 
commissar must remember that he is the official 
representative of the political department. 
S.Completely unacceptable is for the regimental 
commissar[to conduct-SM]agitation •.• against the command 
personnel and staff of the army. On the contrary, the 
commissar must struggle against such agitation ••. the 
commissar must inculcate in the soldiers faith in the 
vigilance of the army political commissars towards the 
command personnel. 
6.The commissar must send daily to the political 
department a political summary, but more detailed reports 
about his work on the mood of the regiment[must be sent-
SM]no less than once a week ••• in all cases, when the 
commissar is in difficulty on how to d57ide a problem, he 
can refer to the political department. 
This part of the instructions would seem to be a clear 
indication of an element of control creeping over the work 
of the military commissars, emanating from the political 
department itself. As will be detailed further on in this 
chapter, the political departments, on the whole, were to 
play a much greater role in the politicising of the Red 
Army than the military commissars. They were much more 
the organs of the Party in the Red Army than the 
military commissars were. 
Hence, Gusev's instructions virtually making the 
commissars accountable to the political departments was a 
trend which did not occur in all the Red Army units at 
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this time but, as the situation changed and time wore on, 
became a standard in the future development of the Red 
Army's political apparatus. Although the political 
apparatus on the Southern Front developed somewhat later 
than the apparatus on the Eastern Front, it too was not 
slow in seeing the advantages in capitalising on expanding 
the possibilities of the functions of the military 
commissars. 
Following the creation of the Southern Front on 11th 
September 1918, 68 regulations on the formation of the 
political department of the Military soviet(Voronezh 
raion, Southern sector of the 'screens')were published on 
30th September 1918~69 These regulations paint a somewhat 
different picture of the role of the military commissar 
than Gusev's instructions for the Eastern Front. 
According to the instructions published on the Southern 
Front, the commissar was to play the dominant role: 
1)the Political department of the Military soviet is 
organised by the military commissar of the soviet ... 
2)at the disposal of the political department are all 
political-educational organisations, cultural-educational 
commissions, clubs, libraries, schools, agitators, 
lecturers and, in general, all Party comrades working in 
institutions and military units, subor~6nate to the 
Military soviet of the Voronezh raion. 
Thus, in these instructions, it would appear that the 
military commissar had the upper hand, so to speak. It 
was he who created the political department and controlled 
everything subordinated to it. In this paerticular 
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instance, the military commissar had ceased to be merely 
"the eyes and ears" of Soviet power; in effect, he had the 
same amount of power and influence as w~s to be enjoyed by 
the chiefs of the army and front political departments. 
This is an important point, as it serves to demonstrate 
how, without any help from the central military or 
political apparatus, the functions of the military 
commissars had begun to move away from what had been 
earlier fixed by central decree, or order, and respond to 
the exact needs of the military and political situation, 
as it was perceived at the front. 
On the whole, the commissars, at this time, enjoyed 
almost a unique position in the Red Army-for a variety of 
reasons, they enjoyed the t~ust of the command staff, the 
soldiers and the Party. Overall, the commissars had still 
to watch over the command staff and ensure the proper 
level of discipline in the units but, as evident from 
these instructions, by the autumn of 1918, as a direct 
result of the situation at the front, the commissar began 
to assume an ever more important role in the political 
life of the unit. 
Page 80 
(v) The response of the centre to the changing role of the 
military commissars (September-December 1918) 
The situation at the centre was also beginning to show 
some signs of change, however slight. On 25th September 
1918, the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs 
ordered the creation of courses for military commissars, 
under the control of VBVK.71 The order consisted of six 
points, not all of themrelevant to this dissertation, so 
only those of most relevance to this particular section 
will be detailed here. The first point simply stated that 
VBVK was in control of the courses and was in charge of 
the course plans and studies; the second point then went 
on to state that entry to ~he courses was carried out on 
the basis of Party or soviet recommendation; the next 
point then stated that the courses were to consist of two 
cycles of lectures, one military and the other political; 
the rest of the points in the order then went on to 
examine the rates of pay for the students attending the 
course, as well as the fees for the lecturers who taught 
the students. 72 According to one source, these courses 
began operating on lOth October 1918 and more than 200 
students enrolled. 73 By the middle of December 1918, of 
this complement of 200, some 186 graduated and were sent 
to various units at the front. 74 A new intake of students 
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was announced in November 1918 and they began to enrol in 
December 1918(however, more on that in a separate 
section). 
Following the reorganisational shuffle of the central 
military and political apparatus in the autumn of 1918(see 
previous section), VBVk now found itself in a position to 
attempt to exert a much greater influence on the work of 
the military commissars. Although the meeting will be 
discussed in greater detail below, in December 1918, an 
important meeting took place between the chiefs of the 
political departments of all the armies on the Southern 
Front and representatives of VBVK.75 
The instructions worked out at the meeting not only 
discussed the role of the political department or the 
Party cells, but also the role of the military commissars. 
The part of the instructions which discussed the role of 
the military commissars will be analysed here. 
According to the instructions, one of the main areas 
for discussion was "unifying the activity of the 
commissars in the armies, directing their work and 
controlling them." 76 Given official sanction by VBVK, it 
should be remembered, the instructions altered the balance 
of power in the relationship between the political 
departments and the military commissars back in favour of 
the political departments: 
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1.Above all, to establish and maintain a close link with 
all the commissars subordinated to the department. 
3.Systematically inform the commissars about the most 
important facts of the political struggle and about the 
work of the political department. 
4.Direct the Party-organisational activity of the 
commissar, ie direct and control his activity in 
organising regimental Party cells. 
S.Pay special attention to his personal conduct in a 
military situation. 
6.Carefully observe the inter-relationship between the 
co~issar and.the commander and continu~71y check attempts 
to 1nterfere 1n the operational sphere. 
This apparent reversal in the relationship between the 
political department and the military commissar was 
probably brought about by the reality of the work being 
undertaken at the front, at that time. Whilst earlier on, 
it had been the case that initially, at least, political 
departments had been controlled by the military 
commissars, as the political departments-grew bigger and 
more complex, the political departments became the 
dominant political organ in the Red Army. Hence, as 
contained in these new instructions, the political 
department was instructed to watch over the work of the 
military commissars, including their relationship with the 
military specialists. However, there could still be no 
denying the importance of the role of the military 
commissar, even at this stage in the history of the Red 
Army. Witness the following extract from a report sent to 
the Party's Secretariat in December 1918, written by the 
then Chief of Eastern Front's Political department, 
I.N.Smirnov: 
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in every regiment there is a political commissar who 
a~art from watching the command staff, groups around' 
h1mse~f all the Communists of the regiment, he is the 
organ1ser, the agitator, he informs the political 
department about the mood of the soldiers and peasants in 
the neighbouring villages ... the commissar plays an 
exceptionally important role in the army. There have been 
case~, for example in the Bryansk regiment, when the 
~omm1ssar, the only Communist in the regiment, by his 
1nfluen~e on 7ge soldiers, completely changes the face of 
the reg1ment. 
Further on in his report, Smirnov was to state what was 
almost to become a truism throughout the experience of the 
Civil War: 
the Bolshevik in the army is the commi~sar, and th7
9
more 
there are of them, then the more sure 1s the army. 
Thus, throughout the length of 1918, the military 
commissars had undergone a number of changes in the 
perception of their relationship to the other political 
organs of the Red Army, most prominently in their 
relationship to the political departments. The combined 
experience of all the armies seemed to favour what was 
given official sanction in December 1918, by VBVK, that 
political departments should direct the activity of the 
commissars, as they controlled the activity of the Party 
cells. As shown by Smirnov's report, this would seem to 
have been the case, in practise anyway. The basic 
functions of the commissars at the front, in some 
respects, did not change significantly throughout the 
length of 1918-they still had to watch over the command 
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staff and the soldiers; they still had to ensure 
discipline in the units and they still had to set an 
example to the men, both on and off duty. To the extent 
that little emphasis seems to have been paid extending 
their role in the conduct of political or cultural-
educational work can only be explained by the presence of 
the political departments, which were to play a very 
important role in the conduct of political and cultural-
educational work amongst the men in the units, as will be 
shown later. As the political departments became more and 
more important and discipline became less of a problem in 
the Red Army units, then the role of the military 
commissar, throughout the remainder of the Civil War, 
although still important, began to assume a less than 
crucial air about it. 
As will be detailed in the next chapter, whilst there 
is a fairly large body of material on the role and 
function of the commissars in the Red Army in 1918, the 
material becomes considerably less abundant when analysing 
events of 1919. This is more than likely a sign of the 
diminishing total importance of the commissars to the Red 
Army's victories in the remaining half of the Civil War. 
Before leaving this analysis of the role of the military 
commissars in the Red Army and their relationship to VBVK, 
a number of sub-sections will appear which will shed more 
light on the total number of military commissars in the 
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Soviet Republic, at this time, as well as analyse further 
the centralised courses on offer for the training of the 
commissars and, finally, examine the day-to-day activity 
of the commissars in the Red Army, as revealed by the 
admittedly scant memoir material. 
(vi) Numbers 
In attempting to arrive at some overall figure for the 
number of commissars in the Soviet Republic, at this time, 
only one Soviet historian has carried out any form of 
extensive archival research to produce any such figure. 
V.G.Kolychev, in a book published in 1979, quoting an 
archival source, stated the following: 
in December 1918, registered with the ~11-Rus~ban Bureau 
of Military Commissars were 6,389 comm1ssars. 
To date, this total figure for the number of 
commissars in the Republic by the end of 1918 has been 
impossible to check. The best piece of evidence which 
lends support to this figure and which can be checked 
independently is to be found in a collection of documents 
of Lenin's writings on the military question. In such a 
collection, one finds the following document simply 
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entitled, "notes on the structure of the All-Russian 
Bureau of Military Commissars."81 These notes were the 
outcome of information being sent by Yurenev to Lenins in 
response to an_earlier request of Lenin's for information 
about the general activity of VBVK.82 Although the notes 
did describe the general organisational structure of VBVK, 
they also made reference to an approximate figure for the 
overall total of commissars in the Republic. According to 
the notes, the number of commissars in the republic was 
"more than 6,000(up to 7,000)."83 
Thus, although the figures are not exact,they would 
seem to lend general support to Kolychev's previous 
figure, gleaned from the archives. However, even if the 
figure is accurate, it should not be forgotten that it is 
a general total and does not represent the total number of 
commissars working in the Red Army, at the front, for 
instance. Unfortunately, it is also not possible to say 
from what social class the majority of the commissars came 
from, during this time. Whilst there is information 
available for 1919/1920, there is no such information 
available for 1918. 
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(vii)Courses 
As stated earlier, on 25th September 1918, the 
People's Commissariat of Military Affairs ordered the 
creation of a series of courses for the centralised 
training of the commissars. As described earlier, the 
courses were to consist of two cycles of lectures-one 
military and the other political.84 According to one 
Soviet historian's estimation of these courses, the basic 
tasks of the courses were: 
to impart to the Comrade Communists, working in the 
military field, and those ear-marked by the Party for such 
work, knowledge for this speciality and also to give them 
the possibility to revitalise and strengthS~ their own 
knowledge in the area of political theory. 
This would seem to suggest that, initially anyway, the 
emphasis was equally on the military and political cycles 
of lectures-a move which, given the circumstances of the 
time, would have made a lot of sense. After all, as shown 
above, the commissars were important in the military arena 
and, therefore, it was important that the commissars, sent 
out by the central authorities were well-educated 
specifically in the military art. According to Kolychev's 
article, the courses would appear to have been over-
subscribed. On the opening day of the courses, 223 people 
turned up8 6 , but only 186 actually completed the courses 
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in December 1918 .. 87 Apparently, the students studied a 
fairly broad range of subjects, including 
the hist~ry of the working-class movement, the history of 
the Russ1an Communist Party, political economy, 
dialectical and historical materialism and other social-
political subjects. Much prominence was also given to 
studying the military art, tactics and strategy, 
topography, 8~ilitary geography, administration, military psychology. 
Kolychev even identified the men who were in charge of 
these VBVK courses:the chief of the courses was one 
I.A.Aksenov, his assistant was K.A.Bolshakov-
unfortunately, it has not been possible to find any 
biographical details on either of these men.89 Other than 
that, very little information is available on the courses, 
as a whole but, looking through a number of the newspapers 
of the period, it is possible to expand on what has just 
been written and provide more detail on the courses and 
the students themselves. 
In October 1918, an article appeared in the military 
newspaper of the Petrograd Soviet, "Vooruzheniy Narod", on 
VBVK's courses and, to say quite frankly, the article was 
critical of a number of the features of the courses. The 
author of the article-Antyukhin-started off his article in 
a rather complimentary fashion, stressing the good course 
content and the quality of the lecturers: 
since the opening of the courses, more than two weeks have 
already passed. During this time, the trainees have 
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already heard a number of lecturers .•. on various themes: 
strategy, tactics, topography, administration artillery 
fortifications and psychology of the troops .. :the ' 
lecturers chosen by the All-Russian Bureau of Military 
Commissars are good. [They are-SM] people with great 
military training and practical experience. By their own 
statements, they have all taken part in the Japanese or 
imperialist war and, doubtless, this is true. They read 
their lectures simply and clearly, trying as much as 
possible to give their knowledge to the students.9 
No mention here of any socio-political subjects on 
offer to the military commissars; of course, it could have 
been the case that the socio-political subjects mentioned 
earlier were added later to the course content. What is 
also interesting here is that we have a somewhat ironic 
situation of military specialists-former combatants of the 
1905 Russo-Japanese War and the First World War-teaching 
military commissars their military duty. A sign of the 
seriousness that VBVK attached to the proper training of 
the military commissars. As regards the political cycle 
of lectures, Kolychev stated that lecturers from the 
Moscow oblast Party committee were used.91 
Antyukhin then went on to state that the lecturers-the 
military lecturers that is-spent a lot of time analysing 
the "inadequacies" of the Russian Army during the First 
World War, in order that the trainees, after completing 
the course "would take the most active part in building 
the army, according to the new ••. plan of the People's 
Commissariat of Military Affairs." 92 This was obviously a 
case of trying to learn from the mistakes of the past and 
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encourage the future commissars to realise the heavy 
burden of responsibility that weighed on their shoulders. 
However, Antyukhin also went on to discuss the 
problems associated with the course including the raw 
material of the courses, so to speak, the students 
themselves: 
unfortunately, not all the students approach their studies 
seriously. Part irregularly attend, some, if the topic is 
interesting, listen ••. but, if the topic is boring, leave 
the lessons altogether. The remaining 150-200 students 
listen but, unfortunately, also not particularly 
attentive93' which is bad for comrades who seriously wish 
to study. 
The problems were also not restricted to the students 
either-the article also went on to note the following 
problems: 
the administration of the courses, because it was obvious 
that not all the students were attending the lessons, 
compelled the introduction of a watch, both in the 
auditorium and in the hostel, to make a daily note of 
those students who attend the lessons ... and those who do 
not. [When-SM]this measure was introduced, the number of 
students [atten§~ng-SM]increased immediately, but still 
not all attend. 
There was even a problem with feeding the students, as 
detailed in the following extract: 
the most burning problem of the day ... the problem of pro-
visions •.. the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars 
has not bothered about normalising this problem ..• one must 
say that, relying only on the one bad meal a day which the 
students receive, it would not be enough to survive 
on •.• the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars must 
solve this problem quickly, up until now, it has only 
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promised to normalise the situation and more than two 
weeks have already passed.~' 
In concluding his article, Antyukhin returns, once more, 
to examining the quality of the students attending the 
course: 
one can say with certainty that ••. a large number of the 
students do not fulfil the requirements[of the courses-
SM]. Some are very young and unrestrained, even between 
themselves they cannot maintain order ••• Others approach 
their studies with indifference and even often do not 
attend the lectures •.. there are still people arriving who 
are neither serious nor Party members, thanks to poor 
vetting in the enrolment to the courses. This can b9 
explained by casualness on the part of the students. 6 
Thus, the overall picture painted by the initial 
experience of Antyukhin would seem to be a fairly gloomy 
one, as regards the administration of the courses and the 
students themselves. The fact that a number of the 
students seemed to display a fairly bad attitude towards 
the lectures on offer would imply that they would become 
bad commissars in the units, unless they were able to 
change their attitude quickly. Even ensuring that the 
students had a decent meal inside them was a problem for 
VBVK to solve; it has to be said that, given the poor 
organisation involved with the courses, VBVK does not come 
out of the criticism too well. 
Once the students completed their course, they were 
then appointed by VBVK's administration department to 
various brigades, central military institutions and the 
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11.ke. 97 There f h was a urt er uptake of students turned up 
on enrolment day(the courses had been restructured, hence 
the smaller intake)but, despite everything, the courses 
were still beset by problems.98 The situation at the 
front did not help the situation much either, as Kolychev 
noted in his article on the subject: 
the courses of military commissars experienced great 
difficulties in their work. It was difficult to take many 
Party workers from their military work on the front ... a 
great insufficiency of teachers, especially on political 
subjects was felt. All this did not permit a planned 
programme of work for the courses. After two graduations, 
which produced a little more than 300 political 
commissars, in connection with the difficult situation ij~ 
the fronts, on 8th March 1919, the courses were closed. 
Whilst it wou~d be easy to lay all the blame at VBVK's 
door, so to speak and, once again, fault it for its lack 
of ability to supply the Red Army with the necessary 
quality and quantity of commissars, it has to be 
remembered that VBVK was breaking a lot of new ground and, 
in many ways, did lay the foundation for the more 
successful work of the organ that was to replace it-PUR. 
It should also be remembered that VBVK also had the power 
of appointment of m.ili tary commissars-according to a 
number of sources. This, in itself, would help to improve 
its total figure for the number of commissars trained 
and/or/appointed to the Red Army by VBVK: for instance, 
according to one account, between July-October 1918, VBVK 
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sent out 501 commissars to the Red Army units100; 
according to another source, in the last three months of 
1918, VBVK sent out a further 450 commissars to the Red 
Army, of whom almost half went straight into the field 
units. 101 These figures represent all the known 
commissars trained and/or/appointed by VBVK in 1918. It 
could be that there were other appointments, which have 
gone unrecorded, for some reason. It should not be 
forgotten, though, that not all of these commissars would 
be sent to serve in the field units of the Red Army and, 
if.one takes into account that, by the end of 1918, there 
were some 6,500 military commissars in the whole of the 
Republic, then it does not take too much to realise how so 
few commissars owed their training or appointment to VBVK. 
(viii)Daily activity of the military commissars (1918-
1919) 
Before leaving this general analysis of the role of 
the military commissars in the Red Army and their 
relationship to VBVK in 1918, it would probably help the 
reader to arrive at a much clearer and informed picture of 
the importance of the military commissars, if something 
was said about their daily activity in the Red Army. As 
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stated earlier, however, very few commissars have actually 
sat down and put pen to paper and described their 
experience of the Civil War. Thus, what follows below is 
based on a very small collection of memoir material and 
can only give a partial insight in to the work of the 
commissars in the Red Army. In collating material for 
this particular section, only three works have been found 
which actually detail the work of the commissars on 
anything like a daily basis: these works are 
N.I.Kiryukhin's "Iz dnevnika voennogo komissara. 
Grazhdanskaya voina, 1918-1919."(M.1928); A.P.Kuchkin's "V 
boyakh i pokhodakh ot Volgi do Yeniseya:zapiski voennogo 
komissara."(M.1969) and, finally, V.I.Berlov's "V plameni, 
v prokhovym dymi ••. Zapiski politkomissara."(Stavropol, 
1973). 
The earliest of these works is, by far and away, the 
most detailed-it is a comprehensive diary of events, 
experienced by a commissar of 214th Simbirsk regiment in 
1918-1919. As a regimental commissar, Kiryukhin was very 
much at the forefront as regards the conduct of political 
and cultural-educational work in the units, as well as 
having to deal with instances of desertion, drunkenness, 
indiscipline, etc, so his account of life in the unit 
contains a lot of information which one would not expect 
to find in more official and sanitised histories of the 
Civil War. It should also be noted that there is no 
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mention of VBVK, whatsoever, in any of the works listed-
surely, a further indictment of VBVK's lack of contact 
with the commissars at the front. 
Kiryukhin's account begins with a description of how 
he became commissar to the regiment: 
I was still in M~~~ow.a~d wanted to register in the Party 
cell of the 3rd  ~~ regiment but we were so 
quickly sent out to the front that they'told me to 
register in that unit which I found myself in. I arrived 
at the front and from there went into battle ... I was 
preparing to leave when Panov[regimental commander-
SM]asked what I thought about being used in a military-
political capacity. I expressed doubt about this ... but on 
16th October[1918-SM]at a political meeting, I was 
appointed deputy mt 0~tary-political commissar to the 1st Simbirsk regiment. 
For his part, Berlov-a commissar to the First Cavalry 
Army-recounts a similar ex~erience: 
in September 1918, an army congress was held in the· 
village of Sotnikov. The organisation of £8~itical work 
was discussed and I was elected commissar. 
Interestingly enough, as Berlov himself points out in his 
book, in the discussion of political work amongst the 
troops, the views of the command staff were taken into 
account, as well as the views of the other commissars: 
it was necessary to strengthen the political education of 
the soldiers. This we well understood. But how were we 
going to do it? There were various suggestions. The 
majority of the commanders inclined to the view that every 
regiment should have its own commissar. But where were we 
going to get them from? We decided to organise three-
month courses. The regiments would each send 40 of their 
best trained workers. They would then be able to enrich 
their knowledge and familiarise themselves with t~04 forms and methods of political work amongst the troops. 
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There was no suggestion that the relevant political organ 
should turn to VBVK for help. Needless to say, this 
relatively quick transition to the establishment of 
courses for the training of military commissars was not 
reflected in all the other units. For instance, in 
Kiryukhin's regiment, the build-up to political work was 
gradual: in Kiryukhin's regiment, he himself set about 
creating a regimental Par~ cell followed by forming, in 
all the other units, cells of sympathisers and opening a 
regimental library. 105 1his took place within two weeks 
of his appointment! 106 One interesting difference between 
the initial establishment of political work in the units 
was that whereas in Berlov's unit, the views of the 
command staff were brought into the discussion on 
political work in the unit; in Kiryukhin's unit, the 
command staff formed the majority of the regimental CP 
membership. 107 
In all the accounts, there is a somewhat less than 
rosy picture painted of the Red Army-for instance, in just 
a few pages of Kiryukhin's diary, we find him leaving to 
deal with the following problems: soldiers illegally 
requisitioning produce from a local peasant 
cooperative108; too many soldiers imbibing of the local 
samogon and stealing whilst under the influence109 ; 
attacking local peasants whilst stealing110 , etc. In 
fact, as far as Kiryukhin was concerned, all of this 
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helped to strengthen his resolve to carry out more 
political and cultural-educational work amongst the 
troops: 
everything possible must be done to help the cultural-
educational circle, so that it can stand on its own feet 
and can give the soldier and the commander an intellectual 
diversion and distract them from playing cards and 
dru~kenne~~t which are still fairly widespread in the 
reg1ment. 
In a separate extract, Kuchkin equated drunkenness with 
desertion and stated what surely must have been a 
unpleasant truism for the commissars at the time: 
drunk Red Army soldiers ... were more inclined to desert.11Z 
In his diary, Kiryukhin constantly returns to the problem 
of the men drinking too much, a problem seemingly 
exacerbated both by the geographical position of the units 
and, of course, the social origins of the men: 
the Chuvash villages are strongly involved in the illegal 
distillation of samogon and make drunkards of our Red Army 
soldiers. In one village ... we had to impose a fine of 
10,000 rubles but, in spite of warnings made by me at 
meetings! §he peasants continued eo distil and sell 
samogon. 1 
Kuchkin also discovered that not all the illegal samogon-
production was inspireq by the simple desire to make 
money: 
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a number of White agents, working in the villages, helped 
the peasants to distil samogon and sell it to the nearby 
Red Army units. After interrogation, the White agents 
revealed the thinking behind their involvement in the 
dist~llation and selling of samogon: drunk Red Army 
sold1erl 1would be easier to murder and/or/more inclined to desert. 4 
Needless to say, when desertion did become a problem, 5th 
Army took the necessary steps: 
when desertion became serious, it was decided to execute 
every 26th man in the brigade.ll) 
Kiryukhin also reveals the sensitivity of the 
commissars to the national and religious make-up of the 
units(a problem that we will have recourse to return to in 
the next chapter). Whe~ a number of Tatar soldiers 
request that they be allowed to bury their dead according 
to Muslim ritual, Kiryukhin consented to their request 
without much hesitation. After all, there was no sense in 
stirring up any necessary trouble amongst a significant 
minority of the soldiers. 11 6 
As regards the overall importance of political work 
amongst the men, Kiryukhin noted one example where, even 
though it only involved a minor case of petty theft, the 
increased political consciousness of the men allowed the 
authorities to apprehend the villains quickly and without 
much fuss: 
there have been cases of petty theft, unwarranted searches 
and even robbery, but political work carried out amongst 
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the men has not been in vain. The soldiers themselves 
have helped us uncover the cases ••. of petty theft and 
punish the guilty people. For example today[25th January 
1919-SM]the soldiers of the 1st battalion brought to me 
their own comrade, who had stolen .•• a whole bundle of 
lin7n, woT!~'s hankies, etc ••. and requested that he be 
pun1shed. 
Kiryukhin even noted a couple of instances when 
political work was literally carried out under the fire of 
the enemy or during a lull in the fightingll8_given the 
conditions at the front, this must have been a not 
altogether uncommon experience for a number of military 
commissars. Thus, in general, if the activity of the 
military commissars, described here, was representative of 
what really happened in the Red Army, as a whole, then one 
has to argue that the military commissars must have played 
a vital role not only in the construction of the Red Army, 
but also in the maintenance of the necessary level of 
combat efficiency, through the programmes of political and 
cultural-educational activity and, of course, through 
maintaining the level of discipline and order in the unit. 
As shown in Kiryukhin's account, especially, the list of 
duties of the military commissar were fairly lengthy and, 
in effect, had grown throughout 1918-by the end of 1918, 
they were much more than simply watch-dogs of the 
revolution in the army. 
Despite the almost non-existent relationship with the 
centre, the commissars would appear to have acquit 
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themselves well of both their duties and functions. If 
there was not too much actually written down on the 
functions of the commissars, that would appear not to have 
prevented them, in any way, from carrying out their 
duties. As will be shown in the next chapter, the duties 
and functions of the military commissars were not to 
remain unchanged in the year ahead and, although their 
relationship with the central political apparatus for the 
Red Army was never ever really properly defined, 
nevertheless, there could be little denying their overall 
importance to the military functioning of the Red Army 
during the Civil War. 
The next section for examination will involve an 
analysis of the role of the Party cells in the functioning 
of the Red Army during 1918 and their relationship with 
VBVK at the time: a relationship that, in many respects, 
was to be no less complicated than the one that had 
existed between the military commissars and VBVK. 
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CHAPTER TWO(SECTION THREE): 
VBVK AND THE ROLE OF THE PARTY CELLS IN TRE RED ARMY(APRIL 
1918-APRIL 1919). 
As mentioned in the previous section, the military 
commissars were by no means alone in the conduct of 
political or cultural-educational work in the Red Army in 
1918-1919. Both the Party cells and the political 
departments, as will be detailed below, had a role to play 
in the conduct of the various political and cultural-
educational ·programmes being carried out in the Red Army, 
both on a local and a national basis. The degree of 
coordination between the centre and the organs working at 
the periphery, as previously shown in the last section on 
the work of the military commissars, was always a thorny 
problem for the military-political apparatus in Moscow. 
This was never more prominent than in relation to the 
conduct and organisation of the Party cells which, rightly 
or wrongly, would appear to have been largely impervious 
to the demands of the centre and carried out their own 
work in their own way. In short, VBVK had a very 
difficult time in trying to exert any influence on the 
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work of the Party cells at the front and, similar to the 
situation with the military commissars, cannot be judged 
to have been a particular success in this area. This 
section, however, will examine the organisation, work and 
composition of the front-line Party cells and the nature 
of the relationship with the central military-political 
apparatus of the period, using material which has rarely 
been seen outside of a number of Soviet libraries. 
Alongwith the previous section, this section will further 
help the reader to better understand the complex picture 
of political and cultural-educational work in the Red 
Army, as well as provide a useful back-drop to the section 
that follows on from this one, analysing the role of the 
political departments in the Red Army. 
When and in exactly what circumstances the first Party 
cells appeared in the Red Army during the Civil War is, 
unfortunately, almost impossible to describe at present, 
due to the distinct lack of primary and secondary source 
material available on this subject. A virtual throw-away 
comment by only one Soviet historian gives an indication 
of the fate of a number of the Party cells in the old 
Imperial Army, after the October Revolution in 1917: 
many Bolshevik Party cells, having appeared in the old 
army, in connertion with its demobilisation, 
disintegrated. 
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The latter comment may, on the face of it, seem somewhat 
odd-after all, how was it that Party cells, after the 
success of the October Revolution fell apart, surely their 
influence in the armed forces should have increased, not 
diminished? 
The explanation for this apparent paradox is quite 
simple-unlike the position of the commissars in the armed 
forces, in the immediate aftermath of the October 
Revolution, the Party cells were not viewed as being 
guardians of Soviet power in the army. The Party cells 
had, after all, spent a large part of 1917 disseminating 
Bolshevik propaganda in the army units, doing their utmost 
to destroy the overall morale of the army and render it 
useless in the event of a Bolshevik attempt to seize 
power. Given the initial hesitancy in creating a new 
military force for the defence of the revolutionary 
regime, the Party cells found themselves as having 
fulfilled their initial and primary function and were 
simply not equipped to reverse their previous work and 
begin to build a new army. Hence, no doubt, a number of 
them probably did just fall apart.However, once the 
Bolsheviks did realise the importance of a newly 
constituted military force, the Bolsheviks increased the 
powers of the military commissars, mobilised more 
Communist Party members into the Red Army, especially in 
August-September 1918, and forced a turn-around in the 
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fortunes of the Party cells This can be proven if one 
examines the impact that the Party mobilisations must have 
had on the strength and size of the Party cells in the 
military units:between July-October 1918, the Moscow Party 
organisation sent to the front alone some 2,000 Communist 
Party members, to serve in the ranks of the Red Army as 
political workers and military commissars; for its part, 
the Petrograd Party organisation, around about the same 
time, also sent a further 800 Party members to fill in 
similar posts.2 
Thus, whenever there was a threat emanating, the 
Party, amongst other measures adopted, usually carried out 
a mass mobilisation of the Party rank and file to serve in 
the units as political workers, military commissars or 
ordinary unit soldiers. Regardless of their military or 
political capacity, each one of the Party members was 
required to join and play an effective role in the work of 
the Party cell and, on a much more general basis, the 
political and cultural life of the unit. Thus, with the 
increase in the numbers of Communists being sent to the 
military units, the fortunes of the Party cells were 
reversed and soon they began to play a prominent role in 
the life of the unit;a role which, in general terms, VBVK 
found almost impossible to control and/or/ regulate. 
In looking at the figures on the growth in the number of 
Party cells in the Red Army, at this time, there is a 
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slight discrepancy in the figures available. 
However, the most reliable figures available come from 
a collection of documents, published commemorating the 
tenth anniversary of the creation of the Red Army in 
1928.
3 
According to the anniversary collection of 
documents, the number of Party cells in the Red Army by 
October 1918 was 8004-this figure increasing to 3,000 by 
October 1919. 5 Further, it is even possible to state how 
many men, on average, were actually members of a Party 
cell: in October 1918, the average size of the Party cell 
was 43 men per cell;by October 1919,this figure stood at 
40 men per cell.6 This would give an approximate total 
Party representation in the Red Army of 34,400 and 120,000 
men, figures which do bear a striking correlation with the 
actual figures for Communist Party representation in the 
Red Army at that time-the actual figures being 35,000 and 
121,681 respectively for October 1918 and October 1919.7 
Thus, in terms of numbers alone, the Party cells would 
appear to have been in a very commanding position, as 
regards the potential possibility to carry out any 
concerted programme of political and/or/cultural-education-
al workthat the CP may have saw fit to introduce. 
However, there was one major problem, as regards the 
actual organisation of the Party cells themselves-they 
lacked uniformity in organisation and, on a wider scale, 
in definition of purpose and function. Even as regards 
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the actual control ofhe Party cells, there was no 
clearly defined idea of who was supposed to be in charge 
of them: 
leadership of the Party cells either came from the 
political commissar or the political department or the 
local Party committee. Not too rare was the case where 
they simply managed themselves.8 
Curiously enough, G.Lindov, a political commissar on 
the Eastern Front in 1918-1919, who recorded his 
experiences of political work at the front as the Civil 
War was still raging, could discuss the work and 
organisational details of the political departments and 
the military commissars, but when it came to discussing 
the role of the Party cells, had very little to say on the 
latter. As far as Lindov was concerned, the tasks of the 
Party cells in the Red Army units were as follows: 
to carry out amongst the soldiers Communist propaganda, 
develop in them their class and Communist consciousness, 
inure them to the Party organisation and Party discipline. 
The Party cells maintain in the units the revolutionary 
spirit, a .spirit of loyalty to Soviet power, revolutionary 
discipline and a willingness 90 lay down their lives for 
the cause of world socialism. 
At the same time that Lindov had his work published on 
the organisation and tasks of political work in the Red 
Army, another more specialised pamphlet came out, designed 
specifically to help the units effectively organise their 
party cells on a more concrete basis. The title of the 
pamphlet, translated, was "How to organise the company 
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Party cells(on the basis of a report of comrade 
Podvoisky)". 10 The pamphlet was published in Kiev but it 
can be assumed that it was meant to be used in a wider 
context. The pamphlet details the ideal organisational 
structure of the Party cells, as well as discussing their 
primary tasks. According to the pamphlet, the Party cell 
should have the following organisational set up: 




The company Party cell was to involve all the 
Communists and the Communist sympathisers, who themselves 
were to form a separate group within the Party ce11. 12 
The political work of the Party cell largely involved a 
variety of cultural and educational tasks, eg establishing 
a school, gathering all those who could read and write to 
read the papers, brochures, establishing contact with the 
nearby villages, etc. 13 The pamphlet also went on to 
analyse the contents of the books for the company cell's 
library, beginning with the statement that the cell had to 
be careful to choose-
not abstruse, unintelligible 
simple: 
l)to beat or not to beat the 
to the conditions prevailing 
perhaps-SM] 
2)what is the commune? 
3)when will the war end? 
4)why the supply situation is 
books, but only the most 
Jew[a title more appropriate 
in the Ukraine at the time 
so bad. 14 
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As regards maintaining discipline in the company, in 
the words of the author of the pamphlet, "the company's 
eyes and ears are the members of the Partt cell"lS and it 
was also beholding on the members of the Party cell to 
help drive out the evils of "cards, vodka and dirt".l6 In 
conclusion, the pamphlet ended with the following summary 
statement on the Party cell's intended course of action: 
the Party cell must win the soldier over by deeds:in the 
event of misfortune, promise to write home for him, 
organise medical help in the rear ••• all this is 
preparat~7y ••. leading to winning over the masses and the 
company. 
It could well have been the case that a number of the 
Party cells took the latter point t~ be very much the real 
work of the Party cells in the Red Army, ie winning over, 
by deed, the soldiers in the units. It is impossible to 
gauge the exact effect of Babin's pamphlet on the work of 
the Party cells, however, therefore it is not possible to 
say whether, or not, Babin's advice to the company Party 
cells met with any great response from the units 
themselves. In examining the actual work of the Party 
cells in the units, recourse will have to be made to a 
fairly wide body of material scattered in various 
collections of documents, published since the end of the 
Civil War. It is only by examining such evidence that we 
can attempt to properly estimate the total value of the 
Party cells to the political and cultural-educational 
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training of the soldiers at the time. However, it will 
become apparent that for a properly detailed examination 
and analysis of the role of the Party cells in the Civil 
War, much more information will have to be made available 
to historians in the future. 
A number of accounts of the e~rly activity, and chaos, 
of the work of the Party cells, on a general basis, do 
show the problems that the Party cells had to face or were 
themselves actually creating. In a very early account of 
the history of political work in the First Revolutionary 
Army, published in 1920, the author, V.Lopukhnov, had this 
to say about the early inter-relationship of the Party 
cells with the political department: 
very important organisational work of the political 
department was the organisation of Communist Party cells. 
In places, they came into being completely spontaneously 
and very often the political department knew absolutely 
nothing about their existence. Without any sort of 
instructions, on the basis of which the cells should have 
been operating on, there was no registering of Communists. 
All of this created a huge gulf between the Communist 
workefg in the localities and the political depart-
ment. 
Another Soviet historian of the 1920s, A.Geronimus, 
stated the following about the early organisation and work 
of the Party cells: 
the forms of organisation and work of the Party cells 
varied enormously. The absence of any directions from the 
top compelled them to grope for their own paths to 
activity to work out their own rights and duties. Apart 
from int~rnal Party work, the cells directly carried out 
cultural-educational work, organised clubs, libraries, 
literacy schools, distributed literature •.. In a number of 
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uni~s! the ~ells even took upon themselves leading 
adm1n1strat1ve functions, right up to electing 
commissars ••• taking direct control over the activity of 
the commanders •.. and sometimes even interfering in purely 
operational matters.1~ 
The latter quote, in itself, is a clear indication of 
the potential for disaster that the Party cells could 
wreak, if allowed to continue in such a way. Although it 
is impossible to say, at present, how widespread the more 
extreme form of the activity of the Party cells was, ie 
electing commissars, interfering in the operational 
decisions of the commanders, taking charge of a number of 
administrative functions of the units, etc.,it is obvious 
that such discord and lack of unity in overall structure 
and function could not be allowed to continue unchecked. 
Thus, ·on 25th October 1918, the Party's CC took the 
decisive step of removing one tier of the Party apparatus 
in the Red Army-the Army-Party committees were 
abolished. 20 
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to detail the 
work of the Army-Party committees. Other than the facts 
that they were elected organs, and that their pre-October 
1917 career consisted entirely of creating as much trouble 
as ~ssible for the Provisional Government in the Armed 
Forces, very little information has been made available on 
the work of these Army-Party committees. Anyway, 
according to the relevant CC resolution of the 25th 
October, entitled "on Party work in the Army": 
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Party organisations, committees, groups •.. in the army must 
not b7 created. The task of the Party workers consists of 
creat1ng only ~ells of Party members, registering Party 
m7mbers, carry:n~ out agitational work, distributing 
l1terature, ra1s1ng the general level of Communist 
consciousness in the Red Army.22 
It was also the case that the Party decided to 
transfer the overall leadership of the Party cells in the 
units to the local Party committees, a move which, in many 
respects, was a non-starter right from the very beginning, 
especially given the fluidity of conditions at the front 
at that time. However, as will be shown below, although 
the Party's CC may have decreed the abolishment of the 
Army-Party committees and decided to put the local Party 
committees at the head of the Red Army's Party cells, 
practical experience of work at the front ~id not 
necessarily fall in line with the CC's thinking on the 
subject. 
In a report to the Eastern Front's political 
department in November 1918, the then chief of 4th Army's 
political department, P.M.Voytek, expressed his ideas on 
the leadership of political work at the front and the 
position that the Party cells should occupy in this 
respect: 
one organisation should exist, conducting both political 
and Party work, this is the organ of the political 
department of the army. It should be flexible and 
unwieldy ... with the regimental Party cells, the political 
department of the army is linked with the divisional 
political department. The divisional political 
department ... controls ••. all the political workers in the 
division •.. and the Party cells, closely linked with them. 
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Thr~u¥h the political commissars and the cells, it[the 
pol1t1cal department-SM]should be cohesive with the 
masses. The general living link control and 
leadership[of the army-SM] ••• wili be realised by visits 
along the front by the chief of the army's political 
d7partment, visits to the army's political department by 
d1visional political chiefs ••• and, finally, congresses, 
convened at Army staff-level, of representatives from the 
Party cells to discuss generally urgent matters.23 
Thus, judging by the latter statement, the political 
departments were supposed to be in charge of the work of 
the Party cells-an arrangement which, in many respects, 
was a much more logical one than the one worked out by the 
CC. After all, if nothing else, the political departments 
were physically much closer to the Party cells and would 
be in a much stronger position to ascertain their real 
needs, make use of their manpower strength and, of course, 
attempt to introduce a much greater degree of control and 
coordination over their work.A month later, in actual 
fact, 4 Army's Political department was to make another 
report on political work in the Army, in which, once 
again, one of the main topics of the report was a brief 
organisational history of the Party cells, showing the 
need for some form of organisational control over the 
former's activity: 
the cells existed before this time[presumably October 
1918-SM], but their organisation was of the highest 
disorder:in the cells were both Communists and 
sympathisers, calling themselves some sort of a collective 
and not only sympathisers, who no one had recommended, but 
also simply those who had defined themselves as such. But 
they all called themselves a Communist Party cell. Those 
who considered themselves Communists were those who worked 
in a rural commune, or those who simply wished to bear 
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that name. 
The cells~ comp~sed in such a way, in some units took on 
all funct1ons: 1t was the Party court, it was also the 
comrade's court, it was the economic-control commission, 
in a word, it suited itself[what it wanted to be-SM]. It 
accepted members and expelled them, arrested them .•. 
Now t~e m~tte: of registering Par24 comrades and their 
organ1sat1on 1s on another track. 
Thus, towards the end of the report, there would appear to 
be a hint that the Party cells were being brought more 
under the control of the political department, though 
whether this was as a direct consequence of the October 
1918 CC resolution is impossible to say at present. It 
could well have been the case that the Army political 
department was exerting its own authority and power, 
regardless of the instructions emanating forth from the 
CC. After all, if the situation, as described, was that 
bad, then the Army political department could hardly wait 
on the CC sending out the necessary instructions before 
rectifying the situation to its advantage. 
However, if the situation on the Eastern Front was 
showing some signs of improvement, then an examination of 
the situation on the Southern Front, at that time, would 
appear to show that although there were a number of 
hopeful signs, concerning the positive impact of the Party 
cells on the political consciousness of the units, the 
Party cells were still posing a number of problems for the 
political departments to solve. 
In a report of the Southern Front's Political 
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department, published in December 1918, the latter 
reported that in the lOth Army: 
from the reports, the position of the army at the front 
was ascertained:the mood of the units is determined the 
influence of the political commissar-Communists is ' 
sig~i~icant, th~ cells are introducing a new spirit, 
pol1t1cal consc1ousness ~3 on the increase, the influence 
of the Party is growing. 
The above report also mentioned the number of Party cells 
in the three main armies on the Southern Front at the 
time: 
overall, in the 8th, 9th and lOth Armies on the Southern 
Front, according to the latest available figures, there 
are 122 Communist Party cells, 38 groups gf sympathisers, 
1,717 Communists and 1,200 sympathisers.2 
The report then went on to examine the activity of a 
number of the Party cells, throwing some light on the good 
and bad activity of the front-line Party cells: 
in every unit[reference to the lOth Rifle Regiment, 8th 
Army-SM]of the regiment, there are Communists and, 
sometimes, even weak Party cells, in which there is no 
registration[of Party members-SM], no separate work under 
the leadership of the Party centre. The Moscow 
Communists[reference to the mobilisation of Party members 
for the Southern Front held between October-November 1918. 
The Moscow Party organisation sent 1,000 Party members 
alone-SM]have begun to create Party organs under the 
leadership of the political department. On the 17th 
November, a Party cell was created which numbered 16 men. 
The weakness of the Party
2
9rganisation is explained by the 
pressure of the Left SRs. 
The above quote is interesting, not least because it 
demonstrates that the Bolsheviks did encounter problems in 
the initial creation of Party cells in the units, 
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requiring in this particular instance, an influx of Party 
members from Moscow to get the situation back on an even 
keel, but also because it is a unique mention of the 
pressure, not merely the existence, of Left SR Party 
members on the Bolshevik Party's political apparatus in 
the Red Army. Their strength in this particular unit must 
have been fairly prominent in order for them to have rated 
a mention in the Southern Front's political departmental 
report. The question that now has to be asked, even if no 
answer can be presently found, is how strong was the 
influence of the Left SRs in the Red Army at the time? 
Certainly, it would be very interesting to gauge the 
effect of the Left SRs in the conduct of the Red Army's 
political app-aratus-after all, as previously noted in the 
last section, there were a number of Left SR commissars 
working in the units of the Red army in 1918. Now, in the 
latest example, we have Left SR pressure preventing the 
formation of a strong regimental Party cell. 
The report also made mention of another regimental Party 
cell's activity and again the picture painted was not too 
bright: 
the Orlovsky Iron regiment[8th Army-SM]. There exist 
comrade courts, a Communist Party cell, numbering 18 
members and 150 sympathisers. The Party cell warned 
against mob law ..• meetings ~o n~t take pla28-there is no 
time to carry out any organ1sat1onal work. 
Thus, again, the Party cell would not appear to have 
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been exerting any particularly positive influence on the 
ordinary rank and file to any significant extent. In 
summarising political and cultural-educational work in 9th 
Army, the report concluded that: 
for the creation of Party collectives in the Red Army, too 
little is being done:there are no instructions for the 
organisation of Communist Party cells. Party-
organisational work bears a fortuitous nature. In the 
created Party cells the work, to this day, is not 
united ... In the political department, there is no 
registration of Party cells or Communists. There is no 
cadre of t2~velling Party agitators, there are no 
lecturers. 
Overall, then, the work of the Party cells would still 
seem to have been a cause for concern both on the Eastern 
and Southern Fronts and, judging by at least one other 
report, sent to the Southern Front's Political department 
at the end 9f 1918, the situation did not look to have 
improved. The relevant report was prepared by the chief 
of 8th Army's political department and focused on the 
activity of the the latter between November-December 1918. 
The chief of 8th Army's political department, 
V.Malakhovsky began the relevant section of his report 
with the following set of introductory remarks: 
our main attention and efforts were directed on Party 
work. In this respect, there was a lot of work to do. 
There was not a single Party cell. In units, there were 
lone Communists ... Party discipline, of course, was 
lacking, as was Party work. What was necessary was to 
unite all the scattered Communists .•. There was a proposal 
to create a firm Party organisation with elected centres 
and headed by a Party committee[exactly forbidden by the 
CC resolution of 25th October 1918-SM]. 
But, very quickly,even before putting this into effect, in 
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practise we became convinced that such a form of 
organisation was unsuitable and harmful. And at the 
K~zlov meet~n?, I wa~ already •.. a firm supporter of the 
v1ew author1s1ng pol1tical de5artments to become the 
centres for the Party cells.J 
The fact that it was still undecided as to who was in 
charge of the Party cells at the front speaks volumes for 
the lack of coordination and poor organisation then 
existent in the Red Army's political apparatus of the 
period. The CC resolution, as detailed earlier, of 
October 1918 had placed the overall leadership of the 
Party cells in the hands of the local Party committees-
from the word, "go", this had not been a particular-
ly bright move, as the situation at the front demanded 
that control of the Party cells at the front be handed to 
another organisation actually also serving at the front-
only then could there be an opportunity for the Party 
cells to be properly disciplined and coordinated. Thus, 
Malakhovsky's authorisation that the Party cells be put 
under the control of the political departments has to be 
viewed as a step in the right direction, in fact as he 
himself later pointed out in his report, it was a move 
which the Party cells themselves recognised as being the 
right option: 
the bottom[the Party cells-SM]pushed us to have a formal 
Party centre:constantly, they came to us with requests to 
approve the organisation of the cell, approve new members, 
accept members-hip dues, etc. And gradually .•. the cells 
grew in numbers and in composition, united around the 
political department ••• I will quote a few figures ••• by 
28th November, there were 8 cells, by the 1st December-23, 
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by the 15th December-41, by 1st January 1919-88 cells with 
a total number of 1,833 members and 2,621 sympathisers.Jl 
The latter extract would seem to provide some strong 
evidence as to explaining the rise in the overall total 
number of Party cells in the Red Army between October 
1918-0ctober 1919. Obviously, with the overall increase 
in the number of Party members being sent to the Red Army; 
more cells would have to be created in order that they 
were used more effectively than had been the case in the 
early 1918 period of the history of the Red Army's 
political apparatus. It certainly made sense, both to the 
Bolsheviks operating in the political departments and, no 
doubt, those working in Moscow, that the recognised Party 
organ in the Red Army-namely, the political department-
controlled the Party cells and coordinated their activity. 
Certainly, Malakhovsky's report would seem to indicate 
that this increased centralising trend emanated not 
directly from Moscow, but was a direct reaction to the 
situation at the front. Given that the Party centre in 
the Red Army was the political department, once the latter 
had been formally recognised, the Party cells grew both in 
size and number. This should not be taken to mean that, 
from the end of 1918 onwards, all the problems previously 
associated with the Party cells vanished, but it was the 
' case that as the increased trend towards centralisation of 
the political apparatus took place, the Party cells did 
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pose less of a problem for the political departments. 
Malakhovsky was able to close his report with a degree of 
optimism for the future conduct of the Rerl Army's Party 
cells: 
thus, _in all the units now we have cells, perhaps, 
somet1mes, they are too small, in composition weak, but 
their existence, even in a comparatively short time, has 
left its mark in the life of the army. In raising the 
discipl~ne and military capability of the u~~ts, the cells 
have, w1thout any doubt, played their part. 
Due to the lack of available primary source materials, 
it is difficult to evaluate the experience of political 
work on the Northern and Western Fronts. In a sense, both 
fronts, which were formulated a good deal later than 
either of the Eastern or Southern Fronts, would have been 
expected to have missed the initial teething problems, so 
to speak, which the Eastern and Southern Fronts had cj~ 
through. The Northern Front had been formed, by decree of 
RVSR(the English translation of the Russian abbreviation 
for Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic)on 15th 
September 191833 and the Western Front yet later still, on 
the 19th February 1919.34 Therefore, they would have had 
the possibility of examining the experiences of the two 
earlier fronts;of course, whether they actually availed 
themselves of this opportunity is impossible to say at the 
moment, although, given the similarity, for example, of 
6th Army's(Northern Front)instructions on the organisation 
and functions of the Party cells, it could be assumed that 
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they did avail themselves of examining the past of the two 
earlier created fronts. 
In October 1918, 6th Army did publish a series of 
instructions on the organisation and functioning of Party 
cells in 6th Army. 35 The instructions were made up of a 
series of sections, each of which will be examined and 
detailed here in turn. The first section was on the 
organisation of the Party cells and consisted of the 
following points: 
in every Red Army unit, a Party cell of Communists 
(Bolsheviks) is to be organised from Party members and 
sympathisers. 
All members of the Party, serving in any Red Army unit, 
must become members of the Party cell, no soldier of any 
unit can join the Party past the cell ... 
The Pa§6Y cell(collective)is not an organ of state 
power. 
The latter statement is an interesting one· to have made, 
as it states quite simply that the Party cell was not an 
organ of the state, but an organ of the Party, ie it 
emphasises the division that still existed between the 
Party and the state. 
The next section in the instructions dealt with the 
functions of the Party cells and the latter were divided 
into four main areas:political-educational,Party work, 
establishing discipline and ensuring the necessary level 
of control.37 The first section stated that the Party 
cells were to conduct: 
agitation and propaganda in the Red Army unit of Communist 
ideas and the elimination, at the roots, of any kind of 
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coun~er-revolutionary agitation.38 
The other points contained in this particular section 
were more of an educational nature, emphasising the 
conduct of the Party cells on educating the men in the 
broadest sense of the word, therefore the Party cells had 
to see to the: 
the organisation of systematic lessons on political 
literacy, under the leadership of the local (town) 
committee. 
The setting up of lessons on general educational 
subjects, under the direction of the the educational 
department of the military commissariat. 
Furthering the organisation of the distribution of 
newspapers and literature on political and military 
ques§~ons; setting up libraries, reading rooms, clubs, 
etc. 
Thus, this part of the instructions shows the work of 
the Party cells outside the political apparatus of the 
unit, ie the inter-connection with the local Party 
committee and the local military commissariat. The latter 
contacts would seem to imply that the military situation 
on the Northern Front was somewhat quieter than elsewhere, 
otherwise it would not have been possible to hold the 
necessary political and military instruction in accordance 
with the local Party committee or the local military 
commissariat. 
The next section of the instructions was also the 
largest and was mainly concerned with the composition of 
the Party cell and its attendant executive organ. 40 
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Admittance to the Party cell was as a Party member or as a 
sympathiser. Admittance of new members, needless to say, 
was slightly more complex: 
admittance to the Party of new members is on the basis, 
approved by the Party's rules and regulations 
(recommendation of two members, period of time spent as a 
candidate member, co~pletion of questionnaires, discussion 
by the local committee a~~ approval by a meeting of the 
[Party-SM]organisation). 
Party sympathisers were also allowed to join the cell but, 
in doing so, had "to attend all sessions of the Party cell 
and submit themselves to Party discipline."4Z For its 
part, the cell could exclude from its composition, " 
members of the Party, candidate-members and sympathisers, 
unworthy of the name of Communist."43 
The Party cells were then instructed to elect from 
their membership a staff of three people (a bureau) which 
would then act as the cells's executive organ. This was 
designed to keep a check on those who attended the 
meetings and those who did not and keep a direct link with 
the local Party committee. 44 The other main functions of 
the bureau were to register the members of the cell and 
distribute work between them.45 
The final two sections of the instructions were concerned 
with the functions of the Party cells, in relation to 
discipline and control. Thus, the Party cell was in 
charge of: 
furthering the organisation of the disciplinary courts, 
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punish~ng all crimes .. Conducting propa~anda about the 
necess1ty for the str1ctest discipline.~b 
In the general area of control, the cells had: 
~o observe ~he fulfilment, by all responsible people[those 
1n charge, 1n other words-SM]of their duties in 
. ' acc~rdance wi49 the demands of the Communist Party and 
Sov1et power. 
In a separate section of the instructions, the cells were 
briefed as regards what they should do on immediately 
being sent to the front: 
on being sent to the front, the cells must:combat all 
forms of deviation and desertion;care about the supply to 
the units of literature, whilst on the front;maintain 
strict discipline;combat faint-heartedness, cowardice and 
pillagi~g;c~~duct agitation amongst the neighbouring 
populat1on. 
Thus, as detailed above, it should now be fairly clear 
that the majority of the Party cells were not working to 
any specific set of instructions, issued by VBVK or the 
Party's CC, but very much according to their own devices 
and how they themselves interpreted their own functions 
and tasks. In centralising the work of the political 
apparatus of the Red Army, such a situation could not be 
tolerated forever and in December 1918, VBVK for 
apparently the first time in its brief history, held a 
direct meeting with a number of front political 
departmental chiefs, at which the tasks and duties of the 
Party cells were discussed and a document eventually 
published which was to form the basis of the CC's 
instructions to front-line Party cells, published in 
Page 130 
January 1919. 49 Obviously, since the meeting involved the 
direct representation of VBVK and centred on the 
discussion of the duties of the Party cells, it will be 
analysed here in detail. 
As stated earlier, following the reorganisational 
shuffle of the Red Army's political apparatus in the 
autumn of 1918, VBVK was in a much stronger position than 
it had previously, as regards trying to exert some form of 
organisational centralisation of the Red Army's front-line 
political apparatus. This should not be taken to mean 
that VBVK, after the autumn of 1918, was the dominant 
political organ for the Red Army, adequately coping with 
all the demands placed on its shoulders. In fact, VBVK 
was still to have a tremendous amount of difficulty in 
trying to exert its authority on the front's political 
apparatus. However, at least in December 1918, it tried 
to increase its authority by holding a meeting with the 
chiefs of the Southern Front's political departments to 
examine the future tasks and role of the Party cells. 50 
According to a telegram sent by the Southern Front's 
political departmental chief, I.I.Khodorovsky, the meeting 
was opened on 3rd December 1918 arid, apart from the army 
political departmental chiefs present, were Yurenev, 
I.N.Smirnov, D.I.Yefremov and, of course, Khodorovsky 
himself.51 Of that particular group, I.N.Smirnov was 
still serving on the Revolutionary Military Council of the 
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Eastern front and, as quoted earlier, would have a very 
good understanding of the problems facing political 
workers on the Eastern Front.52 As constituted, the 
meeting can be viewed as representing opinion both from 
the centre-in the person of Yurenev-and the two main 
fronts at the time-the Eastern and Southern. Hence, 
whatever was decided upon here would have a potentially 
significant effect on the work of the front-line political 
apparatus of the Red Army, as a whole. The agenda for the 
meeting consisted of the following series of points: 
reports from the localities, draft instructions for the 
Party cells and the position of the political departments, 
organisational and Party work in the army,
5
§ultural-
educational work and the current position. 
As regards the Party cells, what the meeting would 
appear to have worked on was a previous draft series of 
instructions, prepared by Yefremov, then serving on the 
8th Army.54 A examination of both this draft set of 
instructions and the instructions that were published 
under the guise of the Party's CC, reveals a large number 
of points where the two documents are virtually saying one 
and the same thing. According to a later telegram of 
Yefremov's, the meeting did introduce a number of changes 
to his original draft series of instructions, 55 and 
changes did appear in the CC instructions to the Party 
cells, issued in January 1919. However, before the 
instructions were published in January 1919, the CC est-
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ablished a special commission to examine the instructions 
in more detail. In one recent collection of primary 
documents, the following explanation is to be fauna: 
the draft of these instructions[January 1919 instructions-
SM]was worked out at a meeting of workers of the political 
departments of the Southern front, alongwith 
representatives of the All-Russian Bureau of Military 
Commissars, which took place at the beginning of December 
1918 and on the lOth December were sent by the political 
department of 8th Army to Ya.M.Sverdlov. 
At a meeting of the bureau of the CC of the RCP(B)on 
19th December 1918,, the decision was taken to instruct a 
commission, consisting of Ya.M.Sverdlov, J.V.Stalin and 
others to approve the instructions. After several 
editorial changes and corrections, the draft of the 
instructions was taken as the basis for the 'Instructions 
of the CC of the RCP(B)to Party cells .•• publisggd in the 
newspaper, 'Izvestiya' ••• on 5th January 1919. 
Therefore, rather than waste time in discussing both 
versions of the instructions, ie the draft version 
prepared by the December meeting and the final version, 
prepared and published by the CC, it would be much easier 
and much more profitable to discuss simply what was 
introduced in January 1919, as a direct result of the 
December 1918 meeting between VBVK and the Front and Army 
political departmental chiefs. 
The "Instructions of the CC of the RCP(B)to Party 
cells of the Red Army units of the front and rear"-to give 
them their full title-were issued on January 5th 1919, 
although they were not actually published in "Pravda" 
until the lOth January 1919. 57 
The instructions consisted of 9 separate sections. ranging 
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from the organisation of the Party cell to their 
relationship with the press.58 In order to cut down on 
the superfluous detail, only those parts of the 
instructions of direct relevance to this particular study 
will be examined here. 
The first section, on the organisation of the Party 
cells, contains a number of fairly familiar points: 
1. All members of the Russian Communist Party in the Red 
Army unit(regiment, division, etc.)will make up the Party 
cell of the unit. 
2. For the organisation of the Party cell, the commissar 
of the unit, or one of the members of the RCP with the 
permission of the commissar will announce the convening of 
an organisational meeting for the formation of the Party 
cell of the RCP, at whi§g all members of the Party are 
invited [to attend-SM]. 
Having organised the cell, the next s·tep was then to 
elect a commission of three people,.instructed to .carry 
out a check of all the members' Party credentials: 
3. At the first meeting, in order to check all the 
presented Party credentials, a commission of three people 
is selected, one member of whom must be the regimental 
commissar, if there is one, who must make a report at the 
next meeting. 
4. The second meeting must take place no later than seven 
days after the first. On hearing the report of the 
commission, the comrades, who have faultless documents, 
will g0 approved at a general meeting as members of the cell. 
The next series of points examined the size of the 
Party cell and the corresponding number of people 
instructed to carry out the work of the cell on a daily 
basis.61 The final point in this section examined the 
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possibility of there being nO Party members in the unit: 
8. If in the given unit, there are absolutely no members 
of the Party, the Party cell may be based on candidate 
members o~ the Party[appointed-SM]by the g~mmissar, or 
some spec1ally appointed Party organiser. 
The next large section of the instructions was 
concerned with listing the main duties and functions of. 
the Party cells and, was, arguably, the most important 
section of the nine listed in the instructions. The 
section began thus: 
9. On the cells is placed the duty of putting into effect 
~11 ~he ~ecreg~ of the leading Party organs and 
1nst1tut1ons. 
This was obviously one of the seminal functions of the 
Party cells or, at least, it should have been. As regards 
the functions of the Party cells both in the units and 
amongst the native local population the instructions 
continue: 
10. To cultivate, by means of propaganda and agitation, 
amongst its soldier-members a clear and firm class 
consciousness. 
11. To carry out cultural-educational work in the 
surrounding population. For this purpose, the cell must 
form a part of the existing cultural-educational 
commissions of the unit, or themselves create 
such[commissions-SM]in accordance with the instructions of 
a higg~r Party cell or the political depart-
ment. 
It is interesting that before the instructions went on 
to examine the role of the Party cell as regards the 
maintenance of discipline ~nd the need to set an example 
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to the men in the unit, the commission thought it 
necessary to place a point about the need to carry out 
propaganda work amongst the local population so 
prominently. This could well be an indication of how 
important the Bolsheviks, at the top anyway, thought of 
agitational work being carried out amongst the ordinary 
peasants. There was an obvious political, as well as 
military, gain to be achieved by this. If the work was a 
success, then the Bolsheviks would be able to increase 
their support amongst the local population and, as regards 
the Red Army, hopefully, the peasants would be more 
obliging in meeting the demands of the locally stationed 
units for food, horses, shelter where appropriate, etc. 
The more the work was successfully conduct-
ed, the better the short and long-term position of both 
the Bolsheviks and the Red Army. 
The next series of points in this particular section 
concern the more orthodox role of the Party cells in the 
areas of discipline and setting a good example to the 
ordinary rank and file: 
12. To mercilessly fight against a breakdown of Party 
discipline within its own sphere. 
13. With all its energy, to render assistance to the 
commissar and the commander in the fight against a 
breakdown of Red Army discipline and, in itself, to be an 
example of the maintenance of such[discipline-SM] •. 
14. To provide an example of utter courage and fort1tude 
in battle, encourage hardiness towards all the 
difficulties and the deprivations ••• In the case of the 
need for volunteers for a dangerous task-spying in the 
enemy's rear, making up a shock group-to put oneself 
forward. 
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15. To bring to the attention of the commissar all 
disorders and abuses in the unit .•• 
16. The cell must constantly work to bring[together-SM]the 
Red Army soldiers and local workers and the pgor peasants 
and remove any misunderstanding between them. ) 
Again similar, in some respects, to the post of 
military commissar, being a member of a Party cell was not 
meant to grant any particularly special privileges to the 
members;on the contrary, the burden on the Party cell 
member was greater than on the ordinary rank and file 
soldier. It was the Party cell member who had to do all 
the necessary "volunteering" for all the risky and 
dangerous field missions that cropped up and, no doubt, 
the disciplining of Party cell members who displayed 
cowardice or a lack of metal in the performance of their 
duties would be particularly severely dealt with, when the 
time came. 
Indeed, in an interview that Trotsky gave a few days 
before the actual publication of these instructions, 
Trotsky was keen to emphasise the overall responsibility 
of the CP members in the cells: 
some soldiers imagine that the title of Communist comes 
with privileges ... Communist cells, created in a hurry, 
have sometimes even shown a desire to compete with the 
commanders and the commissars and take the running of the 
unit into their own hands .•. Party and military authorities 
must firmly explain that Communists in the Red Army do not 
have more rights,
6
gnly more responsibilities than every 
Red Army soldier. 
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The necessity of creating a core of Party members, willing 
to make the supreme sacrifice, was further emphasised in 
the next point of the instructions: 
17. All the work of the Party cell in each Red Army unit 
must boil down to the task of creating, in the unit, a 
strong nucleus of Communists and sympathisers, imbued with 
the realisation of the serious significance of victory on 
the front for the socialist Motherland, ready at the 
necessary moment ... to lay down their lives for the sake of 
victory:··g~erywhere fighting against the spread of lies 
and pan1c. 
The next couple of points examined the role of the 
Party cell in the conduct of propaganda amongst· the troops 
and, on a somewhat unrelated theme, its relationship to 
the command staff: 
18. For successful Party propaganda, the cell must: 
a)concern itself with the distribution of newspapers and 
literature on political and military matters, b)hold 
general ~eadings and talks, c)if it is possible, organise 
lessons on political literacy, etc. 
19. The Party cells will not intg§fere in the activities 
and orders of the command staff. 
The latter point, in particular, a number of the men who 
served on the CC commission which examined the draft 
instructions would have personal experience of, ie where 
the interference of the Party cells in the work of the 
command staff was not something which the Bolsheviks 
wanted. Especially in the military arena, where the chain 
of command and control is vital for the successful conduct 
of military operations, the interference of the Party 
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cells in the purely strategic and operational art, it was 
important that the Bolsheviks stamped on this at the 
source. The functions of the Party cells in this area had 
never really been worked out, in any particular detail, 
but it is true to say that the Bolsheviks had always stood 
for the non-interference in operational decision-making 
approach, rather than accepting the possibility that the 
Party cells had a right or a duty to get involved in such 
a technical capacity. 
The next important section of the instructions 
concerned the links between the Party cells and the higher 
Party institutions, although it still did not manage to 
define clearly enough the relationship between the 
political department and the Party cell: 
29. The Party centre of
6
ghe of the regiment is the 
praesidium of the cell. 
The praesidium of the Party cell was to consist of three-
five people(depending on the overall size of the Party 
cell)and was to carry out the work of the cell on a 
general basis. 70 
The other main points in this section were: 
30. By decision of the army's political departments, 
divisional Party bureaux may be created from 
representatives of the regimental(and other)Party cells. 
31. The army and front political departments may convene 
divisional and army meetings[of Party cells-SM], in order 
to discuss matters connected with the position of 
political work in the army. . 
32. The meetings will not elect any execut1ve 
organs(bureaux, etc). 
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33. The Party cells are linked with the Party centres 
through th~ political departments at the front and the 
local comm1ttees of the RCP in the rear.7 
The instructions would seem to have come across this 
particular difficulty and proposed a reasonably practical 
solution to the problem-although, on saying that, it did 
not answer the question of who was in charge of the Party 
cells per se. However, given the conditions at the front, 
the CC would appear to have opted for the safest way out 
of the problem:if the Party cell was operating in a front-
line military unit, then the front political department 
was its link with the other Party organs; if, however, the 
Party cell was operating in a unit in the rear of the Red 
Army, then the local Party committee was there. 
The next section of the instructions was concerned with 
the relationship of the regimental Party cells to the 
commissars and the command staff. 72 Overall, it has to be 
stated right from the start that the January 1919 
instructions did considerably strengthen the power of the 
commissars in relation to the Party cells. The commissar 
was made responsible for the organisation of the Party 
cell73; checking on the Party affiliation of each of its 
members74; granting the commissar the right to call a 
meeting of the Party cell on a regular basis. etc. 75 
However, in this particular section, the power of the 
regimental commissar was still further increased: 
34. The regimental Party cell has, in the face of the 
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commissar, approved by a higher Party institution, the 
leader of Party activity on the front. In the case of a 
disagreement bet~een the commissar and the Party cell, the 
latter has the r1ght of appeal to a higher Party organ. 16 
However, it has to be said that the next series of 
points on the relationship between the two bodies 
introduced a number of checks on the power of the 
commissars vis a vis the Party cells: 
35. A meeting, convened by the cell to complain about the 
activities of the commissar, cannot be stopped or 
postponed by him, unless in conditions of military 
activity, when it may be postponed for up to seven days 
only. 
36. The commissar cannot rightly hinder the sending of a 
delegate from the Party cell to the political department, 
with a report on the 79ature, or complaints about, his[the commissar's-SM]work. 
The final two points in this section were concerned 
with the Party cell doing its utmost to ensure that the 
ordinary rank and file soldier had trust in the commissar, 
as well as trusting the military commander and, in the 
event of some act of treachery that the Party cell render 
the commissar all help necessary to liquidate the 
treason. 78 
The other main sections in the January 1919 
instructions were concerned with the adoption and 
exclusion of members;financing the activities of the Party 
cell;the duties of the Party cell's praesidium and, 
finally, the lack of a press organ for the Party ce11. 79 
The most interesting point in the remainder of the January 
1919 instructions was the point concerning the removal of 
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members from the Party cell: 
43. The expulsion of members from the cell can take place: 
a)by decree of the higher and local Party institutions; 
b)at the front, by decree of the political department of 
the ~rmy or the front, based on a declaration of a general 
meet1ng of the cell or the commissar.8u 
Th~s, it was not purely a matter for the Party cell to 
settle-some higher form of Party organ also had to be 
involved in the decision-making process. 
In assessing the overall importance of the January 
1919 instructions, it is very difficult to say anything 
based on hard documentary evidence. Simply put, there is 
not enough documentary evidence available for proper 
I 
examination. All that does exist is a number of 
generalised statements. For instance, in assessing the 
overall importance of the January 1919 instructions, one 
Soviet historian of the Red Army's political apparatus had 
the following to say in 1928: 
in the course of the development of the army-political 
apparatus, by the end of 1918 .•. all the basic component 
parts of the system of the Party's leadership of the army 
were apparent-the far-flung network of lower Party organs, 
the institute of commissars and the system of political 
departments. But at the same time, in the work of all 
these layers of the political apparatus there was a lack 
of sufficient coordination and harmony, which created a 
confusion of rights and responsibilities, parallelism, not 
too rare internal friction, etc. 
What was necessary was the following step-a unification of 
all the elements of the army's political apparatus into 
one centralised and internally unified organisation ... 
The first significant attempt in this area was the 
publication, by the CC in January 1919, of the 
instructions to the errty cells, outlining their general 
tasks and functions. 
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The latter quote obviously placed the Jpuary 1919 
instructions against the wider background of the 
disharmony and discord in the Red Army's political 
apparat~s at the time. As has already been detailed, 
there was a fair amount of disunity in the army's 
political apparatus and if one looks at the figures 
concerning the growth in the number of Party cells in the 
Red Army after January 1919, it can be said that, if 
nothing else, certainly the January 1919 instructions did 
not hinder the further development and growth of the Red 
Army's Party cells. 
For example, in February 1919 alone, the number of 
Party cells in the armies of the Eastern Front increased 
dramatically-in 1st Army, the number of new Party cells 
formed in February alone stood at 64;in the 2nd Army, 30 
new Party cells were formed in that one month;in 5th Army, 
54 new Party cells were formed. 82 One must assume that 
the increase in Party cells must have meant a subsequent 
increase in the number of Party members and sympathisers 
in the units. 
Certainly, this was the case as regards the growth of 
CP representation in the armies on the Southern Front. As 
previously noted, by the end of December 1918, in the 8th, 
9th and lOth Armies(Southern Front), there were 122 Party 
cells, 38 groups of Communist sympathisers, totalling some 




By the beginning of February 1919, the 
figures had increased to 154 Party cells(no separate 
figure given for the number of groups of Communist 
sympathisers)combining a total of 3,320 CP members and 
2,976 sympathisers.84 
Assuming that the figures are accurate and that a 
similar trend could have been detected on the other 
fronts, it would appear that the trend towards the 
increase in numbers of Party cells in the Red Army, with 
the subsequent increase in the number of CP members and 
their sympathisers, can be partially explained by the 
publication and the putting into effect of the January 
1919 instructions. Hence, Geronimus' earlier statement on 
the subject wo~ld appear to have been a fairly accurate 
reflection of what did happen to the Red Army's political 
apparatus at the time-an increase in the centralisation of 
the Red Army's political apparatus, with more control of 
the latter being put in to the hands of the political 
departments. 
However, in all of this, it is very difficult, almost 
impossible, to find any link with the centralised 
political apparatus in Moscow. Indeed, other than VBVK's 
brief discussion with the chiefs of the political 
departments of the Southern Front in December 1918, VBVK's 
contact with the Party cells would appear to have been on 
a very limited basis. Even though VBVK was still not, 
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technically, a Party-organ, it was, nonetheless, the organ 
in charge of the Party's political apparatus in the Red 
Army and should have been expected to play a much more 
prominent role in the development and functioning of the 
apparatus than the one just described. However, the real 
challenge to the continued functioning of VBVK came not 
from the Party cells, or even the military commissars, but 
the organ for the control and operation of the Red Army's 
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CHAPTER TWO (SECTION FOUR):-
VBVK AND THE RED ARMY'S POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS (JUNE 1918-
APRIL 1919). 
In the last section, the role and duties of the Party 
cells were described, as well as the nature of their 
relationship with VBVK. As stated in the conclusion to 
the last section, at that time, the main influence on the 
general conduct of political work.did not emanate from the 
central political apparatus, but more from organs, which 
were placed infinitely closer to the needs and demands 
emanating from the front itself-most noticeably, the Red 
Army's political departments. The latter were brought 
into being by a mixture of local initiative and a 
particularly local perception of what was needed, rather 
than by any one decree, being issued from the centre. In 
effect, they came into being almost as a direct response 
to the lack of control emanating from the central 
political apparatus, and thereby ensured a measure of 
control and coordination of the political and cultural-
educational work being carried out at the front. 
Throughout 1918-1919, the power of the political 
departments slowly, but surely, increased as the demand 
and need for greater centralised control grew. Certainly, 
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even before the creation of the Political Administration 
of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the 
Republic(hereinafter referred to by the English 
transliteration of the Russian abbreviation, PUR)in May 
1919, the Red Army's political departments were playing a 
substantial role in the political and cultural education 
of the men in the Red Army. 
Overall then, even at this relatively early stage, it 
would be reasonably safe to begin this section by stating, 
at the outset, that the political departments played a key 
role in the development and work of the Red Army's 
political apparatus at the front. This particular section 
will seek to analyse the following main points, ·as regards 
the history and activity of the political departments at 
this time:first of all, the creation and development of 
the political departments during VBVK's period of 
power;secondly, their relationship to VBVK during 1918-
1919;thirdly, their relationship to the other political 
and cultural-educational organisations in the 
units;fourthly, their powers and duties within the Red 
Army at this time, and, finally, a comprehensive 
assessment of their overall role in the Red Army in 1918-
1919. 
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(i) The creation and growth of the network of political 
departments on the Eastern Front(June-December 1918) 
Having examined a number of primary and secondary 
source materials on the topic, it would appear that there 
seems to be an element of confusion, as regar~s the 
creation of the first political department in the Red 
Army. In Fedotoff White's history of the Red Army, 
quoting a early Soviet source, the latter stated that: 
attempts at the political guidance of the front units were 
apparently made as early as December 1917. The official 
Soviet history of the Civil War makes mention of the 
establishment of a political department at the H.Q. of the 
Commander in Chief of the Soviet troops in the south. 
This department published a politico-military paper. In 
this way, at a very early date, fhe political control of 
the army units began to develop. 
If one does go back to the-original source, then one finds 
that Fedotoff \fuite has indeed taken the relevant piece of 
evidence, virtually word for word, from A.Geronimus' brief 
essay on the history of the Red Army's political 
apparatus: 
at this time on the front[December 1917-SM], attached to 
the staff headquarters of our troops in the south was 
created a political departmen~, which published a 
military-political newspaper. 
Unfortunately, Geronimus did not provide any further 
information on this political department and, other than 
the fact that he saw fit to mention it in his essay, there 
is no other piece of evidence, currently available, to 
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support his contention that this department can be 
considered as an early forerunner to the political 
departments that were to crop up in the R~d Army in the 
spring-summer of 1918. Indeed, all the other Soviet 
historians who have written on this particular matter have 
argued that ·the earliest known political department 
created in the Red Army was created on what was to become 
the Eastern Front, in June 1918 and, as will be described 
below, there certainly would appear to be wholesale 
agreement on this by a large number of Soviet historians. 
As regards Geronimus' statement, it certainly would appear 
to be worthy of mention but, without any further evidence, 
almost impossible to verify. After all, the Red Army had 
commissars serving in its ranks at that time and yet the 
commissars which were to serve in the units of the Red 
Army in the spring-summer 1918 were not identical to those 
which served in the military units in late 1917-early 
1918. Therefore, it could be the case that there was a 
political department, of some description, serving in the 
military units of the south, supportive of the Bolshevik 
regime, but whether this political department bore any 
real resemblance to the future political departments of 
the Red Army would have to be left open to question. For 
the time being, it probably would be a good idea just to 
return to the established views on the origins of the Red 
Army's first identifiable political department, bearing in 
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mind Geronimus' earlier statement. 
According to a recent history of the Red Army's 
political apparatus, the first political department of the 
Red Army came into being in early June 1918: 
on the 11th June 1918, a political department was formed 
attached to the staff H.Q. of the North-Urals-Siberian 
Front, from which was later formed 3rd Army. The 
political department was organised by representatives of 
the Supreme Military Inspectorate, carrying out work for 
the creation of units of the Red Army in an area of 
~ilitary ac§ivity directed against the White Guard Czech 
1nsurgents. 
This view of the creation of the Red Army's first 
political department has been similarly argued for in such 
works as E.F.Krivosheenkova, "Sozdanie i deyatelnost 
politorganov armiy Vostochnogo fronta s interventami i 
belogvardeitsami(1918-1920 gg.)"(M.1972) 4 ;v.G.Kolychev's 
"Partiino-politicheskaya rabota v Krasnoi Armii v gody 
grazhdans;k:oi voiny. 1918-1920."(M.1979) 5 and, finally, 
V.M.Portnov and M.M.Slavin, "Pravovye osnovy stroitelstva 
Krasnoi Armii. 1918-1920 gg."(M.1985) 6 • 
If the -~ statement is historically correct (and 
there certainly would appear to be one good piece of 
historical evidence to support.the latter), then the 
statement does raise a number of interesting points, not 
least of which is that the political department would 
appear to have been brought into being as a partial 
response to a direct military threat, rather than meeting 
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specific political requirements emanating from Moscow or, 
for that matter, the local Party headquarters. The 
involvement of the Supreme Military Inspectorate-and not, 
it should be stressed, VBVK- is also worthy of further 
comment, as it would appear to demonstrate the latter's 
lack of control and initiative, even at this early stage, 
in the organisation of political work at the front. This 
would seem to indicate a pattern that was to be repeated 
in the months ahead. 
As regards the accuracy of the claim that the above 
was the Red Army's first political department, as 
previously stated, there is one good piece of factual 
evidence, available to the researcher, which helps to shed 
light on the work and initial responsibilities of this 
particular political department. In a early Civil War 
journal published on the Red Army's Eastern Front in 1919, 
an article was published entitled, "the work of the 
political department of 3rd Army to 1st November 1918". 7 
The article began with examining the thinking that led to 
the creation of this political department and, similar to 
the previous statement quoted earlier, would again 
demonstrate that the political department was created in 
direct response to an actual military threat: 
in order to counteract the agitation of the White Guard 
agents, it became vitally obvious that the broadest 
possible agitation was conducted, both by the written and 
the spoken word, and that political work be strengthened.
8 This stimulated the creation of the political department. 
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The article continued to list the immediate background to 
the creation of the political department: 
the political department was founded on about the 20th 
June[a date supported by Krivosheenkova in her work-SM]. 
However, the first period of its existence was spent in 
Ekaterinburg and lasted from 20th June-26th July. The 
department developed only slightly its activity and the 
composition of its staff was fairly limited(chief, a 
secretary and 2-3 responsible assistants and technical 
personnel •.• Political representatives in the localities(on 
important railway junctions and at the front)were 
subordinated to the political department, who had to send 
in reports on their work •.. and receive, in return, papers 
and leaflets for dis~ribution amongst the troops and the 
civilian population. 
Thus, it would appear that, initially, the political 
department saw its role as being in the general area of 
agitational work, both amongst the troops and the local 
civilian population. Given the apparent threat emanating 
from the White Guardist forces operating in the vicinity, 
this would appear to have been the primary duty of the 
political department then but, as will be shown, as the 
situation developed and the power of the political 
department grew, the functions and duties of the political 
department changed as well: 
the work of the department significantly increased at the 
beginning of August when, after a short stay at Kushve, 
the H.Q. and its political department were moved to Perm. 
Then, almost the entire department was split into a number 
of sections .•• the following sections were created: 
information, literary-agitational, expeditionary and 
publications. Agitational work, formerly completely 
irregular and sporadic, began to be put right with the 
creation of a spr6ial section and the arrival of agitators 
from the centre. 
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In detailing these changes, the report then went on to 
list the functions of each of these sections: 
the work has been allocated thus, the information section 
is in charge of registering radio and agency telegrams, 
the compilation of daily political secret reports, the 
compilation of operational reports for the newspapers, 
[the compilation of-SM]reports on the political life on 
the front ... the literary-agitational section i3 mainly in 
charge of the distribution of agitators and the leadership 
of their work;the publications' section is in charge of 
the publication of newspapers, brochures, leaflets, 
bulletins, etc; the expeditionary srrtion is in charge of 
sending to literature to the front. 
Thus, as contained in the above extracts from the report, 
it is obvious that the political department, at least as 
it initially came in to being, was more concerned with the 
direction and conduct of a broad agitational campaign than 
anything else. As revealed by one of the USSR's leading 
historians on the topic, the political departments were 
also useful in providing the military commissars with some 
sort of back-up, in the performance of their duties: 
at the beginning of their activity, the political 
departments played the role of an administrative-political 
apparatus for the military commissars, helping them in the 
organisation of political and cultural-educational work, 
implementing control over the military specialists, the 
placing of military commissars in the units •.. they[the 
political de~artments-SM]assumed.a bro~d range of 
12 functions, r1ght down to the reg1strat1on of the men. 
Following on from the creation of the Red Army's 
first-or, at least, potentially first-Army political 
department, it was not too long before the first political 
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department, designed to take control of the political 
activity of a whole front, came in to being. Although 
there is some confusion as to the exact date-as will be 
shown below-of the creation of the first Front political 
department, there is general agreement about the 
approximate circumstances surrounding its creation. As 
one modern account states: 
in July 1918, the political department of the Eastern 
Front was formed-the first political organ at front-level. 
Its creation was led by members of the Revolutionary 
Military Soviet, K.Kh.Danishevsky and K.A.Mekhonoshin jnd 
the head of the political department was I.N.Smirnov. 1 
A slightly more revealing account of the formation of the 
Eastern Front's political department-and one that leads to 
the confusion of dating the precise formation of the 
political department-can be found in A.Geronimus' essay on 
the Red Army's political apparatus in the Civil War, 
published in a collection of essays on the Civil War in 
1928: 
by[decree-SM]the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the 
Eastern Front, whilst it was still headed by Muraviev, a 
Poltical department was created, split into a number of 
sections(agitational-literary, publishing, information and 
communications, etc). The lack of any significant traces 
of its activity allows us to conclude that the work of 
t~is_f~rst fr£~t political department had no decisive 
s1gn1f1cance. 
Although the latter statement can be viewed as being 
slightly contentious, to say the least, Geronimus' 
statement that the front political department was created 
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whilst Muraviev was in charge of the Eastern Front does 
begged to be examined, as, almost in the same breath, 
Geronimus throws a lot of cold water on chis piece of 
chronology by stating that the Eastern Front's political 
department came in to force by a decree of the Eastern 
Front's Revolutionary Military Soviet, dated 22nd July 
1918. Judging by a number of accounts of the Civil War, 
Muraviev had quit the Bolshevik cause, so to speak, 
certainly no later than 11th July 191815_therefore, it 
would appear that Geronimus has simply made a mistake 
about the chronology of the events he has described. 
Thus, putting all the necessary pieces of information 
together-and leaving aside the details concerning the 
exact formation of the Eastern Front's political 
department-it would appear that the first Front political 
department bore a remarkable resemblance to the earlier 
created Army political department, both in terms of 
organisational structure and, on the face of it, functions 
and duties. The emphasis, at the time, would appear to 
have been on the political departments conducting 
agitational work, both amongst the soldiers and the 
civilian population, although as the tasks grew more 
complicated, then the whole structure of both the 
political departments at Front- and Army-level changed to 
match the new tasks placed before it. Needless to 
say, the political departments would appear to have been 
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more dynamic organs than anything else that had been 
created, or organised, before them. They appeared to 
respond to the need, both felt actually at the front and 
in the centre, for an apparatus that could more readily 
respond to the political and cultural-educational needs of 
the men serving at the front. This should not be taken to 
mean that all the political problems of the Bolsheviks in 
the Red Army were solved instantly with the creation and 
growth in the political departments-as will be shown 
below, problems still remained for the Bolsheviks and the 
political departments to solve-but with the creation of 
the Red Army's first political department in the summer of 
1918, the Bolsheviks had taken a big step towards more 
effectively controlling and coordinating the political 
work that they thought important to the waging of the 
Civil War. 
As stated above, with the creation of the first 
political department, a dynamic seems to have been set in 
motion which saw the creation of other political 
departments on the Eastern Front. In 3rd Army, the first 
divisional departments were created16 ; not long after 
that, apparently, another Army political department came 
into being "in the second half of June 1918"-1st Army's 
political department had been created. 17 
Whilst it is, as yet, difficult to say precisely what~re 
the exact conditions that gave rise to the political 
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departments, it would seem that a great role in their 
creation and organisation belonged to the Revolutionary 
Military Soviets-it should be noted, for instance, that 
the Army- and Front-political departmen~s were 
subordinated to the control of the relevant Army- and 
Front-level Revolutionary Military Soviets.18 Therefore, 
in examining the background to the creation of the 
political departments, it would be worthwhile to attempt 
to ascertain the role of the relevant Revolutionary 
Military Soviets(hereinafter referred to simply as RMS). 
One way to try and work out a connection between the 
relevant political departments and the RMS is to examine 
their personnel composition and see if there is a link-up 
there and, overall, there would appear to be a very strong 
tie-up indeed. 
As we already know, the three men who are identified 
~ 
as having played a crucial role in the creation of the Red 
Army's first political department-Danishevsky, Mekhonoshin 
and I.N.Smirnov-were all members of the Eastern Front's 
RMS in July-August 1918, not long after the actual 
creation of the political department. 19 Similarly, if we 
examine the personnel composition of the RMS of 3rd and 
1st Armies respectively, we find a number of men there who 
played an important role in the Red Army's political 
apparatus; either at a local level or, even, at a national 
level. For instance, in June-July 1918, amongst the 
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members of the RMS of 1st Army were such prominent 
political figures in the future history of the Red Army's 
political apparatus as O.Yu.Kalnin and V.V.Kuibyshev. 20 
As regards the political composition of the RMS of 3rd 
Army, then one only has to realise that no less a 
personage than the future head of PUR itself-I.T.Smilga-
was a member of the former to testify that, indeed, there 
would appear to be strong evidence to support the claim 
that the link between the political departments and the 
RMS was a strong one. A number of the key personnel in 
the RMS would certainly appeared to have, at least, 
doubled up and worked in the relevant political 
departments. Given the scarcity of experienced Party 
figures, this should not come about as too much of a 
surprise-after all, there were plenty of instances, both 
in the past and in the future, when experienced Party 
workers had to satisfy the demands of a number of posts, 
held concurrently. 
In a report published in December 1918, but partially 
referring to the early history of the political apparatus 
on the Eastern Front, the author of the report-
I.N.Smirnov-described the early problems and tasks that 
awaited the newly formed political apparatus: 
before September 1918, political work in the army was 
uncoordinated. The general position at the front can be 
described thus:both the command staff and the political 
workers had to strain every nerve in order to overcome the 
separation of isolated armies. If, up until the present 
day, there were cases when separate military groups 
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appealed directly to the Chairman of the cc· or Sovnarkom 
on military and supply mattefs then in political work 
this happened all the time.l ' · 
What was so special about the events of September 1918 
that the actual month deserved special mention is 
difficult to ascertain. Certainly, there would appear to 
have been no special CC decision or set of instructions 
issued, relevant to the proper functioning of the Red 
Army's political apparatus;it could be that Smirnov was 
making a reference to the decisions made by a particular 
congress of political workers of the Eastern Front-
although, on saying that, the only such congress known to 
have taken place was a congress of political workers of 
the Eastern Front's 1st Army held in late September 1918, 
not known for any particularly unique degree of radical 
decision making. 22 In other words, without access to .the 
relevant information, it is impossible to say precisely 
why Smirnov decided that September 1918 was the beginning 
of the more coordinated work of the Eastern Front's 
political apparatus. 
The feeling of "separatism", referred to by Smirnov, 
was a symptom of one of the main problems facing the Red 
Army's political apparatus at that time-the difficulty in 
centralising and coordinating an apparatus that was badly 
disjointed. The political departments, working, as they 
did, so close to the front, knew that if the political 
departments were not able to centralise the work of the 
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apparatus, then the political and cultural-educational 
work that they were designed to carry out would be much 
harder to do. Certainly, as previously described in the 
previous sections, the Red Army's political apparatus 
strongly needed a degree of centralism in its work if it 
were to improve its overall effectiveness. Separatism, in 
whatever form it took, could only do harm to the 
successful conduct of the necessary agitational, political 
and cultural-educational work to be carried out. Hence, 
in his report, Smirnov made special reference to the 
creation of a Political department which, despite its 
rather brief history, as will be detailed later, was an 
attempt by the political and military centre to try and 
increase the coordination and control of political work 
being carried out on the front: 
the creation of a Political department, attached to the 
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic, had to put 
an end to the amateurish attempts of. political activity, 
although the separatism is only overcome with great 
difficulty. Overcoming it is necessary, otherwise it will 
not be possible to correctl2
3
distribute Party strength 
over the fronts and armies. 
The creation of a political department, attached to the 
highest military organ of the Republic, in effect, should 
have allowed the Bolsheviks more of a chance to more fully 
centralise the work of the Red Army's political apparatus 
but, as was happening with VBVK at the time, the lack of 
the necessary information flowing in to the Political 
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department of RVSR seriously hampered its work and it was 
not too long before the organ was abolished and a 
strengthened VBVK took its place, as will be detailed 
later on in this section. 
Further on in his report, Smirnov went on to analyse 
the organisation and work of th~ Army political 
departments, as they had grown since the summer of 1918: 
each army has a political department, usually consisting 
of 12-15 comrades. They are divided into 
groups:organisation, agitation, cultural-educational and 
publications. All Communists, arriving in the armies, are 
registered in the department and distr~zuted according to 
the needs of the regiments and squads. 
Apparently, Smirnov always tried to ensure that in each 
regiment there was a group of Communists of between 10-20 
men to carry.out the necessary work. 25 Problems which the 
political departments encountered in their work ·on the 
Eastern Front were, according to Smirnov's report, 
parallelism with the work of the Army committees 26 ;the 
relative youthfulness of the majority of the Party members 
sent to the political departments and, finally, the actual 
total number of Communists in each of the armies. 2 7 As 
Smirnov himself stated in the report: 
about 80% of the people who have passed through my hands 
are Bolsheviks of 17 and 18 years old. Chiefs of 
political departments in the army despair of such workers 
and continue to se2§ in demands for workers with longer 
Party memberships. 
Smirnov also expressed a degree of caution, as regards the 
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total numbers of Communists in the armies, arguing that if 
the armies were brought up to full military strength, but 
there was no corresponding increase in the numbers of 
Party members, then the situation for the Party control of 
the armies could decidedly worsen: 
in the 1st Army, there are about 250 Communists, in the 
2nd Army there are about 300, in the 3rd Army, there are 
about 2,000 men, in the 4th Army, there are about 1,400 
and in the 5th Army, there are about 600 members. With 
this strength, we can hold the army in ou~ hands, but if 
we bring the regiments up to full strength, then the 
armies will increase 3-4 times. If the number of 
Communists re2~ins the same, then here will lie for us a 
great danger. 
Smirnov's proposed solution to this potentially tricky 
situation was to increase the number of Red officers, who 
could effectively combine the functions of commander and 
commissar and relieve some of the burden on the shoulders 
of the political departments.30 
Thus, at least as regards the development of the political 
departments on the Eastern Front, it would appear that the 
latter had gradually transformed themselves from being 
part of the military-administrative apparatus to taking on 
the responsibilities of being the leading organs for 
political work on the front. The political departments 
had to face the twin problems of parallelism and 
separatism and, in attempting to unite the political 
apparatus, as a whole, still faced an added danger of 
being viewed as being cut off from the mass of the 
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soldiers themselves, the people that they were supposed 
primarily to serve. This was made clear in a very early 
account of the work of the Eastern Front's political 
apparatus, published whilst the Civil War was still 
raging, in actual fact: 
for a long time, one saw the alienation of the political 
departments from the Red Army mass. Even although the 
political departments were decreed[a probable reference to 
the decree of 5th December 1918 which granted them 
official recognition-SM], there were still no instructions 
for their work:everything was based on personal 
initiative. One must not negate the importance of 
personal initi~£ive but, in this instance, it very slowly 
proved itself. 
In order to combat this feeling of alienation between the 
political departments and the soldiers, this particular 
author proposed that the burden of political work be 
shifted away from the Army and Front political departments 
and onto the regimental and divisional political 
departments, a proposal that, in actual fact, was to be 
put into effect after the 8th Party Congress in March 
1919. 32 
Before leaving the analysis of the work of the 
political departments on the Eastern Front, for the time 
being, one other work of the period worthy of analysis, 
was written by a former military commissar of 4th Army-
G.D.Lindov-and published in 1919. 33 As a front-line 
military commissar, Lindov was in an ideal position to 
examine the apparatus from the inside so to speak and, 
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where necessary propose changes in its structure. As 
regards the tasks and organisation of the political 
departments, Lindov had actually quite a lot to say and it 
is to a description of the latter that we now turn. 
He began his section on the political departments by 
stating that the political departments had a dual set of 
functions to perform-"one Party, the other military".34 
Given the nature of the functions of the military 
commissars, the Party cells and, most probably, the Army 
committees, it could easily be argued that each and every 
part of the Red Army's political apparatus, at that time, 
had a dual set of functions to perform. He elucidated the 
point still further, by stating that the twin tasks of the 
political departments, as he saw it, were "to direct and 
lead the activities of the Party workers in the army" and 
"to carry out the tasks, placed on the commissars." 35 
Curiously enough, in his interpretation of matters, he 
viewed the latter as the political department carrying out 
its military duties, a view which, arguably, under valued 
the role of the military commissars in the political 
sphere. In his further description of the organisational 
structure of the political department, Lindov seems to 
have been drawing on some sort of ideal organisational 
structure, one which is almost impossible, at the present 
time, to examine as being of much relevance to the real, 
practical activity of the political departments. In his 
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ideal vision of the Army political department, Lindov 
argued that the political department should consist of the 
following sub-departments:organisation-agitation;literary-
publications; cultural-educational;information and 
communications; a military court and, finally, a 
secretariat. 36 Some of the sub-departments he thought 
would have to be further sub-divided into a number of sub-
sections, thereby leading to a fairly complex 
organisational structure, much more complicated than the 
original political departmental structure. Overall, the 
army political department, as viewed by Lindov, would 
carry out a wide range of functions, ranging from purely 
agitational work to organising communes of poor peasants 
in the local villages. 37 As stated earlier, though, it 
has to be stressed that this would appear to have been a 
set of ideal views of the political department and, as 
will be shown below, the latter did not really come into 
effect until the later stages of the Civil War. Still, in 
view of the fact that Lindov was a front-line commissar, 
his views on the whole subject of the political 
departments are worth ~ring in mind. 
Throughout the autumn of 1918, the political apparatus 
on the Eastern Front continued to develop, with an 
increased role for the political departments. On 1st 
September 1918, a "chief political commissar" was 
appointed-F.I.Goloshchekin-who was placed in charge of not 
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only political work in the vicinity of 3rd Army, but also 
placed in charge of its staff political department.38 A 
few days after that appointment, V.V.Kuibyshev, as chief 
of the political department of 1st Army, made a report on 
latter's activity, in which he especially noted the work 
of the political department in the surrounding villages: 
oral and written agitation have achieved favourable 
results, committees of the poor are being organised, the 
local soviets are being strengthened, cultural-educational 
work is being carried out. In the villages, about 200 
libraries have been organised. A front newspaper is being 
published, it has a circulation of 10,000 copies ... in 
total, there are 200 Communists working in the army, 
although it should be noted that recently from the centre, 
they have sent us ver3
9
poor agitators, who can only be 
used with difficulty. 
Thus, despite the success of some of the work being 
carried out, Kuibyshev was not slow in complaining about a 
poor bunch of agitators being sent out from the centre and 
yet, regardless of complaints, the pace of development of 
the political apparatus still gathered momentum. At the 
beginning of September 1918, the political department of 
2nd Army published a series of instructions on the 
"responsibilities of the military commissars" operating in 
the units of 2nd Army. On 9th September 1918, 
Goloshchekin published an order on the creation of 
divisional and brigade political departments, subordinate 
to 3rd Army's staff political department. 40 At the end of 
the month, as mentioned briefly earlier, the First 
Congress of Communists of 1st Army was held at Ruzaevka, 
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at which, amongst other things, the organisation of 
divisional political departments was discussed.41 
Therefore, throughout the month of September 1918, a 
number of moves were made which, in different ways, 
further redefined the structure or the tasks of the 
political departments on the Eastern Front. Again, what 
has to be underlined is the distinct lack of involvement 
of VBVK in all this activity. This refers back to the 
criticism about the reliance on personal initiative and 
the lack of any centralised instructions. Indeed, as has 
been shown by the examination of the Eastern Front's 
political apparatus, VBVK was simply not involved at any 
level. The political departments were not borne out of 
any particular ·initiative emanating from the centre and, 
to all intents and purposes, were very much left to their 
own, as regards the conduct of the necessary agitational, 
political and cultural-educational work. However, in 
October 1918, a congress did take place on the Eastern 
Front at which one of the central political organs-the 
Political department of RVSR- seems to have been involved, 
even if only partially. Given the overall importance of 
the congress, as regards the future development of the 
political apparatus on the Eastern Front, especially the 
political departments, it will now be analysed in detail 
here. 
Between 21st-24th October 1918, in the city of 
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Simbirsk, a congress was held of the chiefs of political 
departments of the armies of the Eastern Front.42 One 
Soviet historian, in evaluating the overall importance of 
the meeting has dubbed the congress "practically the first 
all-army meeting of political workers."43 Although there 
is some doubt as to who actually decided to convene such a 
congress-it was either the Party's CC or RVSR's Political 
department 44 , there can be little doubt about its 
importance to the future development of the Red Army's 
political apparatus-unfortunately, despite its importance, 
the congress has received very little attention by Soviet 
scholars of the subject, presumably because of the people 
involved, rather than the subjects touched upon at the 
congress. Only one Soviet historian has spent any real 
time on a~alysing the meeting and, so, the bulk of what 
follows has largely been derived from his own account of 
the meeting. Where possible, things have been checked but 
that has only been possible in a very few instances. 
Other than representatives of the Eastern Front's 
political apparatus, it would appear that the only other 
political representatives at the meeting came from the 
Supreme Military Inspectorate, somewhat apt given the fact 
that the latter did play an important role in the 
establishment of the Red Army's first political department 
in the summer of 1918. 45 There would appear to have been 
no representative from VBVK; RVSR's Political department 
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was, however, represented at the congress, by its chief-
the self-same I.N.Smirnov, who had been appointed to head 
the Political department of RVSR in October 1918.46 It 
should be noted, though, that a number of invitations to 
the meeting did go out, only that the invited delegates 
were not able to attend:these included the Chief of the 
political department of the Southern Front, D.I.Yefremov 
and representatives from the Operations' Department of the 
People's Commissariat of Military Affairs.47 
According to Nenarokov's research, the main aims of 
the congress were: 
on the basis of the experience of the work of the Party-
political apparatus of the Eastern Front, to instil a 
uniform system for the construction of the leading Party-
propagandistic organs, to work out the structur~8 6f the political departments and demarcate their work. 
Judging by what was said at the congress, the latter 
would seem to have gone a long way to realising the 
demands of the congress. Needless to say, Smirnov was to 
play an important role at the congress and, in his first 
speech to the congress, chose as his first point for 
discussion the parallelism in the functioning of the two 
central political organs-VBVK and RVSR's Political 
department.49 In this part of his speech, Smirnov stated 
plainly the functions of the two organs at the time: 
at this time, the Political department of the 
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic works mainly 
for the front and, most of all, for the Eastern Front;the 
activity of Communists in the rear military units is led 
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by the Bureau of Military Commissars.SO 
According to Nenarokov's work Smirnov proposed that 
the two organs be united and rid the central political 
apparatus of this paral1el~sm.5 1 Indeed, without jumping 
ahead too much, this did happen:on 13th November 1918, 
RVSR issued an order fusing the two organs together.5 2 
Yurenev was still left in charge of the newly constituted 
VBVK, though. 
Smirnov then went on to discuss the work of the 
Eastern Front's political apparatus, especially as it had 
affected the organisation of the local soviets and the 
committees of the poor.53 According to one delegate, 1st 
Army's political department alone had created 140 
committees of the poor and aided the rebuilding of other 
Party and Soviet organs, in regions closest to the 
front.5 4 However, despite the importance of the political 
departments in the overall area of rebuilding or creating 
various other Soviet and Party organs, Smirnov argued that 
one of the main tasks of the whole political apparatus on 
the Eastern Front was the establishment of a link with 
Party workers, operating in the enemy's rear.SS 
In his second address to the congress, Smirnov 
returned to highlighting the lack of any real contact 
between VBVK and RVSR's Political department, stating 
that: 
between them, as yet, a link has not been established." 56 
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Without a proper link being established between the two 
organisations, Smirnov saw a major problem ahead in the 
future development of the Red Army's political apparatus: 
the Bureau carries out political work in the rear, the 
Political department on the front •.• but in the front-line 
zon~,.it ~~difficult to delineate their spheres of 
act1v1ty. 
Obviously, in many respects, Smirnov's fears for the 
future were fully justified and, as shown earlier, it was 
surely no coincidence that within a few weeks of such 
fears being expressed at the congress, that both the 
central political organs were fused into one. Smirnov's 
criticism must have been taken to heart by the relevant 
military and political leadership and acted upon swiftly. 
Following on from Smirnov's comments and the wider 
mention of the activity of the political department of 1st 
Army, the representative from 3rd Army's political 
department came to the forum and told the other delegates 
about the wider cooperation between 3rd Army's political 
department and the local Soviet and Party organs, closest 
to the front. In his speech, the delegate openly admitted 
that such cooperation existed: 
the political department coordinates its work with the 
local okrug and guberniya military 5§mmissars and also 
with the guberniya land department. 
Due to this coordination of work, 3rd Army's political 
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department was able to report on the creation of 30 
committees of the poor, the distribution of literature in 
more than 39 places, the creation of 4 village libraries 
and the setting up of a "mobile theatre".59 
Thus, as detailed above, it would appear that the 
term, "political work" took on a much broader meaning than 
simply agitating in the ranks of the Red Army or 
conducting some form of political work solely within the 
confines of the military units. The political departments 
would also have appeared to have played a not 
insignificant role in the organisation of the committees 
of the poor, the reconstruction of the soviets, the 
establishment of a basic cultural-educational apparatus, 
etc. A whole range of political and cultural-educational 
activity would appear to have been emba~ked upon in order 
to further strengthen Bolshevik power where it mattered 
most, ie in the villages. -After all, the vast majority of 
the Bolshevik soldiers were peasants and, certainly, it 
was absolutely essential that the Bolsheviks retained the 
support of the peasantry in the best possible way. 
Therefore, it did the Bolsheviks no harm at all in 
ensuring that the peasants were looked after, even by the 
Red Army's political apparatus at the front. 
In the resolutions of the congress, partially quoted 
by Nenarokov, it was stated that: 
with the development of the activity of the political 
departments, the military capability of the armies is 
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raised, because firm control of the command staff has been 
introduced; from regularly held meetings, the 
consciousness of the mass is strengthened;the correct 
distribution of literature is regularised and the front-
line zone is brought to the fore, where the armies can 
create the committees of the poor and smash the White 
Guard, kulak and right-wing socialist organisations.bO 
The congress also proposed the following organisational 
structure for the Army political departments and, in some 
respects, it did bear a striking resemblance to that 
proposed by Lindov and described earlier. According to 
the congress' resolution, the political department was to 
consist of the following sub-departments: 
information, agitation,literary-publication, a peg!ant 
section and a sub-dep~rtment of staff commissars. 
Unfortunately, there is no indication of the precise 
functions of any of these sub-departments, although the 
functions of the majority of the sub-departments should be 
fairly self-evident. 
Although Nenarokov ends his analysis of the work of 
the congress by quoting part of the final resolution on 
the need for the central political apparatus to coordinate 
its work,62 it is possible to take our study of the 
congress one stage further by examining some of the other 
resolutions of the congress. It would appear that 
Nenarokov did not use the collection of resolutions of the 
congress, which were published in the collection of 
documents on Party-political work in the Red Army during 
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the Civil War, published in 1961. Of this particular 
collection of the congress' resolutions, the most relevant 
of them are the following: 
political work in the army is carried out in conditions 
which do not allow a regular link with local 
organisations. However, the political departments do have 
the job of using all the existing local Party organs, 
working in contact with them, joining the existing 
committees and soviets, if the army is in one place for a 
long time and, in the event of a short stay, the army is 
required to set up an information bureau[working-SM]with 
the local Party organs. The political departments are 
responsible for he~~ing to create soviet and Party organs 
in the localities. 
As previously detailed above, the political departments 
were already helping the creation of the local soviets and 
Party organs, when and where needed. This particular 
·resolution can be viewed as formally strengthening a role 
that the political departments were· already quietly 
fulfilling. 
Looking at the other resolutions in the collection, 
the only other one worthy of serious examination is the 
very last resolution, actually published in the 
collection. This was concerned with the overall 
organisation of the political apparatus at the centre and, 
curiously enough, made no mention of the role, or the 






work in the entire army is led by the Central 
of the Party, which issues directives to the 
the political departments of the Soviet 
A close organisational link between the 
departments .•• and the Central Committee of the 
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Party is necessary.64 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to trace any of 
these CC directives, which were supposed to have been 
issued to the political departments. It is also somewhat 
surprising that the resolution made no mention of the role 
of RVSR's political department, after all, the latter was 
supposed to be in charge of political work being carried 
out at the front and, as already shown, the Political 
department of RVSR had been discussed at the congress. 
The lack of any mention of VBVK was not too unusual, 
especially given the fact that, at the time, VBVK was in 
charge of political work being carried out in the rear of 
the Red Army. 
Looking back at the whole of the congress, it would be 
no exaggeration to say that, up until then, fewer 
congresses of political workers had taken place which were 
more important than the one in Simbirsk. The congress, 
judging by the evidence presently available, discussed a 
wide range of issues relevant to the future development of 
the Red Army's political apparatus, both that operating at 
the centre and that operating directly at the front. The 
fact that I.N.Smirnov, who was chief of RVSR's Political 
department then, played a not insignificant role and made 
a number of positive contributions further underlines the 
importance of the congress to this whole topic. It is a 
cause for regret, however, that so little time has been 
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devoted to this congress by other historians, especially 
those working in the USSR. How much more detail about the 
congress still awaits the patient researcher? The latter 
can only be guessed at. But the overall importance of the 
congress certainly cannot be seriously doubted. 
(ii) The actvity of the Red Army's political departments 
on the Southern Front(September-December 1918) 
Having examined the activity of the political 
departments on the Eastern Front, it is now time to turn 
to analysing the work of the political departments on the 
other fronts of the Red Army's military activities, 
starting with the front that was formed after the creation. 
of the Eastern Front: namely,the Southern Front. Although 
the latter did not come formally in to being until quite 
late on in September 1918, it certainly was not too long 
before the first signs of political activity began to 
appear. It should be stressed, however, that the work and 
organisation of the political departments on the Southern 
Front did not mirror exactly the work of the political 
departments on the Eastern Front-different conditions and 
circumstances prevailed on each of the fronts and this had 
an influence on the work of each of the political 
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departments. 
The Southern Front came in to formal existence on 11th 
September 1918, by order of RVSR.65 As stated above, it 
was not too long before the first signs of the activities 
of the political departments became apparent. On the 30th 
September 1918, a statute was passed on "the political 
department of the Military soviet, Voronezh raion, 
Southern sector of the screens" which was very long and 
detailed and very precise about the work of the political 
department: 
under the command of the political department are all the 
political-educational organisations, the cultural-
educational commissions, clubs, libraries, schools, 
agitators, lecturers and, in general, all Party comrades, 
working in institutions and military. units, subordinagg to 
the Military soviet, Voronezh raion(southern sector). 
According to the other details of the statute, the 
political department was to consist of two sub-
departments:political-educational and administrative-
inspection.67 The political-educational sub-department 
was in charge of organising the work of the cultural-
educational commissions, agitating amongst the soldiers, 
uniting the activity of the Party cells, etc. 68 The work 
of the latter sub-department was further strengthened by 
the work of the administrative-inspection sub-department, 
which was in charge of publishing the orders of the 
military commissar on a daily basis, registering the 
Page 182 
command staff, inspecting the work of the commissars, 
etc. 69 Of course, it can only be assumed that the 
structure and the work of this particular political 
department was carried out in the way described; 
unfortunately, there is no detail concerning its exact 
functioning on the front. 
Although it has not been possible to tracthe exact 
date for the formation of the Southern Front's political 
department, an examination of the available evidence would 
appear to show that the latter was created in mid-October 
1918. In a report, made by the Southern Front's political 
department in December 1918, the following statement is to 
be found: 
a meeting of all the chiefs of the army political 
departments of the Southern Front was opened today ... from 
the reports, it was clear what great work had been 
undertaken by the political depart,0nt of the Southern Front during its 6-week existence. 
Since the report was made on 3rd December 1918, then 
deducting 6 weeks from that particular date would 
certainly place the creation of the political department 
in the middle of October. It is also the case that 
D.I.Yefremov took over the post as Chief of Southern 
Front's political department in mid October 1918. 71 
The earliest mention that can be found concerning the work 
of the Southern Front's political department is a 
communication of the latter's information section, in 
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which is discussed the "high morale qualities of the 
Chinese-internationalists", then fighting on the Southern 
Front(November 1918). 72 A more interesting publication of 
the Southern Front's political department, however, was 
issued a few days after the above communique and was a 
circular entitled, "on the organisation of agitational 
work in the rear of the enemy".73 The circular stated 
that: 
the political department of the Southern Front considers 
work in the rear ..• of the enemy one of the most important 
and urgent tasks. All measures have been taken by us to 
establish links with the enemy zone and to the creation 
th~re.:.of 7 ~ number of strong points for the purposes of ag1tat1on. 
This agitation in the enemy's rear was to be carried out 
by a wide variety of means: 
before the creation of Party cells in the rear, 
agitational literature must be distributed amongst the 
enemy's troops. For this purpose, aeroplanes are of 
little use. It is necessary to create a different 
apparatus. In creating this apparatus, we must adopt all 
measures .•. we await your ideas on this. In the meantime, 
we will send a certain amount of leaflets for distribution 
in the enemy's rear. Take all necessary steps to ensure 
that the literature achieves its '~m. Aeroplanes are to 
be used in the most urgent cases. 
Within a few days of this circular being sent out, the 
chief of the political department of the 13th Rifle 
Division sent the following reply: 
in answer to your request .•• concerning agitational work in 
the enemy's rear, we have to tell you that work in this 
area has virtually not been carried out, with the sole 
exception of the politic1G department of the 13th division 
and also its instructor. 
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Thus, it would appear that the priorities of the front 
political department and the political departments 
underneath it were not necessarily one and the same thing 
all the time. 
The first real mention of the work of the political 
apparatus on the Southern Front is the discussion that 
arose between various political departmental chiefs and 
VBVK, held on 3rd December 1918-the first time, as far as 
can be judged presently, when VBVK held direct talks with 
representatives of political departments, operating at the 
front. 77 There are a number of documents available, 
relating directly to the meeting, so that it is possible 
to build up some sort of picture as regards what, in 
actual fact, took place. 
In a copy of a telegram sent to the Party's CC, 
concerning the opening of the meeting, a footnote to the 
latter describes the actual agenda of the meeting-
apparently, the agenda was to consist of the following 
series of points: 
reports from the localities, draft instructions on the 
Party cells and regulations on the political departments, 
organisational and Party work in the 7~rmy, cultural-educational work and current events. 
I.I.Khodorovsky, who was then head of the Southern 
Front's political department and the sender of the above 
telegram, stated in the telegram that the meeting was well 
attended by a number of prominent figures of the Red 
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Army's political establishment: 
today saw the opening of the meeting of the chiefs of the 
political departments of all the armies on the Southern 
Front, with the participation of Yurenev, Smirnov, 
Yefremov and Khodorovsky. From the reports[at the 
meeting-SM] it was made clear how much good work had been 
undertaken by the Southern Front's political department 
during its 6-week existence. Through the department, one 
thousand one hundred Communists have been distributed over 
all the armies with comparative rationality, if one takes 
into account the feverishness of the work. For all newly 
arriving Communists, cycles of lectures are read, in 
accordance with a specific programme approximating to the 
needs of the front ••. political departments have been 
organised in all the armies and in the divisions. A 
registration of all the Red Army Communist Party cells is 
taking place and a general 7~tal of all the Communists on 
the front is being reached. 
According to Khodorovsky's figures, in the three 
armies of the Southern Front-8th, 9th and lOth-there were 
approximately 60 Party cells, representing a total number 
of 1,500 Communists and ·1,000 sympathisers. 80 If one 
bears in mind the relative youthfulness of the armies 
under review-8th Army was the oldest of the three, coming 
into being only on 26th September 191881 -then the 
registration of so many Party members and sympathisers was 
not a bad achievement. However, on saying that, there was 
still room for improvement: it should not be forgotten 
that at the same time that these figures relate 
to(December 1918), 3rd Army(Eastern Front)alone numbered 
2,000 Party members. 82 
Khodorovsky also mentioned the fact that the Southern 
Front's political department operated a number of 
"political investigative" inspectors, who were sent not 
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only to various units operating on the front, but also 
those closest to the battle zone. 83 Their main function 
was "to normalise and secure the rear".84 Unfortunately, 
other than the latter brief mention, it is not possible to 
expand any further on their role. 
On the question of cultural-educational work being 
carried out on the Southern front, Khodorovsky expressed a 
degree of satisfaction in this area: 
the cultural-educational work of the department is 
demonstrated by the invitation of a whole number of 
lecturers, several artistic groups, mobile cinemas. The 
distribution of papers and a!terature, one can consider to 
be comparatively efficient. 
The next account of the meeting is to be found in 
another telegram, sent by the Southern Front's political 
department, as regards the differences between one of the 
Southern Front's chief political representatives-
D.Yefremov-and a number of the representatives at the 
meeting over Yefremov's draft instructions to the Party 
cells, as previously described elsewhere in this 
chapter.8 6 However, the meeting also discussed a proposed 
set of regulations on the operation of the Party cells and 
it is to that we now turn. 
The instructions were published on 3rd December 1918, 
ie just one day after the meeting had formally closed so 
there is a very strong indication that the instructions 
had been well-prepared in advance. The full title of the 
instructions reveals that they were of, arguably, a 
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localised nature but, nevertheless, are worthy of detailed 
examination as they provide an insight as to how the 
political departments working on the front, actually saw 
their .own powers and functions. Thus, the title of the 
instructions was "instructions to the Army political 
departments of the Southern Front, adopted at the meeting 
of workers of the Southern Front and represent-
atives of the All-Russian Bureau of Military 
Commissars."8 7 
The instructions consisted of an introduction and four 
main sections, each one describing the relationship and 
organisational structure of the political department. The 
introduction to the instructions stated the following: 
the work of the political department is divided into three 
main areas: 
1. Unifying the activity of the commissars of the armies 
in the units, directing and supervising their work. 
2. Political and organisational work in the army. 
3. Political work in the front-line and rear 
are~s(organ~§ation of political espionage and counter-
esp1onage). 
These three basic areas are then described, in detail, 
in the relevant separate sections of the instructions. 
For instance, as regards the relationship between the 
political department and the military commissar, the 
regulations proposed that the political departments: 
1. Above all, establish and maintain a close link with all 
the commissars, subordinate to the department. 
2. Conduct a complete registration of them and collect 
material, characterising the activity of the commissar. 
3. Systematically inform the commissars not only about the 
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most important facts of the political struggle, but also 
about the work of the political department. 
4. Direct the Party-organisational activity of the 
commissar, ie, leading and supervising his activity in the 
organisation of the regimental Party cells. 
6. Closely watch the interrelationship between the 
commissars and the commanders, constantly thwarting 
attempts to interfere in operational matters. This, 
however, does not release the commissar from his 
respoH~ibility to always be involved in operational 
work. 
What this part of the instructions relate is the 
changing nature of the relationship between the political 
departments and the military commissars. Whereas before, 
as previously shown, in the initial development of the 
political apparatus on the Eastern Front, the political 
departments were viewed as being part of the "support" 
apparatus for the work of the commissars, as the power of 
the political departments increased, then the situation 
reversed itself and the commissars became the support 
apparatus for the work of the political departments. This 
part of these instructions clearly demonstrates that the 
balance of power in the front political apparatus had 
moved away from the commissars to the political 
departments. A point which was further shown to be the 
case in the week following the publication of this set of 
instructions, as will be detailed later. 
The next main section of the instructions dealt with 
the organisational work of the Army political departments 
and covered a wide range of functions. In order to save 
on needless repetition, the most interesting points in 
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this particular section are the following: 
1. Registering and d~stributing equally Party strength in 
the army. 
2. Organising Party cells in the units, unifying and 
supervising their work. 
3. Strengthening the conduct of propaganda and agitational 
work. 
4. Establishing the systematic supply of papers and 
literature. 
5. Organising libraries, reading rooms and clubs.90 
According to the instructions, the main reasons behind 
such work being undertaken were: 
a) an exact assessment of the mood of the army .•. 
b) raising the level of discipline amongst the troops ... 
c) a merciless purge from the army of all irresponsible 
agitators, especially those who are destroying the army by 
cond~ct~ng a§ftational work against the military leader-
spec1al1sts. 
In gen~ral,the three main tasks of the political 
departments here described could easily be applied to the 
work of any of the ~ther Red Army political departments. 
After all, in assessing the mood of the army and raising 
its overall levels of discipline were two of the key 
functions of political departments on all the other fronts 
that the Red Army was fighting on, as well. 
The final sections of the instructions detail the work 
of the political department, both in the front-line zone 
and in the enemy's rear. As regards the functions of the 
political department in the front-line zone, the political 
departments were instructed to: 
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1. Normalise the attitude of the army to the people. 
2. Maintain the army's links with the local Party and 
workers' organisations, also with all the soviet political 
organisations, so as to ensure that the army is not split 
from the working masses. 
4. Study in detail the socio-economic and political 
groupings of the population, with the aim of finding out 
on which gg~ups one may rely on and which may be used by 
the enemy. 
Arguably, the most interesting of the points listed above 
is the last one, as it beg~ a number of further 
questions, like what were the criteria in judging which 
groups could be relied upon and which could not? How 
often were these studies supposed to be carried out? How 
were these studies exactly acted upon? Unfortunately, 
without access to any of these studies, it is even 
impossible to say whether they were, in actual fact, 
carried out in the first place. 
As regards working in the enemy's rear, then the Army 
political departments were, for obvious reasons, fairly 
restricted in what could be undertaken. However, even so, 
they were still expected to: 
1. Organise political intelligence. 
2. Distribute literature in the rear of the enemy. 
3. Create Party organs in the area of the opposition 
forces. 
4. Organise cells of insurrection.93 
It was also in this particular section of the instructions 
that the political departments were told "to punish every 
dereliction of duty on the part of the commissar."9 4 The 
latter was, once again, further evidence of the way that 
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the role of the two parts of the political apparatus had 
changed-now, the political departments could, if needs be, 
punish the military commissars. 
In assessing the importance of the meeting, something 
which, as yet, can only be done partially, one must 
remember that amongst those who are identified as taking 
part are prominent figures of the Red Army's political 
establishment, eg Yurenev, Smirnov, Khodorovsky, etc, and, 
furthermore, it surely was no coincidence that, within a 
couple of days of the closure of the meeting, as will be 
detailed below, RVSR issued an order on the formal 
recognition of the political departments? Mind you, it 
should be remembered in this particular context that both 
Yurenev and Smirnov were themselves members of RVSR.9S It 
was also the case that less than 10 days after the closure 
of the meeting, VBVK also passed an order, increasing the 
status of the political departments, as regards the 
conduct of cultural-educational work at the front.9 6 
Thus, given what was discussed at the meeting, the 
prominence of the personalities who took part and the 
changes in the political apparatus, immediately following 
the December 1918 meeting, it certainly would appear to be 
the case that what took place was of an importance that 
stretched far beyond the physical confines of the Southern 
Front. 
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(iii) Formal recognition of the Party-political status of 
the political departm~nts(December 1918) 
In attempting to arrive at an explanation as to why 
both the CC and RVSR took so long before granting the 
political departments the necessary legal recognition, one 
Soviet historian, V.G.Kolychev, who has written widely on 
the Red Army's political apparatus during the Civil War, 
has postulated the following reasons-firstly, that the 
political departments themselves were simply not ready to 
take on the full responsibilities of being the Party's 
leading organs in the Red Army and, secondly, before 
December 1918, there were simply not enough of them to 
warrant such responsibility.9 7 Again, it is difficult to 
debate the actual content of this argument-after all, 
there are no figures on the exact number of political 
departments in the Red Army at this time and, as shown 
above, as they began to be created, they were simply not 
the Party organs in the Red Army. The latter was a role 
that they eventually evolved into, so to speak. But, 
despite the lack of the necessary detailed information, it 
is still odd that it was well into the actual history of 
the Red Army's political departments, before they received 
their formal recognition. 
Leaving that argument aside, the actual order which did 
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grant them the necessary legal recognition was issued by 
RVSR, note not VBVK, on 5th December 1918 and was entitled 
"on the political departments of the Revolutionary 
Military Soviets of the Fronts and Armies~~. 98 Since the 
order was fairly short, as well as being an important 
historical document, it is translated below in full: 
1. For the conduct of political(Party)and cultural-
educational work both in the Red Army field forces and 
amongst the population at the front, political departments 
have been created by the Revolutionary Military Soviets of 
the armies and fronts, being themselves organs of the 
Revolutionary Military Soviets. 
Notes:1. The chief of a political department, if he is not 
a member of the Revolutionary Military Soviet, joins the 
latter with a consultative vote. 
2. The political departments are financed by the 
corresponding Revolutionary Military Soviets. 
ll.The political departments of the fronts direct the work 
of the political departments of the armies. The direction 
of all the political work of the front and rear, equally 
the distribution of Party strength, mobilised for work in 
the Red Army, belongs to the All-Russian Bureau of 
Military Commissars, working in the closest contact with 
and according to the directives 9 ~f the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. . 
The order was signed by both Trotsky and Yurenev in their 
capacities as Chairman and member of RVSR respectively.100 
In a number of respects, the order lacks a certain 
degree of clarity in its statement of the role of VBVK and 
its assertion that VBVK was working in close contact with 
the directives of the Party's CC. Given what has so far 
been written about the work and organisation of the 
political departments, it has to be said that there would 
appear to have been very little real contact between VBVK 
and the front political departments. They operated fairly 
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independently of VBVK, if not totally independently of 
VBVK. Therefore, the assertion that VBVK was in charge of 
the overall direction of the political work being 
conducted on the front somehow rings hollow. In some 
ways, this is further borne out by the statement 
concerning VBVK's relationship with the CC. Certainly, 
for an organ that perhaps did not enjoy a great degree of 
popularity amongst hardenJBolshevik Party members, any 
identification with the Party's supreme decision-making 
organ would have helped it to increase both its overall 
authority and prestige among the members of the political 
departments. In other words, it could have been the case 
that the order was an attempt to paper over a number of 
cracks that had appeared throughout the year, concerning 
the relationship between VBVK and the front political 
departments. 
A week after the issue of the RVSR order, VBVK itself 
published an order on the cultural-educational work in the 
front units, in which VBVK pronounced on the role of the 
political departments, amongst other things. 101 In the 
relevant section of the order, the latter stated that: 
the leading centre for the establishment and direction of 
cultural-educational work in the entire Red Army is the 
agitation-education department of the All-Russian Bureau 
of Military Commissars; the closest leading organ for the 
troops, located on the front, is t~02political department attached to the staff of the army. 
Thus, within the space of less than 10 days after the 
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meeting on the Southern Front, the political departments 
had been acknowledged as being the Party's leading organs 
in the Red Army and, at front level, the most important 
.organs in the conduct of cultural-educational work in the 
Red Army. These were important indications in the real 
shift of power to the political apparatus, operating at 
the front. Neither of these measures can be viewed as 
having weakened the position of the political departments 
in the conduct of political and cultural-educational work 
on the front; on the contrary, they formally recognised a 
position that had been the case ·for some time previous. 
There were still problems ahead for the political 
departments, but within the space of less than 10 days, 
their fortunes had turned and their position strengthened. 
The activity continued apace with the publication of 
an order, on 25th December 1918, on the creation of 
divisional political departments. 103 Needless to say, the 
order was issued by RVSR, not VBVK, and, again, would seem 
to confirm that RVSR played a more prominent role in the 
affairs of the political departments than VBVK. 
Eventually, RVSR also got round to issue orders on the 
figures of staffs for the front and army political 
departments, but that was not to occur until February 
1919104 and, before moving on to discuss the latter, it is 
now time to examine the formation and work of the other 
political departments, operating on the other fronts, at 
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his time. 
(iv) Political department activity elsewhere in the Red 
Army units(September 1918-February 1919) 
Political work on the Northern and Western fronts was 
basically conducted along similar lines, given the 
interchangeability of the two fronts. The Northern front 
was created on 11th September 1918 and was made up of the 
troops of the Northern and North-West sectors of the 
"screens", troops of the Petrograd raion and, finally, 6th 
and 7th Armies. 10 5 Later on, however, the Northern Front 
was eventually liquidated(February 1919)and the subsequent 
men and materials used to make up the Western Front. 106 
Thus, as long as it is remembered that the Northern Front 
was eventually to become the Western Front, then there 
should be little room for confusion. 
The first steps towards the creation of an Army 
political department on the Northern Front were taken on 
24th September 1918, when 6th Army decided to create an 
Organisation-mobilisation department, attached to the 
Army's staff H.Q. 107 According to the published statute, 
the Organisation-mobilisation department was to consist of 
three sections-organisation, agitation and 
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mobilisation. 108 One of the then sectional heads-
V.I.Suzdaltseva-Tagunova-wrote, some 18 years after the 
event and during the beginning of the Stalinist show 
trials, --:- the following brief reference to the origins 
of the department: 
for the conduct of all the work, the Organisation-
mobilisation department was created. In it were comrades 
Shcherbakov, Metelyev and Suzdaltseva. In essence, the 
Orgmob had to become and 1 B~bsequently became the political department of the front. 
It has to be said that, however brief the statement is, it 
does raise one contentious point, namely, the assertion 
that the Orgmob became the effective political department 
for the front. Whilst it is true that the Orgmob did 
become the political department for 6th Army110 , it should 
also be borne. in mind that 7th Army also had an effective 
political department working at the time, therefore 
·Suzdaltseva's assertion that 6th Army's political 
department became the political department for the whole 
of the front may well have had something to do with 
historical events closer to 1936 than 1918. 
As regards the work carried out by the 6th Army's 
political department, Suzdaltseva did state that it 
"covered a wide range of responsibilities"-
the terms of reference for the Orgmob were many and very 
different. It was not only political work in the military 
units, but also establishing a close link with soviet 
organs in the frontal raions, the publication of leaflets 
for the army and population, organising the rear, 
calculating the mood of the masses, mobilising the 
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bourgeoisie for trench work.112 
A further indication of the work carried out by the Orgmob 
is the statement that between September-November 1918, in 
the regions where 6th Army was placed, 149 Communist Party 
cells and 5,839 committees of the poor were created in the 
localities. 113 The strength of the 6th Army's political 
department, on the face of evidence presently available, 
would appear to have been moderate: Kolychev quotes a 
figure for February 1919 of only 800 Party members in 6th 
Army.114 
In a report on the work of the political department of 
7th Army, the history and membership of the latter is 
given in a very matter-of-fact way: 
the organisation of the political department began on 28th 
November 1918, by members of the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of 7th Army[at that time, the RMS of 7th Army 
consisted of E.M.Golubintsev(commander), M.I.Kozen, 
S.A.Natsareyy3' I.A.Tomashevich and, finally, 
S.P.Voskov ]. Officials of the department were 
elected ... from a number of mobilised Communists. The 
overall total of workers in £~5 department is 10-15 
people, including agitators. 
The relevant report of 7th Army's political department's 
activity covers the period of the latter's work between 
28th November 1918-16th December 1918 and is composed of 
three main sections, each one outlining one of the main 
areas of work of the political department. 117 Thus, 
judging by each of the sections, it would appear that the 
political department was engaged in registering Communists 
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in the units; sending out personnel to the various towns 
in the area(although for what exact purpose is impossible 
to say) and, finally, helping to support the activity of a 
theatre group, operating on the front at that time.ll8 
All in all, it would have to be said that it would appear 
that 7th Army's political department initially started off 
rather slowly, picking up from the middle of 1919 onwards, 
as, no doubt, the influx of new political personnel and 
better access to materials allowed the political 
department to carry out its duties. Before leaving this 
analysis of the work of the political departments on the 
Northern Front, contrary to the assertion made by 
Suzdaltseva, indeed there was a proper functioning Front 
political department on the Northern Front and it is only 
fair that it should be examined here. 
The Northern Front's political department was created 
in January 1919-according to available evidence, no 
earlier than lOth January 1919. 11 9 The chief of the 
Northern Front's political department was N.K.Goncharov, 
an experienced Bolshevik Party member, who had joined the 
Party way back in 1904. 120 Although there are very few 
documents which actually tell us anything about the work 
of this particular Front political department, the ones 
that do exist paint a very interesting picture of a Front 
political department, faced with a tremendous amount of 
problems. For instance, on 29th January 1919, Goncharov 
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sent a telegram to both the CC and VBVK, concerning the 
lack of "responsible workers" being sent to the front: 
not one responsible worker has been sent. We cannot 
advance from this dead start. This applies equally to 
both r2ttational-organisational and cultural-educational 
work. 
Goncharov then followed up this telegram, by sending 
in a report on the work of the Northern Front's political 
department and, compared to the previous front political 
departmental reports, his was fairly black and 
pessimistic: 
already a whole month has passed since the department 
began to function. However, at the present moment in 
time, this has been a very long period. There have been 
no appreciable results. The position is such that not 
only can one not expect any favourable results soon, but 
that given existing working conditions ... there is no basis 
for hoping that even in £22 future ... will the des1red 
success manifest itself. . 
The reasons for such a pessimistic forecast become 
more apparent further on in the report; meanwhile, 
Goncharov listed what he considered to be the main tasks 
of a political department at front-level: 
the tasks which a front department must carry out consist 
largely and almost exclusively of the following-directing 
the work of the Army political department and commissars; 
inspecting and studying their work; on the basis of the 
latter, correcting a number of measures; working out plans 
for the conduct of political campaigns •.• cultural-
educational work; formulating instructions for the 
political departments, commissars, agitators, instructors; 
establishing a system of accounting and statistics; 
preparing specialist cadres for each area of work, 
allotting to them various tasks, organising organs to 
ensure that the tasks are carried out and providing them 
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with everything necessary to carry out their duties. 12 3 
The latter was a fairly comprehensive summary of the tasks 
of a front political department; the question that 
Goncharov now posed was what if a front political 
department was not equal to the tasks?: 
if the front political department is not in a position to 
carry out even part of these duties, then it becomes an 
organ of local work, equal and soon even lower than the 
Army political departments subordinate to it, becomiy2
4 completely irrelevant •.• even harmful •.• like a brake. 
Goncharov's explanation as to why the Northern 
Front's political department was in such a bad position 
was, in part, due to the lack of experienced workers: 
the political department of the Northern Front completely 
lacks knowledgeable, experienced workers for cultural-
educational work; it also does not have authoritative, 
independent, responsible workers for agitational-
organisational work; on top of that, it also lacks the 
following, necessary for the productive work of the 
political department-no press, no store, no simple reserve 
of literature, no trained workers, no money, the lack of 
which makes cultural-educational work unthinkable .•. 
Consequently, it cannot, absolutely canno£
2
3ssist the Army 
political departments subordinated to it. 
Goncharov then proposed one of two solutions to the 
obvious difficulties that the Northern Front's political 
department found itself in: 
1. Order that to the political department of the Northern 
Front be sent:a)two propaganda workers, who have been in 
the Party a long time and who also have great 
organisational experience(one could alter this to four 
comrades:two lecturers and two organisers), b)two trained 
and practically experienced workers in the cultural-
educational sphere(educational-library and theatrical-
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club), c)one specialist in general book-keeping .• d)an 
energetic and experienced secretary, e)an artist-
decorator, f)a librarian, g)an experienced director and 
h)an experienced teacher; on top of all this, to send 
literature to equip 200 complete libraries for the squad 
and regimental Party cells. 
2. Allow me to liquidate the political department of the 
Nor~hery25ront, dividing its workers between 6th and 7th Arm1es. 
According to available evidence, this would appear to 
have been the first recorded instance when the chief of a 
front political department asked the CC to allow him to 
abolish his own political department. Other than that, it 
is also the case that in seeking the CC's permission for 
such a drastic step, he felt inclined to write to the CC 
and not to VBVK, once again, demonstrating that for many 
old Bolshevik Party members, working in the Red Army's 
political apparatus at the front, they felt much easier in 
writing to the CC on issues, rather than VBVK. This, to 
say the least, must have made the conduct of work at the 
front,· from the point of view of VBVK, very, very 
difficult indeed. In this particular instance, a decision 
was reached, of sorts, when the Northern Front itself was 
abolished and the Western Front took its place on 19th 
February 1919. 127 For his part, Goncharov would appear to 
have been moved to the somewhat less demanding task of 
becoming the political commissar for the 26th Rifle 
Division, a post that he held onto until well into October 
1919. 128 
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(v) VBVK's attempt to establish direct contact with the 
Front-line political departments (January 1919) 
As already shown above, one of the main defects in the 
work of VBVK, in its relationship to the political 
apparatus at the front, was that it simply did not seem to 
have too much contact with the Front or Army political 
departments. If VBVK was going to have any chance in 
asserting some sort of control over the front political 
apparatus, then it would have to insure that it was much 
better informed of what was happening on the front and, 
more importantly, attempt to impose some sort of control 
over the Red Army's front political apparatus. It would 
appear that such an attempt was made in January 1919, as 
will now be detailed. 
In January 1919, Yurenev proposed holding a meeting of 
all the front political departmental chiefs and, although 
needless to say, it was an excellent idea, it would appear 
that the organisation of such a meeting left a lot to be 
desired. 129 Yurenev proposed holding the meeting over a 
three-day period, opening the meeting on 19th January and, 
yet, he only sent out the necessary telegrams informing 
all the political departmental chiefs on 18th January 
1919! 1 3° To say the least, this would seem to cast a 
shadow of doubt, as regards the seriousness of Yurenev to 
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try and sort out the nature of the relationship between 
the front political departments and VBVK. The fact that 
the telegrams were sent out so late-indeed, there is at 
least one recorded case where the relevant political 
department did not receive their invitation until after 
the closure of the congress! 131 That as it may be, 
referring back to Yurenev's original telegram it was, in 
many ways, fairly brief and to the point: 
on 19th January at 10 o'clock in the morning, in the 
building of the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, 
will take place a meeting of the chiefs of the political 
departments of all the fronts. The agenda of the meeting 
will be: !)reports from the localities; 2)Party work; 
3)planning the registration and redistribution of 
Communists; 4)supplying the fronts with literature; 
S)cultural-educational work; 6)organisational problems; 
7)current m~tt:rs. l~Z request that you bring with you 
relevant mater1als. 
In effect, Yurenev did not give anyone really enough 
time to properly prepare for such a meeting, especially 
given such a lengthy.and detailed agenda. If only to 
further underscore the latter point, one Soviet historian, 
in a very rare reference to the meeting, has stated that 
the question on "organisational problems" was further 
subdivided into the following sections: 
a)the inter-relationship of the Front political 
departments and VBVK; b)the inter-relationship of the 
Front political departments and the Army political 
departments; c)the inter-relationship of the political 
departments and the political commissariats; d)finance; 
e)the.head~~3rters of the political departments and their 
funct1ons. 
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Again, thanks to Petrov's account of the meeting, we 
also have some idea of a number of the delegates, who 
actually attended the meeting. Thus, the meeting was 
chaired by Sverdlov, representing the Party's CC; also 
present were G.I.Okulova, then chief of the Eastern 
Front's political department, then A.I.Pisarev, chief of 
the political department of the Western Army(later, 
front), A.S. Savelev, chief of the political department of 
1st Army and, in Petrov's own words, "and others". 134 It 
is unfortunate that Petrov did not list the other members 
of the meeting but, nevertheless, he does provide some 
sort of insight as to who actually did attend the meeting. 
Judging by the latter, it certainly would appear to have 
gone some way in trying to get the views of the chiefs of 
the front political apparatus. According to Konovalov's 
previously quoted article, there was a representative from 
6th Army-possibly Suzdaltseva?-although he does not 
actually state who it was. 135 Although the list is 
incomplete, it is odd that Petrov did not list anyone 
representing the political apparatus on the Southern 
Front. Of course, it could well have been the case that 
no one is listed, simply because the telegram arrived too 
late for anyone from the south to make the journey. 
Certainly, the Southern Front's political apparatus should 
have been represented, given its overall importance and 
size. 
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~nrtunately, the meeting has been largely ignored by 
Soviet historians in the past and, other than the details 
described above, there is very little else that can be 
added. Petrov only made one other refe~ence to the 
meeting, when he described part of the outcome of the 
meeting: 
the participants of the meeting adopted the suggestion 
that the appointment of chiefs of the political 
departments proceed from the Central Committee. The 
staffs of the political departments of the front, army and 
especially the divisional political departmenti 3~ere significantly broadened and made more precise. 
The latter comment would appear to be a possible 
reference to the order of RVSR, published on 4th February 
1919, on the figures for the staffs of the Front and Army 
political departments. 137 According to the latter order, 
the Front and Army political departments were to consist 
of a series of sub-departments and sections. Thus, the 
Front and Army political departments were to be made up of 
the following sub-departments: chancellery, agitation-
organisation, cultural-educational, registration-
distribution and, finally, information. 138 On top of the 
latter, the following sections were also to be added: 
literary-publications, theatrical-club and, finally, a 
school. 13 9 According to one author, quoting the full 
original order itself, the actual staff number of the 
Front political department was 160, the corresponding 
figure for the Army political department was 114.140 
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Needless to say, the structure of the divisional political 
departments was less complicated and, therefore, required 
less staff. The divisional political departments were to 
consist of three Party organisers, three lecturers, a 
number of agitators corresponding to the number of 
regiments in the division, etc. 141 The total number of 
staff for the divisional political department was fixed at 
24.14 2 Thus, it would appear a strong possibility that 
the meeting held in January 1919 may well have ~ an 
important role in the eventual appearance of this 
particular order on the sizes and organisational 
structures of the various political departments. However, 
other than that possibility, it is regrettable that so 
little i~formation is available on this particular 
meeting. Much more needs to be written on this particular 
meeting, before it can be evaluated properly. 
(vi) Future conduct of political work in the Red Army and 
the Red Army's political departments (January-March 1919) 
Political work in the Red Army carried on apace 
throughout January-March 1919 and the role of the 
political department in the conduct of the political work 
was still a source of debate. In an article which 
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appeared in the journal of the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of the Eastern Front-"Voennaya Mysl"-the then chief 
of the political department of the Eastern Front, 
G.Okulova, listed ten reasons for the necessary existence 
of political departments. 144 Since the list is of primary 
importance to this work and has never before been 
published in a ·western publication, it is reproduced below 
in full: 
for the successful conduct of the Civil War, all other 
things being equal, it is necessary: 
l)that the army be conscious, that each Red Army soldier 
knows what he is fighting for; 
2)it is necessary that our army works amongst the people 
and is well-disposed towards them. Only by working in a 
benevolent atmosphere can all the forces of the army be 
exclusively turned against the enemy; 
3)as much as possible, it is necessary to introduce 
consciousness in the ranks of the enemy ... and by this 
introduce demoralisation in his army; 
4)one of the most serious obstacles in spreading ed~cation 
in our army is mass illiteracy. It is necessary to fight 
against this evil by the most energetic means possible; 
S)it is necessary to fill the leisure time of the soldiers 
by healthy pursuits; 
6)it is necessary to brighten up the life of the soldiers; 
?)there should exist an institution, which carefully 
observes the mood of the army, examining the reasons for 
unfavourable attitudes and attempt to eradicate the 
latter; 
8)it is necessary that the broadest sections of the 
population of the RSFSR are informed about the life of the 
army. It is necessary that the workers and peasants feel 
that the army is their own creation; 
9)it is necessary that such an institution exist, 
operating like an all-seeing eye, watching over the work 
of all the institutions in the army, enjoying the 
unlimited trust of the soldiers and whose word carries 
undoubted authority; 
lO)from the actual character of the tasks listed above, it 
should be stressed that that exclusively almost only 
Communists can fulfil them, thereby signifying that there 
should also be an institution which is concerned with the 
distribution of Communist Party strength in all the armies 
and units. 
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The organ fulfilling all these tasks i~ the 1 ~glitical department of the Front, Army and division. 
As can be shown from the above, it would appear that 
the political department had to attach great significance 
to the training of the peasant soldier into becoming a 
conscientious fighter for the Russian Republic. Given 
that Okulova was a chief of an active front political 
department, this list probably represented what she 
considered to be the real essence of the activity of the 
political departments, working at the front. There would 
not be too much room in her list for academic or merely 
scholastic schemes-even in attempting to demoralise the 
enemy soldiers, the latter was nQt viewed as mere bravado, 
but a determined attempt to woo the enemy soldiers away 
from their counter-revolutionary officers and, thereby, 
reduce the military effectiveness of the forces that faced 
the Red Army. 
Okulova also had a number of things to say about the 
nature of the relationship between VBVK and the front 
political apparatus: 
at the present time, the practical approach of the Army 
political departments and a number of the divisions is to 
send directly to the centre their various requests(for 
literature, people, cinematic apparatus, theatrical 
groups, etc)and the fulfilment of these requests, by the 
centre, without the involvement of the front political 
departments. This confuses the work of the latter, as it 
removes the possibility of establishing a proper 
distribution of men and materials and working according to 
a specific plan. 
On top of this, in entering into separate agreements 
with local political departments, the centre takes on a 
very heavy burden and, because of this, distributes all 
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terials completely accidentally. A position is being 
created that all the help is being received, not by the 
weaker political departments which especially need it, but 
by those departments which are more enterprising and 
succeed in receiving everything14goth from the centre and the Front political department. 
Without access to a number of primary source 
materials, it is difficult to say exactly what Okulova 
could have been referring to, as regards her remarks about 
separate agreements being struck. Certainly, it was a 
point that she came back to with even more force later on 
in her article: 
strict centralisation of work is necessary. A categorical 
ban on all separate discussions is also necessary. 
Discussions should be carried out according to the 
following chain of command: divisional political 
departments->Army political department->Front political 
department->All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars and 
conversely. And only this way. Any other way and 1~7 will . still .•. be in the chaos that we find ourselves in. 
Thus, judging by Okulova's article, it would appear 
that there were reasonable grounds for complaint about 
VBVK's work, emanating from the point of view of the front 
political departments. If VBVK was making separate 
agreements with a number of political departments, without 
previously consulting the necessary front political 
department, then a confused situation, to say the least, 
could quite easily have arisen. It would also seem to be 
the case that the most successful political departments 
were those which, through a variety of measures, were able 
to work the system, ie gain all the required men and 
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materials through holding separate talks with both VBVK 
and the relevant front political department. This could 
well be a partial explanation as to why, for instance, the 
Northern Front's political department found itself in such 
a bad position-an inability to get the necessary attention 
from VBVK. Again, though, this has to remain purely 
speculative, but there would appear to be some evidence to 
support such a view. 
By the beginning of 1919, the emphasis in the conduct 
of political work in the Red Army began to change. This 
was exemplified in the decision, taken by the Southern 
Front's political department, that political work should 
be carried out more by the divisional political 
departments than the Army and Front political 
departments. 148 The basis for such a shift was, judging 
by the original order, eminently logical: 
assume, as a basis, the division, representing the 
natural, vital and, more or less, constant link of the 
various military units. The divisional political 
department, maintaining an uninterrupted link with the 
regiments and always informed of all the details of each 
separate part is in a much better position to carry out 
the direct leadership of political work in the units. The 
work of the divisional political departments is even more 
important, located, as they are, very often in 
villages ... because, under the necessity of the situation, 
they are ideally placed to carry out work amoy~gt the 
peasants in the front-line zone, good or bad. 
In effect, what happened on the Southern Front was to 
be mirrored elsewhere and was to receive official support, 
so to speak, at the 8th Party Congress in March 1919, when 
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the Party's CC decided that the future emphasis on the 
conduct of political work in the Red Army should be 
transferred away from the Army and Front political 
departments and onto the divisional political departments-
however, more on that in the next chapter. Suffice it to 
say, presently, that, once again, the front political 
apparatus was moving ahead and developing its own answers 
to its own problems, largely independently of what was 
being said or done at the centre. 
As shown earlier, the political departments came in to 
being largely through a mixture of local initiative and 
centralised help(in the shape of the Supreme Military 
Inspectorate, not VBVK) and, in the early stages, they 
were simply designed to help the Revolutionary Military 
Councils. However, as the situation on the front changed 
and the demands for more effective political control of 
the units grew, then the functions and overall role of the 
political departments also changed until, by December 
1918, they were officially recognised as the Party's 
leading organs in the Red Army. Needless to say, the 
actual structure of the political departments did not 
remain a fixed one and nor could it, with its changing 
position and increasing list of functions and duties to 
perform. They held a number of important meetings-
especially on the Eastern and Southern Fronts-and from 
these meetings, it would be logical to infer that a number 
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of significant changes were adopted by the central 
political and military organs, which were a direct 
consequence of the Front political departmental meetings. 
However, despite all this activity, the relationship with 
VBVK would appear to have been, at best, weak, and, at 
worse, non-existent. There were a number of reasons for 
this, not least of which was the independence of the 
front-line political apparatus from the centre, as well as 
the relative weakness of the centre, in its attempt to 
impose some sort of control over the work and the organs, 
operating at the front.· VBVK was not alone to blame for 
the poor organisational links with the political apparatus 
at the front, but it is difficult to understand when, for 
instance as happened in January 1919, VBVK called a 
crucial meeting of the chiefs of all the Front political 
departments, why it allowed them so little time to make 
the journey, never mind, prepare for the meeting. 
VBVK's final demise was to occur at the 8th Party 
Congress but, in all honesty, had occurred much earlier 
than that, at the front. It never assumed the leading 
position that was necessary for the control of the 
political apparatus at the front and, although it was not 
to entirely blame for its own failings, nevertheless it 
has to assume a good portion of the blame. Its final 
demise, however, will be discussed in the final section to 
this particular chapter. 
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VBVK AND THE EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS-THE FINAL CHAPTER IN 
THE ACTIVITY OF VBVK(MARCH-APRIL 1919). 
In a number of respects, the reader might be forgiven 
if he thought that such a closing section was a bit of a 
waste of time in writing, given the fact that VBVK had, 
for such a long time, proven itself not to be doing the 
job that it was intended to do, that its eventual 
replacement by another cerntralised political organ for 
the Red Army was a bit of a foregone conclusion. In 
actual fact, an examination of the historical record would 
appear to paint a somewhat different picture-whilst the 
reorganisation of VBVK was definitely on the cards, as 
will be described below, ·in some respects, the total 
replacement of the organ did come as a bit of a surprise. 
There was obviously every indication that VBVK had to be 
reorganised and made into a more effective organ, but its 
total replacement by PUR was not an automatic certainty. 
This section, then, will examine the performance, so to 
speak, of VBVK at the 8th Party Congress and analyse the 
changes made by the latter on the Red Army's political 
apparatus. Obviously, such a discussion will also involve 
a retrospective look back at VBVK itself and assess its 
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overall importance to the development of the Red Army's 
political apparatus and the reasons for its eventual 
downfall. Unfortunately, one thing.that should be taken 
into account, right from the outset, is the fact that VBVK 
has been a victim, for a period at least, of the Stalinist 
historiography of the history of the USSR, therefore, in 
evaluating a number of sources, this will be apparent and 
the necessary caution exercised. 
A modern interpretation of the events of the 8th Party 
Congress and the decision to abolish VBVK states the 
following: 
the VIII Congress Qf the RCP(B) produced a positive 
assessment of the work of the All-Russian ·Bureau of 
Military Commissars ... Alongwith this, however, it was 
noted at the Congress that the Bureau, overburdened with 
the responsibility of directing the activities of the 
various activities of the military commissars-from the 
main and central establishments and institutions of the 
military department to the regiments and special units, 
their appointment, placement and dismissal, the 
organisation of military-political counter-espionage and 
other matters, the Bureau was not in a position to devote 
sufficient attention to Party, political and cultural-
educational work amongst the troops. Besides the latter, 
in all the military units, Party organisations had arisen 
which needed unified leadership. The existing All-Russian 
Bureau of Military Commissars did not possess Party 
functions. 
In connection with this, the VIII Congress of the 
Party took the decision to eliminate the All-Russian 
Bureau of Military Commissars and create thi Political 
department of Revvoensovet of the Republic. 
Before moving on from this particular quote, there are 
a number of points contained in this quote worth further 
examination. First of all, the quote states that the 
Congress did produce a positive assessment of the work of 
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VBVK and yet, curiously enough, as will be shown below, 
one cannot find any evidence for such a positive 
assessment judging by what has been made available of the 
minutes of the Congress. Secondly, in the list of the 
duties that VBVK had to perform in the proper functioning 
of the tasks of .the military commissars, there seems to be 
a veiled reference to the demand of the political 
departments(the mysterious "Party organisations" in the 
quote)for a more rigorous centralised leadership emanating 
from the centre and, finally, the admission that VBVK did 
not possess Party functions almost seems, in itself, an 
extraordinary admission to make given the fact that one of 
VBVK's main functions was sending Party members to the 
front. Since the extract seems largely to have been drawn 
on Congress material, then the latter quote can be 
inferred to have been a statement made at the Congress, or 
even perhaps part of the secret military minutes of the 
Congress. Either way, given the overall demand of the 
Congress for a purely Party organisation, in charge of the 
political apparatus of the Red Army, it would appear that 
the Congress had found a number of important deficiencies 
in the organisation and functioning of the organ. That, 
even on the eve of the Congress, VBVK was still having a 
hard time in getting its message across to the political 
departments and, indeed the entire political apparatus of 
the Red Army, is further borne out by the fact that, on 
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16th March 1919, VBVK still had to send a circular to all 
the relevant political institutions operating in the Red 
Army, explaining the functions of its single, most 
important department-the Agitation-education department. 2 
Thus, there would appear to have been still a widespread 
ignorance of the basic functions of VBVK, even on the very 
eve of the Congress itself. 
The 8th Party Congress opened in Moscow on 18th March 
1919 and lasted until the 23rd March 1919. Altogether, 
there were some 300delega~ at the Congress, representing 
313,766 Party members. 3 According to one source, some 
30,006 Army Communists were represented at the Congress 
and this, combined with the still serious military 
position of the Soviet Republic, ensured that the military 
question was one of the important questions on the agenda 
of the Congress. There was even an appearance of a 
"military opposition" to the CC's approved theses on the 
military question, which helped to make the military 
debate an important and lively affair. Unfortunately, 
however, it is true that the military part of the 
Congress' debate was not entirely held in open session, so 
to speak, even until this day, not all the relevant 
minutes of the Congress' record have been published. 
However, there are enough bits and pieces of information 
available to enable us to examine part of what the 
Congress had to say about the political apparatus of the 
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~ed Army. 
Due to the relatively large number of delegates who 
signalled their intention to speak on the military 
question-64-it was decided to transfer the debate on the 
military question to special sessions of the Congress' 
military section. 4 In fact, some 85 delegates took part 
in the work of the military section and the latter met on 
the 19th, 20th and 21st March 1919.~ Despite the 
importance of the military debate, Trotsky did not, in 
actual fact, attend the debate nor, for that matter, the 
Congress. In a conversation that he had with various 
representatives of the press on 17th March 1919, Trotsky 
briefly stated why he would not be attending the Congress: 
I personally deeply regret that I will not be able to take 
part in the debate on this question[the military question-
SM] :with the agreem5nt of the Central Committee, I will be 
going to the front. 
Despite his enforced presence at the front, on military 
duty, this did not mean that Trotsky, or RVSR, were given 
an easier ride at the Congress; on the contrary, it 
perhaps would have been better had Trotsky personally 
attended the Congress, in order to rebuke the criticism 
levelled against him, rather than allow the subsequent 
mythology, which grew up surrounding Trotsky's non-
appearance at the Congress, any basis for taking hold. 
However, he was at the front and, on his behalf, G.Ya. 
Sokolnikov, presented the main report to the Congress on 
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commissars, was not a proper debate per se. As will be 
described below, a number of prominent political 
personalities-Smilga being one of them-argued that the 
role of the commissar had changed so much that he was no 
longer fulfilling the same functions that he had been 
fulfilling since March 1918. Contrary to what has been 
portrayed in Soviet historiography of the subject, Smilga 
did not advocate the total abolishment of the commissars 
in the Red Army right away-he was in favour of a gradual 
transition in the powers and duties of the commissars, so 
they gradually became more like the Red Army commanders 
than anything else. 9 It could well be the case that this 
particular issue was debated upon, at length, in the 
Congress, simply that the relevant section of the minutes 
has not been made public yet. Until they are done so, it 
is impossible to assess the real impact of Smilga's 
suggestion. 
In concluding this particular part of the report, 
Sokolnikov then went on to state where he thought the 
future lay for the future development of the political 
apparatus of the Red Army: 
there are two methods for political education on the 
front:either it is led by the Communist Party cells, 
which, in order to accomplish this task, create their own 
political apparatus, or the Communist propaganda is 
carried out like the state propaganda of Communism. I 
think, comrades, that this congress must vote for the 
state propaganda of Communism on the front, that the 
direction of this propaganda is in t~0 hands of the political departments of the armies. 
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This would seem to be a somewhat hidden indication 
that the Bolsheviks were coming round to the idea that in 
order for the political work in the Red Army to be carried 
out to a greater effect, then it had to be carried out on 
the level of a state organ, ie that it was no longer the 
preserve of a purely government department, or organ, that 
it was far too big for the concerns of a single, 
governmental organ. It also seems to confirm the dominant 
position of the political departments in the future 
conduct of this state propaganda-a position which, in 
itself, merely reflected the true course of events at the 
front. The dominant political organ was the political 
department. There could be little serious doubt about 
that. 
However, as stated in the introduction to this 
particular section, there was opposition to the CC's 
theses, as presented by Sokolnikov and the man who was to 
officially espouse the views of the "military opposition" 
at the Congress, V.M.Smirnov, was himself no stranger to 
the political work being conducted at the front. 11 In a 
general statement on the link between the political 
consciousness of the peasant and the Red Army soldier, 
Smirnov underlined the importance of the political work 
being discussed: 
there is not the slightest doubt that the 
conscientiousness of the peasant today is still weak, and 
for us it is extremely important that we get him on our 
side, especially to convince him in the communality of our 
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interests. We must as widely as possible develop the 
political consciousness of the Red Army soldiers, who 
12 often come to us from the ranks of the middle peasants. 
Smirnov, whilst not denying the importance of the work 
to be undertaken, was critical, however, of the way that 
the work was to be carried out: 
despite the colossal importance of political work, ~in the 
way that the army is organised, political work is carried 
out almost entirely in a bureaucratic manner. In front of 
me is a copy of the journal, "Voennaya Mysl", the organ of 
the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Eastern Front, in 
which is described a series of draft instructions on the 
organisation of the political departments in the army. 
What do we see? The political department is to consist of 
a chief of the department and a whole range of sub-
departments-for example, a general, military-registration, 
military-organisational, etc. Can such an institution 
carry out the work? Of course not ... The only way[that the 
work can be carried out-SM]is to disentangle the 
bureaucratism and build politf§al work on the basis of a 
comradely unit of Communists. 
Thus, as far as Smirnov and the "military opposition" 
were concerned, the way forward for the future development 
of the Red Army's political apparatus was, in some 
respects, very reminiscent of what it had looked like way 
back at the very beginning. There would be no political 
departments, therefore coordination of work, which had 
always been a problem, would be now near impossible and 
duplication of effort would be rife. In other words, 
although the general idea behind Smirnov's proposals was 
attractive-ie cutting down on the bureaucratic approach 
and allowing more individual initiative at the front-the 
practical suggestion that political work should be carried 
out solely on the basis of comradely units of Communists 
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did not attract the support of the majority of the 
delegates at the Congress. To a certain extent, though, 
the Congress did take note of some of the views of the 
"military opposition". For instance, in one of the 
resolutions of the Congress, the latter stated that: 
the political departments of the army, under the direct 
leadership of the CC, will conduct in the future a 
selection of the commissars, removinT
4
from their midst all 
casual, unstable careerist elements. 
However, despite the worries of the "military 
opposition" finding some expression in part of the 
resolutions, on the whole, their worries were largely 
rejected. The Congress rejected the suggestion that the 
Party organs in the army should have control over the 
military activity of the units for instance, stating that: 
approving, in general ... the instructions, worked out by 
the Central Committee, on the rights and responsibilities 
of the Communist Party cells, commissars and the political 
departments, the Congress also makes it obligatory on all 
comrades, working in the army, t~ 5 unswervingly comply with the aforementioned instructions. 
Thus, there was to be no let up, as regards the political 
organs in the Red Army, as well as the CP representatives 
in the Red Army, carrying out the necessary military 
orders and instructions unswervingly and with total 
obedience. There would be no return to the past 
situation, when selective commissars, or other political 
representatives in the army, took' a hand in deciding 
matters, which were purely the domain of the proper 
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military authorities. 
Of course, as stated earlier, one of the main features 
of the work of the 8th Party Congress was the decision to 
transfer the burden of political work away from the Front 
onto the Army and the divisional political departments. 16 
As shown earlier, this was already happening at the front, 
so the Congress was basically, once again, confirming a 
trend that had already appeared on the front. In an 
interesting commentary on the latter, Yurenev, writing in 
his capacity as a member of the RMS of the Easter Front, 
wrote in June 1919: 
the 8t-h Congress of the Russian Communist Party, in its 
resolution on military policy, recognised the fact that 
the centre of burden for political. work in the existing 
army should be transferred from the front political 
departments to the political departments of the armies and 
the divisions. 
The decision was brought about because of the fact 
that Front political departments, due to the force of the 
military situation, are torn away from the Red Army masses 
and have lost their vital link with them ... thus, it was 
completely natural that, after many months of experience 
of political work, that Congress should decide to shift 
the burden of political work ftCm the front to the army 
political department, which stands much closer to the Red 
Army masses and has ~ink with the divisions. 
All direct political s to be carried out namely by the 
latter[the divisiona political departments-SM], but only 
under the most careful attentioy
7
and leadership of the 
army[political departments-SM]. 
Thus, through the speeches of the majority of the 
Congress and the "military opposition", it would appear 
that very few of the delegates actually had a kind word to 
say about the work VBVK. Indeed, in some respects, the 
speeches and resolutions quoted reflect that VBVK did have 
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a fairly rough time of things at the Congress. Given the 
present sources of information at the Congress, it would 
appear that there was a great deal of hostility towards 
VBVK and, i~ one statement from a prominent Soviet 
military historian on the subject, VBVK had already 
managed to attract a lot of very powerful enemies: 
the Congress of the Party devoted much attention to the 
work of the central political organ of the Red Army. The 
All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars ... in connection 
with the growing tasks placed before the commissars, was 
not already able to encompass the full complexity of their 
work. On top of that, the All-Russian Bureau of Military 
Commissars was also not ready for the leadership of Party 
work on the front, which was being heaped on it in 
connection with the transformation of the political 
departments into the leading army-Party organs ... At the 
Congress, delegates R.S.Zemlyachka, A.F.Myasnikov, 
J.V.Stalin and others, unleashed a fierce critique of the 
All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, pointing out 
actual shortcomings in its work. 
The Party Congress agreed with the proposal of J.V.Stalin 
and other delegates to abolish the All-Russian Bureau of 
Military Commissars and creating, in its place, the 
Political departT§nt of the revolutionary Military Soviet 
of the Republic. 
There are a number of points in the above passage which 
are obviously worthy of further detailed examination. 
Overall, though, it is a fairly balanced assessment of 
what probably did occur at the Congress, concerning the 
fate of VBVK. VBVK, as shown in the previous sections, 
failed in its attempts to control the work of both the 
commissars and the political departments and both points 
were to prove crucial in its apparent lack of support at 
the Congress. 
As demonstrated in the last section, as the importance 
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of the political departments grew, then, curiously enough, 
the power and influence of VBVK diminished. VBVK simply 
was not able to impose either its will or power over the 
work of the political departments, operating at the front. 
There was not the machinery, so to speak, in existence in 
order to allow VBVK any real chance of increasing the flow 
of information and materials between VBVK and the front 
political apparatus. Therefore, when it came to the 
crunch at the Party Congress, VBVK did not attract a great 
deal of support. If one looks back at the list of people 
who spoke out against VBVK-Zemlyachka, Myasnikov, Stalin, 
etc-regardless of what they were to do in the immediate 
future, as can be seen from their relevant biographies, 
all three had played a leading role in the Red Army's 
political apparatus, at one stage or another.19 
Under different circums~4.nces, the cht~ fs of the political 
departments should have been the natural allies of VBVK 
and yet, as detailed, they were amongst its fiercest 
critics. 
Another factor which also would not have helped VBVK's 
cause any is the possibility that VBVK may well have been 
an early victim of a possible power struggle going behind 
the scenes of the Congress. If one examines the account 
of the Congress in the official history of the Congress, 
one finds the following interesting statement: 
many delegates, both those who took part in the 'military 
opposition' and those who supported the CC sharply and, to 
Page 234 
a significant extent, justly criticised the activity of 
the military establishment. The chief of the military 
department, Trotsky, did not take into account the opinion 
of the Army Party organisations, often ignored the rights 
of commissars, displaying a negative attitude towards 
them •.. by his lordly manner and dictatorial ways, Trotsky 
set against himself personally many Communist-military 
workers •.. this was shown not only during the actual 
debates at the Congress, but also during the elections for 
membership of the CC. 50 delegates voted against 
Trot~ky'2 0candidature. Th~s was a serious political warn1ng. 
Further support for the anti-Trotsky nature of the 
proceedings is revealed in another extract from 
Yu.P.Petrov's work quoted earlier: 
the activity of the central military organs was severely 
criticised at the Congress: the Field Staff, the All-
Russian General Staff and also the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of the Republic, were all criticised for their 
bureaucratic methods of work ... Congress delegates, 
K.E.Voroshilov, F.I.Goloshchekin and S.K.Minin and others 
noted that Trotsky did not know the real position on the 
fronts, the compos~£ion of the troops, the problems which 
had to be tackled. . 
Whether there was, in any fact, any truth in these 
charges levelled against Trotsky, was not too important. 
What was more important was the fact that they were being 
made and that anything which he was remotely involved in 
was in for a fair amount of criticism at the Congress. As 
stated earlier, given the actual anti-Trotsky feeling at 
the Congress, it was no real surprise that VBVK, linked to 
Trotsky through Yurenev, was also fair game for the 
critics of Trotsky himself: 
the delegates, especially those from the Army, criticised 
sharply the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, 
headed by K.K.Yurenev. R.S.Zemlyachka, in her speech, 
stated that unfit commissars were being sent to the units 
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and that Yurenev and the other supporters of Trotsky, did 
not know what was happening in the Army, did not
2
zven know 
what was happening in the Communist Party cells. 
Thus, the latter combined with VBVK's failure to make 
any real impact on the front political apparatus more than 
likely sealed the end for VBVK. In all of this, Stalin 
would appear to have played a not insignificant role. 
After all, he is usually given the credit for proposing 
the abolishment of VBVK, as previously noted. Stalin's 
dislike of the organ probably stemmed both from its close 
ties with Trotsky and his own personal experience of 
political work on the Southern Front. In a number of 
early accounts of Stalin's role at the 8th Party Congress, 
Stalin is supposed to have criticised VBVK in fairly s~arp 
tones: 
comrade Stalin criticised sharply ... the work of the All-
Russian Bureau of Military Commissars(VBVK)for its 
inadequate leadership of the units, unsatisfactory 
selection of cadres and other inadequacies and mistakes. 23 
Further on in the above article, the author apparently 
made use of Stalin's speech to the 8th Party Congress, 
and, in a quote from Stalin's speech to the Congress, 
noted Stalin as having said the following: 
political education in the Army has great significance. 
We must put the question whether the All-Russian Bureau of 
Military Commissars should be reorganised or abolished; it 
is necessary that both in the rear and on the front, units 
are trained in the revolutionary spirit; it is necessary 
to achieve this in order that, a2
4
any moment, a regular 
army is ready to go into battle. 
If all of this is true, then it would appear that VBVK had 
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managed to attract a lot of enemies, but very few friends. 
Not even Trotsky was there to defend himself or VBVK; 
Yurenev was there, but apparently made no reference to the 
work of VBVK, and only discussed the electivity of the 
command staff. 2 5 Thus, with VBVK facing apparent 
opposition from all sides and no one, not even its 
Chairman, prepared to make any positive statements on its 
behalf, VBVK was almost doomed from the very beginning. 
The relevant resolution, which formally abolished VBVK, 
was, in many respects, very low key: 
to abolish Vseburvoenkom. To create a Political 
department of Revvoensovet of the Republic, transferring 
to the department all of the functions of Vseburvoenkom, 
putting in charge of it a member of the CC of the 
RCP(B)who will have the right2
6
of a member of the 
Revvoensovet of the republic. 
Not long after the end of the 8th Party Congress, a 
session of the CC was held on 25th March 1919 which, apart 
from electing the membership of the Politburo and the 
Orgburo, also examined the problem of "strengthening the 
central organ of the Red Army's Party-political 
apparatus". 27 The CC resolution noted, at its meeting, 
that: 
up until the transfer of functions of the All-Russian 
Bureau of Military Commissars, all instructions of 
Vseburvoenko2
8
will remain in force and must, as before, be 
carried out. 
Thus, it was not until 18th April 1919 that the new 
Political department of the Revolutionary Military Soviet 
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of the Republic came into formal existence and VBVK ceased 
to exist. On the 15th May 1919, the Political department 
was reformed and renamed and became the Political 
Administration of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the 
Republic(referred to by its abbreviation earlier as 
PUR). 29 The new Chief of PUR was not to be Yurenev, 
needless to say, nor was it to be I.N.Smirnov either, but 
one member of the CC who had a wide variety of experience 
in various areas of Party work-I.T.Smilga. 30 Not only was 
Smilga a member of both RVSR and the CC, but PUR was made 
subordinate to the CC and that, arguably more than · 
anything else, was to ensure that from now on the new 
ceptralised political organ for the Red Army would be more 
subject to the demands of the Party's CC. VBVK had shown 
that with the distrust shown towards an organ which was 
not a totally controlled Party organ, the political 
apparatus at the front had tremendous difficulty in 
establishing a proper working relationship. It would 
remain to be seen, though, how well PUR would work with 
the front political apparatus. 
Despite the eventual demise of VBVK, not all of the 
history of the Red Army's first real, serious attempt at a 
centralised political organ makes for sorry reading. It 
should never be forgotten that VBVK was faced with immense 
tasks, when it was created in April 1918, not least of 
which was the almost continuous need to re-assess exactly 
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·what was VBVK designed to do. Was it just a coordinating 
body for the work of the military commissars in the units? 
Then what happened when the political departments began to 
assert themselves? Whose interests became more dominant 
then? Regardless of the answers to these questions, it 
has to be stated that the Red Army's political and 
cultural-educational apparatus, despite all its faults and 
mistakes, were in a much stronger position in April 1919 
than they had been, say, a year earlier. For instance, 
the total number of CP cells in the 7 military districts 
(Moscow, Petrograd, Orel, Yaroslavl, Urals, Volga and, 
finally, the Western MD)stood at 1,378; the total number 
of literacy schools, again in the same geographical area, 
stood at 425; the total number of Red Army clubs was 381, 
etc. 31 As a PUR report for 1920 stated: 
political work during VBVK's existence was placed at the 
necessary level ... cultural-educational work developed 
rapidly in comparison w~zh the period of existence of the 
All-Russian Collegiate. 
However, on saying that, as the 1920 report itself 
stated, there was still a lot of work which VBVK had not 
been able to get to grips with: 
nevertheless, during the period of existence of the All-
Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, the problem of 
correctly constructing the political-educational apparatus 
and its normal and productive functioning was far from 
fully solved. It would be a mistake to think that this 
apparatus was a smooth machine, operating quickly and 
easily in all of its parts. Whole armies d~~ not find 
answers from the centre to their questions. 
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Thus, in many respects, in evaluating the whole 
activity of VBVK, one has to say that although it did a 
lot, it did not do enough and, in establishing some sort 
of control over the work and activity of the commissars 
and the political departments, it was largely a failure. 
The best epigraph to VBVK was the opening sentence of 
Smilga's anniversary article on the creation of PUR, 
published in 1924: 
PUR is the direct su§~essor to the All-Russian Bureau of 
·Military Commissars. 
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CHAPTER THREE(SECTION ONE):-
THE CREATION AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY SOVIET OF THE 
REPUBLIC (MAY 1919-NOVEMBER 1920). 
Before embarking on a detailed examination of the 
activity of PUR in 1919-1920, it was thought best that the 
opening section to this complex subject consist of the 
necessary background to the formation of PUR, as well as 
providing the reader with all the vital organisational 
detail at the beginning. In such a way, it is hoped that 
the reader will then be able to make better use of the 
information that then follows this section. Thus, this 
section will evaluate and examine the following main 
themes: 
1)the contribution of VBVK to the organisational structure 
of PUR; 
2)examine the various sub-departments that went to make up 
PUR in this period; 
3)examine the relationship of PUR to the other military 
and political organs of the period(most notably the CC and 
RVSR). 
In writing this particular section, it should be 
' 
stressed that a number of very rare primary and secondary 
source materials have been used and that, to the author's 
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best knowledge, the information contained both in this 
section, and in the other sections that follow, should 
provide the reader with the most complete picture yet 
available of the work of the Red Army's main political 
organ during the Civil War. However, this should not be 
taken to mean that there will not be any "gaps" in the 
sections that follow; what is being said is that much new 
information will be made available on the work and organ-
isational structure of a body which has been little 
studied both here and in the USSR itself. 
Following the decision of the 8th Party Congress to 
abolish VBVK, the way was made clear for, at least, a 
partial reconstruction of the Red Army's political 
apparatus, both that operating at the front and, more 
importantly, that operating in the centre. Thus, on the 
18th April 1919, the Political department of RVSR, as 
previously outlined in the last chapter, was temporarily 
recreated and, not too long after that, PUR itself came 
into formal existence. 1 As described in the previous 
section, between the closing of the 8th Party Congress and 
the 18th April 1919, all the former decrees and orders of 
·vBVK remained in force. 2 With the recreation of the 
Political department of RVSR, however, this was a 
reasonably clear indication that the Party was preparing 
to introduce a new, central organ, in charge of the 
political apparatus of the Red Army. Thus, on 26th May 
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1919, by order of RVSR, the Political department of RVSR 
was renamed and became the Political administration of the 
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic(PUR for 
short). 3 Unfortunately, the truncated version of the 
decree that appears in vol.2 of "Partiino-politicheskaya 
rabota ... ",(M.l964)does not list any of the functions of 
the new organ, or any details concerning its 
organisational structure or even any details about its 
membership. All of these matters have to be solved 
entirely independently of the decree. Thus, according to 
one early source on the history of the Red Army's 
political apparatus, the staffing of PUR owed quite a lot 
to its predecessor, VBVK: 
the entire staff of VBVK was used in the formation of the 
political department of RVSR. 
The Political department existed in agreement with the 
statutes of VBVK and carried out its functions. On the 
26th May 1919, by order of RVSR ... the former was 
transformed into the political Administration of RVSR. 4 
The clear implication from the above statement is that 
all, or virtually all, the staff transferred from VBVK 
directly into PUR. This would have made a great deal of 
sense, as it would ensure that a lot of useful and vital 
experience, which was there thanks to the work of VBVK, 
was not lost. However, a caveat has to be introduced 
here. After all, given the castigation of VBVK's 
leadership at the 8th Party Congress, it is extremely 
unlikely that the entire leadership of VBVK were involved 
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in the new organ-for instance, Yurenev himself was not 
involved in PUR; his term of appointment(16th April 1919) 
on the RMS of the Eastern Front even precedes the formal 
creation of the Political department of RVSR. 5 It is 
probably also the case, although presently impossible to 
prove due to the lack of the necessary primary source 
material, that the majority of the departmental leaders of 
VBVK were also not used in the organisational make-up of 
PUR, although, on saying that, as will be shown later, one 
did survive and obtained a fairly high position in the PUR 
organisation-her name was V.D.Kasparova. 6 
Although they have not been republished with the 
original order from 1919, it has been possible to track 
down the original staff numbers of PUR, as envisaged by 
the May 1919 order. They are listed at the end of this 
~~/as an appendix. However, a number of interesting 
points may be made about them here PUR was to be based on 
four main departments-these being a general department, a 
political department, an educational department and, 
finally, a literary-publications department. 7 controlling 
the work of the departments was the Chief of PUR and his 
assistants. 8 The largest of the departments listed was 
the general department("obshchiy otdel") which, judging by 
the functions of the staff given, was in overall charge of 
the administration of PUR, communication facilities, 
finances and so on. 9 A calculation of the total number of 
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staff listed reveals that it had a grand total of 469 
people in its employ. 10 However, although this was very 
large number of people, it should be remembered that this 
figure included 240 "packers and messengers" which, 
according to another source, were for "the distribution of 
literature" to the front. 11 Unlike the other departments 
involved in the organisational structure of PUR, it has 
not been possible to track down the name of the person in 
charge of this particular department-despite its overall 
size and undoubted importance of the department to the 
proper and effective running of PUR, no Soviet historian 
has identified the name of the person in overall charge of 
the department. 
By comparison, the Political department was fairly 
small. According to the list of staff involved, the 
majority of the staff were divided into four 
sections:information(7); statistics(lO); agitation-
propaganda(4+) and, finally, administration(21). The 
figure for the number of people involved in the agitation-
propaganda section is like that because under this 
particular section, there was also a "agitational courses" 
part, the number of staff for which has not been noted. 12 
Other than the staff duly noted, the department also had a 
further 10 "travelling inspectors" who, as their name 
suggests, went around inspecting the units to see how the 
work was being carried out at the front. 13 Judging by the 
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various sections that went to make up this particular 
department, it would appear that this department was 
mainly concerned with both collating information, as 
regards what was happening at the front, as well as 
inspecting units and, of course, distributing propaganda 
to the front. 
As regards who was in charge of the department, it has 
been possible to both track down the name of the person in 
charge, as well as a number of interesting biographical 
details on the man. Although a full biography of the man 
appears in the special appendix attached to the end of the 
dissertation, it would not be out of place here to note a 
few of the more·salient points. The man ~n charge of the 
department was R.P.Katanyan, a man who had played an 
active part in the revolutionary movement since 1901. 14 
Like most of his generation of student activists, before 
the October Revolution, he had served various terms of 
imprisonment and worked underground for the Bolshevik 
Party in Orenburg, Moscow, Tbilisi, etc. 15 In 1919, he 
served with 11th Army's political department, editing the 
newspaper, "Krasniy Voin". 16 In 1920-1921, he became 
Chief of the agitation and propaganda department of the 
CC-a possible testament to his work with PUR.17 His post-
Civil war career, however, becomes slightly unsavoury, as 
he eventually became a senior assistant to the USSR's 
State Prosecutor, taking part in the 1930s "show 
Page 249 
trials".18 However, in 1938, he himself was arrested, 
sentenced and not released until 1955. He died some 11 
years after release. 1 9 To all intents and purposes, as 
will be shown below, the career of Katanyan before the 
October 1917 revolution, would appear to have been fairly 
typical for those who worked in the upper echelons of PUR, 
at this time. 
The second largest department was, perhaps 
surprisingly at first glance, the Educational department. 
According to the list of staff, the latter numbered 96 in 
total and were spread over a number of sections and 
bureax. 20 Amongst the various sections and bureaux were a 
library bureau, a bureau of physical culture, a museum 
bureau, etc. 21 The single largest bureau/section within 
this particuk,r department was the joint theatrical/ 
musical bureau with a combined staff of 17. 22 Looking at 
the range of bureaux and sections, it would appear that 
the primary interest of the department was the conduct of 
cultural and educational work in the units. 
Thankfully, it is also possible to state who was in 
charge of this particular departnment. This is the only 
identifiable case where a person who had an important role 
to play in the running of VBVK, also had an important 
position in the running of PUR; the person in question 
23 being V.D.Kasparova. Unfortunately, unlike Katanyan, 
there is very little information on Kasparova, either when 
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she worked in VBVK, or when she worked in PUR. However, 
what information that is available does make for some 
interesting reading, including one very peculiar item of 
information which, if true, would upset our existing 
knowledge of Stalin's personal life! 
The information that is available on Kasparova usually 
refers to the post-Civil War period, specifically as 
regards her activity in the the Left Opposition group in 
1928. 24 In the latter reference, Kasparova signed an 
appeal, by the Left Oppositionists and sent to the 
Communist International, against expulsion from the CPSU. 
Interestingly enough, among the other signatories to the 
appeal were such prominent figures of the Red Army's 
political establishement as Rakovsky, Smilga, Beloborodov, 
etc. 25 Could this have been an indication of some sort of 
shared outlook, stemming from the days of the Civil War? 
In a more recent reference to Kaspar ova, one memoirist 
stated that Kasparova was exiled to Siberia in 1928, 
alongwith Radek. 26 He also goes as far as to state that 
Kasparova was a former wife of Stalin! 27 However, there 
is no supporting evidence for this claim. whatsoever. In 
a footnote on Kasparova, there is the following piece of 
information about her: 
Vera Kasparova was an Old Bolshevik who was in charge of 
work among women of the East for the party and for the 
Comintern's International Women's Secretariat, beginning 
in 1921. The Secretariat was dissolved in 1926. 
Kasparova, a leading member of the Left Opp~gition, was 
expelled at the fifteenth congress in 1927. 
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The fact that she was involved in such work for the Party 
would seem to indicate that she, herself, may have come 
from the Caucasus region and that sh~ may have had, other 
than her experience of working in both VBVK and PUR, pre-
revolutionary qualifications in teaching, or something of 
that nature. Of course, this is mere speculation but, 
given the fact that there is so little information 
presently available on her, even some speculation on her 
pre-revolutionary career is warranted. 
The smallest of the departments of PUR was the 
literary-publications department. It had a total staff of 
45 people, split into a number of sections and bureaux. 29 
the largest of the sections was the editorial board, which 
numbered some 20 people. 30 Judging by the published list 
of staff, its main duties would appear to have been 
concerned with producing the necessary volume and type of 
literature required for the front. 31 As regards the 
actual leadership of this particular department, then the 
earliest name that can be traced to this post is 
V.P.Polonsky, the earliest identification of the latter 
with the relevant post being November 1919. 32 There is so 
much biographical information available-he was a very 
prominent Marxist literary critic, both before and after 
the October revolution-that there is no real need to go 
into too much detail about him here. 33 Suffice it to say 
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that, in the post Civil War period, he was to become no 
less than editor of "Noviy Mir". 34 
If we add up then all the relevant figures listed 
above, as well as the four people who, as it were, were 
the "brain" of PUR, ie the Chief and his support staff, 
then we arrive at a grand total of 663 people working 
actually in PUR itself.35 This would make PUR a 
reasonably large organ and, in one explanation for its 
size, one early Soviet historian of the Red Army's Civil 
War apparatus wrote the following: 
the large number of staff was, on the one hand, due to a 
number of reasons which also were apparent in other Soviet 
organs, being considerably swollen at the time and, on the 
other hand, it should also be remembered that PUR was an 
organ of a distributive nature having, for example, 240 
men for the distribution of literature ... it had a large 
supply apparatus which, other than receiving materials 
from Soviet organs and then distributing then to the local 
·political organs, also had the function of preparing such 
materials. It also had a large number of i~gtructors, 
going out to the localities-78 men, in all. 
(PUR's overall structure, at this time, is shown in 
appendix one). 
If one looks back at the October 1918 list of staff 
for VBVK, which gave a grand total of 286 employees 
working for VBVK, then it is obvious that PUR was a much 
. larger structure-more than double the size, in actual 
fact, than VBVK. Unfortunately, it is difficult to make 
direct comparisons between individual departments of PUR 
and VBVK, as both were constructed along different 
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lines:the only department that was common to both of them, 
in a recognisable form, was the Education department, 
although even there one has to introduce the caveat that 
in VBVK's 1918 structure, the latter was a sub-department, 
not a full fledged separate department, as was the case 
with PUR. ~ver, there would appear to have been a 
significant increase in the number of personnel allocated 
to working in this particular area-in October 1918, VBVK 
had a staff of 16 people working in the Education 
department; 37 PUR's figure for the same department, 
however, was 96-a very significant increase, even given 
the fact that the sub-department was now a department, in 
its own right. 38 
Arguably, the main deciding factor for the success of 
PUR was in terms of its relationship with the political 
apparatus of the Red Army at the front and also the 
relationship between PUR and the centralised political 
apparatus of the Soviet state. If PUR is to be judged as 
more of a success than VBVK, then the nature of the 
relationship between, say, PUR and the political 
departments and PUR and the CC has to be investigated and 
analysed. Without prejudging the issue too much, it has 
to be said that a number of the problems which had faced 
VBVK were also to rear their ugly heads and be a problem 
for PUR, as well. In some respects, the political 
apparatus still had to cut a few teeth before being able 
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to show its true worth to the Bolshevik drive for victory. 
In a article which a former Deputy-Chief of PUR (Ch.G. 
Rakovsky) wrote in 1920, he summarised the relationship 
between PUR and the political departments thus: 
in its organisational relationship, the Political Admini-
stration of the Republic was a hierarchical organ, similar 
to many other hierarchical military organs. Just as to 
the Revvoensovet of the Republic were subordinated the 
revvoensovets of the fronts, the revvoensovets of the 
armies ... then so to the Political Administration of the 
Republic were subordinated the political administrations 
of the fronts, to the political administrations of the 
fronts were subordinated the political administration of 
the armies, to the political administrations of the armies 
were subordinated the divisional political 
administrations, to the divisional political 
administrations were subordinated the brigade political 
commissars, to the brigade political commiss39s were 
subordinated the regimental commissars, etc. 
Obviously, the distinct impression to be gained from 
the above article was that from top to bottom, ·PUR's 
orders and decrees would and could be faithfully carried 
out to the letter. Unfortunately, for a whole host of 
reasons, the theory and the practise were not one and the 
same thing. PUR was still to suffer from a distinct lack 
of information emanating from the front, which in itself 
alone meant that PUR would have problems in a number of 
areas, eg allocating the correct number of Party workers 
to the units, knowing what were the basic needs and 
requirements of each of the units, knowing exactly what 
was happening at the front, etc. If the information did 
not flow, then, similar to the position of VBVK, PUR had 
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to act with a good deal less authority than should have 
been necessary. 
As previously mentioned, the original intention of the 
military resolutions of the 8th Party Congress, as they 
were supposed to affect the Red Army's political apparatus 
anyway, was the introduction of a much more centralised 
political organ for the Red Army, made more accountable to 
the Party's CC. What was also important was that the new 
political organ also had a good relationship with the 
Soviet Republic's leading military organ of the period-
RVSR. As an early account of the history of the Red 
Army's political apparatus stated in 1922: 
at the 8th Party Congress of the RCP(B), the military 
delegates from the provinces strongly insisted that all 
political work in the Red Army must be directly 
subordinated to the supervision of the CC of the Party, 
for this it was necessary to create a political 
administration, in the form of an autonomous department of 
the Revvoensovet of the Republic, at the head of which 
must be placed a member of the CC of the RCP(B) with the
0 rights of a member of the revvoensovet of the Republic. 4 
In effect, this happened with the appointment of Ivar 
Tenisovich Smilga as chief of PUR in May 1919.41 Smilga 
had been a member of the Party's CC as far back as April 
1917.42 His appointment as a member of RVSR was made on 
8th May 1919, therefore before his appointment as Chief of 
PUR, Smilga had already fulfilled both requirements for 
the job-ie membership of both the CC and the RVSR. 43 
Thus, in the form of its Chief, PUR was tied into both the 
Page 256 
military and political apparatus of the Soviet state and, 
due to its representation on both the most powerful organs 
of the Soviet state, had ensured itself a unique position, 
amongst all other Soviet organs. PUR was alone in having 
dual membership, so to speak, of both the CC and the RVSR. 
No other organ was to receive such treatment and certainly 
the fact that PUR was accorded such status was probably 
both a reflection of how important had been the relevant 
debate at the preceding Party congress, as well as the 
fact that the CC was adopting a much more serious, 
determined line, as regards the conduct of political and 
cultural-educational work in the Red Army units. 
Much work was now conducted through PUR which had 
earlier been the prerogative of other parts of the central 
political apparatus, eg, the mobilisation of Party members 
soon became an area of responsibility of PUR. 44 This 
meant that in certain areas of work, PUR worked in close 
contact with organs likje the Secretariat and the Orgburo. 
Indeed, a point worth noting here is that a number of 
Deputy-Chiefs of PUR, namely A.G.Beloborodov, 
L.P.Serebryakov, Ch.G.Rakovsky, as will be detailed later, 
were members of the Orgburo.45 This would seem to imply 
that, formally or otherwise, there was some sort of link-
up between the Orgburo and PUR, although the exact nature 
is still impossible to determine at present. Thus, 
through Smilga and its close working relationship with a 
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number of the other leading Party organs of the period, it 
is easy to see that, in many respects, PUR was in an 
organisationally much stronger relationship with the other 
central military and political organs of the period. 
That, however, there were still problems to overcome, 
should not be underestimated, but, at least, PUR had links 
with the centre which had not previously existed with 
VBVK. 
Curiously enough, until comparatively late in its 
history, no single set of instructions were produced which 
described the functions of PUR in any detail. This should 
not be taken to imply, however, that PUR enjoyed a 
particular level of organisational s~bility, previously 
unheard of before in other parts of_ the Soviet military 
and political establishment; on the contrary, it could 
have been precisely why there was a lack of a concrete set 
of instructions that PUR, in the words of one author, 
"restructured itself 15 times" in the course of the first 
year of its activity!46 Certainly, throughout 1919, there 
took place a number of identifiable organisational changes 
which, on the whole, tended to add further bits onto the 
overall organisational structure of PUR. These will now 
be described. 
In June 1919, the Military department of the Central 
Executive Committee's Publications' section was 
transferred to PUR.4 7 On the 31st July 1919, an 
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Inspectorate of Cultural-Educational Work in the Red Army 
was created under PUR's contro1 48 and then, on 12th 
Novemebr 1919, the commission, "Krasniy Podarok"(lit."Red 
Present")was transferred to PUR's control also. 4 9 At the 
beginning of 1920, a further two new departments were 
created-the Eastern department and the Polish 
department. 50 As their names would suggest, they were 
designed to look after the interests of specific 
nationalities. In the case of the Eastern department, it 
was in charge of conducting propaganda-agitational work 
amongst the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Republic.Sl 
However, although there is documentation for the 
existence of all these organisational changes, the picture 
becomes somewhat confused when one begins analysing a 
series of articles and statements, made by the then 
Deputy-Chief of PUR, Rakovsky, on the work and 
organisation of PUR in 1919, when he began to discuss the 
work not of a "general department", as previously noted, 
but of an "administrative-finance" department, etc.5 2 
Whether these were new departments or new names for the 
old departments is impossible to say at present, without 
the relevant staff figures, one cannot say whether the 
departments were growing, stayed the same or had even been 
cut, so it is impossible to tell whether the general 
department was the same as the administrative-finance 
department. Certainly, more evidence would have to be 
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produced to assess whether, in actual fact, these new 
departments were new departments and not simply old 
departments renamed. 
Looking at the "new" departments, however, it is 
possible to detail the precise nature of their functions 
and, in such a way, help to arrive at a much clearer 
picture of the organisational structure and activity of 
PUR at this time. Thus, the administrative-finance 
department was in charge of supplying the necessary 
amounts of money for the wages and projects of the various 
political departments, scattered all over the Republic. 53 
In view of the fact that this department was in charge of 
the purse strings, it can be safely assumed that it was 
either the single, most important department or one of the 
most important of all the departments that went to make up 
PUR. According to the departmental report, in the second-
half of 1919 alone, the department allocated 215 million 
rubles to the Front political departments alone and a 
further 106,250,000 rubles to the okrug military 
districts.5 4 The department also financed the 
agitational-educational work being undertaken by the 
guberniya and uezd military commissariats.55 
On a broader scale, the department also financed the 
literacy schools, operating in the Red Army, as well as 
the Red Army clubs, the mobile theatres, etc.56 
The agitation-information department was split into 
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three sections-these being agitation-instruction; 
information-statistics and, finally, mobilisation-
distribution.57 The first section was in charge of 
instructing agitators, watching over the political 
courses, helping to unify the work being carried out in 
the units, etc. 58 The second section, as its name would 
suggest, had to collate information and statistics for the 
compilation of reports, on political work amongst other 
things, so important to the working of PUR. The final 
section in this particular department was, in accordance 
with the relevant decrees and instructions of the Party's 
CC, in charge of the mobilisation an distribution of Party 
members to the front and their "rational use" in the 
Army's political organs.59 Other than the functions 
listed above,the department was also concerned with the 
distribution of papers and posters in the Red Army-
similar, in some respects, to the work of the Literary-
publications department.60 
According ~ ~kovsky' s speech to the first All-
Russian Congress of Political Workers held in Moscow in 
December 1919, the task of the cultural-educational 
department was, simply, "the struggle against 
illiteracy". 61 Apparently, in· the first half of 1919 
alone, some 150 million rubles was spent on educating the 
Red Army soldiers in a number of different ways.6 2 The 
department was also in charge of organising and 
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instructing the various cultural organs, operating in the 
Red Army at the time, e.g. the theatres, sport societies, 
libraries, etc.63 
The Literary-publications department was in charge of 
publishing and distributing the various journals, 
brochures, posters, etc. 64 The last department listed-the 
Inspectorate-was charged with "centralising and 
systematising political work in the armies." 65 What this 
meant precisely is impossible to say-indeed, the relevant 
section of the report stated that the latter department 
was so new that its precise functions still awaited 
further definition. 66 Given the title of the department, 
it would be logical to assume that it generally conducted 
an examination of political work being undertaken in the 
Red Army. If the latter was the case, it certainly would 
be an important department of PUR and further 
identification of the precise nature of its functions, as 
well as identifying the personnel involved, would be 
beneficial to the work of this thesis. 
It is possible to identify some of the people who were 
involved in the various sections and sub-sections of PUR, 
at this time. Although, on saying that, it is also the 
case that very little actual biographical information is 
available on any of the names listed below. In no 
particular order, the Chief of PUR's Press bureau(April 
1920)was B.Samsonov; 66 Deputy-Chief of PUR's Political 
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department(April 1920)was N.Ruzer-Nirova.67 As regards 
the library activity of PUR, one name that seems to come 
up with a great degree of regularity is Evg.Khlebtsevich-
his name first appears in such a context in March 1920. 68 
Other names associated with various sections and 
departments of PUR include O.D.Kameneva (sister of 
Trotsky, wife of L.B.Kamenev), chief of the Inspector-
Information department (May 1920)69; chief of the 
information section, also at the same time, was 
Z.M.Kossakovsky 70 ; by April 1920, Vl.Faydysh was chief of 
PUR's Education department 71 ; by August 1920, chief of the 
agitation and propaganda department was Suzdaltseva, a 
person who we have alreay came across in the previous 
chapter. 72 Chief of supplies at this time was a man 
called Krasinsk7 3 ; by December 1920, Deputy-Chief of PUR's 
Political-education department was Khassis.7 4 In a 
collection of documents, devoted to analysing political 
work in the Red Army during the Civil War, a number of 
other names crop up, as regards PUR's internal 
organisational structure, therefore, we find that, In 
April 1920, associated with PUR's administration 
department was a chap named Lotsmanov7 5 ; the Deputy-Chief 
of PUR's literary-publications department(October 1920)was 
Milman. Unfortunately, no other information is 
presently available on the overwhelming majority of the 
people listed and it can only be hoped that such a 
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situation will be rectified in the not too distant future. 
A number of commissions were established under PUR, in 
1920, which again added to the overall organisational 
structure of PUR, as well as increasing its remit and 
influence. One of these commissions is only known by the 
following flingle reference to its existence: 
in May 1920, in order to control the agitational-
propaganda work both on the front and in the rear, the CC 
of the RCP(B)created, under the control of PUR, a special 
commission, the composition of which contained
77 Yu.Yu.Markhlevsky, P.M.Kerzhentsev and others. 
Exactly, what work the commission did carry out is 
impossible to say.presently. Was the commission in charge 
of all agitational-propaganda work to be carried out on 
the front and in the rear? If so, then this commission 
would have been a very important organ~ well-worth 
detailed examination. Unfortunately, there simply is not 
enough information available to examine the work of the 
commission, even in a perfunctory way. The identification 
of a couple of the commission's staff does not help the 
situation too much either, as neither of the two men would 
appear to have played a particularly important role in the 
work of the Red Army's political apparatus earlier. 78 
As previously noted, the main work of PUR's 
Educational department was the liquidation of illiteracy. 
In order to increase the department's capabilities in that 
area, on the 22nd July 1920, by order of PUR, the Central 
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Commission for the Liquidation of Illiteracy in the Red 
Army was created. 79 Apparently, the main tasks of the 
latter were: 
providing the Red Army with school workers, the necessary 
teaching books and the creation and control of the work of 
the local commissions and §oher local organs for the 
liquidation of illiteracy. 
The decrees of the commission were to be approved by the 
Chief of PUR himself and were then automatically made 
compulsory for all the other organs, involved in the 
campaign to wipe out illiteracy from both the Red Army.and 
the Red Fleet. 81 
Thus, by September 1920, PUR's organisational 
structure was, arguably, in need of some further 
clarification. PUR was now in charge of a whole range of 
political and cultural-educational activities in the Red 
Army-from conducting propaganda campaigns amongst Polish 
prisoners of war to publishing leaflets on how to combat 
the tank menace! Hence, in September 1920, by order of 
RVSR, a set of regulations ("polozheniya") was issued 
which discussed both the organisation of PUR and its 
overall tasks. 82 Although these regulations were 
published towards the end of PUR's Civil Was career, so to 
speak, nevertheless, they were an important document and 
will be analysed here in detail. The regulations 
consisted of a series of general statements, as well as of 
a more specific set of statements, concerning the duties 
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of a number of the departments that went to make up PUR.83 
Unfortunately, unlike the order of May 1919, there is no 
indication in the new set of regulations, whether the 
overall staff of PUR actually increased or not. There is 
also no information available from other sources either on 
this point, so this particular question will have to be 
left open for the time being. 
The opening series of statements in the regulation 
consist of a number of points concerning PUR's general 
structure and responsibilities: 
1. The Political Administration is in control of all 
political-educational and agitational work in the Red Army 
and Fleet. This is carried out on the basis of the 
instructions and orders of the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of the Republic and, also, the decrees of the 
Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. With 
this in mind, the Political Administration: 
a)works out and issues orders, circulars and instructions, 
directing political-educational and agitational work; 
b)publishes books, papers, magazines ... and supplies them 
to the relevant institutions and units; 
c)instructs the political departments of the fronts, 
armies, divisions, the okrug political-educational 
administrations and other political-educational 
organisations in the Army and Fleet, as regards the 
conduct of political-educational work ... and controls their 
activitj in this area; 
d)trains a cadre of instructors and agitators for the 
conduct of political-educational and agitational work; 
e)convenes congresses on matters of a general and 
political nature, concerning political-educational and 
agitational work, and also takes part in meetings, 
conferences on matters of political education; 
f)assesses all the political-educational work and, with 
this purpose in mind, publishes special bulletins and 
tables; 
g)creates museums and exhibitions; 
h)appoints and approves the military commissars, operating 
in the military un~~s, administrations and institutions, 
subordinate to it. 
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Thus, judging by the above, it can be shown that PUR 
had a very broad remit for the control and conduct of all 
forms of political-educational work in the Red Army, at 
this time. The work is spelt out in clear, unequivocal 
terms and so is the nature of the relationship between PUR 
and the CC and RVSR. The next part of the regulations, in 
actual fact, went on to discuss the appointment of PUR's 
top personnel, including its Chief: 
2. The Chief of PUR is appointed by the Revolutionary 
Military Soviet of the Republic and enjoys the rights of a 
Ch~ef of a main administration; in an administrative 
sense, he is subordinate to the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of the Republic and, in all actions, is directed by 
both the orders of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of 
the Republic and the decrees of the CC of the Russian 
Communist Party. 
3. The Deputy-Chief of the Political Administration is 
appointed by order of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of 
the Republic. 
4. The chiefs of the departments of the Political 
Administration are selected by the Chief of PUR and 
appointed by §sder of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of 
the Republic. 
There are a number of interesting points worth 
examining in this particular section. For instance, the 
phrase about the Chief of PUR enjoying the same rights as 
a chief of a "main administration" would seem to imply 
that the decision to create a political administration in 
May 1919, instead of allowing the political department to 
operate, had some significance in terms of status. That 
the word, "administration" implies something bigger, or 
more powerful, than the word "department". After all, the 
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only other main administration that comes to mind is the 
GPU, created in 1922. It would also appear to be the case 
that the people who drew up these regulations had no 
doubts about the relationship of the CC and RVSR to PUR, 
i.e. that they could not see any potential conflict of 
interest arising. However, it still does not answer the 
question as regards the dominance of the two organs to 
PUR, in other words, did PUR have to obey the demands of 
the CC or RVSR more? If PUR was the political organ for 
the Red Army, one would assume that it would owe its 
allegiance more to the Party's supreme political organ, 
rather than the military organ. The next point in the 
regulations discussed the structure of PUR: 
5. The Political Administration consists of the following 
departments: administration, inspBctorate-information, 
agita~ion~~-educational, literary-publications and 
suppl1es. 
The next part of the regulations then went on to discuss t 
he nature and functions of each of the departments in 
turn. Thus, the administration department consisted of a 
chancellery ("kantseleriya"), mobilisation-registration 
section, cipher section, a commandant's office and, 
finally, a printing press. 87 Amongst its functions were 
editing the orders of PUR's Chief and ensuring that they 
were carried out on time; matters in relation to the 
placement and appointment of political workers and 
commissars in the Red Army and Fleet; sending coded 
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telegrams; rendering medical assistance, etc. 88 
The inspectorate-information department consisted of 
two sections-the inspectorate and the information 
sections. Basically, the functions of the two sections 
were to respectively inspect political work being 
conducted in the regions and then compile and publish 
information bulletins on the latter. 89 
The agitation-education department consisted of the 
following sections-general, library, school, artistic, 
club, agitational and, finally, propaganda.9° Thus, it 
would appear that the latter department, judging by the 
list of sections, had a very broad remit and would appear 
to have been in charge of virtually all the political and 
cultural-educational work in the Red Army. In order to 
help the work of the department, the department also had 
under its control a symphony orchestra, a cinema-train and 
a museum.9 1 
The literary-publications' department consisted of 
three sections and a press bureau.9 2 The sections were 
general, editorial and technical.9 3 The department was in 
charge of editing all agitational and educational 
publications for use in the Red Army. It was also in 
charge of of the publication activity of the local Army 
organs, as well as exercising political control over the 
activity of the central military publishing organs. In 
connection with this, it should be remembered that this 
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effectively meant that PUR had control over what went in 
the various text books for the military schools and the 
command courses.94 
The final department listed in the regulations is the 
supply department. The department was marde up of a 
financial part, further sub-divided into a number of 
sections(warehouse, distribution, economic, etc), as well 
as a bureau of commissioners.9 5 These commissioners would 
appear to have been in charge on how the money was spent 
and the materials used.9 6 ~s the regulations stated: 
13. The supply department directs: a)the organisation and 
work of the departments of supply both at the front and in 
the rear and subordinate to the Political Administration; 
b)works out estimates for the Political Administration and 
examines the e~timates presented to the former, by the 
corresponding political departments and administrations of 
the fronts and okrug military districts ... ; c)compile and 
put in to effect a plan of purchases for cultural-
educational(cinematographic, th9~trical-artistic, book, 
text book and musical)property. 
However, despite the importance of the September 1920 
set of regulations, the reorganisation of the Red Army's 
main political organ was still not complete~ Within a 
month of the publication of the September 1920 
regulations, PUR was to undergo a still more significant 
reorganisation, with the decision to create a combined 
political-educational and agitational-educational 
apparatus for both the Soviet Republic and the Red Army in 
one organ-the Main Political-Educational Committee of the 
Republic was born. 98 This merger of two organs to create 
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a super, combined organ for the needs of both the Red Army 
and the Soviet Republic took effect only after PUR had 
completed a tremendous amount of work during 1919-1920 
and, since it comes at the end of the Civil war period, it 
will be examined once the work of PUR itself has been 
examined and will not be analysed here in detail. 
Thus, in looking back at PUR's organisational 
structure, one is able to discern a number of distinct 
differences between what had existed under VBVK and what 
was put into effect under PUR. To all intents and 
purposes, it would appear to have been a considerably 
larger organ than VBVK had ever been and with an increase 
in size also went with it an increase in the overall 
responsibilities of the organ. Its relationship with both 
RVSR and the CC would also appear to have caused little 
problems, although there are still a number of unanswered 
questions in this area, not least of which was a definite 
answer to the question of which of the two organs took 
precedence over PUR? The RVSR or the CC? The fact that 
Smilga was both a member of the CC and RVSR would seem to 
have placed PUR in a very unique position over all other 
State and Party organs, however, as will be shown later, 
this too was not without drawbacks. If the success of the 
organ needed only an improvement in the organisational 
structure, then PUR would appear to have been adequately 
equipped; however, as will be shown, despite the 
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organisational overhaul, PUR was still to face a number of 
problems that had beset VBVK throughout its year-long 
existence. One problem which would appear not to have 
much bothered VBVK, but certainly created a degree of 
trouble for PUR was the problem of leadership of the organ 
itself and it is to that we now turn. 
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THE LEADERSHIP OF THE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY SOVIET OF THE REPUBLIC(PUR)DURING 
THE CIVIL WAR(MAY 1919-JANUARY 1921). 
As stated briefly in the last section, the actual lead 
ership of PUR during the Civil War is an area of special 
interest. Unlike the leadership of VBVK, which can be 
identified throughout the organ's history as being headed 
by Yurenev and assisted by a number of deputies, PUR's 
leadership throughout the Civil War is a much more 
difficult matter to solve. Although, as stated earlier, 
Smilga was appointed in charge of the organ as early as 
May 1919, as will be shown below, there is a large body of 
evidence presently available which shows that, although 
Smilga was playing a very active role on the front during 
1919-1921, his role in the actual day-to-day running of 
PUR would appear to have been less prominent. Not that 
the latter situation was entirely of his own making, but 
it should be conceded here and now that the Deputy-Chiefs 
of PUR, of whom there were quite a number, were probably 
just as important to the running of PUR and, in a number 
of cases, probably even more important, than the organ's 
nominal Chief. This short, but important section, will 
examine the evidence currently available and state who was 
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in charge of PUR and when they were in charge:in such a 
way, it is to be hoped that the reader will then have a 
much better idea, as regards the conditions that the organ 
itself had to endure throughout the length of the Civil 
War. 
In 1924, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of 
the creation of PUR, a series of articles appeared, 
commemorating this event, in PUR's own political journal, 
"Politrabotnik". 1 The articles were written by a number 
of important military and political figures of the time, 
e.g. Trotsky, Frunze, Beloborodov, etc. Among the more 
interesting of the articles were two written by people, 
who had been among the organ's more prominent members of 
staff, so to speak, namely I.T.Smilga and 
A.G.Beloborodov. 2 In the case of one, he had been the 
organ's Chief throughout the Civil War(Smilga) and in the 
case of the other(Beloborodov), he had been, at one time, 
the Deputy-Chief of the organ. Therefore, in general, 
what both men had to write about their separate 
experiences of working at, or near, the top of PUR does 
make for interesting examination. 
Smilga's article, in some respects, posed more 
questions than it answered but, in the following brief 
extract, Smilga stated how important was the role of the 
Deputy-Chief: 
comrade Stalin was appointed a member of the Revolutionary 
Military Soviet of the Southern Front, I was appointed to 
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the South-Eastern Front. Work at the front took all of my 
energy, and that was why PUR was managed by a deputy. In 
turn, in this role, were: A.G.Beloborodov, 
L.P.Serebryakov, Ch.G.Rakovsky and V.I.Soloviev. I was 
forced to lead PUR sporadically, either from the fronts or 
during my stays in Moscow. It goes without saying that, 
in such a system, there were a lot of abnormalities 
concealed. Circumstances justif~ed this, there was a lot 
of work, but far too few people. 
Why Smilga should make specific reference to Stalin's 
appointment to the Southern Front is difficult to fathom. 
Smilga's appointment to the South-Eastern Front took 
effect from the 1st October 1919 and lasted until 16th 
January 1920.4 This would seem to suggest that between 
May-October 1919, Smilga was able to work effectively in 
Moscow on PUR's behalf; unfortunately, there is an element 
of confusion in all of this which, on the basis of present 
evidence, is impossible to solve .. In a speech Smilga made 
to the Second All-Russian Congress of Political Workers, 
held in Moscow in December 1920, in discussing his early 
days as the Chief of PUR, Smilga had the following to say: 
in April 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP(B) 
appointed me Chief of PUR[a very curious mistake to make, 
given the fact that PUR did not formally come into being 
until May 1919-SM]. I brought to the work a number of 
comrades from the front. The work went well. But how 
long was I allowed to work in PUR? On the 26th May, I was 
sent to the Western Front, then to the South-Eastern 
Front, then the Caucasus Front, then back to the Western 
Front and eventually to the Southern-Wrangel Front. I was 
both a member of the Revolutionary Military Soviets and 
commander of the Front, a3 well as being Chief of the 
Political Administration. 
Although, as will be shown later, all of this can be 
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verified independently, the one key fact in the above 
statement which does throw considerable doubt on how long 
Smilga was able to work as PUR's effective Chief is his 
very first statement, concerning his need to leave for the 
Western Front in May 1919. The implication is that he was 
sent to the Western Front to serve on the latter's RMS; 
however, no other evidence testifying to that effect has 
been found. If one examines the RMS of the Western Front 
during May 1919, one does not find Smilga's name listed; 
indeed, it is not until 1920 that Smilga is listed as a 
member of the Western Front's RMS. 6 If, however, Smilga 
was correct, then it would be true to say that almost 
right away, Smilga's military duties called him away from 
his post as PUR's Chief. That being the case, his earlier 
statement on the leadership of PUR would have to be 
reinforced still further-without the Deputy-Chiefs, PUR 
wou~d have lacked any central figure at all, despite its 
perceived importance to the Bolshevik cause, in other 
words·, PUR would have been effectively leaderless. Thus, 
in evaluating the precise nature of the leadership of PUR, 
at this time, it will be necessary to detail the 
appointments of the various Deputy-Chiefs, in order to be 
able to arrive at a much fuller picture of the working of 
PUR. 
Unfortunately, in evaluating the available evidence, 
as regards identifying the Deputy-Chiefs of PUR, there is 
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a fair degree of confusion. However, for the first time 
anywhere, it is now possible to state with a great degree 
of accuracy who the Deputy-Chiefs of PUR were and when 
they served in the latter capacity. There are two lists, 
so to speak, of men who are identifiable as having served 
as PUR's Deputy-Chiefs; one of them was, in actual fact, 
produced by Smilga himself and it is to an examination of 
that list, in particular, that we will now turn. 
In Smilga's 1924 anniversary article, already quoted 
from earlier, Smilga listed the men who had served as 
PUR's Deputy-Chiefs and the order in which they took over 
the post:it should always be remembered that, in Smilga's 
absence, these men were effectively in charge of the day-
to-day running of PUR: 
comrade Stalin was appointed a member of the Revvoensovet 
of the Southern Front, I[Smilga-SM]was appointed a member 
of the Revvoensovet of the South-Eastern Front[lst October 
1919-SM]. Work at the front took up all my strength and 
that was why PUR was run by a deputy. In this post, in 
turn, were:A.G.Be7oborodov, L.I.Serebryakov, Ch.G.Rakovsky 
and V.I.Soloviev. 
As will be shown below, this is a fairly accurate list, 
but it does not give any impression of how long each of 
the men were involved with PUR. The order in which the 
names appear also raises a number of questions-in a number 
of histories, either of the Party or the Soviet armed 
forces, various authors have actually changed the order of 
the names. For instance, in the relevant volume of the 
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authoritative history of the Party, the following list of 
names is to be found: 
PUR was headed by the CC members, successively IeT.Smilga, 
L.P.Serebryakov, A.G.Beloborodov, Ch.G.Rakovsky. 
Thus, judging by the above list, PUR was run by Smilga, 
followed by Serebryakov, then Beloborodov and, finally, 
Rakovsky. There is also no mention, at all, of 
V.I.Soloviev. In another work which was published in the 
same year as the relevant volume of the Party's history, 
there is yet another list of names of people, identified 
as running PUR during the Civil War-this time, however, 
the historian concerned, Yu.P.Petrov, has stuck much more 
firmly to the original list of names quoted by Smilga 
himself: 
the responsibilities of the Chief of PUR were carried out 
by the CC memb9rs A.G.Beloborodov, L.P.Serebryakov and 
Ch.G.Rakovsky. 
Thus, judging by all the various lists, there would appear 
to be an element of confusion, certainly surrounding the 
order of when the position was filled by the various men, 
but even regarding the identity of the men involved, there 
is also some doubt. However, it is true to say that, 
other than Smilga himself, the lists do share a number of 
commonly-identified figures, namely, Beloborodov, Rakovsky 
and Serebryakov. The only odd one out, so to speak, is 
V.I.Soloviev. However, judging by the available primary 
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source material, it is possible to largely clear up the 
issue of doubt, as regards the appointment of Soloviev to 
the post. 
Judging by the relevant press reports of the period, 
the earliest identifiable Deputy-Chief of PUR was 
Serebryakov, and not Beloborodov, as identified by Smilga 
in his 1924 article. Order No.4, dated 23rd June 1919, 
is not only clearly signed by Serebryakov, but is signed 
bearing the title of "Chief of the political 
Administration of the Revvoensovet of the Republic". 10 
This seems to continue for quite some time. the last order 
both bearing this title and Serebryakov's signature 
appearing on 4th July 1919. 11 Unfortunately, after that, 
the pict~re becomes slightly more confusing-on two 
consecutive days(4th/5th July 1919)PUR's orders were 
signed by a properly-identified Deputy-Chief but, once 
again, it is not Beloborodov's signature that appeared 
next to the orders, but that of V.I.Soloviev. 12 Indeed, 
Beloborodov's signature is not to be found next to an 
order of PUR's until lOth July 1919. 13 Then due to the 
relative frequency of his signature over the next three 
months, it would appear that under Beloborodov's 
leadership, PUR did begin to enjoy a degree of leadership 
stability. His orders appeared from July-September 1919 
and covered a wide range of areas of responsibility, from 
i nspecting the conduct of political work in the Red Air 
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Force14 to listing the officially approved abbreviations 
for telegrams being sent to PUR. 1 5 In the anniversary 
collection of essays, devoted to the creation of PUR in 
1919, as stated previously, Beloborodov contributed a 
brief essay, in which he made the following observation 
which, if nothing else, confirmed his time of office 
working in PUR: 
my memories of working in PUR in 1919(July, August and 
September)cannot pretend to encompass all the work of 
PUR ... according to my impressions, PUR, at that time, was 
an organ working, above all, to supply the fronts with 
that which was molg valued, most necessary for victory-the 
Communist cadres. 
The first traceable order, bearing Rakovsky's 
signature, dates from 4th November 1919.1 7 It could well 
be the ~ase that earlier orders bearing Rakovsky's 
signature do exist, simply that they were not reproduced 
in the relevant military newspapers of the period. 
Certainly, if one examines Rakovsky's autobiographical 
entry in the Soviet encyclopaedia, there would appear to 
be a strong indication to the effect that Rakovsky took 
over in the middle of September 1919, or shortly 
thereafter: 
in the middle of september, I arrived in Moscow and, still 
retaining the post of Chairman of the Council of People's 
Commissars of the Ukraine, I was put at the head of the 
Political Administration of the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of the Republic. I was the leader("rukovoditel")of 
this institution until January[l920-SM], in the diffitglt 
days of the Denikin, Kolchak and Yudenich offensives. 
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Other than the latter entry, confirming his stewardship at 
PUR, Rakovsky's leadership of PUR is also further 
evidenced by his speech to the First All-Russian Congress 
of Political Workers, held in Moscow in December 1919, due 
to be discussed separately in another section. 1 9 After 
his spell at PUR, Rakovsky, like all the other leading 
military and political figures of the period, was then 
sent to perform a variety of other political and military 
tasks-for instance, after the liberation of Kharkov 
(December 1919), Rakovsky was appointed Chairman of the 
Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet 
Republic and a member of the RMS of the South-Western 
Front.20 Rakovsky was appointed to the latter on 15th 
February 1920. 21 
In April 1920, PUR issued a programme of courses for 
political literacy, to be carried out by the Army 
political departments and the guberniya political-
educational departments, bearing the signature of an 
apparently restored Deputy-Chief of PUR-Serebryakov. 22 
This would intimate that when, and if needs be, former 
Deputy-Chiefs were brought back into the apparatus to 
perhaps fill a gap in personnel at short notice. In all 
parts of the Republic's political and military apparatus, 
especially during the Civil War period, skilled people 
were at a premium and, just like a number of the other 
organs, no doubt PUR found it difficult to find personnel 
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for the top posts at short notice. If we examine the 
relevant part of Serebryakov's entry in Granat then, once 
again, we find another man who considered himself as being 
PUR's Chief: 
from October 1917 onwards, Serebryakov worked in he 
capacity of a member of the praesidium of the Moscow 
soviet and secretary of the Party's oblast committee, then 
he was elected a member and secretary to the praesidium of 
VTsiK. In 1919-1920, he was a secretary to the CC RCP(B), 
then Chairman of the Southern Bureau2 ~f VTsSPS, a member of the Southern Front, Chief of PUR. 
It must be assumed that the phrase at the end of this 
extract, i.e. "Chief of PUR", should not be taken too 
literally;simply, that Serebryakov performed the duties as 
if he was Chief of PUR. In actual fact, Serebryakov was 
to be formally made Chief of PUR in 1922 but, as yet, it 
was still too e~rly.24 
Another figure who made an apparent return to the 
upper hierarchy of PUR's leadership structure was 
V.I.Soloviev. as shown earlier, Soloviev had been working 
as a Deputy-Chief of PUR as early as July 1919. After 
that appointment, however, he was then placed in charge of 
administrative affairs of the RMS of the Southern Front 
until October 1919. 25 After that, in January 1920, he was 
appointed Deputy-Chief of the Main Political 
Administration of the People's Commissariat of 
Communications and then, from August 1920, Deputy-Chief of 
PUR. 26 Within two months of his reappointment, he was 
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elected Chairman of a conference of military delegates at 
the All-Russian Party Conference, held in Moscow in 
September 1920.27 In the same month as the latter 
conference, a meeting was held of the Higher Academic 
Military-Pedagogical Council, the membership of which 
included the Chief of PUR and the name alongside that 
particular title was Soloviev's, not Smilga's. 28 The 
final piece of evidence linking Soloviev with the 
leadership of PUR is, curiously enough, to be found in 
Smilga's brief resignation notice from the post of PUR's 
Chief, published in January 1921: 
in accordance with the personal wishes of comrade Smilga, 
the latter i$ released from his post as Chief of the 
Political Administration of RVSR. The d~gies of Chief of 
PUR will be carried out by V.I.Soloviev. 
Thus, for Soloviev to adopt such a post implies that he 
must have been Smilga's immediate Deputy-Chief and, since 
Smilga resigned, the position of leading PUR, at least 
temporarily, fell on Soloviev's shoulders. This is not 
usually reflected in Soviet histories of PUR:virtually in 
every other source, it is listed that Smilga ceased being 
Chief of PUR on the exact same day as S.I.Gusev took 
over. 30 There is never any indication that a transition 
took place involving Soloviev. Thus, throughout 1920, a 
number of orders can be found which bear Soloviev's 
signature and, alongside this, the title "Chief of PUR" 31 ; 
it was not until June 1921 that an order was published 
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bearing Gusev's signature, as Chief of PUR. 32 Obviously, 
it could easily have been the case that Gusev simply was 
not in a position to take up the post of PUR's Chief right 
away and, under such circumstances, Soloviev j~st held on 
to the post. But there was a transition period and that 
has not been noted before by other Soviet histoiians. 
Thus, summing up all the available evidence, as regards 
listing the exact leadership of PUR during 1919-1920, one 
can draw up the following running-order: 
beginning with Smilga's formal appointment in May 1919, 
the earliest Deputy-Chief was Serebryakov(May-July 1919); 
then Soloviev was briefly in charge in July 1919; 
Beloborodov then assumes the mantle, so to speak, taking 
over the post in July 1919 and apparently lasting until 
September of that year; judging by his own version of 
events, Rakovsky would then seem to have. taken over in 
September 1919, or round about September 1919, and lasted 
until January 1920; there then would appear to be a gap, 
as no one has been concretely identified as taking over 
PUR in January-March 1920; in March-April 1920, 
Serebryakov returns to the fold; in August 1920, another 
reappointment took place when Soloviev was brought back. 
This was a significant ?ppointment, as events were to 
unfold and leave Soloviev a temporary successor to Smilga, 
l 
when the latter reigned in 1921. Soloviev was to retain 
this temporary status until mid-1921, when Gusev was 
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finally able to take up the post as PUR's Chief, a post 
that he apparently had been offered as early as January 
1921. 
Before leaving the leadership question entirely, one 
other point should be borne in mind here-in the persons of 
Rakovsky, Beloborodov and Serebryakov, you have three 
members of the Orgburo. Beloborodov was a member of the 
Orgburo at the same time that he was Deputy-Chief of PUR; 
then, for his part, Rakovsky gains a seat on the Orgburo 
in December 1919, at the same time replacing Beloborodov 
on the Orgburo 33 and, finally, when Serebryakov takes 
over, again, at PUR, he also manages to get a seat o~ the 
Orgburo.34 Thus, there would certainly appear to be a 
link between PUR and the Orgburo, worthy of further 
examination, if only enough evidence were available. 
Overall, then, it would appear that the leadership of 
PUR itself was a much more complicated affair than on 
first sight. Due to Smilga's constant military and 
political activity on the front, he simply was not able to 
work effectively as PUR's Chief.· So, on that basis, the 
real leadership of PUR had to be entrusted to his Deputy-
Chiefs who, as shown above, varied both in terms of length 
of stay at the post and the frequency in which they held 
the post, i.e. Serebryakov would appear to have held the 
post at least twice(in the same position is Soloviev), 
whereas Beloborodov and Rakovsky would appear to have held 
Page 290 
it only once each. It was probably a reflection of the 
conditions that most political and military organs had to 
work under that PUR had to change its leadership so much. 
However, as can be shown by looking at each of their 
biographies, a lot of the Deputy-Chiefs of PUR were 
politically very able men and, compared to the past 
leadership of VBVK, PUR was in a much stronger position 
than VBVK ever was. As shown in the previous section, PUR 
enjoyed a unique status in that it was represented on both 
the CC and RVSR and this further reflected itself in its 
Deputy-Chiefs, who, as previously, stated were also very 
influential political figures in their own right. Further 
proof of the seriousness that the Party attached to PUR. 
Thus, despite the problems that a regularly changing 
leadership brought, PUR was still staffed by many 
prominent political personalities and this, in itself, 
ensured that PUR was able to carry out a fairly intensive 
campaign of political and cultural-educational work 
amongst the Red Army soldiers. The nature and details of 
that campaign will from the basis of study for the rest of 
this particular chapter, beginning with an examination of 
the role of the military commissars under PUR, a role 
which witnessed a great deal of change since VBVK existed. 
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CHAPTER THREE(SECTION THREE):-
THE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY 
SOVIET OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE WORK OF THE MILITARY 
COMMISSARS (HAY 1919-DECEMBER 1920). 
Throughout the end of 1919-beginning of 1920, a debate 
arose both in the ranks of the Red Army and the Party, 
concerning the role of the military commissar in the Red 
Army. Given the growing importance of the political 
departments and the increasing confidence in the abilities 
of the military specialists, the role of the military 
commissar, ·as previously understood and interpreted, was 
on the verge of quite a significant change, not long after 
the actual creation of PUR in May 1919. The two events 
were, by no means, unconnected. 
The formal Chief of PUR, Smilga, was one of the 
leading participants in the debate, as will be detailed 
below, despite being the nominally most important figure 
in the Red Army's political apparatus. He became one of 
the leading advocates of the view that the commissarial 
system, as it had previously existed, should be revamped 
and altered to suit the changing conditions and demands of 
the Red Army. In overall terms, despite the involvement 
of people like Smilga and Trotsky, the debate itself has 
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received comparatively little attention from Western 
scholars, although there have been a number of references 
to the debate in a few works. 1 The situation is virtually 
the same in Soviet accounts of the Civil War and/or/the 
Red Army. It has been virtually totally ignored by Soviet 
historians for some 60-70 years. Therefore, in compiling 
the following section, the material used has been 
virtually culled from all the various records of the 
debate itself, dating from 1919-1920. Thus, this section, 
it is hoped, will add once again to our knowledge of how 
the political apparatus of the Red Army further developed 
under PUR and how it differed from that which had existed 
under VBVK. 
When examining the work of the military commissars in 
1919-1920, it is evident that some change must have 
occurred simply because, as compared to the previous 
period when VBVK operated, there is a distinct lack of any 
evidence concerning either the work, or the relationship, 
between the military commissars and the other parts of the 
Red Army's political apparatus. Potentially, at least, 
anyway, there are a number of explanations for this 
unusual state of affairs-firstly, that the political 
apparatus was working so smoothly that there was no need 
for PUR, or any of the other relevant state organs, to 
interfere in the operation of the Red Army's political 
apparatus or, secondly and, given the conditions of the 
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time, more likely, that the apparatus was being carefully 
examined from the top and, so to speak, it was a question 
of the calm before the storm. Given that the Red Army's 
political apparatus was going through a fair degree of 
significant change, thanks to the demands of the 8th Party 
Congress, it is more likely that the political apparatus 
was still being evaluated and, certainly, one of the parts 
that needed evaluation was the role of the military 
commissars. A slight indication that the role of the 
military commissars was on the verge of being reappraised 
was contained in an order of RVSR, dated 7th August 1919: 
6earing in mind that many Communists from the ranks of the 
military specia~ts, both on the front and in the rear, 
are carrying out he responsibilities of the military 
commissars, the evolutionary Military Soviet of the 
~epublic decrees: . 
1aking into account the significant lack, in the armies, 
of command personnel, especially in the numbers of Red 
commanders, [it has been decided-SM)to immediately appoint 
Communist military specialists to the corresponding 
command positions, thereb2 not appointing such people ~s 
commissars in the future. 
Thus, there is a distinct hint in this order that, 
even as far as RVSR was concerned, the work and position 
of the commissars had to undergo some revision, given both 
changi~g circumstances and the distinct lack of the 
sufficient number of Red Army commanders. 
Ten days after the publication of the latter order, 
the CC issued a circular to all Party organisations, 
concerning the removal and transfer of military commissars 
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to other posts. 3 Judging by the content of the circular, 
it would appear that a number of local Party organisations 
were taking the law into their hands, so to speak, and 
transferring a number of military commissars to a variety 
of other posts.4 This being the case, it would appear 
that in the localities, the perception of the role of the 
commissars had changed to such an extent that a number of 
local Party organs certainly thought it worthwhile to 
transfer a number of the military commissars to other 
positions. Thus, although the evidence is small, it 
certainly would appear that the examination of the role of 
the military commissars was gathering apace. 
(i) Smilga and Trotsky on the role of the military 
commissars(February 1919-March 1920) 
In examining the debate on the role of the militray 
commissars in 1919-1920, the two key figures in the debate 
are Smilga and Trotsky. Both in terms of what they said 
and wrote, as well as their important positions in the Red 
Army's political and military establishment, they were 
indeed very prominent figures in the debate. This special 
section will hopefully provide the reader with all the 
necessary information, in order to better understand what 
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was, in actual fact, being proposed at this time, by 
people like Smilga and Trotsky. In assessing their views 
on the topic, however, it will be necessary briefly to 
look back at a number of their utterances on the matter 
before the actual creation of PUR in May 1919. This will 
help us to appreciate what the content of the debate was 
in the months following the creation of PUR. Thus, on the 
eve of the 8th Party Congress, Smilga, then serving on the 
RMS of the Eastern Front, wrote the following in February 
1919: 
it is not a matter for the Party Congress to decide on 
concrete forms for the administration of the troops. But 
the Congress must say that the reconstruction of the
5
army 
on the basis of one-man command is our primary goal. 
This clear and unambiguous statement on the importance of 
one-man command in the Red Army would certainly seem to 
have been an unusual one to make, especially from the 
future Chief of PUR itself. However, it received further 
support from another prominent figure of the Red Army's 
establishment at the time, namely, Trotsky himself. In an 
order that Trotsky issued not long after Smilga's 
statement, Trotsky stated the following: 
commissars play a tremendous role in the construction of 
our army. It can be said with complete confidence that we 
should not have had an army capable of fighting, had it 
not been for the heroic, self-sacrificing work of the 
commissars. At the same time, it is clear that the 
institution of the commissars is not a permanent 
institution, but has arisen from the transitional 
character of the present epoch in the construction of the 
army .•. all the work that has been done in building the 
army has prepared conditions which will lead, sooner or 
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later, to the establishment of complete one-~an management 
in the sphere of administration and command. 
That Smilga felt very strongly on the matter was 
further evidenced by the fact that, again on the eve of 
the Party Congress, Smilga had a brochure published, 
arguing that it was already time for the liquidation of 
the commissarial element from the Red Army, that it was 
time to create a new type of military-political figure, by 
transferring a number of technical and administrative 
functions to the military commissars. 7 At the 8th Party 
Congress, Smilga's views were far from being endorsed by 
the other delegates-Sokolnikov who, as stated earlier, was 
the main speaker at the Congress on the military qu~stion, 
dubbed Smilga's views as "premature" 8 and, for his part, 
the main speaker for the "military opposition", Smirnov, 
wanted the powers of the military commissars increased, 
not decreased.9 In brief, before the storm broke forth in 
December 1919, the clouds had already began to roll in-
Smilga and Trotsky, as briefly described above, had 
already expressed their opinions on the temporary nature 
of the institution of the military commissars and the need 
for change. Indeed, Smilga's opposition to the continued 
role of the military commissars without change, has 
prompted one British historian to write of Smilga's 
appointment as PUR's Chief in May 1919 the following: 
the appointment of so stout a champion of the military 
specialists as Smilga as the first head of PUR was 
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significant of a determination to put the claims of 
milit~ry.effitbency above those of the Party 
doctr1na1res. 
According to a speech that Smilga made in December 
1919 to the First All-Russian Congress of Political 
Workers, following the 8th Party Congress, it would appear 
that, although no less a body than the CC itself was put 
in charge of drawing up a series of instructions on the 
role of the military commissars, not even the CC was equal 
to the task: 
if we ask one of the military workers here[i.e.attending 
the Congress-SM]who a commissar is, what are his duties 
and rights, we will not receive a distinct reply, in spite 
of the fact that the 8th Congress of our Party instructed 
the Central Committee to work out a distinct series of 
statutes on the commissars. Even to this day, the 
decision of the Congress has not been carried out and is 
not being carried out, not because someone has sabotaged 
the work, but because trying to carry it out is 
exceptionally difficult, more so because the 
institution[~£ m~lit~ry I~mmissars-SM], by its essence, is 
a temporary 1nst1tut1on. 
Furthermore, just after that particularly comment, 
Smilga went on to state how much effort he himself had 
personally put into attempting to resolve this dilemma: 
comrades, I personally have spent a lot of time thinking 
over this question and, more than once, have attempted to 
write such a series of statutes but, other than a few 
general and useless proposals, have not succeeded. I 
think that here the blame does not lies with me; it is 
obvious that now, in general, it is not possible to 
adequately write a series of statutes on the commissars.~ 2 
Thus, there would certainly be strong indication from 
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both these statements that even such a body as the CC 
itself found the task of writing out a general, useful 
series of instructions on the rights and duties of the 
commissars in the units far too difficult to tackle. 
Given the presence of both Smilga and Trotsky on the CC, 
it can be inferred from this failure that both men were 
more than obviously aware of the CC'S failure in this area 
and, by their demands for a re-examination of the role of 
the military commissars in the Red Army were attempting to 
solve a problem, which had even been too difficult for the 
CC to solve. 
At the First All-Russian Congress of Political Workers 
in December 1919, Smilga's views were further supported by 
his then Deputy-Chief, Rakovsky, who, in his speech to the 
Congress, stated the following: 
the institution of the military commissars, having played 
an important role in the Civil War has, at the same time, 
great inadequacies. Although formally it is not meant to 
interfere in operational matters ... it introduces splits, 
disperses strength and wastes time. Consequently, the 
idea which has been expressed about the introduction of 
one-man coy§rol has met with great sympathy from the 
delegates. 
If Rakovsky's statement, concerning the support for 
Smilga's views on the introduction of one-man control, is 
correct, then it would appear that whereas the CC was 
unsure about what to do exactly with the military 
commissars, at least one section of the Red Army's 
military-political establishment had a good idea what to 
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do with them. If the institution of the military 
commissars was to be changed, however, the question now 
was what type of changes were envisaged? Needless to say, 
Smilga was ready with an answer: 
I propose the following organisational structure for the 
administration ay~ command of the troops. Instead of the 
Military soviets , to establish the post of a 'special 
commissar'. To this commissar should be directly 
subordinatig the political department, the special 
department and the revolutionary tribunal ... Further 
more, I consider it possible to grant the commander the 
right to issue individual orders ... and to begin, at the 
same time, the liquidation of the commissars in those 
administrations, departments and units, at the head of 
which are already experienced men. In essence, the 
commissars do nothing there. In fact, for a long time 
already, the military commissar has become an assistant 
and, in some units, even a deputy to his specialist. By 
this reform we will free a number of our comrades from 
unproductive work •.. we have forgotten that the institution 
of the military commissars was a child of the transition 
period, that new conditions are being and have been 
created, under which
1
ghe existence of the commissars is 
far from obligatory. 
In commenting on this, Carr has stated that: 
Smilga defended in everything but name, the conception of 
a regular army, and demanded 'the reorganisation of the 
Red Army on the principle of one-man command'. This was a 
return to the proposal for the suppression
1
9r 
subordination of the political commissars. 
Whilst Carr is ~orrect to a certain extent, as can be 
shown by reference to the extracts quoted, Smilga did not 
envisage that the commissars would have no role to play in 
the future conduct of political or cultural-educational 
' 
work in the Red Army. After all, under Smilga's 
proposals, it could easily be argued that his political 
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role could have been, in actual fact, enhanced, especially 
given the fact that Smilga wanted the political 
departments subordinated to the special commissars. 
Smilga continued to press home the view that circumstances 
had changed to such an extent that his views were by no 
means too radical to adopt wholesale. He argued that 
circumstances had changed due to three main factors: 
l)the number of former Tsarist officers who had proven 
themselves loyal to the regime was considerable; 
2)the number of Red Army commanders graduating from the 
various command courses was increasing and, finally, 
3)the number of political workers who, for a variety of 
reasons, had been working in the purely military sphere, 
was also not inconsiderable.l8 As far as Smilga was 
concerned, all these steps meant that the Red Army had a 
reliable command staff, politically loyal to the regime. 
In fact, he even dubbed a new term for this politically 
loyal command staff, "commander-Communists". 1 9 This must 
have seen to some delegates as too much wishful thinking 
because, having said that, Smilga then went on to allay 
the fears of some of the delegates, by emphasising the 
role and importance of the political departments in all of 
this: 
the army will not be taken away from the influence of the 
Party .•. the political departments are growing and 
spreadi2e· These organisations have a tremendous 
future. 
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On the same day that Smilga made the above speech, 
Trotsky delivered his report to the congress and, as might 
have been expected, in general terms, agreed with Smilga's 
observations. This was evident right from the very 
beginning of his speech, which began with the following 
opening sentence: 
the matter is not about the simple elimination of the 
institution of the military commissars in the army, but as 
quickly as possible of the m2fging of the functions of the 
commissar and the commander. 
Thus, whilst the aim was approximately the same as 
Smilga'B, Trot~ky does seem to have placed more emphasis 
on the fusion of the two figures, a gradual process that 
would take a degree of time. Drawing on the past history 
of the commissars, Trotsky argued the following: 
one cannot say that the institution of commissars has 
proved to be a guarantee against individual acts of 
betrayal and flight to the enemy camp. The establishment 
of the institution of commissars signified a political 
assurance: in so far as the mass of the Red Army men were 
utterly lacking in confidence in the command personnel, 
and in so far as the commissars acted as the 
intermediaries between the commanders and the mass of the 
Red Army men, the commissars served as sureties for the 
commanders. I presume that this period is now behind us. 
The mass of the Red Army men have now realised that we had 
to recruit the military specialists. The masses who have 
taken part in the battles and have been in difficult 
situations· have s~t'\ the commanders at work, and have seen 
how some of them have died at their posts, whilst others 
ran away. Comrades, a colossal proportion of our command 
personnel have become casualties in battle and among them 
have been former officers. The Red Army men know this. 
And now the institution which served as a sort of screen 
for the commanders is no longer needed for thaz
2
purpose. 
The army has become sufficiently consolidated. 
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Coupled with Smilga's previous argument that, due to a 
number of reasons, the Red Army now had a sufficiently 
large number of trustworthy command personnel, Trotsky 
further compounded the latter by his insistence that the 
previous duties of the commissars-i.e.watching over the 
military specialists for fear of betrayal or treachery-
were now no longer relevant to the needs of either the Red 
Army or the men that they were supposed to serve. On the 
face of things, both men's arguments did look convincing. 
In one of the most famous analogies of the Civil War 
period, Trotsky then went on to compare the commissars to 
the scaffolding needed for the building of a house: 
the institution of the commissars was like scaffolding, 
necessary for the construction of the Worker-Peasant's Red 
Army. The construction has been completed, it is now 
necessary to take away the scaffolding. But this must be 
done gradually, from the top, not from the bottom, in 
order that it does not cave in. It is necessary to begin 
with removing the commissars from the Supply departments. 
The Communists there have enough experie~3e, in order to 
immediately take over these departments. 
This gradual approach to the solution of the problem 
was further emphasised by Trotsky later on is his speech: 
in any case, comrades, I ask you to believe that we are 
not indulging in any leaps where this problem is 
concerned. I am against issuing an order that where the 
commander is a Communist, the Communist commissar is to be 
removed. Such a decision would cause great embarrassment 
both to the commissars and to the specialists. What, for 
example, about those commanders who are neutral or who 
joined the Party only yesterday? Who is to decide wh2Eher 
or not they need to have commissars attached to them? 
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Thus, whilst both men wanted to see a move away from 
the system of dual command, as it had existed in the Red 
Army, both men did express views on how this was to be 
achieved which were, by no means, carbon copies of one 
another. Arguably, Trotsky's views on this matter were 
more gradual; Smilga looks like he wanted the change to 
occur a lot more quic~ than Trotsky. Trotsky seems to 
have been more keen on the idea of fusing the two figures 
together, whereas Smilga seems to have been more keen on a 
proper delineation of the functions of the two figures, 
with a clear cut separation of political and military 
responsibilities, with the added possibility that the 
political role of the military commissars would be 
enhanced accordingly. It could well have been the case 
that, as stated by Fedotoff White, Trotsky did not want to 
radically alter the system too much, a system which had 
given a very good account of itself during the Civil 
War. 25 Unfortunately, however, it is presently impossible 
to state what the effects were of either the two speeches 
in any detail-no information has, as yet, been released 
which would make such a description possible. That their 
views must have had some impact goes without saying, on 
the basis that both men occupied very senior posts in the 
Red Army's political and military hierarchy. However, it 
is true to say that, as will be shown below, Smilga did 
not let the debate end there-certainly, through out the 
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early half of 1920, Smilga did continue to voice his 
opinion on the question of dual control. 
In March 1920, Smilga published an article, again on 
the nature of the role of the military commissars, once 
again emphasising the difficulties in trying to assess the 
nature of the duties of the military commissars: 
all attempts ... to write a series of statutes met with no 
success, or, at least, every statute was too narrow, too 
inadequate to cover all the multisided activity of the 
military commissar. On pa~gr, he is nothing but, in 
reality, he is everything. 
Later on in the article, Smilga still insisted that it 
was possible to rid the army of a significant number of 
·military commissars: 
at the present time, the Red Army is in such a position 
that it can, in a whole number of areas of military work, 
do without the military commissar. The army has 
spontaneously reconstructed itself on the basis of one-man 
administration and command. Collegiality has died. But 
the military commissar will not die as long as the Civil 
War lasts ... It is difficult to say, at present, what the 
content
2
9f the work of the commissar will be in the 
future. 
In some respects, this statement of Smilga's seems to 
be an acceptance of the situation as it then existed in 
the Red Army, i.e. that, virtually regardless of what 
Smilga himself thought, the military commissars would be 
retained in the Red Army, fulfilling their indescribable 
duties, for as long as the Civil War lasted. Their 
rational use would just have to wait until the present 
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emergency had passed. Curiously enough, in the same issue 
of "Politrabotnik", one of the Chiefs of a Front political 
department-D.A.Furmanov-wrote in outline support of 
Smilga's stance, on the abolishment of a number of the 
military commissars. His article was entitled, "For and 
against.(On the problem of the future liquidation of the 
institution of the military commissars)." 28 In his 
article, Furmanov pointed out the potential in abolishing 
the military commissars: 
with the abolishment of the institution of the military 
commissars, we will achieve a huge economy in highly 
qualified Communist Party strength ... if we give these 
thousands and thousands of the best Party workers to other 
areas of work, how this ~~~her' new work will be 
strengthened and develop! 
Possibly due to his experience of work at the front, 
Furmanov then proposed the following plan for the 
liquidation of the military commissars: 
l)military commissars remain with the same rights and 
duties as before if they are attached to those military 
specialists who have still not earned the complete 
trust[of the military commissar-SM]by selfless loyalty to 
the cause of the revolution ... 2)administrative-economic, 
operational-military and observational functions are 
removed from those commissars, whose chiefs are 
experienced and particularly distinguished military 
specialists or members of the R.C.P. 
In both of these cases, the military commissar is 
solely in charge of political-educational work. 
3)Finally, the post of military commissar is completely 
liquidated, if the chiefs are R.C.P. members and can give 
full guarantees to the effect that they will be able to 
cope themselves, in terms of the overall leadership of the 
unit,
3
soth in military-technical and political-educational 
work. 
Page 308 
Obviousy, there is no saying how well a plan like 
Furmanov's could have been put into effect on a nationwide 
scale, there is no evidence of it having been applied on 
the scale of even a front. Therfore, it is impossible to 
say, at present, exactly how such a plan would have 
affected the work of the Red Army's political apparatus at 
the front. Who would have made the final decisions as 
re~ the removal of the commissars? The CC or PUR or 
even RVSR? Who would have checked all the releavnt 
documents to ascertain which commanders could be safely 
left in charge of their units and who could not? Would 
the length of Party membership played any part in the 
final decision? Overall, it would appear that like 
Smilga's plan before, Furmanov's plan was left to gather 
dust. 
Although it has not been possible to track down any 
direct reaction to either Smilga's or Trotsky's ideas on 
the subject, one of the Army political departments did 
make a number of comments on the general issue of the 
abolishment of the military commissars, at the time, and 
it is to that we now turn. 
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(ii)Practical reaction to the idea of abolishing the 
military commissars 
The political department of 7th Army, at the same time 
that Furmanov wrote his article described above, published 
its response to the general debate on the future role of 
the military commissars. The relevant article of 7th Army 
makes a number of direct references to the deliberations 
of the First All-Russian Congress of Political Workers, at 
which both Smilga and Trotsky expressed their views on the 
subject, so it would appear that 7th Army was represented 
at the Congress. The relevant article is simply entitled, 
"on 'the liquidation of the commissars'" and began thus: 
incomplete and not totally accurate information, 
circulating in the press about the debate at the all-
Russian congress of political workers, on the problem of 
one-man administration in the army, has given rise to and 
continues to give rise to this day
3
Io bewilderment amongst 
the political workers of 7th Army. 
As far as 7th Army's political department was 
concerned, the best way to rid the army of this 
bewilderment was to make a list of policy statements on 
the role of the military commissars in the Red Army: 
l)the question of the swift and general elimination of the 
institution of military commissars is not being discussed 
by anyone; 
2)what was discussed, and could only be discussed, was the 
gradual dying away of the institution by strengthening the 
cadres of the Communist command staff. Where conditions 
permit, it is possible not to appoint commissars, attached 
to the chiefs and the commander-Communists, by limiting 
the appointment of responsible Party organisers. However, 
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this should be done with great care, as the role of the 
commissarial staff in the Red Army is still very 
important; 
3)the role and significa~~e of the commissars remains as 
it has been in the past. 
The latter point, in itself, almost seems to contradict 
the other two points-if it was possible not to appoint 
commissars, in a number of instances, then how could their 
role and significance have remain unchanged? However, 
regardless of that, it is interesting that the debate at 
the First All-Russian Congress of Political Workers had 
encouraged such a reaction from at least one Army 
political department. It could well have been the case 
that the other Army political departments also expressed 
similar views or, for that matter, views that supported 
Smilga's stance on the issue; unfortunately, i~ is simply 
not possible to gain access to the relevant primary source 
materials, at present. 
(iii)Conclusions 
What then seems to have happened is a virtual dying 
down of the debate, until it would appear that it 
disappeared from everyone's lips. Without access to the 
full record of, for example, the Second All-Russian 
Congress of Political Workers(December 1920), it is 
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impossible to say whether the issue was raised again and 
debated. True enough, a draft set of statutes on the 
rights of the commissars was produced but, judging by its 
content, it said nothing new or anything radically 
different from previous sets of such statutes. 33 
Certainly, in his address to the Second All-Russian 
Congress of Political Workers, Smilga made no further 
reference to the debate. 34 This may seem curious but, 
given the fact that Smilga was to soon hand in his 
resignation, it could have been possible that he thought· 
the battle was lost and decided simply not to broach the 
subject again. In the absence of any information, 
informed speculation is all that can be presently offered. 
Could it even have been the case that the overall debate 
on the role of the commissars and Smilga's resignation 
were related? After all, having been rebuffed on an issue 
that he felt so strongly, Smilga could have thought his 
position untenable within the organisation and decided to 
resign. 
All that can be safely said is that after April 1920, the 
debate on the military commissars seems to have died down 
and the commissars would appear to have carried out their 
previous functions, as normal. 
Overall, then, the debate on the role of the military 
commissars would appear to have been sparked off by a 
perception that their role had changed to such an extent 
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~hat they could no longer be left to carry out functions, 
the basis of w hich no longer seemed to be there. This 
would certainly appear to be the position that Smilga 
adopted, a man who, in some ways, one would have 
automatically expected to defend the rights of the Red 
Army's political establishement to the last. Judging by 
the available evidence, however, Smilga was a firm 
advocate of one-man command and argued that the functions 
of the commissars needed to be changed in order to reflect 
what had been happening at the front. As far as Smilga 
was concerned, there then existed in the Red Army an 
adequate command staff, who could cope with the necessary 
demands of the units, without the constant gaze of the 
commissars. For his part, Trotsky also argued that the 
commissarial system should change, but Trotsky seems to 
have preferred a much slower pace and, at the end of the 
day, would appear to have been reasonably contented with a 
system that had produced quite favourable results. As 
shown earlier, there was also an indication that both the 
CC and RVSR had taken note of the changing situation at 
the front and had partially reacted to it but, again 
without access to more information, it is impossible to 
analyse the role of either the CC or RVSR in any great 
detail. 
What then happened is also difficult to ascertain. It 
is doubtful that both Smilga and Trotsky lost their 
Page 313 
interest entirely in the debate, but after April 1920, no 
one seems to have picked up the torch and carried forward. 
No more articles, no more public pronouncements on the 
latter. Could there bo more material waiting in the 
archives, which could throw some light on the matter? 
There could be but that is pure speculation. The debate 
could have died, simply because no one was interested 
anymore. Either way, the conclusion to the debate would 
appear to have been unsatisfactory, especially as regards 
what Smilga and Trotsky had wanted earlier. 
As mentioned throughout this section, one of the most 
important events, as regards the work and development of 
the Red Army's political apparatus, took place in December 
1919:namely, the opening of the First All-Russian Congress 
of Political Workers. Other than the debate on the 
military commissars, there was a whole range of matters 
discussed at this congress and it is to analysing the work 
of the congress that we now turn. 
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THE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY 
SOVIET OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE WORK OF THE FIRST ALL-
RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF POLITICAL WORKERS OF THE RED ARMY 
(DECEMBER 1919). 
In examining the political and cultural-educational 
work of PUR in its first six months of existence, the best 
way to do this is to examine the various reports made on 
PUR's activity, presented at the First All-Russian 
Congress of Political Workers of the Red Army, held in 
Moscow in December 1919. This congress was important, not 
only in the fact t~at it allowed PUR the necessary forum 
from which to inform the assembled delegates about the 
progress of the political and cultural-educational work 
which was being undertaken ·in the Red Army, but also 
because at the congress itself, a number of very important 
people in the Red Army's political apparatus-most notably 
Smilga-made a number of very important contributions to 
the overall debate on the future conduct of political and 
cultural-educational work in the Red Army, at the time. 
Simply because Smilga was the Chief of PUR did not prevent 
him from expressing his disquiet about the way political 
work was being carried out in the Red Army or, as will be 
detailed later, criticising the CC itself for what he 
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considered its negligent attitude towards the political 
apparatus of the Red Army. As will be shown below, it 
also did not prevent his Deputy-Chief at the time, 
Rakovsky, also unleashing quite a determined assault on 
the way political work was being carried out by the 
political departments at the front. Of course, needless 
to say, the congress also provided a platform for the 
political departmental chiefs to criticise PUR, so all in 
all, the congress is more than worthy of a separate 
detailed section to itself. 
Rakovsky made a number of opening remarks to the 
Congress delegates, and started off with the following 
declaratory statement: 
from this congress, one can say that the Political 
administration of the Republic ... with all its front, afmy, 
okrug, guberniya and other organs, has begun to exist. 
This somewhat grandiose statement, especially judging by 
what Rakovsky was to say in the rest of his speech, would 
appear to have been a slight over-statement of the actual 
situation as it really existed then. The distinct 
implication that PUR was in charge of all political organs 
operating everywhere; indeed, technically, PUR was,but in 
its effective control of that apparatus, well, the reality 
was somewhat different. His opening remarks to the 
Congress also hinted at the dangers that the apparatus 
faced from the increasing bureaucratic trend that was 
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already creeping in to the Red Army's political apparatus: 
the struggle with bureaucratism, threatening the political 
departments, should be our first priority .•• there is also 
no uniformity in structure or even the terms used in the 
political organs. In some units, the political organ is 
called the political department, in others the latter is 
called the political administration; in some units, the 
head of the latter is called a chief, in others he is 
called a manager. The statutes were also all different. 
There is not enough plannedness["pla~omernost"-SM] in the 
political structure of the Red Army. 
Thus, in these few opening remarks, Rakovsky almost in 
the same breath has stated that PUR is in control of a 
wide range of political organs, both at the front and in 
the rear, but that there is a growing bureaucratic threat 
to the political departments, emanating, one assumes, from 
inside the structures themselves. Somewhat ironically, he 
then reveals his own bureaucratic attitude with his own 
opinions on the need for uniformity not only as regards 
the structures of the political departments, but even as 
regards the very names used and adopted by the political 
departments and their staffs! After these opening 
remarks, the congress would then appear to have elected a 
praesidium, but its composition is not known. 3 
The next person to address - the delegates was a 
former prominent member of VBVK, namely, V.D.Kasparova. 
Her new position within PUR's overall organisational 
structure is not listed but, judging what has already been 
written about her, it can be assumed that her position at 
the congress would have been as representative, if not 
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chief, of PUR's Educational department. Unfortunately, 
the report of her speech is just that, a very brief 
report. No full copy of her speech has been found. 
However, even so, a number of useful things can still be 
said about the general content of her speech to the 
Congress. The paraphrased copy of her speech that is 
available would appear to show that her speech was made up 
of a number of sections: a few general remarks on the 
overall importance of cultural-educational work to the 
military success of the Red Army; secondly, a number of 
statements on the history of PUR and its work and, 
finally, her speech would appear to have ended by her 
trying to warn the delegates present of the future 
problems facing PUR's education department.4 There is one 
fairly lengthy extract from her speech, discussing the 
most urgent problems facing the education department at 
the time, available for analysis: 
the quickest possible liquidation of illiteracy amongst 
Red Army soldiers, the organisation of schools at an 
advanced level, the further organisation of courses, 
lectures, etc. A wholesale re-organisation of the library 
system ... encouraging the growth of the Red Army choirs, 
drama circles ... meeting the demands of the 5ocalities by 
sending out groups of professional artists. 
The overall activity of the political and cultural-
educational apparatus of the Red Army prompted Kasparova 
to state that: 
the hour is already near for the final triumph of light 
over darkness and that soon the flame of social revolution 
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will spread over the entire world, that the Russian Red 
Army will stand at the head of the risen world proletariat 
and on ghe ruins of the old order hoist the red banner of 
labour. 
Regardless of Kasparova's belief in the importance of the 
cultural-educational work being carried out in the Red 
Army, it would appear that a number of delegates did not 
share her belief in the success of the work being carried 
out-apparently, the main points of criticism of her speech 
were the following: 
the main accusations were the following: the doctrinaire 
attitude emanating from the centre, its divorce from the 
political-educational workers in the field, the 
unresponsiveness of the educational apparatus to the 
demands of the front(its insufficient flexibility). The 
delegates of the conference also pointed out that, in 
reality, educational work in the army was conducted on 
modest means, that it was necessary not only to work out 
general instructions, but also to create f~vourable 
conditions for the work to be carried out. 
The complaints, however, did not stop there. Various 
delegates stated that there was an insufficient number of 
educational workers on the front; that political workers 
devoted more time and effort to administrative-economic 
tasks than cultural duties and that, finally, there 
existed a purely formal attitude by the librarian 
specialist to the ordinary Red Army soldier. 8 Thus, 
putting all these complaints together, it would appear 
that Kasparova's rosy predictfon about the triumph of 
light over darkness was, for a number of the delegates at 
the meeting, too much like pie in the sky. All of these 
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charges were serious and could not be easily ignored. But 
in defence of Kasparova, as will be shown later, the 
cultural-educational apparatus of the Red Army did play an 
important, if somewhat diversified role, in the life of 
the Red Army units and, although Kasparova perhaps had got 
too slightly carried away with her reference to the 
triumph of light over darkness, there was a justifiable 
element in what she said. In some respects, Kasparova, 
like PUR itself, was in a no-win situation,best summed up 
by one delegate(a person only identified by his surname, 
Potemkin)who, in a reaction to Kasparova's speech, stated 
the following: 
if the centre controls the work, then the accusation is 
voiced that it is crushing lo~al initiative; if the centre 
grants freedom to local self-activity, then the localigies 
complain about isolation, the lack of guidelines, etc. 
In a nutshell, this particular delegate had very much 
hit the nail on the head. If PUR had sought much greater 
control over the political apparatus at the front, then 
the charges would have went up from the front that the 
centre was stifling local initiative, that it was 
attempting to subordinate too much to centralised control 
and yet, because the latter was not happening, the 
Congress heard criticism that there was a rift between PUR 
and the political apparatus at the front. Given the past 
criticism of VBVK, it would appear that the political 
apparatus had not advanced a great deal since the 8th 
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Party Congress but this, of course, would be untrue. But 
yet the same criticisms were being made, despite the large 
expansion in the duties and tasks of the new organ. 
In_Rakovsky's principal address to the Congress, on 
the activity of PUR in its first six months of existence, 
every detail of PUR's work was covered, as well as how 
much money was being spent on the various projects being 
carried out in the Red Army. 10 The various statistics 
quoted in Rakovsky's address covered, as will be detailed, 
every aspect of political and cultural-educational 
activity being undertaken in the Red Ar~y during 1919. 
Since there is so much statistical information contained 
in Rakovsky's report, a number of sub-sections will appear 
which will hopefully help to disseminate the necessary 
information in a much more compatible form. Thus, the 
.first sub-section will analyse the relevant figures on the 
number of Communists and commissars in the Red Army at 
this time. 
(i)The number of commissars and Communists in the Red 
Army(1919) 
Rakovsky began his report to the Congress with a 
detailed assessment of the number of commissars and 
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Communists in the Red Army by the end of 1919. Although 
the figures would appear to be ~j~ as regards the number 
of Communists in the Red Army, there would appear to have 
been some slight confusion about the exact number of 
commissars in the units. However, that will be cleared up 
here. The relevant passage of Rakovsky's report stated 
thus: 
the number of commissars in the army, the rear units and 
institutions has reached 2,500. Of these, there are in 
the okrugs 12, in the guberniyas 56, in the uezds 435. In 
the units: in the revvoensovety, there are 60, in the 
staffs and institutions, there are 2,000, in the military 
units, there are 3,120(divisional, brigade, regimental, 
including artillery divisions and battalions, batteries 
attached to armour!~ trains). The figure does not include 
political leaders. 
Obviously, if one adds up the number of commissars in 
the units(60+2,000+3,120), one arrives at a figure 
considerably more than the 2,500 listed in the opening of 
the paragraph(the figure, in actual fact, amounts to 
5,180). This figure is one which one finds support from a 
unlikely source, in some respect-namely, a newspaper 
report of the self-same speech made by Rakovsky to the 
Congress! Although the relevant newspaper report is not a 
direct quote from Rakovsky's speech to the Congress, 
nevertheless, it would seem to cast a very strong doubt on 
Rakovsky's earlier statement. The relevant part of the 
newspaper report simply stated that, according to 
Rakovsky's report, "there were more than 5,000 commissars" 
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in the Red Army at the time. 12 This figure is further 
supported by research carried out by one Soviet historian 
of the subject some time back.13 
Assuming, therefore, these figures to be correct, what 
must have happened is that someone has simply made a 
typing error in the republished version of Rakovsky's 
speech in the issue of "Politrabotnik". However, it is 
unusual that given the nature of the information released 
and its overall importance that the mistake was not 
publicised and then immediately rectified. It should be 
remembered that even if the figure calculated-5,180-is 
correct, it still does not represent the exact number of 
commissars in the entire Soviet Republic. After all, one 
still has to take account of the military districts. 
Rakovsky's figure of .2,500 commissars as representing the 
total number of commissars in the military districts would 
appear not to have been the subject of any misprint, 
therefore, if we accept it as being correct, it would be 
possible to state that by the end of 1919, serving in all 
posts in all parts of the Republic, as commissars, were 
some 7,680 men(2,500+5,180). If we remember that the 
total for 1918 was 6,389 commissars in the Republic, then 
we can record an increase of just under 1,300 commissars 
in the whole year, in itself, a not unbelievable increase 
in the space of 12 months. It has to be emphasised, 
however, that the latter figure is purely speculative and 
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it could well be that the grand total of commissars in the 
Republic was more than that established here-the only way 
to determine the exact figure is to dig out the relevant 
archival sources. 
There is less controversy surrounding the number of 
Communists in the Red Army towards the end of 1919. 
Rakovsky not only quoted the overall figure for the number 
of Communists and Communist Party sympathisers in the 
field army ("deistvyushchaya armiya") for October 1919, 
but also showed the relative strength of the Party on a 
front by front basis. Thus, by the 1st October 1919, the 
total figure for the number of Communists and Communist 
sympathisers in the field· units numbered 61,681. 14. This 
figure is then broken down on a front by front basis to 
reveal, amongst other things, that the most critical 
fronts in 1919 had the highest proportion of Communist 
Party members and sympathisers. Thus, in reverse order, 
so to speak, the lowest number of Party members and 
sympathisers was recorded on the Northern Front-the number 
there was only 2,043; on the Turkestan Front, the figure 
amounted to 8,911; the South-Eastern Front had only 9,840; 
the Western Front numbered 11,460 Communist Party members 
and sympathisers amongst its ranks; the second largest 
figure of all the fronts was the Southern Front-14,825 
Communist Party members and sympathisers being recorded 
there but, the largest number of Communist Party members 
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and sympathisers on any of the fronts was recorded on the 
Eastern Front, the figure there being 14,962.15 
If we place these figures alongside figures for the 
number of men under arms on each of the fronts, then it is 
possible to arrive at some idea of how significant a 
proportion of the Communist Party strength was on each of 
the fronts, relative to the actual number of soldiers on 
each of the fronts. Therefore, according to the relevant 
materials, on the Northern Front, which was made up almost 
entirely of 6th Army at the time, there were some 100,000 
men on the front; on the Turkestan Front, there were some 
340,000 soldiers; on the South-Eastern Front, there were 
some 317,000 soldiers; on the Western Front, the number of 
soldiers was 375,500; on the Southern Front, the figure 
was 360,000 and, finally, on the Eastern Front, the number 
of soldiers was 282,000 men. 16 Thus, if we start to 
compare both sets of figures, we tend to find that the 
highest proportion of CP members and sympathisers was 
recorded where the perception of the military danger was 
greatest. 
If we remember that the overall total of CP members 
and sympathisers in the Red Army was 61,681 and that the 
total number of Red Army soldiers listed above was 
1,774,500, then, by dividing the two sets of figures 
together, we find that, on average, for every 1 CP member 
or sympathiser, there were 28.7 soldiers. If we use the 
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same sets of figures to calculate the relevant proportions 
of each of the fronts concerned, we find that the highest 
proportion of Party members and sympathisers to soldiers 
was recorded on the Eastern Front(the relevant figure 
being 1 CP member or CP sympathiser for every 18.8 
soldiers). The other Fronts followed the pattern set 
below: 
Southern Front-1 CP member or sympathiser per 24.2 
soldiers; 
Western Front, the figure was 1:32.7; 
South-Eastern Front, the figure was 1:33.4; 
Turkestan Front, the figure was 1:38.1 soldiers and, 
finally, on the Northern Front, the figure was 1:48.9 
soldiers. 
Thus, in 1919, where the fighting was concentrated 
mainly in the Eastern and Southern Fronts, that was where 
the highest proportion of CP members and sympathisers was 
to be found. The Party's mobilisations for the front were 
not in vain. 
After detailing the figures, Rakovsky then went on to 
analyse PUR's budget for the last six months of 1919 and 
it is to that that the next section will concentrate on. 
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(ii)PUR's 1919 budget 
In the last six months of 1919, i.e.the first period 
of PUR's activity, PUR had spent a total of 664,217,243 
rubles: of this, 215,000,000(approximately a third of the 
budget)was spent on fulfilling the needs of the Front 
political departments and a further 106,250,000 rubles 
spent on meeting the requirements of the okrug military 
districts. 17 Thus, putting the two figures together, we 
can see that a little less than half of PUR's total budget 
was spent on the direct requirements of the Red Army's 
political apparatus, both that operating at the front and 
that operating in the rear. The money would appear to 
have been spent on paying the wages of the staff, 
agitators, organisation of literacy schools, etc. 18 On 
top of the latter sums of money, a further 78 million 
rubles was to be spent on the creation and organisation of 
Red Army clubs, 6 million rubles was to be spent on the 
provision of mobile theatres for the needs of the Red 
Army, over 159 million rubles was to be spent on supplying 
the Red Army with libraries, books, papers, etc. 19 The 
needs of the central apparatus, i.e. the wages of the 
staff working in Moscow for PUR amounted to 11 million 
rubles.20 These were, it should be stressed fairly 
substantial amounts of money. 
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Although it is difficult to obtain budget information 
on many of the leading Party and state organs of the 
period, work carried out by one Western scholar, in 
particular, would seem to provide us with an opportunity 
to make some comparison of the figures quoted. For 
instance, Sheila Fitzpatrick in her mammoth work on the 
People's Commissariat of Education during 1917-1921, has 
produced a table for the budgetary expenditure of the 
People's Commissariat of Education, which would appear to 
show that the Commissariat's budgetary expenditure for 
July-December 1919 stood at 164,699,000 rubles. 21 Thus, 
if the latter figure is accurate, it would appear that 
PUR's budgetary allocation was some 3 times more than that 
of the People's Commissariat of Education, an indication 
in {tself of how importantly the Bolsheviks at the centre 
viewed the work of PUR in the Red Army. 
(iii)PUR and the political workers sent to the front(l919) 
The next main section in Rakovsky's report was a 
detailed examination of the political workers mobilised 
and sent out by PUR in 1919. 22 according to Rakovsky, 
there existed a special section of PUR's agitation-
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information department, which was specifically in charge 
of mobilising political workers for the front: 
this section[namely, the mobilisation-distribution 
section-SM]is in charge of mobilisations, undertaken in 
accordance with the decrees of the Central Committee of 
the Party, allocating Party workers to the fronts and 
ensur~~g their rational use by the political organs in the 
army. 
Rakovsky then went on to produce the relevant figures for 
the period just before the formal creation of PUR in May 
1919 and ending in October 1919: 
in April-290, in May-715, in June-335, in July-43~4 in August-431, in September-1,027, in October-5,427. 
The final figure for·October 1919 is further broken down 
to reveal how many workers were sent to each of the 
fronts: 
to the Southern Front-2,167; to the South-Eastern Front-
857; to the Eastern Front-209; to the Turkestan Front-227; 
to the Northern Front-7; to the Western Front-766; t2
5
the 
Reserve Army-566; to various other institutions-629. 
Before leaving this particular set of figures 
entirely, it should be noted that the October total of the 
figures for the fronts, in actual fact, adds up to 5,428. 
The difference is slight, but there. However, a slightly 
more serious discrepancy arises in a republished report of 
PUR's activity for 1919-1920, which states that the actual 
number of political workers sent to the fronts in October 
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1919 was only 5,403. 26 Again, the difference is small but 
worth noting. 
Looking through the individual figures, another 
discrepancy has to be brought to the reader's attention:in 
two sources, both involving the use of primary source 
material, the October 1919 figure for the number of 
political workers sent to the Southern Front is larger 
than the one given in Rakovsky's report. Thus, in the 
relevant pages of both an issue of "Istoricheskii 
arkhiv"(1959)and vol.2 of "Partiino-politicheskaya 
rabota •.. "(1964), the figure given is 2,411.27 
The difference between the two figures is 244 and, is by 
no means, what could be termed as being marginal. 
Unfortunately, given that both figures are based on 
primary source material, it .is impossible to explain such 
a big disparity between the two sets of figures-it could 
be simply a accounting mistake of some description. 
(iv)PUR and the agitational literature sent to the 
front(l919) 
By October 1919, PUR had also managed to send a vast 
amount of agitational literature to the front-papers. 
brochures, leaflets, etc. For instance, by this time, 
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681,700 copies of "Pravda" had been distributed to all the 
fronts, as well as a further 286,310 copies of the peasant 
newspaper, "Bednota". 28 Surprisingly, few copies of 
"Izvestiya VTsiK" were sent to the fronts at this time, 
just a little over 28,000 copies. 29 It should be 
remembered, though, that the various individual armies 
were producing their own local newspapers-by October 1919, 
it was estimated that the daily production run of all the 
army papers combined stood at 250,000 copies.30 This was 
a considerable top up, so to speak, to the papers that PUR 
was able to send to the fronts. However, despite the 
large volume of papers being sent to the fronts, there was 
still a lot of room for improvement:in his report to the 
Congress, Rakovsky still was able to quote the fact that, 
in a number of units, there was an average of only one 
paper per sixty soldiers.31 
The distribution network for the despatch of 
newspapers to the front was, in many ways, the main reason 
for the lack of newspapers at some areas of the front. In 
general, Rakovsky stated that there were two main reasons 
why some of the newspapers being sent by PUR were not 
reaching their intended destination: 
1)the poor state of the railway network in some areas of 
the Republic; 
2)at a number of stations, for weeks on end, bales of 
papers and poster literature are left unsent ... due to the 
inadequacies o~ 2 the despatch department of Tsentropechat. 
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Thus, it would appear that, despite the large volume 
of newspapers being produced and being sent to the front, 
there was still room for improvement. As will be shown 
later, the situation was to get better rather. than the 
worse in the year ahead. Rakovsky, once having analysed 
the amount of literature being sent to the front, then 
proceeded to examine the work of a number of the main 
departments of PUR at the time-namely, the Cultural-
educational and Literary-publications departments-and it 
is to these that we now turn. 
(v)The work of PUR's Cultural-educational department in 
1919 
Rakovsky began his examination of the latter 
department by stating that the main task of the 
department, as a whole, was the liquidation of illiteracy 
from the ranks of the Red Army. 33 To achieve this aim, 
some 150,000,000 rubles had already been spent in the 
first half of 1919(i.e. when VBVK still existed for part 
of the period) and that credit, to the tune of a further 
450,000,000 rubles had been allocated to the department 
for the second-half of 1919. 34 Rakovsky also stated that 
PUR had previously asked the Council of Labour and Defence 
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for 15,000-17,000 cultural workers, specifically to serve 
the needs of the Red Army but, due to the demands of the 
other ministries, government and Party organs, this figure 
had had to be scaled down to a more realistic 5,000 
cultural workers. 35 Unfortunately, there is no indication 
of whether, or not, even such a reduced estimate was 
actually fulfilled. 
Rakovsky then produced a table, showing the extent of 
the Red Army's cultural-educational apparatus by October 
1919,(reproduced here at the end of the dissertation, as 
an appendix). Moving on from listing the facts behind the 
Red Army's cultural-educational apparatus, Rakovsky then 
went on to make a brief, but interesting statement, on the 
number of cultural-educational workers being sent from the 
centre, whose Party affiliation did not exist: 
from the centre alone, for the organisation and 
instruction of the aforementioned cultural institutions, 
during this period[January-October 1919-SM]861 people were 
sent, of whom 25% were sen3
6
to the front(among those sent, 
only 132 were Communists). 
Thus, although it was still fairly early, both in 
terms of the money spent and the people sent out to help 
organise the Red Army's cultural-educational apparatus, 
PUR's cultural-educational organ would appear to have laid 
a reasonably solid basis for the future conduct of the 
work to be carried out. As will be detailed in the next 
chapter, one of the most successful campaigns ever 
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undertaken during the Civil War was the Red Army's 
campaign to abolish illiteracy from amongst its ranks and, 
given what has just been written, it certainly would 
appear to be the case that PUR's cultural-educational 
department played an important role in the latter 
campaign. 
(vi)The work of PUR's Literary-publications department in 
1919 
Moving on from the examination of the work of the 
cultural-educational department, Rakovsky then went on to 
analyse the work of the Literary-publications department. 
The latter was largely in charge of the production of 
magazines, brochures, posters, etc. 37 These were 
primarily for use among the Red Army soldiers but, as will 
be shown below, some of the publications were for 
agi ta tional use among· the soldiers of the various \Vhi te 
armies. Once again, the production figures of a number of 
the journals were phenomenal-issue numbers 3-9 of the 
magazine, "Krasnoarmeets", were produced in a total run of 
over 1 million copies.3 8 furthermore, 241,000 copies of 
various brochures were sent out to the Red Army, as well 
as 40,000 copies of a magazine for White Army soldiers, 
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called, "Svetoch". 39 Again, emphasising the importance 
that PUR attached to work amongst the White armies-up 
until October 1919, the department had produced and 
distributed well over a million leaflets specifically for 
agitational purposes amongst the White armies.40 This 
would seem to reveal an important activity of PUR's work 
at the front which, for a variety of reasons, has not been 
the subject of much attention from scholars of the Civil 
War. PUR's commitment, revealed in the fact that it 
produced a large proportion of literature for agitational 
purposes behind the White lines, is an aspect of its work 
which, like a few others, has neither been properly 
analysed or examined. Unfortunately, it is not possible 
to detail the contents of such brochures or any of the 
issues of the relevant journal, but the mere fact that so 
much literature was produced for the Whites by PUR is 
interesting in itself and raises the very pertinent 
question of what exactly did PUR have to say to the White 
soldiers? Obviously, it can be surmised that part of the 
prupose of much of the literature being sent to the White 
armies was an attem pt to persuade the White soldiers to 
desert and quit the ranks of the White armies altogether, 
but it could also have been possible that some of the 
literature being sent had a wider purpose th an merely 
fulfilling the role of agitational-propaganda literature. 
Page 337 
(vii)PUR and the work of the local political apparatus at 
the front(l919) 
In his closing remarks to the Congress, Rakovsky 
analysed the nature of the relationship between PUR and 
the local political apparatus of the Red Army with, it has 
to be said, with a fair degree of candour and frankness, 
pointing out what he considered to be the main problem 
areas. ~akovsky began this particular area of his speech 
with the following terse statement: 
the Political administration is still not up to the mark. 
I must tell you that we, much more than you, who are at 
the periphery, feel the inadequacies of th~ 1 Political administration[operating-SM]at the centre. 
Rakovsky then went on to state where he saw the main blame 
in the fact that there was no "vital link" established 
bewteen PUR and the political departments: 
I must tell you that, above all, I have been struck 
today ... by the lack of a living link, a constant link 
between the Political administration and the periphery. 
Who is to blame for this? Comrades, I think that you 
would be very unjust if you placed all the blame for this 
on the Political administration. It is to blame, but what 
is much more to blame has been the complicated position 
and circ~~stances which have existed since PUR was 
created. 
Rakovsky could have been referring to a number of 
factors here, not least of which, obviously, would be the 
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disruption brought about by the Civil War itself, both in 
terms of manpower and material shortages. However, it is 
also possible that Rakovsky may have been hinting at 
something else here, for instance, the virtually permanent 
secondment of PUR's Chief to a number of revvoensovets, an 
element that was not to change throughout the length of 
the Civil War. Also the fact that the appointment of 
Deputy-Chief seemed, on some occasions, to be reminiscent 
of a game of musical chairs, even by this stage of the 
Civil War, would have been apparent to a man like 
Rakovsky. Needless to say, Rakovsky was not only critical 
of the situation that PUR found itself in: 
the political departments have been too independent of one 
another and the centre too long. I ~~uld say that a 
certain separatism has been created. 
This criticism was further reinforced by Rakovsky when he 
went on to argue what he thought was the view of the ideal 
relationship between the centre and the political 
departments, as viewed by the political departments 
themselves: 
you will have to admit that many[political departments-
SM]willingly want the Political administration to continue 
as before, separately, so that it does not direct them, 
only supplies them with money and literature, not 
interfering i~ their internal administration and 
organisation. 4 
Of course. this in itself was a not too heavily 
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disguised criticism of the political departments 
themselves. Rakovsky thought that such a situation should 
not be allowed to continue and pointed out the dangers of 
the situation where PUR was not in receipt of a lot of 
reports from the front or army political departments: 
in my two months of directing PUR, I have received a total 
of only 9 reports from the political departments, two of 
which were from the Southern Front concerning retreating 
from the front! Every front and army political department 
is required to send AT LEAST a monthly report ... if the 
fronts and armies do not pass on their experience to the 
centre, then they do not have t~5 right •.• to accuse it of 
being doctrinaire and academic. 
However, Rakovsky did end his report to the Congress 
on a reasonably optimistic note: 
I would like to say, comrades, that I consider the main 
aim of this Congress to be the creation of that living 
link which, up until now, has been lacking between zge 
Political administration and the political workers. 
Thus, judging by Rakovsky's arguments overall, the 
view from the centre was not a particularly healthy one-
the political departments would seem to be more than happy 
to take PUR's money and the personnel that it sent out, 
but would appear to have been far less keen in imparting 
to PUR the information that it needed in order to 
understand better the work that was being carried out at 
the front. In many respects, if PUR did not gather in 
enough of the right sort of information, then its ability 
to direct the political apparatus at the front would be 
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seriously hampered. Similar to the position of its 
predecessor, PUR still had to rely on an equal and precise 
flow of information from the Army and Front political 
departments, if it was to carry out its functions to the 
best of its abilities. Curiously enough, however, 
although the situation as viewed from PUR's point of view 
was not too healthy, viewed from the position of the 
political departments themselves, the opposite could well 
have been the case. After all, as long as PUR did 
continue to send out the necessary monies and personnel, 
the political departments actually working at the front 
could well have carried out a better job working 
autonomously of one another, responding more directly to 
the needs of the soldiers quicker. The political 
departments could respond in a more flexible way, as 
regards the conduct of political and educational work, not 
feeling the need or the pressure to carry out work 
according to a strict set of regulations emanating from 
the centre. Of course, it has to be stressed that whether 
this flexibility was desirable, or not, depended on one's 
perception-obviously, from the centre, PUR needed to 
control what was being carried out on the front or, at 
least, needed to know what was happening at the front. 
The position viewed from the periphery, however, was 
different. If the political departments could carry out 
the political and educational work required, then, as far 
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as they were concerned, they probably thought that 
informing the centre was not as important as carrying out 
the necessary work. The political departments would 
appear to have little realised the importance of PUR 
receiving a consistent flow of information from the front. 
Following on from Rakovsky's report to the Congress, 
the Congress would then appeared to have debated the 
"organisational question" and the "literary-publication 
activity" of PUR. 47 Unfortunately, there is no 
description of either of these debates so it is not 
possible to detail them. 
The next items on the agenda would appear to have been 
both Smilga's and Trotsky's speeches to the Congress, both 
of which will be analysed below. 
(viii)Smilga and Trotsky's speeches and the closing of the 
First All-Russian Congress of Political Horkers(December 
1919) 
Both Smilga and Trotsky spoke on the second last day 
of the Congres-14th December-and, as shown earlier, both 
men's speeches would appeared to have added something to 
the overall debate on the future nature of the work of the 
political apparatus at the front. Mind you, on saying 
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that, they added varying amounts to the debate: as shown 
earlier, whereas Trotsky's speech covered a number of 
concerns of the Red Army, disappointingly, Smilga's 
virtually concentrated itself on analysing the role of the 
military commissars in the Red Army.4 8 Trotsky's speech, 
on the other hand, largely concerned itself with a number 
of issues and although it too examined the role of the 
military commissars in the Red Army, unlike Smilga's, it 
also took on a broader scope, and, consequently, is worth 
examining in detail here. 
Trotsky's speech focussed on a number of important 
issues, not least of which was the necessity to create a 
directing organ, in charge of looking after army property; 
the use of guerrilla attachments in the regular army; the 
creation of a Ukrainian army; the strict regime of the 
military censor, with a view to easing up slightly on the 
latter's functions, etc. 49 In one reference to the work 
of PUR, as regards controlling drunkenness amongst the 
commanders and the commissarial staff, Trotsky had the 
following to say: 
I have received a few letters, stating that, in certain 
headquarters and even higher centres of authority, 
drunkenness is flourishing. A struggle against this 
phenomenon must be started. The commissars not only fail 
to show the necessary vigour in this struggle, but are 
also guilty of drunkenness themselves. Measures will have 
to be taken, through the Politi§Bl administration, to 
ensure that drunkenness ceases. 
Trotsky then proceeded to emphasise the importance of 
Page 343 
carrying out agitational work amongst the White armies: 
the Political departments of particular armies and 
divisions must now, when we are victoriously advancing on 
all fronts, pay special attention to the disintegration in 
the ranks of the enemy, and literature specially adapted 
to the particular needs of the fronts must be 
prepared ... Publishing activity for the purposes of 
agitatigy amongst the enemy must be developed to the 
utmost. 
Trotsky then closed his speech with a reference to the 
hard winter that lay ahead for the Bolsheviks and the need 
to maximise every effort in order to further ensure 
Bolshevik military victory in the coming year.5 2 
Thus, with both speeches apparently being devoid of 
any discussion of the issues put forward by Rakovsky, 
this, in itself, was a curious sign. Other than the 
question of the future role of the military commissars, 
Smilga's speech is virtually blank and, although Trotsky 
did mention a number of points, he virtually did not have 
too much detail to add to the debate or any of the points 
made by Rakovsky on the nature of the political apparatus 
or the nature of the relationship between PUR and the 
political departments at the front. Such important 
figures having apparently so little to say about such 
important issues is cause for interest in itself. Why did 
neither of the two men not have something more concrete to 
say about the issues raised by Rakovsky? CC involvement? 
As the Congress drew to a close, the description of 
the last day's work of the Congress is interesting: 
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on Sunday, late in the evening, the congress of political 
workers was closed. For more than two days, the delegates 
have been involved in intensive, almost uninterrupted work 
in sections and commissions. Only at 9 o'clock in the 
evening was the work of the sections completed and a 
plenary session of the congress convened to hear the 
repo:ts a~~ approve the resolutions, adopted by the 
sect1ons. 
There is, in actual fact, very little information on the 
work of these sections, which seemed to have played such 
an important part in the overall work of the congress. 
What is available is a number of very brief, newspaper 
extracts outlining some of what was carried out by these 
sections, but not in any particular detail. Very little 
information is available on the number of people involved 
in the work of the sections or what they were instructed 
to work on. However, even though there is so little 
available, it will be duly noted here and examined. 
As stated earlier, one of the issues at the Congress 
was the question of organisation. The organisational 
section had been split into four sections, these being: 
l)staff-organisational; 2)information-publicity; 
3)political-registration-civil; 4)financial-budget. 54 
There are some further details about the work of two of 
these sections, namely the staff-organisational and 
political-registration sections. 
Apparently, the work of the staff-organisational 
section was mainly concerned with working out the 
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organisational structure of the Army political 
departments:according to the relevant newspaper extract, 
the section decided that: 
the Army political departments should consist of four 
sections: l)political-educational; 2)supplies; 
3)information; 4)administrative-organisational.SS 
Other than these sections, the political department was 
also meant to contain a general section, which would 
include an editorial board, a treasury and a clerical 
office. Unfortunately, that is all that is known about 
the work of this particular section. 
The work of the political-registration section was 
reported by Katanyan, a name that is not unfamiliar to us. 
Again, according to the relevant newspaper extract, this 
particular section: 
l)worked out forms for mutual relations between the Party 
organs and the political departments; 2)approved the draft 
instructions to the Communist Party ce113
6
in the Red Army 
units ... [the report breaks off here-SM]. 
In the subsequent resolutions of the Congress, a number 
were devoted to analysing the role of the political 
departments, vis a vis the other parts of the civilian and 
military apparatus, as will be detailed later. 
There is some information available on the work of the 
cultural-educational section. The main speaker identified 
with the work of the latter section was Kasparava.5 7 
Apparently, the section decided to re-name itself and 
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became known as the political-educational section. The 
re-naming of the organ was for a very good reason: 
the apolitical nature of educational work is a fiction, 
because only on the soil of revolutionary Marxism is it 
thinkable to consider the real education of the masses.58 
Other than change its name, the section also worked out 
the relationship between the political-educational 
institutions of the Red Army and the organs of the 
People's Commissariat of Education and, in more general 
terms, requested that Sovnarkom looked at the relevant 
part of the decree which transferred the direction of 
educational work in the Red Army away from RVSR to the 
People's Commissariat of Education. 59 In total, this 
section brought forward nine resolutions for Congress to 
vote on. 
The congress then closed with the passing of a number 
of fairly detailed resolutions, the report of the mandate 
commission, which stated that the Congress was attended by 
227 delegates, only 2 of whom were not Communist Party 
members and final speeches by Smilga and Rakovsky. 60 
Before turnirig to analyse the Congress' resolutions, it 
would be useful to examine the content of the closing 
speeches, made by Rakovsky and Smilga, which showed that 
both men had appreciated a lot of what had been said at 
' 
the Congress. 
According to Smilga's speech, the Congress had managed 
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to show up a lot of defects in the nature of the 
relationship between the central authority and the organs 
working at the front: 
the work of the co~ress has shown that the Political 
administration wasJ1inked with the localities, the work of 
the latter scarcely conforming to the paths marked out by 
the centre. The reason for this was the military 
situation, disrupting the systematic character of the 
work, especially in the area of political work, there was 
no uniformity, there was a feeling of doing things in 
isolation and inefficiently. The basic task of the 
Political administration
6
yill be to put into effect the 
decrees of the congress. 
Even so, Smilga did end his speech on an optimistic note: 
the position for the next congress will be more fortunate. 
The cause is almost half-finished, we can now expect 
complete victory and this will give us the opportunity to 
travel he62 again and jointly take on the regulation of 
our work. 
Rakovsky's closing remarks to the Congress were 
slightly more harsh than Smilga's, more keen on pointing 
out the duties of the political workers and their 
responsibilities to the Red Army soldiers: 
political workers·are not simply employees, they are not 
government servants but political leaders of the army, who 
must show an example, by their conduct1 to the Red Army 
masseg~ both in battle and in conditions of everyday 
work. 
Thus, although the latter extract can only but be a brief 
resume of what Rakovsky must have said at the Congress, 
nevertheless, it does fit in well with what we know 
~akovsky said at the opening of the Congress, as detailed 
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earlier. All the same, though, it is disappointing that 
both men's speeches were not published in full, but, even 
so, it would appear that in both men's comments, there are 
two different schools of thought working, with Smilga 
being slightly more optimistic about what the future would 
bring than Rakovsky. At the time, as shown in the section 
on personnel, Rakovsky was more involved in political work 
and possibly understood the strains better than Smilga, 
who was constantly serving on various battle-fronts 
throughout the Civil War. Whether, of course, either of 
the two men's views were to be proven correct would only 
be shown by time itself but, before analysing the work of 
PUR and the Red Army's political apparatus in 1920, it is 
necessary to examine the resolutions of the Congress, as a 
conclusion to this section and as a prologue to the 
beginning of the next one. 
(ix)The resolutions of the First All-Russian Congress of 
Political Workers(December 1919) 
There are two main versions of the Congress' 
resolutions-one version which appeared immediately after 
the Congress itself, published in an issue of 
"Politrabotnik" in early 1920 and, more recently, another 
collection of the resolutions appeared in a volume of 
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documents, devoted to analysing various meetings and 
congresses of political workers of the Red Army, published 
in 1984. 64 The two versions of the resolutions differ 
mainly in the layout of the resolutions, i.e. the order in 
which they appear in the two versions is, for some 
inexplicable reason, different. Since the detail in the 
resolutions is so great, only those of most relevance to 
the body of this dissertation will be noted here, in order 
to save time and unnnecessary exposition. 
The first resolution in the 1920 version of the 
resolutions-this copy being the copy of the resolutions 
that will be referred to throughout this section-was 
entitled, "on the principles of political-educational work 
in the Red Army." 65 The resolution was mainly concerned 
with stating the overall aims of the polit~cal-educational 
work being carried out in the Red Army: 
in order to strengthen the construction of the Red Army as 
a weapon for the successful completion of the Civil War 
and the victory of the proletariat, at the very heart of 
the education of the Red Army soldier should be the 
principles of revolutionary Marxism, awakenining and 
organisisng the class consciousness and the creative self-
activity of the armed labouring masses. Education carried 
out along these lines will create amidst the Red Army a 
real supporter of Communist culture, as well as amongst 
the peaceful civilian population, and secure for it[the 
Red Army-SM]the swiftest possible victory over the 
bourgeois world ... All areas of political-educational work, 
be it by word or artistsic means, must deepen political 
agitation
6
gnd strict devotion to the military tasks of the 
Red Army. 
This general statement reveals that the cultural-
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educational work being carried out by the political 
departments had come to be seen as having a distinct 
political and military purpose. The statement emphasises 
that the work to be carried out in the Red Army had a 
distinct military, as well as cultural and political, 
purpose to it. This is. important to understand, as it 
helps to explain why the Bolsheviks did spend so much 
time, money and effort to ensure that the Red Army's 
political departments could carry out the political and 
cultural work that the centre required that the front 
political apparatus carry out. 
The next section of the resolutions then went on to 
discuss the organs that were required to carry out the 
work: 
l)the great significance which political-educational work 
has in the Red Army underlined the necessity for the 
creation of a special organ-the Political administration 
of RVSR, with its departments, commissioned to carry out 
work over the entire length of the RSFSR, according to the 
demands of the RVSR and the CC of the RCP. 
2)The division, in the structure of PUR, into separate and 
independent departments-political and educational-does not 
signify the desire to attach to educational work in the 
army the nature of pure .ulturtr _gerstvo[from the German, 
"Kulturtrager", meaning a person with a civilising 
mission-SM], but only the aspiration to separate the 
political-adminisg7ative functions from the political-
educational ones. 
The latter resolution is almost a restatement of basic 
principles, in some respects, not least in its estimation 
of the relationship between PUR, RVSR and the CC of the 
RCP. The fact that PUR's functions could be broken down 
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into two broad spheres-political and educational-probably 
encouraged the implied statement that PUR CDnsisted of 
only the two departments whereas, in actual fact, PUR did 
consist of a number of departments. However, in its broad 
range of responsibilities, PUR carried out its work in the 
two broad areas of work. Thus, having discussed the 
general position of the centre, the resolution then went 
on to discuss the broad responsibilities of the 
peripheries: 
3)the leading organs of educational work in the localities 
are the political-educational sections of the political-
educational departments of the okrug military 
commissariats, the guberniya military commissariats for 
military units in the rear and the political-educational 
sections of the politic~! departments of the fronts, 
68 armies and divisions for military units at the front. 
If the situation arose, for instance, that the front 
political department, the army political department and 
the political-educational department of a okrug or 
guberniya military commissariat were all located at the 
same time in the same city, then the front and army 
political departments were instructed to look after the 
interests of their own military units and institutions and 
the relevant political-educational department would render 
assistance if and when it was required. 69 Hopefully, this 
would lead to a reduction in the the possibility of 
parallelism in the work of each of the political 
departments. 
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The next resolution worth analysing was entitled, "on 
the organisation of educational work."70 The most 
important parts of this resolution in particular were the 
references to the work of the Party cells and the military 
commissars: 
3)having as their main aim the political education of the 
Red Army soldiers, the Communist Party cell must, at the 
same time, watch over the general direction of educational 
~ork i~ the un~t' try to enliven it, in every way render 
1t ass1stance. 
The commissars were enjoined to do everything in their 
power and capabilities to carry out the necessary 
political-educational work and help to remove all 
obstacles towards the successful completion of the 
political-educational work being undertaken in the unit. 72 
The next series of resolutions that appear in the 1920 
issue of "Politrabotnik" concerned the implementation of 
school-educational work, the work of the Red Army's clubs, 
work in the areas of theatre, music, cinema and sport, 
etc. 73 However, the next important resolution worth 
looking at was on the supply of political-educational 
workers for the front: 
l)the existing resource of political-educational workers, 
presently taking part in cultural organisation in the 
army, is inadequate. 
2)This condition has been brought about by, on the one 
hand, the inadequately full use of the cultural forces of 
the Republic and, on the other 7~and, the generally low cultural-level of the country. 
Page 353 
The resolution then proposed a potential solution to the 
problem: 
4)it is necessary to recruit political-educational workers 
not only by attracting to the work intelligent and semi-
intelligent people from society,(as has been the case 
until recently), but, mainly, by broadly attr~~ting the 
Red Army masses to cultural-educational work. 
This would appear to have envisaged an attack on the 
problem from two sides, not only in stepping up 
recruitment amongst that sector of the population most 
suited to the task, but also in attempting to attract the 
most able of the Red·Army soldiers themselves. Whether, 
or not, such an approach did have a positive effect on the 
number of cultural-educational workers joining the Red 
Army, is difficult to say, given the lack of the relevant 
figures. However, at least on the face of it, it would 
appear to have been a good idea. 
In the next major resolution, on agitation and 
propaganda, the role of the political department was seen 
as very important: 
S)to put into practice ... the tasks of agitation and 
propaganda, the political department must use the 
authority of every Communist in the Red Army, regardles~ 
of the post he occupies. With this purpose in mind, 
special work should be placed on every Communist, (the 
reading of lectures, reading and commenting on newspaper 
articles, talks, lessons in school, etc)which must be 
carri7g out not casually ... but systematically, as a Party 
duty. 
Needless to say, importance was also attached to the 
agitational work of the political departments in the 
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enemy's rear. 76 
The final two resolutions in the version of the 
resolutions contained in "Politrabotnik" were concerned 
with the work of the schools in the Red Army, as regards 
the conduct of courses for political literacy, and the 
organisation of information. 77 As will be shown in the 
next section, a lot of time and effort were devoted to the 
courses of political literacy, in a real attempt to 
educate the soldiers and make them politically more aware. 
The lack of information had been a point of contention 
at the Congress and in the relevant resolution on the 
question of information, Congress resolved that the 
political departments were to: 
l)send in daily telegraph reports ... 2)a fortnightly 
statistical table
7
§n the state of political and cultural-
educational work. 
One thing that can be said about PUR's work in the Civil 
War is, one way or another, PUR did manage to amass a 
whole range of statistical information on a wide variety 
of subjects, from Communist Party membership to the amount 
of literature being sent to the fronts for the various 
months of the year! Someone must have been sending in the 
information in 1920, so, obviously, the supply of 
information to the centre must have improved. As was to 
be described in a later article appearing in 
"Politrabotnik", the type of information that PUR wanted 
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from the political departments was the following: 
1)on supplies; 2)on the Red Army soldiers(military 
capability, mood, consciousness); 3)on the command staff; 
4)on the commissars and the political leaders[introduced 
in October 1919, the political leaders("rukovoditeli")were 
in charge of the political apparatus away at the bottom of 
the front political apparatus and were designed to help 
both the commissar and the Party cell-SM]; 4)on the 
commissars and the political leaders; S)on political work; 
6)on cultural-educational work; 7)on the medical-sanitary 
state of the unit; 8)on the state of the region closest to 
the ~ron7~ 9)information on the enemy; 10)instances of 
hero1sm. 
If such reports were compiled by the various political 
departments, then they would be vital in assessing the 
importance of political work to the Red Army. 
Unfortunately, as yet, they are still locked away in the 
archiyes of the Ministry of Defence and have not been made 
available for independent examination by any Western 
scholar. 
However, before leaving the resolution of the Congress 
altogether, it should be noted that although the 1920 
version of the resolutions ended with the resolution on 
the establishment of an information link between the 
centre and the localities, in the 1984 version of the 
Congress' resolutions, a number of other resolutions are 
republished which did not appear in the original 1920 
version.8° For reasons which are totally unknown, the 
resolutions which did not appear in the 1920 version 
included the resolutions on the relationship between the 
local political apparatus and the organs of the People's 
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ommissariat of Education81 ; the relationship between the 
civilian and military organs in the localities82; the 
relationship between the political departments and the 
Party organs 83 and, finally, the registration and 
distribution of Communist Party members at the front.84 
The first resolution described above, i.e. that concerned 
with analysing the nature of the relationship between the 
Red Army's political apparatus and the organs of the 
People's Commissariat of Education stated the following: 
4. In the interests of the strictest economy of effort and 
resources, the ·congress considers it necessary to 
coordinate the activity of the organs of Narkompros 
[abbreviation for the people's Commissariat of Education-
SM]and political work in the army in a whole range of 
educational tasks:preparation of personnel, publication of 
text books, etc. In order to achieve this aim, both in 
the centre and in the localities~ 5 the appropriate agreements will have to be made. 
A draft set of instructions was then published, designed 
to set out the framework of the future coordination of 
activity between the local political apparatus and the 
local educational apparatus. 86 Thus, with the help of the 
local educational apparatus, Red Army units were to 
receive 30% of all available theatre and cinema tickets; 
access to all educational institutions, at the disposal of 
the local educational departments, e.g. museums, 
libraries, clubs, etc. Schools were also to be used in 
the campaign to abolish illiteracy from the ranks of the 
Red Army. 87 
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The next resolution not contained in the 1920 version 
was the one concerned with the relationship between the 
·civilian and Party organs in the localities.88 Basically, 
the resolution stated that all commands and orders of the 
Revoiutionary military soviets(the RMS)were to be carried 
out by the local organs of Soviet power to the best of the 
latter's ability and without delay. 89 As it stated 
tersely: 
all instructions of the Revvoensovets, in the area of 
serving the army, must be carried out, put ~Bto practical 
effect by the local organs of Soviet power. 
The resolution on defining the nature of the role of 
the local political apparatus and the Red Army's political 
apparatus went over some fairly well-trodden ground, an 
interesting statement in itself, given the fact that the 
resolution was passed in December 1919, i.e. well into the 
history of the Red Army's political apparatus. The most 
relevant statement of this partic~lar resolution was the 
following: 
Party work in the units, administrations and departments 
of the military department, subordinated to the division, 
army and front command, must be carr~id out by the 
corresponding political departments. 
By this stage, the latter statement should have been 
obvious to all concerned· in the Red Army's political 
apparatus, the fa~t that it had to be made shows that for 
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some in the political apparatus, the statement was not as 
superfluous as it should have been. In order to help 
coordinate Party work, it was resolved that the chief of 
the front political department be coopted on to the 
highest local Party committee.92 The various other parts 
of the resolution were concerned with improving the 
overall efficiency of the Red Army's political apparatus. 
The main point in the final resolution not listed in 
the 1920 version of the Congress' resolution, concerning 
the registration and distribution of Party members, was 
that the latter be exclusively controlled by the front 
political department. 93 The resolution also stated that 
under-used Party members be more effectively used and 
that, as regards the the arrival and transfer of Party 
members at the front, PUR be constantly informed.9 4 
It was also the case that the Congress was responsible 
for the changes that occurred in the structure and work of 
the political departments serving the soldiers on the 
front. This reorganisation of the Red Army's front 
political apparatus must go down as one of the most 
significant changes that took place in the history of the 
Red Army's political apparatus during the entire length of 
the Civil war and has yet been little detailed. However, 
one accurate summary of the events of January 1920 stated 
thus: 
in January 1920, the statutes on the political departments 
were put into effect, outlining the rights and duties of 
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the political departments and the relationship between the 
political departments, the commissars and the Party 
organisations in the Red Army. The front political 
department was in general control of the activity of the 
army political department and was directly in charge of 
the political-educational work in the units, staffs and 
institutions at the front .. The chief of a front political 
department was directly subordinate to the Front RMS and 
PUR ••. the army political department was in charge of of 
the activity of the divisional political departments, 
political-educational work in the units and institutions 
of the army, it recommended to the army RMS candidates for 
the post of commissar, instructed them on questions of 
organisation and political-educational work. It was 
directly subordinate to the army RMS ... the divisional 
political department was directly in charge of the 
political, Party and cultural life of the military units 
of the division, the work of the Communist Party cells and 
the cultural-educational commissions in the units, the 
work of the commissars of the units, recommending 
candidates for the post of c~~missar. It was subordinate 
to the divisional commissar. 
This admittedly rather.lengthy extract, whilst 
summarising the statutes of 22nd January 1920 fairly 
cogently, does not fully convey the real impact of the 
January 1920 statutes,namely that, once again, to transfer 
the burden of political work away from the army political 
department onto the shoulders of the divisional political 
departments. This decision had been initially brought 
about by the 8th Party Congress in March 1919 and would 
appear to have been subsequently reaffirmed by the First 




Given what has just been written about the Congress, 
it would appear that summarising the work of the latter 
would be relatively simple-after all, the Congress was 
important for a number of reasons, not least of which was 
it was the first time that PUR had produced and submitted 
a report on its activity for the first six months of its 
existence. This, if nothing else, would make the Congress 
worthy of detailed examination. However, in attempting to 
assess its overall impact on the future development of the 
Red Army's political apparatus, then the position of the 
Congress becomes slightly more difficult. How far were 
the resolutions implemented on the ground? Unfortunately, 
that is the main question that has to be asked in this 
context and, given the lack of relevant material, simply 
cannot be answered as yet. By examining the work of PUR 
in 1920, it is possible to hint at the likely effects 
concerning the implementation of a number of the 
resolutions of the Congress but, other than that, to say 
that all the decisions were carefully put into effect and 
were a resounding success would be historically 
misleading. In evaluating the Congress' importance, then, 
one has to look back at what we know for sure happened, 
i.e. that a number of the Red Army's leading figures took 
Page 361 
part in the Congress' debate; that PUR presented a 
comprehensive report on the first six months of its 
activity; that over 200 front-line and rear political 
workers took part in the Congress, therefore making it one 
of the largest gatherings of political workers of the Red 
Army in 1918-1919 and, finally, that the debates and the 
commissions set up by the Congress to look into a whole 
range of issues, concerning the future development of the 
Red Army's political and cultural-educational apparatus 
did produce some results in the year to come. Thus, in 
ending this particular section, all the necessary 
background information has been given to prepare the 
reader for the final section in this chapter-a 
comprehensive examination of the work of PUR in 1920. 
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PUR AND POLITICAL-EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL-EDUCATIONAL 
WORK IN THE RED ARMY IN 1919-1920. 
Having examined PUR's structure, leadership, w~rk, 
etc., for 1919, it is now possible to bring this chapter 
to a close by detailing the work of PUR in 1920. In many 
ways, 1920 was to be a decisive year both for PUR and the 
Soviet Republic-by the end of the year, the Bolsheviks had 
all but won the Civil War and, also by this time, PUR was 
to face a major organisational change, largely brought 
about by its own success during the preceding eighteen 
months of activity. However, that will be discussed 
later, suffice it to say presently that the year was, in 
many respects, the culminating point both for Bolshevik 
fortunes in the war and PUR's Civil War activity. 
Since there is a mass of data and figures on PUR's 
activity during the Civil War, this section, similar to 
the last section, will be sub-divided into a number of 
sub-sections, thereby making the presentation of the 
material easier to digest. Each sub-section will focus on 
one particular area of PUR's work, i.e. the anti-
illiteracy campaign, the recruitment of CP members, 
cultural-educational activity, etc. In such a way, once 
all the relevant sub-sections are put together, it will be 
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possible to arrive at an overall view of PUR's work during 
this period. In detailing PUR's work during 1920, it will 
then be possible to attempt to assess PUR's contribution 
to the total war effort of the Bolsheviks and evaluate its 
importance to the Bolshevik victory. Since PUR's role, as 
regards the mobilisation and distribution of CP members 
and political workers to the front political units,was 
significant the first sub-section will be devoted to 
analysing the number of CP members and political workers 
mobilised and distributed by PUR at this time. 
(i)PUR and the mobilisation and distribution of CP members 
and political workers to the front Red Army units(October 
1919-August 1920). 
Beloborodov's brief account of his work in PUR does 
provide some information about the early role of PUR in 
the mobilisation and distribution of CP members to fill 
the various posts in the front Red Army units: 
at the beginning, the CC created a commission which looked 
at lists of Communists, drawn up according to institution, 
and mobilised everyone possible. Then a universal 'call-
up' was announced: every Communist had to appear before 
PUR, fill in a form, personally expand on a number of 
answers to a few questions, thereby determining his 
suitability for the army and the nature of his future 
work. For instance, if he knew how to ride a horse, he 
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was sent to the cavalry; if he was a teachir of Russian 
history, he was sent to a Red Army school. 
Whilst this method would appear to be on the primitive 
side, nevertheless, there was no other option open to PUR. 
It should also be borne in mind that when Beloborodov 
actua~worked in PUR (July-September 1919), PUR had not 
been long in existence and, therefore, initially at least, 
things would be a bit rough and ready. further on in his 
article, Beloborodov even goes as far as to state that the 
role of the Communist party cadres was vital for the 
victory of the Bolsheviks. 2 Given the almost constant 
demand from the front for CP members, it certainly would 
appear that the number of Communists in the ranks of the 
Red Army would seem to have been an important factor in 
the determination of the final outcome of the war. Thus, 
in detailing the number of CP members and political 
workers in the Red Army during the Civil War would be an 
important step towards evaluating the overall influence of 
the Party in the Red Army and it is to that we now turn. 
Detailing the CP presence in the Red Army throughout 
1919-1920 is not all that difficult. One set of figures, 
originally published in 1928 to commemorate the tenth 
anniversary of the formation of the Red Army, has been 
reproduced constantly by Soviet historians of the topic 
ever since. 3 There have been a few minor fluctuations 
but, overall, the majority of Soviet historians would 
appear to have stuck to this original set of figures and 
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quoted them quite happily. It is no surprise to learn 
that the figures, in question, were prepared by PUR's 
Information-statistics department and were probably 
gleaned from archival sources, therefore insuring their 
accuracy. 
As we already know, by 1st October 1919, in the Field 
Army, there were 61,681 CP members and sympathisers listed 
as serving in the former, with a further 60,000 CP members 
and sympathisers, serving in the rear institutions and 
units. 4 By the beginning of January 1920, the total 
figure for the number of CP members and sympathisers in 
the Red Army had increased to 153,523 men.5 From archival 
sources, the Soviet military historian,·V.G.Kolychev, has 
estimated that of this figure, some 100,000 were actually 
serving in the front military units and institutions. 6 
Obviously, in the case of the latter figure, Kolychev has 
arrived at an estimate and has not been able to produce an 
exact figure for the number of CP members and sympathisers 
in the Red Army by this time. 
The figures continued to grow, however. By March 
1920, the new total had risen to 182,726. 7 Of this total, 
104,238 CP members and sympathisers were working on the 
front-the largest concentration of Party members and 
sympathisers serving in the 4 Armies on the Caucasus 
Front, the grand total there being 26,996 men. 8 However, 
the largest number of Party members and sympathisers in a 
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single Army belonged to an Army operating on the Eastern 
Front: the newly-created 1st Army of Labour (the former 3 
Army) had 16,534 CP members and sympathisers in its 
ranks.9 
The largest total number of CP members and 
sympathisers .peaked in August 1920 and, even then, the 
figure is an underestimation of the true state of affairs. 
As of August 1920, 278,040 CP members and sympathisers 
served in the ranks of the Red Army. 10 In commenting on 
this huge figure of the Party membership ~nvolved in the 
Red Army, another Soviet military historian has stated 
that the Party layer in the Red Army was five times larger 
than in the leading areas of industry. 11 Of this figure, 
it is usually stated that 120,185 CP members and 
sympathisers were serving at the front. 12 However, one 
has to be careful in making this statement, as this total 
figure is, in itself, not complete. Checking through the 
relevant table listed in the source, "Direktivy 
komandovaniya ... "(Vol.4, M.1978), whilst it is possible to 
find the figure listed above quoted as the number of CP 
members and sympathisers, serving at the front by August 
1920, the table also makes it clear that there are a 
number of totals missing in the compilation of this grand 
total. Therefore, there are no figures for the number of 
CP members and sympathisers for 8 Army(Caucasus Front), 1 
Army(Turkestan Front); it was also the case that, 
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apparently, not all the Armies that did send in figures 
were able to send in complete figures because, for a 
variety of reasons, not all of the divisions were taken 
into account; .finally, one total which was included in the 
grand total but has to be extracted, if we want to know 
how many CP members and sympathisers were actually serving 
on the front, is the total for the Reserve Army, the 
Volga-Caspian Flotilla and, finally, the Baltic Fleet. 
This total was 16,404, therefore, the new total for the 
number of CP members and sympathisers is not 120,185+, but 
103,781+. Using this new total, it is then possible to 
actually list the spread of Party members and sympathisers 
on the four main fronts of the Civil War: 
Western Front ..........•.... 35,175; 
South-Western Front .•.•..... 21,189; 
Caucasus Front ....•........• 22,964+; 
Turkestan Front •.........•.• 24,453+. 
Grand total ..•. l03,781+. 
Thus, whilst the work described reduces the usually 
accepted figure, it should obviously not be forgotten that 
the reduction has to take place against the background 
that the overall total is still not accurate, in itself. 
Since the figures were not all complete, the reduction 
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still has to be read as 103,781+. Without access to the 
relevant archival sources and, it could well be the case 
that not even the archives would be able to sort out this 
problem, it is simply impossible to say EXACTLY how many 
CP members and sympathisers were serving on the front by 
August 1920. 
However, as will be detailed later, this huge 
commitment to the Red Army did not last too long; as the 
military danger receded, so did the need for such a vast 
proportion of the Party's membership devoted to military 
work and soon the former military-Party cadres began to be 
demobilised and sent to various other areas of work. 
Although PUR had an important role as regards the 
proper distribution of Party members et al. over the 
various fronts, it should not be forgotten that PUR had to 
perform a similar function in the despatch and posting of 
political workers, cultural-educational workers, Communist 
Youth volunteers, etc. However, totalling the exact 
numbers of these is more complex than assessing the total 
number of CP members and sympathisers in the army. This 
can best be explained not so much by a lack of 
information, but more by the existence of conflictin~ets 
of figures. ~fhy the relevant source materials should 
conflict in this particular area, and not in others, is 
impossible to explain, especially when one remembers the 
importance that PUR attached to to the collation of such 
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materials. What makes the situation worse is that 
differences between the figures number not just tens or 
even hundreds, but thousands. However, regardless of the 
difficulties, the figures will be examined below. 
The earliest table that can be found, setting out the 
number of political workers sent out by PUR, between 
December 1919 to August 1920, stated that PUR sent out 
3,425 political workers. 13 Using the exact same dates, 
the relevant source also showed that PUR had also sent out 
a further 900 cultural-educational workers, as well as 
7,854 workers from the Soviet civilian institutions, 
designed to help out in the conduct of the cultural-
educational work of the Red Army. 14 Overall, apparently, 
the number of Communist Youth volunteers, teachers, 
technical workers, etc., sent out by PUR to the Red Army 
between December 1919-August 1920, according to this 
source, was 22,530 people. 1 5 
A month after the publication of these data, however, 
new figures on the total number of political workers alone 
sent out by PUR, between June 1919-July 1920, would seem 
to cast serious doubt on the total just quoted. The new 
set of figures were contained in a special report on 
political and cultural-educational work in the Red Army 
between 1918-1920, commissioned by PUR in October 1920 and 
headed by the then chief of PUR's Agitation-education 
department, V.I.Suzdaltseva. 16 Thus, according to 
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Suzdaltseva's report, between June 1919-July 1920, PUR 
sent out 17,707 political workers to the Red Army, with 
5,403 being sent out in October 1919 alone.17 Apparently, 
the overwhelming majority of the political workers sent 
out were either CP members of sympathisers.18 The only 
likely explanation for such a difference between the two 
sets of figures could be that in using the term, 
"political worker", Suzdaltseva's definition included more 
categories of people, than when it was employed in the 
compilation of the figures provided in "Politrabotnik". 
In general, it has to be said that neither Suzdaltseva nor 
PUR actually quote a definition of the term, "political 
worker", despite the frequent use of the term, therefore 
it is impossible to say for sure exactly what did PUR, or 
Suzdaltseva, mean when they compiled these figures. 
Recourse to the relevant section of documents contained in 
the volume, "Direktivy komandovaniya ... " helps only to 
confuse the picture even more. 
The September 1920 table has been reproduced in the 
1978 collection, "Direktivy komandovaniya ... ", although 
December 1918 is given as the start of the table, but then 
Suzdaltseva's report is also listed. 1 9 As if the picture 
was not already confused enough, there is yet another 
table entitled, "on the number of political workers sent 
out by PUR from 1st April 1919 to 1st March 1920." 20 
Regardless of the inaccuracy of the title, i.e. PUR did 
Page 376 
not come into formal existence until May 1919, the table 
quotes an even smaller figure for the number of political 
workers sent out by PUR-1,451. 21 The table also listed 
PUR sending out 338 cultural-educational workers, 4,209 
workers from the Soviet civilian institutions, 241 
Communist Youth volunteers, etc., all being sent out to 
the Red Army, as well as the previous number of political 
workers. 22 It is again impossible to accountr ft:he 
difference in the figures: if one ~akes the average per 
month(based on the figures supplied in "Politrabotnik") 
then the average number of political workers being sent to 
the front was 428 per month, therefore, 1,451 would appear 
to be a three-monthly total and yet, it clearly states in 
the heading to the table, that the starting point is the 
1st April 1919. The difference is impossible to resolve 
at present. Another table in this particular collection 
also shows that between December 1918 to July 1920, some 
19,777 Party workers were sent out to the Red Army. 23 
Given the dates listed, assuming that the Red Army's 
political apparatus was obviously involved, then VBVK 
would also have had a role to play in the number of Party 
workers being sent to the front, as well as PUR. 
Obviously, another question that needs to be answered here 
is what was the difference between a "Party worker" and a 
"political worker"? If any? 
In looking back at the various figures involved, it is 
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impossible presently to clear up the position of the 
number of political workers sent out to the Red Army, by 
PUR, during this time. Is the figure 22,530 or 17,707? 
Why the confusion? Why has no Soviet historian noted 
these discrepancies already and made an attempt to correct 
them? Is there a possibility that both Suzdaltseva and 
"Politrabotnik" were working from different definitions of 
the term, "political worker"? What was the difference? 
Where do the "Party workers" fit into all of this? These 
are all worthy questions but, as yet, will have to wait 
before they can be properly answered. 
(ii)Evaluating the militaryvalue of the CP members, 
political workers and workers to the Red Army(l919-1920) 
In examining this particular point, one has to be very 
careful to sift through the propaganda and the 
historically recent statements in order to try and arrive 
at a more objective assessment of the role of the CP 
members et al. in the Red Army and their importance to the 
overall Bolshevik victory. As previously shown, there was 
always a firm definition of the military role of the Red 
Army's political apparatus, and that also held true for 
the political representatives of the Party in the Red 
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Army, whether they were called political workers or Party 
workers or were themselves Party members. Even in 
Lindov's 1919 work, previously quoted, there are a number 
of references to the duties and responsibilities of the 
Party representatives in the Red Army; for instance, in 
the latter work, Lindov stated that the main duties of the 
Party workers should be: 
!)participation in the general leadership of the life and 
activity of the army; 2)control over the command staff; 
3)political education of the Red Army soldiers; 
4)maintenance of the revolutionary spirit and 
revo1~4ionary discipline in the military units of the Red 
Army. 
Thus, as previously detailed, the work of the Party 
representatives in the Red Army did not entirely consist 
of political or educational-cultural work being carried 
out amongst the men, but there was also a significant 
emphasis placed on the military and disciplinary work to 
be carried out amongst the soldiers by the Party 
representatives. In evaluating the importance of the CP 
element in the Red Army, one author, writing as early as 
1921, stated that: 
if the tens of thousands of Communists, who poured into 
the Red Army and created in it strong cells of the Party, 
had not been actually, specifically and generally, an 
example for the non-Party Red. Army masses, both in battle 
a~d at.rest, t~en the ~ed A~my w~~ld not have been 
v1ctor1ous as 1t was v1ctor1ous. 
This idea of the importance of the CP element to 
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Bolshevik victory is one which is repeated very easily by 
Soviet historians, but one which has to be treated with a 
degree of caution. It could well be the case that the CP 
element in the Red Army helped to firm up, so to speak, 
unsound or military incapable units, the point is where is 
the evidence to prove it? Propaganda aside, there is some 
evidence to show that Soviet historians may actually be 
making a valuable point here and that Western historians 
should look into this more closely. For instance, in a 
speech he made in December 1921, S.I.Gusev made the follow 
ing interesting assertion: 
the minimum number of Communists in a military unit, lower 
than which the unit would be completely militar~ 
ineffective was 6%[of the total number of men in the unit-
SM]. Units, which had from 6%~12% Communists were, more 
or less, steadfast, but only in those units where the 
number of Communists was mo~e tqfn,~?% werz
6
the units 
completely steadfast and MlJat tlf~.l!liJiif../·:. ;_ ..• 
Given the fact that when Gusev made the speech, he was 
then the new Chief of PUR, one could easily dismiss such a 
statement as simply being a case where, for whatever 
reason, Gusev wanted to attach great importance to the 
work of the apparatus that he now controlled. That would 
be a logical statement to make and one that would be 
difficult to argue with. However, given that the % 
figures are so precise and that Gusev himself did serve on 
a variety of fronts during the Civil War-the Eastern 
Front, South-Eastern Front, the Caucasus Front, etc. 27 -and 
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that he had been a member of Field Staff of RVSR, as well 
as being a proper member of RVSR later, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the figures were not dreamt out 
of noth~ng and that there was a school of thought, so to 
speak, which reckoned that the figures that Gusev quoted 
were true and accurate. He was making this speech in 
December 1921, long before there was ·a real need to crave 
the support of any one of the main twenties appositional 
factions, when the Bolsheviks could still face being told 
the truth. Thus, the argument put forward here would be 
to accept Gusev's estimates, for the time being, but to 
try and look for other supporting evidence. 
Unfortunately, Gusev did not mention a source for the 
figures quoted-one must assume that they were derived 
either from his own personal observations, or reports 
coming in from the fronts, or a mixture of both. 
Unfortunately, this a lot easier said than done but, 
something which will make the task slightly easier is to 
examine another part of Gusev's speech, in which he talked 
about the class composition of the CP members mobilised 
for the front: 
during the Civil War, on a number of occasions, 
mobilisations of Communists for the front were 
held ... undoubtedly, the overwhelming majority(pr2§ably up 
to 90%)of the mobilised Communists were workers. 
A few years after the above statement was made, a very 
interesting article appeared in the Soviet military press, 
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concerning the discipline of a number of units in relation 
to the class composition of the units.29 The article 
opened with a number of interesting statements about the 
role of the Communists in the Red Army during the Civil 
War: 
agitation and the influence of educational work of the 
Communists in the army during the Civil War were very 
strong, because Communists by their life, by their 
example, by the~0 sacrifice, were able to show the justice of their cause. 
In further support of this, the author quoted a figure of 
some 50,000 Communists who died on the various fronts 
during the Civil War(1918-1920). 31 However, this figure 
would seem to be the object of some dispute. Although he 
did not quote an actual source for his own estimate, one 
other Soviet historian, Yu.P.Petrov, writing in admittedly 
more recent times, has stated that the number of dead 
Communists during the Civil War was 200,000. 32 The 
balance of evidence, however, seems to be swinging back in 
favour of the earlier quote-in the most recent reference 
yet to the number of Communists who died at the front 
during the Civil War, another authoritative source has 
fallen back on the original figure of 50,000, and has used 
the latter as its total for the number of Communists who 
died at the front, during 1918-1920. 33 
The main point of the article, however, was not to 
investigate the number of dead Communists during the Civil 
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war but, as stated earlier to analyse the class 
composition of the units and their disciplinary records. 
Obviously, he did not mean to encompass the entire Red 
Army, but what he did was to draw up a table of the best 
disciplined and worst disciplined units in the Red Army 
and analyse the% composition of workers in each of.the 
units. If we remember that a large proportion of the 
workers used in the Red Army were members of the CP, then 
it gives us a rough idea of how important the CP/working-
class element in the maintenance of the necessary 
discipline and, more importantly, the battle capability of 
the units. The table is reproduced below: 
Divisions and units, which excelled in battle and had a 
higher proportion of workers than in the unsteady units. 
The good units. 
5th division ............................... 15.8% workers. 
6th divi·sion ............................... 16.1% 
5 Army ..................................... 1 5 • 3% 
14th division ..............•............... 19.4% 
20th division .............................. 18.9% 
28th division •.••••.......................• 19.6% 
45th division .............................. 19.9% 
42nd division .............•................ 22.4% 
41st division .............................. 25.8% 
1 Cavalry Army ............................. 21.7% 
8th Red Cavalry division ................... 26.4% " 
etc. 
The unsteady units. 
9th division ............................... 10.5% workers. 
210th Rifle regiment ....................... 5.7% " 
In the guardrooms of the entire Army and Fleet 
at the time of the census .................. 12.2% " 
In the penal battalions .................... 9.7% worke]~· 
In the teams of deserters .................. 3.8% 
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The census referred to in the table is one that was 
carried out in the Red Army in August 1920. 
Thus, although this table does specifically refer to 
the number of workers in the units, rather than CP 
membership, if one remembers that the majority of the 
working-class members of the Red Army were CP members, 
there would appear to be some evidence supporting Gusev's 
earlier assertion concerning the combat effectiveness of 
the unit and its class and political composition. The 
less the number of workers, the less reliable the military 
unit was; a similar position would also seem to have been 
recorded as regards the CP composition of the units and 
their military efficacy. ·Remembering Gusev's assertion 
about the number of Communists needed to make units 
reliable in the military sense, there certainly would 
appear to be some correlation between both sets of 
figures, i.e. less than 6% Communists and the unit was 
none too effective, certainly, the position would seem to 
be about the same as regards the number of workers, i.e. 
in the 210th Rifle regiment, the figure is less than 6% 
and, in all the units which are listed as good in the 
table, the lowest figure for the number of workers in the 
unit is 15.3%, similar to Gusev's assertion concerning the 
military reliability of the unit and its CP 
representation(more than 12% of the total). Therefore, 
there would seem to be a strong link between the number of 
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workers, the number of Communists and the military 
reliability of the unit, although, more evidence needs to 
be produced in orler to show the exact nature of this 
link. 
(iii)PUR and the political and cultural-educational work 
in the Red Army(1920): background 
As detailed before, PUR was responsible for a wide 
range of political and cultural-educational work being 
carried out in the Red Army, both directly and indirectly. 
In many ways, all the theatres, schools, clubs, etc., owed 
their existence to PUR, either through the latter setting 
them up or, just as importantly, helping to fund them. 
PUR funded a massive series of programmes to combat the 
political and cultural backwardness of the ordinary rank-
and-file soldier. In this particular context, it should 
be noted that for the first half of 1920 alone, PUR's 
budget ran to a staggering 4,000 million rubles 35 , for 
comparison's sake, at this time, the budget for the 
People's Commissariat of Education ran to only 1,215 
million rubles36 and the Cheka's budget ran to 4,488 
million rubles37, not that much in front of PUR's budget. 
Therefore, in terms of money alone, PUR has to rated as 
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one of the Civil War's most important organs. 
In evaluating the importance of political and 
cultural-educational work, the chief of PUR's Educational 
.department, V.D.Kasparova wrote in early 1920 that: 
cultural-educational work must not only work parallel with 
political work but, sometimes, must even precede it, as it 
is necessary to conduct oral propaganda, but in order to 
strengthen the latter and fix it in the minds of the 
men,they, for their part, must know how to read and 
write •.. political agitation completes the political 
education of the 3~ed Army soldier, begun by the Communist cultural worker. 
In another early statement on the import~nce of the 
political and cultural-educational work to be carried out 
in the Red Army, Kasparova touched on yet another tenet of 
the work being carried out, that of raising the 
consciousness of the men: 
the army in the socialist state is a union of conscious 
citizens, fighting for the great ideal of the 
international brotherhood of workers ... but the struggle 
for the socialist revolution presupposes the total 
political consciousness of all its participants and, 
consequently, their general cultural development. 
Proceeding from this, one must recognise that to 
educational work in the Red Army be attached no less 
attention than political work with 3~hich, in general, it is indisputably linked and united. 
Thus, political and cultural-educational work was 
carried out to raise the overall political and educational 
level of the ordinary rank-and-file soldier, with a view 
not only in making him a more conscious citizen after the 
Civil War was over who would, hopefully, play an important 
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role in the future building of Soviet power in the 
villages and small towns of the USSR, but, in the short 
run, would make him a more effective fighting tool, more 
able to carry out more complex written orders and 
instructions from his commanding officers and the military 
commissars, as well. The more literate the army, the more 
responsive it would be to the demands for more complex 
military manoeuvres-a maxim that had been long established 
in other armies throughout Europe. Thus, when looking at 
the sections that follow, which examine in more detail the 
work of PUR ~~4 the Red Army's cultural-educational 
apparatus, always remember that all the money spent on the 
theatres and clubs and schools were designed to do two 
things:. 
l)make the Red Army soldier a more conscious soldier, more 
adept at coping with the demands of modern warfare for a 
literate recruit, able to read and write and more able to 
carry out more complex orders, than had previously been 
possible; 
2)following on from the above, when the war was over, at 
least the soldiers, returning home to their villages and 
small towns, would ensure that the Bolsheviks had a 
potentially sound basis of support in the various small 
villages and towns, should the former soldiers be required 
to serve on the rural or town soviets. It would be no 
surprise, although well outwith the scope of this work, if 
Page 387 
research carried out on the heads of the rural soviets and 
similar such bodies, in the 1920s, found that the majority 
of them had saw some form of service in the Red Army 
during the Civil War. That being the case, one could 
postulate further on the importance of PUR's educational 
and political campaigns and the future construction of the 
Soviet state, long after PUR's role in the Civil War. 
However, to return to the theme of this work, PUR 
noted its achievements in the sphere of political and 
cultural-educational work in the Red Army at the Second 
All-Russian Congress of Political Workers of the Red Army 
and Fleet in December 1920 and it is to that we now turn. 
(iv)PUR and the achievements of the Red Army's political 
and cultural-educational apparatus(1920) 
In its report to the Second All-Russian Congress of 
Political Workers of the Red Army and Fleet(hereinafter 
referred to simply as the Congress), presented in December 
1920 in Moscow4°, PUR listed, both by sections and in a 
general format, its successes in the areas of political 
and cultural-educational work in the Red Army for 1920. 
However, one point that should be made here is that at 
this Congress, PUR would appear to have taken quite a 
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hammering from the Congress delegates and, in his address 
to the delegates, Smilga was not slow in apportioning 
blame where he thought it belonged.41 That will be 
discussed in greater detail below but, it should not be 
forgotten that although the statistics would appear 
impressive, for a number of the actual delegates at the 
Congress, they would appear to have proven very little. 
In order to make the material a little more easier to 
absorb, a number of sub-divisions will appear in this part 
of the dissertation, based on the presentation adopted in 
the original 1921 version of PUR's report to the Congress, 
therefore, the first sub-division will analyse the 
agitational-propaganda work of PUR in 1920. 
Agitational-propaganda work of PUR in 1920 
Beginning with the sectional report of the agitation 
and propaganda section, the report noted that: 
in 1920, the main work of the section lay in the drawing 
up of the theses, programmes, prospectuses for the 
direction and leadership of the agitational campaigns. 
The fulfilment of this work was badly hampered by the poor 
link wit~2 the localities and the inadequate number of workers. 
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This section, apparently, was also in charge of the 
distribution of agitational literature over all the fronts 
and in the rear: 
the section exercised control over the activity of the 
Military bureau of Tsentropechat, concerning the 
distribution of agitational literature. The literature 
was distributed as follows: 
to the political departments of the Western Front-30%, to 
the political departments of the South-Western Front-30%, 
to the other field units-15%, to the sectors of Troops for 
the Internal Security of the Republic-7%, to the political 
departments of the okrug military districts-5%, to the 
political departments of the guberniya military districts-
10%, to the Moscow units-3%. 
From January to October[19~g-sM], the total figure sent 
out was 14,906,350 copies. 
If nothing else, what these figures and calculations 
go to prove is the ~reponderance of quite a fair size 
staff, able to collate such information and analyse where 
the literature was being sent! As stated earlier and 
certainly something which PUR was never able quite to 
shake off, PUR could be, in may ways, just as bureaucratic 
as the other organs of the Soviet state! 
PUR's Courses' sectional work for 1920 
The next section to make its report was the courses 
section-according to the latter, there were some 224 
courses operating in both the rear and front Red Army 
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units by November 1920. 44 What is interesting about the 
report of this particular section is the fact that it 
identified the existence of a number of Red Army 
universities, one of which still survives, obviously in a 
greatly amended form to this day. The N.G.Tolmachev 
Petrograd Red Army Institute, as it was then called, has 
become the Soviet Army's main academy for the training and 
instruction of today's political officers, namely, the 
V.I.Lenin Military-Political Academy(Order of Lenin).45 
It was probably also this section, though there is no 
definite confirmation of this in the report, that was in 
charge of the various schools and courses of political 
literacy in the Red Army. 46 It should be stressed that 
these schools and courses were run independently of the 
ordinary literacy schools and were designed, on the whole, 
to raise the political consciousness of the soldier. By 
August 1920, in both the rear and front-line military 
units, there were 361 schools of political literacy, with 
a "student" population approaching 14,254 men.47 If we 
compare this figure with the relevant figures for the 
ordinary schools, then we come across a huge gulf between 
the two types of school-by August 1920, the number of 
ordinary schools had reached 5,000 with a "student" 
population of some 112,000 men.4 8 It would be interesting 
to know what happened to the graduates of these political 
courses-were they used in the political apparatus of the 
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Red Army directly? For those that survived the Civil War, 
what then? Chairmanship of a rural soviet, perhaps? 
PUR and the construction of the Red Army library system in 
1920 
Overall, it would appear that libraries in the Red 
Army would appear to have received special treatment from 
PUR. In some respects, this should not come about as too 
much of a surprise, given their importance to the work of 
so many parts of the Red Army's cultural and educational 
apparatus, eg, the schools, the clubs, the political 
departments. etc. In 1920, for instance, PUR published a 
small book, with a total circulation figure of 40,000 
copies no less, entitled, "guidance for Library Workers of 
the Red Army", in which was detailed all the necessary 
information to help establish, or run, libraries in the 
Red Army! 4 9 The booklet even included a mini-
classification system for all the books that the Red Army 
library might have in stock!SO The importance of the 
library, even a small one, was not to be ignored: 
the Red Army library, even with a small number of books, 
can and must str1ve to be at 5~e centre of all political-
educational work of the unit. 
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In general, the tasks of the Red Army libraries were 
five-fold: 
l)to give general knowledge, even if it is only 
elementary, but necessary to everyone, and in all areas of 
knowledge; 
2)to help readers work out a proletarian Communist world 
outlook; 
3)to aid the improvement of the daily routine of work; 
4)to attract the reader to actively participate in the 
organisation of political-educational work of the library 
amongst the masses; 
S)to help the reader learn how to read.52 
Having discussed these general tasks of the Red Army 
libraries, the booklet then went on to discuss the proper 
value of each of the books that the librarian may want to 
put on his shelves, helping the librarian question the 
suitability of th~ books on offer. PUR recommended the 
librarian to ask himself the following questions: 
l)What are the main questions tackled by the author of the 
book? 
2)Has he tackled them correctly? 
3)In compiling the book, what was the aim of the author? 
4)What type of reader will be int53ested in it and who 
could the book be recommended to? 
The librarian was also asked to·ponder one further point-
in discussing the content of the book, could it be 
discussed openly with one's brother and/or/sister, as well 
as one's comrades?54 It can only be assumed, however, 
that in judging which book could be put on the shelves and 
which could not, on a lot of occasions, the individual 
judgement of the librarian was used. 
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In examining the actual number of libraries in the Red 
Army during the Civil War, it would appear that the 
figures for the number of Red Army libraries during the 
Civil War would show that they were fairly popular amongst 
the men. In October 1919, according to PUR's own figures, 
the number of libraries in the Red Army was 7,500, an 
increase of over 5,500 on the figure recorded in October 
1918.55 However, even such a large figure as had been 
recorded in October 1919 was not to represent the largest 
number of libraries in the Red Army: according to a number 
of early sources, the largest number of libraries recorded 
in all units of the Red Army, both on the front and in the 
rear, was 10,029 in July 1920.56 
The volume of literature sent out to the front clearly 
shows that the central authorities were more interested in 
meeting the demands of the front than the rear. According 
to one table, reproduced in the April 1920 issue of 
"Politrabotnik", 8,245,124 rubles worth of literature(the 
latter term is used in the broadest possible sense) was 
sent to meet the needs of the front in 1919 alone 57 ; the 
corresponding figure for the rear military districts was 
4,389,460 rubles.5 8 in other words, if the grand total of 
literature sent to the fronts, the rear military 
districts, the special units, etc., amounted to(1919) 
16,005,204 rubles, then the value of the literature sent 
to the fronts amounts to over 51% of this grand total. 
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In overall terms, the supply of literature to the Red 
Army was measured in astronomical figures. In its report 
for 1920, PUR's Literary-publications' department stated 
that in the year, beginning in June 1919 and ending in 
June 1920, 18.8 million pieces of literature were sent to 
the Red Army, including over 5 million books and 
brochures, over 1 million issues of the Red Army journal, 
"Krasnoarmeets", over 8 million leaflets and 
proclamations, etc. 59 Amongst the more curious items sent 
to the Red Army units and included in this overall grand 
total were 20,000 portraits of Trotsky-it is unlikely that 
any of these would have survived the Stalin years. 60 All 
of this literature was both distributed and produced by 
PUR itself and amongst the contributors working for PUR 
and writing for a number of the works mentioned were 
V.A.Antonov-Ovseenko, M.S.Olminsky, D.S.Moor, V.P.Denisov, 
etc. 61 
The total number of books sent to the Red Army, again 
especially to the fronts, was astronomical. According to 
one Soviet historian's research in the archives, between 
January 1919-December 1919, the Red Army received 14 
million books, more than half of which went to the two 
main fronts of the Civil War in 1919, the Ukrainian and 
the Southern Fronts.6 2 In terms of the overall best 
supplied military district then, not surprisingly enough, 
this turned out to be the Moscow Military District, which, 
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in 1919 alone, received 4 million books.63 Unfortunately, 
it is not presently possible to say with any accuracy 
exactly what types of books were being sent to the Red 
Army libraries during the 1918-1920; the earliest such 
figures on this particular area refer to 1921 but, since 
the latter is not too far removed from. the main period of 
our study, they are hereby enclosed: 
by January 1921, 31.8% of all books in Red Army libraries 
were fictional, 30.1% were general knowledge and tg~ 
remaining 38.1% did not fall into either category. 
PUR and the work of the Red Army clubs(1920) 
In December 1919, the First All-Russian Congress of 
Political-Educational Workers of the Red Army had stated 
the following about the overall importance of clubs to the 
Red Army: 
they[the Red Army clubs-SM]are the hearths of socialist 
culture and a centre for the pol~§ical education and self-
development[of the soldiers-SM]. 
There had been a spectacular rise in the growth of the 
number of clubs in the Red Army-the 1920 report on PUR's 
activity showed that between January-November 1920, the 
number of clubs increased from 1,315 to 2,430(an increase, 
in percentage terms, of 85%).66 
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In this context, it should be remembered that the club 
could virtually be anythmg that the soldiers wanted to 
make it, i.e. it did not simply refer to a stationary 
building, but could well be mobile, possibly even a tent, 
which could be set up quite easily and administer to the 
needs of the soldiers in which ever way it could. Despite 
the importance of the clubs as far as the Congress was 
concerned, one early account of the history of the clubs 
stated that: 
during the Civil war, the clubs were not able to develop 
widely among the field units, as the units were never lo~g 
in one place. The figures for 1918-1920 show that in the 
overwhelming number of cases, the clubs operated in the 
rear, reserve units. In the field units tg7re were mobile 
clubs, but their number was insignifica_nt. 
If this wa~ the case, this would help to explain why there 
is so little information available on the activity of the 
clubs in the primary source material consulted for this 
work. It certainly would appear that the clubs had an 
importance relative to the rear military units, rather 
than at the front. Certainly, there is no indication of 
how many Red Army soldiers used the clubs. As regards the 
activity of the clubs, then the only information available 
concerns 1918, well outside of this period, but it would 
appear to show that the activity of the clubs concerned 
reading lectures to the soldiers, formation of Red Army 
drama groups, encouraging the soldiers to take up playing 
chess and forego the pleasures of playing cards, etc.68 
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Thus, whilst it is not possible to analyse in any detail 
the work of the Red Army clubs, judging by what has been 
described, it certainly would appear that they played a 
more important role in the affairs of the Red Army where 
the Red Army units themselves were of a more settled 
nature, i.e. in the rear. Hence, the lack of any mention 
of their activities in the front military units. However, 
more primary source has to be made available before 
anything more substantive can be said. 
PUR and other aspects of the cultural-educational activity 
of the Red Army(1919-1920) 
In an article written in 1924 by Vl.Faydysh, the 
latter quoted the statistics for the number of Red Army 
choirs, theatres, drama groups, etc., in the Red Army by 
June 1920: 
in the rear, in the 12 military districts, there were 624 
theatres, of which 292 were professional and 326 were 
amateur, created by the soldiers themselves, 767 choirs 
and musical circles. 2,209 performances and 722 coricerts 
were given. At the front, in the field armies, there were 
401 drama groups, 510 choirs and musig~l groups, 767 
performances and concerts were given. 
Although little can be said about the musical side of 
the cultural-educational activity of the Red Army at this 
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time, the point about the role of the theatres can be 
expanded. In examining the importance of the theatres, 
one early primary source reveals the actual thinking 
behind the creation of a theatre for the soldiers at the 
front by a Political department of an Army: 
a great plan had been thought out at the centre-i.e. by 
the Political department of the Army-to create a model 
worker-peasants' company, to create a number of complete, 
artistic productions, creating a mobile set, which would 
meet all the demands of all of the productions, and then 
send it all off to the front. At the beginning of 
July[l919-SM], such a company was sent to the front and 
h~d ~o~ossal ~§itational and artistic-educational 
s1gn1f1cance. 
The latter extract was taken from a work, published in 
1920, on the early history of political work in the 1st 
Army. However, even although there is no indication of 
the numbers of Red Army soldiers who attended the 
performances of the theatre, it would appear that the 
theatre was not without success and, given that ther~ was 
little live entertainment, it can be assumed that the 
theatre would be able to attract the soldiers along. 
Another couple of interesting pieces of information on 
the work of the theatres in the Red Army, again as 
revealed by the political establishment of the 
period(Northern Front, to be precise)shows the general 
thinking behind the work of the Red Army theatres: 
the Political-educational administration of the Petrograd 
Military District is going to organise a theatre of 
political satire for the Red Army soldiers. The 
repertoire will be composed in the spirit of the Marxist 
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theatres and will answer the political needs of the day. 
For the opening of the theatre, the play "Petrushka 
molodets-krasniy udalets"[the title of the play could be 
translated colloquially, something in the manner of "Good 
man, Peter-a brave Red man."-SM] will be performed.71 
The fact that plays had to be performed which were overtly 
political is further revealed by the following interesting 
statement banning the performance of a couple of works by 
a particular playwright who, obviously, did not conform to 
the requirements of the Red Army's theatre: 
the Political-educational committee of the Petrograd 
Revolutionary Labour Army wishes to make it known to all 
theatrical organisations of the army that the 
plays:'Demokrat, Kontuzheniy' ['The Democrat Kontuzheniy'] 
and 'Sokrovishche' ['Treasure'], the works of Kireyev-
Gatchinsk, are 7 ~orbidden to appear on the stages of Red Army theatres. 
Thus, judging by these extracts, it would appear to 
confirm the political nature of the Red Army theatres and 
their intention to inculcate into the soldiers an extra 
dose of political propaganda. Given the nature of the 
struggle between the Red and White forces, this should not 
come about as too much of a surprise. After all, it was a 
time in which a lot of the issues that the Bolsheviks were 
fighting for could easily be seen in black-and-white terms 
and it was also important that, in whatever guise or form, 
the soldiers realised the immensity of the task that lay 
before them and exactly what it was that the Bolsheviks 
were trying to achieve. Hence, works which did not 
portray the world, or the conflict, in the terms that the 
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Bolsheviks wanted or needed, were simply banned from the 
Red Army stage and that was the end of the matter. 
Thus, in general, if one was to briefly summarise the 
main purpose of all this general political-educational and 
cultural-educational work, one would have to bear in mind 
that its main purpose was to make the men more politically 
and culturally aware, hence the political content of the 
plays, for instance, as well as the political content of 
the cinema films, shown to captivated Red Army audiences. 
However, increasing their overall awareness of what was 
happening round about them was also designed to make them 
more effective fighting soldiers and although there would 
appear to be little concrete evidence to prove this, 
nevertheless it is a point well worth making. All the 
money spent on political-educational and cultural-
educational work in the Red Army cannot be easily 
~xplained, if one does not think that there was a military 
value to it all, as well as the more obvious cultural and 
political benefits. If soldiers were more conscious of why 
they were fighting and given the figures concerning the 
class composition of the units which were the best 
disciplined or had the most number of Communists in the 
ranks, there is a basis to suppose this to have been the 
case, then they could handle more complex military 
manoeuvres more easily. However, the lynchpin to all of 
the political-educational and cultural-educational work in 
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the Red Army and its eventual importance has to be 
analysis of the basic literacy rates in the Red Army 
throughout the Civil War and it is too that we now turn. 
The campaign to abolish illiteracy in the Red Army(1919-
1920) 
Before beginning to examine the whole anti-illiteracy 
campaign conducted under PUR in 1919-1920, it would 
probably be helpful to put the whole campaign into some 
sort of general political and military context. Lenin, 
himself, in a number of significant remarks on the need 
for a more literate society, realised the importance of 
teaching literacy throughout the length of the Civil War-
in one of his sharper and more memorable comments on the 
whole need for a literate people, he once said: 
in the land of the illiterat7~ it will be impossible to 
build the Communist society. 
In another, more detailed remark on the above, Lenin said 
that: 
whilst in the country there is still such a phenomenon as 
illiteracy, it is extremely difficult to talk about 
political education. It is not simply a political 
problem, but it is a condition in which it is impossible 
to talk about politics. The illiterate man stands outwith 
the political arena, he must, first of all,study his abc. 
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Without the latter, there can be no politics, without 
this[literacy-SM]there exists only 7~mours, gossip, fairy 
tales, prejudices, but no politics. 
Thus, if the problem had worried Lenin to this extent, it 
is not surprising that the Red Army's political apparatus 
had taken a number of important steps towards eradicating 
illiteracy from the Red Army's ranks as soon as humanly 
possible. 
i 
Due to the distinct lack of work ~n this particular 
area, some of the necessary statistical information may 
well seem to be of dubious value. For instance, in one of 
the very few works actually published on the subject, one 
author(A.Vyrvich) has stated that the illiteracy rate in 
the Red Army in 1918 was 80%.75 Unfortunately, Vyrvich 
did not actually produce any supporting evidence to 
justify what must be seen as a high figure.· If we take 
the figures for the ordinary civilian population as a 
backdrop, then we find little evidence which actually does 
support the possibility that so many of the soldiers could 
have been illiterate, unless the definition applied to the 
Red Army was extremely vigorous, more so than that applied 
to the civilian population of the time. In general, 
estimates of the illiteracy rate amongst the population at 
the time of the revolution are in the region of 60-62%, 
with lower rates being recorded for men and men in towns, 
in partciular.76 Thus, it is hard to see, especially as 
Vyrvich did not name any source for his statistic, why the 
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rate of illiteracy should have been so high in the Red 
Army in 1918. 
A few months after the creation of PUR in May 1919, 
RVSR published an order "on the liquidation of illiteracy" 
from the ranks of the Red Army in September 1919.77 It 
was a comparatively long.and detailed order, examining the 
role of the local political and cultural-educational 
apparatus and how it was expected to combat illiteracy 
amongst the men. Vyrvich has stated that the order was 
important for two main reasons: 
firstly, it stated that the struggle for literacy in the 
Red Army had begun earlier than it had among the civilian 
population ... secondly, the order marked an important date 
in the history of the Red Army, because it laid the 
foundation for the organised and planned struggle for 7ge 
liquidation of illiteracy among the Red Army soldiers. 
Strictly speaking, Vyrvich was not correct in his 
assertion that the fight against illiteracy amongst the 
civilian population was begun later than amongst the Red 
Army soldiers-in April 1918, the People's Commissariat of 
Education passed a decree establishing centres for 
fighting illiteracy amongst the masses 79, although 
certainly it was not until December 1919 that a wholesale 
measure was adopted, intended to eliminate illiteracy from 
the entire civilian population in all areas of the 
Republic. 80 
T~ September 1919 order stated that, initially, the 
most important thing to do, right away, was to register 
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all illiterate Red Army soldiers, based in the rear army 
units: 
with the aim of the quickest possible liquidation of 
illiteracy from the ranks.of the Red Army soldiers, it is 
suggested to all the political administrations of the 
okrug and the political-educational departments of the 
guberniya, uezd and city military commissariats that: 
1) to instruct all the cultural-educational commissions, 
and where these do not exist the political commissars, 
under the personal responsibility of this order, to make 
up a register of all the illiterate Red Army soldiers, 
located in the military districts ... 
2) on analysis of the results of the register, to proceed 
quickly to the organisation of lessons for the 
illit7rate~ 1 where these have not already been organ1sed. 
Such lessons were to be ideally carried out by a specially 
appointed "cultural worker" from within the unit itself, 
but where a suitably qua~ified person could not be found, 
then the units could approach another unit, or invite 
people from outside the Red Army to fill the gap. 82 These 
cultural workers, depending on whether they were Red Army 
soldiers eo-opted for such work, or people specially 
invited to take on such work, received 350 rubles a month, 
or the rate of pay as set by the relevant statute of the 
People's Commissariat of Education. 83 
To assist the work of the cultural workers, the 
commissar was instructed to appoint a number of assistants 
from the units, relative to the number of illiterate 
soldiers in the units; the necessary teaching equipment 
was to be supplied by the political-educational and 
cultural-educational commissions. 84 The actual lessons 
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for the illiterate soldiers were to be carried out on a 
regular basis, but were designed not to disrupt the 
normal, military routine of the unit: 
13. The literacy lessons should be carried out daily, 
excepting holidays, two hours per day or three hours per 
day, four days per week. 
14. The literacy lessons must not disrupt or weaken the 
military training, thus it is proposed that the literacy 
lessons be carried out in the morning before the beginning 
of rifle tr~~ning, or two hours after the completion of 
the latter. 
The work of the classes depended on the exact state of 
the students' illiteracy, so to speak-there were those who 
were completely illiterate(1st group) and those who were 
able to read slightly(Znd group). The basic aims of the 
first group were: 
a)to make out what has been written, to be able to write 
their name, patronymic, surname, unit, address, a letter 
in a few words and write manuals of numeration up to 
1,000; 
b)for the second group-read and in their own words, 
explain what they have read, write a letter, a s35vice 
report and add and subtract numbers up to 1,000. 
The order also mentioned that the lessons of political 
literacy for the Red Army soldiers could be included in 
the overall total of hours allocated to teach the men 
ordinary literacy. 87 Soldiers, who were either illiterate 
or barely literate were required to learn their basic 
political literacy by reading the speeches and brochures 
of prominent Soviet leaders.88 
The second last point of the order reinforced the 
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proposition that all the relevant political and cultural-
educational institutions were to spare no effort in 
liquidating illiteracy from the ranks of the Red Army: 
22. The efforts of all the cultural-educational 
commissions, political-educational departments and 
political administrations must be directed
8
go the gradual 
liquidation of illiteracy in the Red Army. 
That a number of important successes were conducted in 
the anti-illiteracy campaign is testified by the following 
facts: 
in the garrison of Nizhny Novgorod, for instance, in 
January 1919, out of a grand total of 7,500 men, only 180 
studied to be literate. However, by December 1919, no 
doubt partially due to the increased importance attached 
to the campaign by PUR and the.other relevant organs, 
although the garrison had been increased to 16,000 men, 
the number of soldiers studying to be literate increased 
dramatically from 180 to 9,372(well over half of the 
garrsion, in other words).9° Not only was such success 
recorded in the rear military units either-in the 15th 
Army, for instance, by December 1919, there were some 96 
schools serving the needs of the army.9 1 Roughly at this 
time, the number of men actually in 15th Army was over 
32,000.9 2 However, in January 1920, the number of schools 
in 15th Army increased to 252.9 3 However, as the number 
of schools increased, so too did the number of men in the 
army-by January 1920, this had increased to over 60,000.94 
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According to one report, due to the work of both the local 
and the central powers, illiteracy was totally wiped out 
in one division of the 15th Army, namely the 11th 
division. 95 Thus, it would appear that as events began to 
gr~dually develop from September 1919 onwards, the anti-
illiteracy campaign was beginning to make its mark. 
All the more confusing as to why there seems to be a 
degree of confusion concerning the number of literacy 
schools in the Red Army and the number of soldiers 
studying in them. 
One Soviet military historian, V.G.Kolychev, has 
produced the following table on the number of literacy 
schools and the number of soldiers attending them during 
the end of 1918-the end of 1920: 
End of 
1918 










1,566 2,328 5,952 
96 
In the range of sources used in the compilation of his 
table, Kolychev used a number of periodicals and journals 
which it has been possible to check. In checking through 
these sources, a number of discrepancies have been noted 
in Kolychev's figures and, given the past thoroughness of 
both the author and the sources used, this is very 
difficult to explain. 
In the report presented by Rakovsky at the First All-
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Russian Congress of Political Workers of the Red 
Army(December 1919), previously examined, the figures 
listed for the number of Red Army schools were 674(May 
1919), but 3,800(0ctober 1919).97 That is a very 
significant increase in Kolychev's estimate and, at 
present, is impossible to verify. What is also 
interesting is that in a re-published report on PUR's 
activity during the Civil War, the number of literacy 
schools for October 1919 is listed as 1,566. 98 So, in 
effect, we have two primary and one secondary sources 
conflicting markedly with one another on one particular 
statistic-with no explanation, or acknowledgement by the 
secondary source as to why there is such a discrepancy. 
In a recent encyclopaedic entry on this particular 
subject, PUR's figure of 3,800 is quoted as representing 
the number of literacy schools in the Red Army for October 
1919, so it would seem to show that the confusion does 
remain. 99 However, the steady increase in both the 
number of schools and students in 1920 is further revealed 
in a report that PUR presented to the Second All-Russian 





















Thus, on the basis of these figures, it is possible to 
calculate the average size of the classes: the largest 
number of students per class belongs to the figures for 
July 1920, when the average size was 24.5 students per 
class; the lowest figure per class belonged to the figures 
for November 1920, when the average size worked out at 
20.1 students per class. Over the full five-month period, 
the average size worked out at 22 students per class-thus, 
although this would not appear to have been many students, 
in actual fact, this was double the recommended size per 
class laid down in the order of September 1919. 
PUR's report of 1920 also made mention of the number 
of teachers in the Red Army-by the end of 1920, there were 
6,230 teachers serving in the various Red Army units.101 
Of this particular figure, 82%(5,152)were cultural workers 
assigned specifically to combat the problem of illiteracy 
in the Red Army. By any standard, this was a considerable 
human investment. PUR is also recorded as having sent a 
further 143 cultural workers to the Western Front and 
another 125 cultural workers to the South-Western Front to 
help further the fight against illiteracy there. 
The fight against illiteracy continued with a further 
reorganisational shuffle at the centre, apparently, in 
July 1920. On the 22nd July 1920, PUR created the Central 
Commission for the Liquidation of Illiteracy from the Red 
Army and Fleet. 102 However, despite the creation of this 
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particular organ, it would appear that problems still 
remained with the fight against illiteracy in the Red 
Army-in October 1920, PUR issued another order, condemning 
the relevant local authorities for not carrying out past 
orders on the liquidation of illiteracy from Red Army 
units with the necessary vigour. 103 As further sign of 
the lack of success of the commission, Vyrvich reports 
that the commission was disbanded a little after 6 months 
of operation. 104 
However, even though one commission may have found the 
going too tough for its own survival, nevertheless, the 
whole campaign can be judged to have been a success. 
After all, even if it cannot be said with any great degree 
of certainty what the illiteracy rate of the Red Army was 
in 1918, it is true to say that, by 1921, the rate of 
illiteracy had fallen to 8.2, 105 and was to continue to 
fall throughout the 1920s. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that PUR and the local organs did lay a good basis for the 
future conduct of the anti-illiteracy campaign, carried on 
through the 1920s and beyond. 
The whole significance of the anti-illiteracy campaign 
was that it was a direct way of increasing the 
consciousness of the ordinary rank and file, from which so 
much could follow. If the soldiers could read and write, 
even at a basic level, then it meant that they could carry 
out more complex military orders and instructions; they 
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could be politically educated with more ease and to a 
greater effect and, last but by no means least, the other 
aspects of the cultural-educational programmes going on 
all around them would be more accessible. They would be 
able to understand more what was going on. Gusev, who 
admittedly cannot be held up as an unbiased source on the 
political and cultural-educational work being carried out 
in the Red Army, once wrote in 1921 that: 
the strength of fBE Bolsheviks lies in the consciousness 
of its bayonets. 
In many ways, this was the whole raison d'etre for the 
whole basis of·the conduct of the political and cultural-
educational work carried out in the Red Ar~y in 1918-1920. 
The Bolsheviks were convinced, and spent vast sums of 
money to back-up the entire political and cultural-
educational apparatus, to make the soldiers more aware of 
what they were fighting for, why they were fighting and 
who would be the main beneficiaries if the Bolsheviks 
won/lost the Civil War. The literacy campaign played an 
important role in trying to impart the rudiments of 
reading and writing to men who, before, probably knew very 
little beyond a very small geographical and political 
confine. In one remarkable article, written in 1920, by a 
man with obvious experience of teaching ordinary peasant 
soldiers at the front, the problems posed by men largely 
ignorant of many things, but prepared to fight and die for 
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their country, comes through very graphically: 
the teacher, regardless of where he is, must come to terms 
with his audience, not only in relation of how to teach, 
but also what to teach. The Red Army audience is not a 
university, it is n9t a labour school, nor is it even a 
series of courses for workers, where students attend 
because they want to attend. 
The teacher must ive the Red Arm soldier what he wants. 
It would be too harsh to force the sol iers, often facing 
death, having to suffer both cold and hunger, to. compel 
~im10 9 listen to something that he is not interested 1n. 
Thus, in the experience of this particular teacher, 
the soldiers were far from being the dark, ignorant 
masses, portrayed of old, if the topic that was being 
taught interested them. He found that the peasant 
soldiers were more interested in learning about the 
origins of the earth, the reasons for the appearance of 
night and day, the rise of Christianity, the essence and 
tasks of the.Soviet state, etc. 108 There was a 
consciousness there, the main work of the Red Army's 
political and cultural-educational apparatus was to tap it 
and develop it, hence the importance of not only the anti-
illiteracy campaign, but all the other political and 
cultural-educational activities carried out in the Red 
Army during 1919-1920. 
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Ov)The restructuring of the Red Army's political and 
cultural-educational apparatus(September-November 1920) 
As the Civil War drew to a close and the fighting 
became less intense at the front, so the demand for a 
reappraisal of the Red Army's political and cultural-
educational apparatus came to the fore. This was largely 
brought about by the success of PUR itself during 1919-
1920; as one prominent spokesman at the time hinted: 
military practice has put forward completely new methods 
of approach to cultural-educational work among the 
masse~ 09 .Military practice has taught us how to plan work. 
However, it is difficult to say definitely whether the 
views of the top leadership of PUR were taken into account 
in the overall drafting of the decree in September-
November 1920. All that can be said is the fact that when 
the organ's new collegium met in November 1920, 
V.I.Soloviev was present, representing PUR. 110 How PUR 
was represented in the drafting of the decree in 
September-October 1920 is not recorded. 
On 27th September 1920, VTsiK passed a resolution 
entitled "the unification of all political-educational 
work of the Republic and the more planned and coordinated 
application to this work of the personnel and material 
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resources and the establishment, under the control of the 
People's Commissariat of Education, the Main Political-
Educational Committee of the Republic."lll 
(In order to save repetition, the Main Political ... will be 
hereinafter referred to simply by the English 
transliteration of the Russian abbreviation, 
"Glavpolitprosvet"). 
VTsiK then instructed the People's Commissariat of 
Education to work out a decree on the basis of the above 
resolution and, on the 25th October 1920, the decree was 
ready fo~ discussion by the CC and the Politburo. 112 The 
draft of the decree was then discussed by the Politburo 
and, on the 28th October 1920, the Politburo resolved that 
all work on the draft of the decree was to be completed by 
2nd November 1920. 113 By the lOth November, all work on 
the decree was completed and on the 12th November 1920, 
Lenin signed the decree that brought Glavpolitprosvet into 
formal existence. 114 The first few points of the decree 
establish the latter's importance for this particular 
work: 
1. For the unification of all the political-educational, 
agitational-educational work in the Republic and for the 
concentration of it in the service of the political and 
economic construction of the country, under the control of 
the People's Commissariat of Education, the Main 
Political-Educational Committee of the 
Republic(Glavpolitprosvet)is created. 
2. In accordance with its task, Glavpolitprosvet 
organisationally unites, above all, the political-
educational work of the People's Commissariat of 
Education, PUR, the All-Russian Central Executive 
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Committee, the Main Political Administration for 
Communications, the All-Russian central soviet of Trf~S 
Unions, the Central Committee of the Union of Youth. 
However, this did not spell the death of PUR as yet-as 
contained in point 5 of the decree, PUR was still to be 
left in charge of political work in the front Red Army 
units, a tacit realisation of PUR's general success in 
this particular area. However,all political and cultural-
educational work in the rear military districts and units, 
which had been formerly conducted by PUR, was to be taken 
over by the new organ: 
political-educational work in the rear military districts 
will now be completely transferred to the control of 
Glavpolitprosvet and the corresponding organ~ 1 gf PUR will fuse with the apparatus of Glavpolitprosvet. 
Thus, whilst PUR was to be· left in charge of political 
work at the front, another point of the decree stated that 
even in this area, PUR's work was to be subordinated to 
the leadership of Glavpolitprosvet. 117 Exactly what this 
meant is difficult to fathom from the context of the 
decree itself. Did it mean exactly what it implied, that 
PUR was now to be subordinated completely to the interests 
of the new organ, with no freedom of manoeuvre? Or did it 
mean simply that PUR was now to be more responsive to the 
demands of the central political-educational apparatus and 
would still be in a position of relative autonomy in the 
conduct of political work in the field Red Army units? 
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Unfortunately, given the continuing lack of information on 
PUR, even after the ending of the Civil War, these 
questions will have to remain presently unanswered. 
However, in general, with the creation of 
Glavpolitprosvet, political and cultural-educational work 
in the Red .Army entered a new phase, not too unlike what 
had gone before, but different in its essence and aims. 
The ending of the Civil War brought new problems for the 
Red Army's political apparatus to solve; within a few 
years, the Red Army itself was to undergo a whole series 
of drastic military reforms and, for a while at least, the 
Red Army's political apparatus seemed to disappear from 
view. New leaders were to take over the running of the 
Red Army's main political organ, in many ways, just as 
able as Smilga and the Civil War entourage had shown 
themselves to be. It was even to play a role in the 
political infighting that was to take place in the late 
twenties but, for the time being at least, it was to enter 
a less hectic phase of its history. 
The Civil war had saw the political apparatus grow and 
grow, both in terms of staff, budgets, work,etc., but to 
what avail was all this? That will be the subject of the 
final, conclusive chapter of this work. 
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As stated in the introduction, the present work was 
undertaken to analyse the overall history and importance 
of the Red Army's political apparatus during the Civil 
War. This subject has not really received a lot of 
attention in the Western historiography of the Civil War. 
However, I felt that it was a topic worthy of detailed 
analysis and examination, especially in view of the 
importance attached to the Red Army's political apparatus 
by countless generations of Soviet historians. 
In general, it seemed to me that of all the reasons 
for Bolshevik victory in the Civil War that Soviet 
historians have examined and analysed over the years, this 
had not been thoroughly examined by historians of the 
Civil War period in the West. This was despite the 
presence of a fairly large body of Soviet material, 
readily available to the Western scholar for serious 
examination. However, in evaluating why Western 
historians had not been too enthusiastic to research this 
particular topic, I quickly discovered that, although 
there was a lot of Soviet material available, most of the 
Soviet writing on the topic had fallen into the same old 
trap, as had other previous historical accounts of other 
periods of Soviet history, i.e. that there was one 
definite line of analysis, concerning the "correct" 
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interpretation of the history and importance of the Red 
Army's political apparatus at this time and, needless to 
say, this was to assert that the Red Army's political 
apparatus had been an integral part of the development of 
the Red Army and that, as a creation of the Party, 
expressing the latter's direct will in the Soviet armed 
forces, that indeed it had played an extremely important 
role in the Bolshevik victory. This meant that very 
little criticism was actually made of the Red Army's Civil 
War political apparatus and even less effort was spent 
detailing the debates and issues raised during the actual 
organisation and functioning of the Red Army's political 
apparatus. In other words, everything concerning the Red 
Army's political apparatus during 1918-1920 had been 
neatly compartmentalised, with little room for questions 
or criticism. 
Thus, on the whole, such histories tended to totally 
underplay, if not ignore, a number of the issues crucial 
to a proper understanding of the role of the Red Army's 
political apparatus and say next to nothing about the 
arguments and disputes that did occur throughout the 
history of the Red Army's Civil War political apparatus; 
ignore the real difficulties that plagued the Red Army's 
political apparatus, such as the lack of a real, unifying 
link between the Red Army's centralised political 
apparatus and the front political apparatus; ignore the 
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role and work of a number of prominent Bolshevik Party 
members in the organisation and running of the Red Army's 
political apparatus, etc. There were so many areas that 
generations of Soviet historians had virtually failed to 
analyse properly that I began to wonder whether any of the 
recent Soviet historical writing on the topic had been 
worthwhile. I concluded that the main reason why so much 
of the writing on this subject was not as useful as it 
could have been must have been simply because such 
research would have rendered a lot of the Soviet writing 
on this topic virtually redundant. Another reason as to 
why this particular topic had been so badly treated in the 
past was, as had happened in other areas of Soviet 
history, the dead hand of Stalin still weighed heavily, 
perhaps even particularly more so on this topic-after all, 
(as can be shown if one reads a few of the biographies 
listed in the biographical appendix at the end of this 
work), a lot of the more prominent members of the Red 
Army's Civil War political apparatus were murdered at 
Stalin's instigation in the purges of the 1930s-Smilga, 
Beloborodov, Smirnov, etc., thus making research on 
this particular topic not purely an academic matter, but 
also one that involved a lot of politics and diplomacy. 
Thus, it became very clear to me very early on that, 
on the whole, Soviet historians had found it very 
uncomfortable to talk and write about the details of the 
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Red Army's Civil War political apparatus. On a slightly 
more personal basis, it may even be pertinent to note here 
that in the preparation of this particular dissertation, 
the Soviet authorities were not at all keen that I should 
study this topic as titled. Instead, it was suggested to 
me that I should restrict my historical "vision", so to 
speak, to analysing the work of the political apparatus on 
the Eastern Front during 1918-1920, that I should not 
attempt to delve too deeply into the wider picture of 
events. And this occurred only a few years back! 
It would appear to be the case that for too long now, 
Soviet historians have tended to steer away from this 
particular topic or, at best, have approached it from a 
"safe" angle, in the sense of repeating what has been said 
before about the organisation, development and work of the 
Red Army's Civil War political apparatus, without really 
analysing what they were writing about in any great depth. 
In my own previous work on a related topic, I knew that 
there were still a lot of questions on this whole area 
that needed to be answered, but not in the spirit of 
previous historical writing on the topic, but in a much 
more critical frame. Indeed, curiously enough, such an 
approach was helped by the fact that, especially in Moscow 
itself, there was a lot of very interesting material, 
stored in the libraries and research institutes, waiting 
to be properly examined and analysed and that such a 
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study, successfully undertaken, would help Western 
historians to get a much more complete picture of the 
Bolshevik war effort in 1918-1920. 
Hence, the main drive behind this dissertation has 
been to re-examine all the evidence currently available 
and, in many respects, re-write what has previously been 
written, but in a much more critical and historically 
accurate way. This should not be taken to imply that this 
dissertation has been able to answer all the questions 
posed by examining the work of the Red Army's political 
apparatus at this time, but for the first time anywhere 
outside the USSR itself, on the basis of the ground 
already covered in this work, Western historians can now 
begin to approach this topic with a degree of confidence. 
In examining the creation of the Red Army's political 
apparatus, the main conclusions of part of this work would 
have to be that, initially at least, it certainly was not 
all that well organised, nor indeed would it seem to have 
performed its duties with any particular distinction. As 
detailed in the first chapter, it would be very difficult 
to accept the standard Soviet view that the Organisation-
agitation department of the All-Russian Collegiate for the 
Organisation and Administration of the Red Army was the 
first real attempt, by the Bolsheviks, at the creation of 
a political organ for the Red Army. The work undertaken 
for this dissertation would appear to show that, in many 
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respects, this is too much of a grandiose claim for an 
organ which, to all intents and purposes, was more 
concerned with recruiting men into the Red Army, than 
actually attempting to educate them or inculcate them in 
the ideals and spirit of the new army. Even in terms of 
its chief, L.M.Kaganovich, we have a man who would appear 
not to have particularly distinguished himself then, or 
later, as being a person who served in the Red Army's 
political apparatus with any particular distinction. 
Indeed, in some respects, as one of the few people 
actually involved in the Red Army's political apparatus 
during 1918-1920 and who survived Stalin, this, more than 
anything else, perhaps iays something of the cali~re of 
the man he really was~he simply carried out the work of 
the Party, regardless of what it was, with little real 
flair or interest. 
During this early formative period of the history of 
the Soviet Republic, it was the case that prior to the 
creation of the Red Army itself in January 1918, there 
were two institutions already operating in various 
military units, which were to have a significant role to 
play in the future political apparatus of the Red Army-
namely, the military commissars and the Party cells. 
Although their respective merits and demerits will be 
discussed later, it should be said here that, even in this 
pre-April 1918 period, it would appear that neither the 
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Party cells nor the military commissars were carrying out 
anything that can be remotely dubbed "political" or 
"cultural-educational" work in the military units. 
Although very little has actually been written on either 
of these two parts of the political apparatus of the Red 
Army, judging by what is available, it certainly would 
appear that the development of the Red Army's political 
apparatus had a long way to go and yet, despite these 
fairly humble beginnings, in less than a year from the 
formation of VBVK in April 1918, the Red Army's political 
apparatus was to be a huge organisation, disposing of 
large sums of money for the upkeep of both the Red Army's 
political apparatus at the centre and on the front. 
I would agree with Soviet writers that the creation of 
the Red Army's. political apparatus, despite the earlier 
creation of the Organisation-agitation department of the 
All-Russian Collegiate for the Organisation and 
Administration of the Red Army did not occur in January 
1918, but really took place in April 1918, with the 
establishment of the All-Russian Bu~eau of Military 
Commissars, VBVK. Although the latter was not an avowedly 
Party-political organ-closer examination, for instance, of 
the political record of its chief, K.K.Yurenev would 
support that view-nevertheless, in embryonic from, one can 
see the future development of the Party's main political 
organ for the Red Army during the Civil War, the Political 
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Administration of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the 
Republic, PUR. However, even if this is the case, it 
should not be taken to mean that, right from the very 
beginning, the Red Army's centralised political apparatus 
functioned smoothly and without much serious difficulty. 
As shown in the second chapter, VBVK, almost from birth, 
had a number of significant handicaps almost built into 
it, not least of which was that it was never viewed as a 
Party organ, designed to control the work of all the other 
Party organs, directly serving the needs of the men at the 
front. Its precise duties were never formally·worked out 
until it was arguably too late. This is an especially 
important point, when one realises that VBVK was in a 
unique position, having no real experience to fall back on 
and everything that it had to carry out had never been 
tried before. Even at the earliest possible stage of its 
activity, it was faced with a Herculean task, designed, as 
it was, to take control of the work of all and every type 
of military commissar in the entire Republic-with a 
initial staff of 22!! Although its numbers were to 
significantly increase by October 1918, still VBVK was 
struggling to establish its authority where it counted 
most, at the front. Whilst this was a problem that would 
also confront PUR in the not too distant future, still it 
would appear to have affected VBVK more seriously. After 
all, VBVK was very much breaking new ground in a lot of 
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what it was actually trying to do; the lack of any real 
previous example to follow meant that it was severely 
hampered in the conduct of its work. There was no pool of 
resources to fall back on, no reserves of experienced 
personnel to rely on, every~hing had to be learnt from 
scratch and mistakes just had to be made, they could not 
be avoided. 
It was also the case that for a comparatively long 
time-virtually half of the period that VBVK actually 
existed-VBVK had to compete with a number of other 
centralised military-political organs of the period, most 
notably the Political department of the Supreme Military 
Inspectorate, the Military-political section of 
Narkomvoen's Operations department and, later on, the 
Political department of the Revolutionary Military Soviet 
of the Republic. With so many organs operating from the 
centre, carrying out a wide assortment of political and 
military functions, it was obvious that confusion and 
overlapping of functions was bound to ensue and this 
certainly did not help VBVK increase its hold on the 
political work being carried out on the fronts. 
The confusion over the precise nature of the functions 
of VBVK and its exact standing within the overall 
political and military establishment ensured that, even 
before the fateful 8th Party Congress, VBVK was facing 
stern criticism from the Army and Front political 
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departments, complaining about VBVK's poor leadership of 
political work at the front. In some respects, though, 
the criticism was perhaps too harsh-after all, the organ 
was hardly to blame for the lack of attention devoted to 
it by the Party's CC which, by the stroke of a pen and the 
publication of an exact, authoritative decree on the 
precise nature of the duties and functions of VBVK could 
have compelled the Army and Front political departments to 
have been more responsive to VBVK. VBVK was also hardly 
to blame for the confusion that naturally arose when, 
after the re-organisational shuffle of the centralised 
military-political apparatus in October/November 1918, it 
suddenly became this huge organisation-with a staff of 
just under 300-and almost overnight and without much 
apparent conviction on the part of the Party's main 
political organ, the Party's Central Committee, designed 
to serve the_political needs of the Red Army units, both 
located at the front and in the rear. Judging by the 
virtually unabated flow of criticism from the front and 
its eventual demise, this organisational reshuffle cannot 
be said to have been a success. It was, in effect, too 
little too late. The centralised political apparatus in 
Moscow did not need so much an organisational reshuffle, 
as much as a total reorganisation. This was the view that 
the Party's CC would seem to have arrived at itself in 
early 1919 when, after having received a report on the 
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military defeats on the Eastern Front late in December 
1918 in which the political apparatus itself came in for 
some stern criticism, the CC itself would have seemed to 
have prepared for the abolition of VBVK at the next Party 
Congress. One other point that should be noted here about 
this particular report was that its sole authors were 
Stalin and Dzerzhinsky and, surely it was not accidental 
that, having made the report to the CC, Stalin himself 
would appear to have become one of the fiercest opponents 
of VBVK itself, both immediately prior to the 8th Party 
Congress and during the 8th Party Congress itself, even to 
the extent that in past historical writing on the subject, 
he has been credited with pushing forward the original 
resolution, dissolving VBVK in its entirety. 
Thus, contrary to Soviet assertions, the early period 
of the Red Army's political apparatus was full of mistakes 
made and new lessons that had to be learned. VBVK did 
make a lot of mistakes and, in some respects, found it 
almost impossible to run smoothly: the Red Army's 
political apparatus was virtually brand new-nothing had 
existed quite like it before and, perhaps, the Party 
should have allowed more time and thought to the creation 
and functioning of an organ like VBVK. However, given the 
emergency nature of the situation, the organs which did 
not produce immediate results had to go the wall, hence 
the decision to abolish VBVK in April 191' and the 
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creation of PUR in May 1919. 
On the whole, again contrary to much of what has been 
written in the USSR on this, there would appear to have 
been no natural progression in the running and 
organisation of the Red Army's political apparatus at this 
time-work had virtually to be carried out on an ad hoc 
basis; after all, with no previous experience, what else 
could be done? There was no plan emanating from the 
centre for the conduct of political work in the Red Army-
as shown in the sections on the military commissars, the 
Party cells and the political departments, the Red Army's 
central political apparatus was virtually forced into a 
situation where it had to work on an individual basis, 
i.e. drawing up agreements which would fit one particular 
situation at ·a time, but no-t conforming to any "grand 
scheme" of things, as it were. Despite the Marxist-
Leninist rhetoric on this point, there is very little real 
hard evidence to show that the work of the Red Army's 
political apparatus was operating according to some 
previously worked out theoretical or practical programme, 
especially in 1918. There was little concrete that, 
initially at least, the Red Army's central political 
apparatus was able to offer to the political apparatus on 
the front, it could offer guidance, advice, assistance but 
what it could not offer, through a lack of Party 
authority, as well as a lack of the necessary 
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organisationakamework, was the necessary control of the 
political appctus at the front. It could not issue 
orders as was.en required- it simply did not have the 
necessary Par1authority over the front political 
apparatus to sure that all its various decrees and 
statements ante political work being carried out on the 
front were puLnto effect. Given the importance that has 
been attached) the Red Army's political apparatus during 
the Civil Warit would appear to be a stark contrast that 
one of the ma reasons for its lack of success in the 
initial perioof its existence was due to it not enjoying 
sufficient Pay authority at the front! 
Despite t:n the initial failure of the central 
political app;atus of the Red Army to control the work 
being carried·ut on the front, political and cultural-
educational W(k was carried out on the front throughout 
1918. The wor of the military commissars, the Party 
cells and argubly, the most important part of the Red 
Army's politial apparatus, the political departments, 
ensured that, .n various ways and to a varying extent, 
attempts were 1ade to raise the overall consciousness of 
the Red Army rtcruit. These attempts were motivated 
initially by the need to maintain good military order in 
the units-after all, it was though that the more conscious 
the soldiers were, the easier they would be to train and 
the more adept they would be on the battlefield. 
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In many respects, the changing perception of political 
work in the Red Army was emphasised by the changing role 
of the military commissar themselves. Initially, they 
were used in a variety of guises, mainly tho~gh in 
defending the gains of the October Revolution. In such a 
way, they had also been used after the 1917 February 
Revolution, although it would be wrong to say that the 
military commissars who served in the old Imperial Army 
units before October 1917 and those who served in the 
military units post-October 1917, were of the same ilk, so 
to speak. Safeguarding Soviet power was not the same 
thing as safeguarding the power of the Provisional 
Government. That aside, however, the position of the 
military commissars gradually changed throughout 1918 
until, effectively before the end of the year, the 
military commissars were viewed as being Bolshevik Party 
functionaries, helping to ensure Bolshevik control of the 
Red Army. Back in April 1918, as detailed in the second 
chapter, there were a large minority of commissars serving 
in Red Army units who were not Bolshevik Party members-as 
long as these men were faithful to defending the interests 
of Soviet power, certainly VBVK saw no harm in employing 
these men in the Red Army. However, with the increasing 
politicisation of the Red Army-brought about largely by 
the increasing'power of the Bolshevik-inspired political 
departments-the military commissars did find themselves 
Page 437 
gradually becoming the weapons of the Bolshevik Party in 
the conduct of political and political-educational work in 
the Red Army. Given the political nature of the regime 
and, no less important, the political nature of the Red 
Army itself, in many respects, there was no other road for 
development of the powers of the military commissars, 
other than them being transferred into becoming 
functionaries of the Bolshevik Party itself. The 
Bolshevik Party could no longer afford the "luxury" of, 
for instance, having large numbers of Left SR military 
commissars serving in the Red Army units, fearing that the 
political control of the Red Army might be wrested away 
from them, either during the Civil War, or later. 
Thus, in general, the role of the military commissars 
in the Red Army would appear to have been an important 
one. In the initial period of the creation of the Red 
Army, the commissars ensured that the Red Army remained 
loyal to the regime-they were, as detailed in the relevant 
chapter, the "eyes and ears" of the regime in the Red Army 
but, as the military and political situation changed, then 
so too did the functions and responsibilities of the 
military commissars in the Red Army itself. They were 
instructed to play a more prominent role in the political 
and cultural-educational work in the Red Army units, as 
well as maintaining good military discipline and order in 
the units. However, despite the full title of VBVK, the 
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latter was not really able to establish any proper 
organisational ties with the front military commissars. 
For instance, whilst it is true that VBVK did hold a 
conference of military commissars in June 1918, it is, as 
yet, almost impossible to gauge the full impact of the 
latter congress on the work of the front military 
commissars in 1918. Such an assessment can only be 
carried out through a careful reading of the relevant 
archival holdings, which it is not presently possible to 
undertake. 
In assessing the role of the Party cells in the Red 
Army throughout 1918-1919, then the situation is even more 
complicated. Given their very nature, it would appear 
from the present lack of evidence that the Party cells 
were even less keen than the military commissars in 
leaving behind any records of their activity and work. 
This may be an area that some future Soviet historian(s) 
may choose to tackle in the future but, presently, all 
that exists on the activity of the Party cells in the Red 
Army during this time would appear to confirm that their 
activity was largely carried out in a unsupervised fashion 
and that the centre had very little direct say in what 
they were carrying out. Similar to the position of the 
Red Army's front political apparatus, as a whole, the 
Party cells embodied a distrust of VBVK, the none too 
strictly Party organ put in charge of an avowedly Party-
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political apparatus. 
There was no commonly-agreed statute on the powers and 
duties of the Party cells worked out until quite late on 
in the history of the Red Army's political apparatus and 
this lack of central direction only helped to add to an 
already confused situation. The Party conferences showed 
a great deal of interest in the activities of the Party 
cells but were not too keen in actually defining what they 
had to do, what their functions and responsibilities were 
in detailing their structure. Thus, the overall impact of 
the Party cells in the conduct of political and cultural-
educational work varied from unit to unit, depending on a 
whole series of factors like who was in charge, the 
proximity of the unit to the front, the relationship with 
the military commissar and/or/ the political department; 
etc. 
Similar to the position of the military commissars, 
the role of the Party cells also changed throughout the 
year. They were the oldest part of the emerging political 
apparatus of the Red Army, being initially created to 
spread Bolshevik influence in the old Imperial Army-
another topic which has been largely ignored by Soviet 
historians. When the Red Army was duly created in 1918, 
they were almost alone in representing the interests of 
the Party at the front. However, with the growing 
presence and power of both the military commissars and the 
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political departments, the Party cells began slowly to 
lose their influence until, by March 1919, they were very 
much a former shadow of what they had been. They had 
begun to be viewed as almost superfluous to the needs of 
the political apparatus-a number of them having been 
ajudged as too interfering in the activities of both the 
commissars and the command staff and, given the over-
riding importance of the attainment of military victory, 
the Bolsheviks were not slow in reducing the power of that 
part of the political apparatus which it perceived as 
being injurious to the Bolshevik war effort. After all, 
one of the prime reasons for the creation and continued 
operation of the Bolshevik's Red Army political apparatus 
was that it aided the military effort of the Bolsheviks, 
not hindered it. Hence, the growing impo~tance attached 
to the work of the main part of the political apparatus of 
the Red Army at this time, the political departments 
which, effectively, came to be the Red Army's front 
political apparatus. 
As shown in the relevant section, the political 
departments were created through a mixture of local 
initiative and centralised help, though not, it must be 
said, thanks to the work of VBVK. The political 
departments, similar to the other parts of the front 
political apparatus, also saw their functions change 
throughout 1918, until by December 1918, they were 
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recognised as the Party organ in the Red Army's political 
apparatus, the organ on the front and in the army which 
was effectively to control the activity and work of all 
the other political organs of the Red Army. Although 
their structure and functions varied from front to front, 
overall, the political departments ensured a much greater 
concentration of effort and resources and helped in 
promoting the necessary level of political and cultural-
educational activity. Due to the variety of personalities 
involved in the front and army political departments-
examination of their composition reads almost like a 
"Who's who" of prominent Bolshevik personalities both of 
the Civil War period and beyond!-in many ways, the 
political departments themselves are proof of how 
seriously the Bolsheviks themselves looked on the Red 
Army's political apparatus. Many of the Chiefs of the 
Army and Front political departments were prominent Party 
members, who had served in the Party usually long before 
the 1917 October Revolution, tried and trusty comrades, 
who had undergone years of imprisonment in the tsarist 
camps. Thus, it was not too surprising that the activity 
and importance of the Red Army's political departments was 
so great in the future development of the Red Army's 
political apparatus. It can be argued that, especially on 
the evidence collated for this work, that the single most 
important reason for the eventual downfall of VBVK was its 
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failure to establish a proper, organisational link with 
the front political departments. Most of the recognised 
public critics of VBVK at the 8th Party Congress were 
chiefs, or former chiefs, of the Front and Army political 
departments. 
Of course, the development of the political 
departments did not go as smoothly as perhaps a number of 
Soviet historians would like to show-the experience of the 
Northern Front's political department would prove this-
but, on the whole, the political departments did play an 
important role in the development of the Red Army's 
political apparatus and in the conduct of the political 
and cultural-educational work in the Red Army units. They 
helped enrol new Party members, controlled the work being 
carried out, dished out funds for the work being 
undertaken, etc. They were very much at the centre of the 
political work being carried out in the Red Army and, if 
they did not function properly, then the political work 
was not carried out properly. It was as simple as that. 
Thus, when it came to the 8th Party Congress, VBVK was 
in a very bad position, as regards having allies at the 
Congress, ready to defend it. Although not all the 
minutes of the 8th Party Congress have been published, 
judging by what is presently available, it would appear 
that very, very few delegates bothered to say anything 
positive about the role of VBVK, as the Party's leading 
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political organ. It would appear that the vast majority 
of delegates were more than happy with the prospects of 
building the apparatus anew, beginning with reconstructing 
the apparatus at the centre. Thus, VBVK was simply 
abolished and its chairman sent to the front. The new 
organ that was created-PUR-did incorporate a number of 
changes right away, in an attempt not to repeat previous 
mistakes and tighten up the apparatus both at the centre 
and at the front. 
These changes were very important and included the 
following:-
a)in its relationship with the CC, PUR was recognised as 
being directly subordinate to the latter, indeed at the 
time, it was stated that PUR was to· be treated like the 
CC's military department; 
b)in the person of its chairman, Smilga, PUR had a man of 
undoubted energy, will and experience, a man who wa~ 
serving both on the CC and RVSR-the two single most 
important organs of the Civil War. It was also blessed 
with a number of top Bolshevik Party figures as its 
deputy-chiefs; 
c)as detailed in the appendix at the end of this work, PUR 
had a huge staff, incorporating the former staff of VBVK, 
thereby ensuring that the new organ had some experience to 
rely on; 
d)judging by the relevant budget figures, PUR had a 
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massive budget at its disposal. 
Thus, in terms of all these apparent advantages, one 
would have assumed that, in every respect, both in terms 
of its leading personnel, its direct relationship with the 
CC and RVSR, i~s increased staff numbers, etc., that all 
the old problems, which had beset VBVK in the immediate 
past would be ironed out and that the Red Army's political 
apparatus went from strength to strength from May 1919 
onwards until the end of the Civil War itself. However, 
as detailed in the various sub-sections of the third 
chapter of this work, this was not entirely the case: a 
fact that previous accounts of the Red Army's Civil War 
political apparatus have been careful to avoid. Despite 
the personnel changes, the money, the increase in staff, 
PUR still found it very difficult to establish that 
working relationship with the R~d Army's front political 
apparatus, which had so earlier eluded VBVK in 1918. A 
detailed examination of the First Congress of Red Army 
Political Workers, held in December 1919, shows quite 
conclusively that, despite the campaigns, the increase in 
the number of Party members on the front, the massive 
increase in the number of Red Army schools, the mobile 
theatres and cinemas, etc, etc, PUR's top leadership still 
could not say that it had a definite organisational 
relationship with the Red Army's front political apparatus 
and that everything that it decreed in Moscow was 
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instantly carried out on the front, by the Red Army's 
political apparatus there. Despite its obvious Party 
authority, PUR was heavily criticised at the Congress for 
being either too remote or for being too centralising. In 
some ways, it could not win. As far as Moscow was 
concerned, the Red Army's front political apparatus had to 
be more centralised in order to cut down on wastage and 
concentrate the resources of men and material better, and 
yet a number of the front and army political departments 
resisted this, as it reduced their autonomy and power. 
This overall picture once again underlines the fact that 
during the Civil War period, the Soviet state, even the 
Red Army itself, was not as centralised as has been 
previously suggested. There were still a number of 
important areas where the writ of the Party was not· as 
strictly adhered to as Soviet historians, and others, have 
attempted to prove in the past. 
If one looks at the relationship between the central 
political apparatus of the Red Army and the front 
political apparatus, then one finds that there was a lot 
of self-determination, on the part of the local Red Army 
political apparatus and, indeed, resistance to attempts by 
the centre to impose greater uniformity in the way the 
work was to be carried out. Even when the debate arose 
about the changing functions of the military commissars, 
despite the support of the top political leadership of PUR 
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and, to a lesser extent, Trotsky himself, the changes 
envisaged by Smilga et al. never took place during the 
Civil War and, indeed, these very thoughts and intentions 
were to be used by a later generation of Soviet historians 
to prove the destructiveness of PUR's leadership during· 
the Civil War. In other words, throughout the length of 
the Civil War the front political apparatus was always in 
a strong position to resist what it did not want to 
implement. 
In general, PUR did tend to suffer from a number of 
the same problems that had beset VBVK in 1918-1919. Thus, 
other than the problem of establishing a proper working 
relationship with the front political apparatus, PUR also 
underwent a lot of organisational changes which, judging 
by the available evidence, would not appear to have 
significantly increased its overall effectiveness. It was 
also the case that, although technically speaking, Smilga 
was in charge of PUR, due to the demands of the military 
situation, he was very rarely in Moscow to actually carry 
out much work on PUR's behalf, the day-to-day running of 
the organ being left to one of his relatively numerous 
deputy-chiefs. This must have created the danger of a 
lack of internal organisational cohesion within PUR 
itself, especially in terms of the overall strategic 
direction of the organ. After all, did Smilga, even when 
he was on the front, have some sort of over-riding voice 
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on what was being carried out in PUR's name in Moscow? 
Obviously, the whole question of leadership of the organ 
does require more material than presently available, in 
order to arrive at a much more concrete assessment of what 
its effect was on the day-to-day running of an organ like 
PUR, but once more, the work undertaken for this 
dissertation would appear to throw a shadow of doubt on 
the importance to the organ of someone like Smilga who was 
very rarely in Moscow to work in the his capacity as PUR's 
chief. 
PUR could, and did, publish reams of statistics on the 
amount of literature sent to the front, the number of 
literacy schools operating in the Red Army units, the 
campaign to encourage the men to read and write, etc., but 
·in arriving at a general evaluation of the effect of the 
entire work of the political apparatus on the actual Red 
Army soldier himself, then the conclusions reached by 
Soviet historians would appear to lack the necessary 
justification. This is not to say that if, in the future, 
all the relevant archival materials were published that it 
might not be proven that the Red Army's political 
apparatus had been a war-winning factor, similar to the 
impact of the number of sabres, guns, cannon, etc, but it 
has to be said that, at present, there is simply not 
enough information to prove conclusively that the Red 
Army's political apparatus was a major factor to the 
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contribution of Bolshevik victory during the Civil War. 
However, I think that it is possible to show how, for 
instance, by examining the role of the commissars, the Red 
Army's political apparatus did ensure that the Red Army 
units remained, on the whole, both loyal to the Bolshevik 
Party, as well as ~easonably disciplined, in the military 
sense, plus that the political workers and the Communist 
Party element did provide the Party with the necessary 
"shock" troops when the situation demanded it. However, 
how does one go about evaluating the impact of all the 
campaigns of political and cultural-educational work on 
the Red Army soldier and prove that he became more aware, 
more conscious and thus a better soldier, without access 
to all the relevant archival holdings, where such 
information is stored? Why have so few, again judging by 
the work undertaken for this dissertation, military 
commissars of the Civil War period written about their 
experiences? What was their general assessment of the 
work carried out? On the basis of only three memoirs, I 
am very wary about making gross generalisations. 
One can also conclude that the Party did attach great 
importance to the work of the Red Army's political 
apparatus, in terms of the top personnel involved, as well 
as budget allocations, but even there, one would have to 
be wary of making too many sweeping remarks. For 
instance, why did the Party take so long to do something 
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about VBVK which, clearly. for quite some time before the 
8th Party Congress, was not in a position to adequately 
handle the tasks thrust upon it? With the creation of 
PUR, the Party's CC would appear to have learnt from the 
mistakes of VBVK and yet PUR still found itself in a very 
difficult position in trying to establish the necessary 
control relationship with the front political apparatus. 
This was a key area-what was the point in decreeing in 
Moscow, if you could not be certain that the necessary 
decrees would be put into effect on the Eastern Front? As 
for the front political apparatus, this dissertation would 
appear to show that it enjoyed a not inconsiderable degree 
of autonomy and local power and, at various times, was 
very reluctant to cede any of this to the centralised 
political apparatus, in Moscow. Smilga himself was very 
aware of this and complained about this on several 
occasions. 
As stated earlier, this dissertation set itself two 
main tasks: 
l)to describe the organisation and work of the R~d Army's 
political apparatus, including all the previous "grey" 
areas in the history of the Red Army's Civil War political 
apparatus; 
Z)to assess the available evidence and evaluate the stated 
importance of the political apparatus in helping to 
achieve Bolshevik victory. 
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Obviously, there have been a lot of problems involved in 
this work, not least of which has been the proper 
evaluation of evidence which has, on occasion, displayed a 
lot of contradictory assertions, but, overall, the balance 
of present existing material clearly shows that, politics 
aside, there is not enough concrete material conclusively 
proving that the Red Army's Civil War political apparatus 
was a major factor in the victory of the Bolsheviks in the 
Civil War. Certainly, Soviet historians have got a lot of 
work to do in order to prove that the Red Army's political 
apparatus was an important factor in securing Bolshevik 
victory and they can do this by publishing everything 
possible, relevant to this topic, warts and all. Soviet 
historians have been far too selective in producing bits 
and pieces on the work of the latter, ignoring the parts 
that they have never felt comfortable to discuss-the work 
of VBVK, the leadership of PUR, the antagonism of the 
front political apparatus to the centralised political-
military establishemnt, etc-and they must begin begin to 
analyse openly and honestly the real impact of the Red 
Army's Civil War political apparatus on the Bolshevik war 
effort. Until that is done, Western historians will be in 
their right to continue to be sceptical about Soviet 




Organisational structure of PUR (May 1919) 
Name _of department 
and position 





Chief of department 
Errand boys 
General treasury. 
Head of treasury 
(1st deputy-chief of 
department). 
1 . General section 
Section head 



















































2. Main accounting department. 





























Book-keeper (equivalent to 
a senior clerk) 
Senior accountants 
Junior accountants 






c) Cash desk 
Paymaster (equivalent to 
a senior clerk) 
Assistant paymaster 
II. Commandant's office 











chief of the department) 1 
1. Treasury of the commandant's 
office, etc. 
Head of the treasury 1 
Junior clerk 1 
Accountant 1 




















Chief (head of section) 
a) Workshop 






































































3. Communications section. 
Head of Communications 
a) Team of cyclists 
and couriers. 
Head of the team (equivalent 





































c) Telephone station. 




4. Medical-sanitation section. 
Head (doctor) 
































Name of department 
and position 
No.of people 






Head of the office 1 
Accountant (equivalent to a 
senior clerk) 1 
Ledger clerk 1 





Cleaners and workers 
2. Dispatch office. 




3. Warehouse for 
literature. 
































Assistant librarians 2 
4. Theatre-music-cinema 
warehouse. 
Head (equivalent to a 
senior clerk) 1 
assistants 3 
5 • Warehouse for study 
books and sports equip. 
Head (equivalent to a 
senior clerk) 1 
assistants 2 
B. POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 
Chief of the department 1 
Travelling inspectors 10 
I. Statistics section. 
Head of the section 1 























Name of department 
and position 
II. Information section. 
Head of the section 






Head of the section 




2. Agitational courses 










IV. Administrative section. 
Head of the section 1 
1. General clerical. 
Senior clerk 1 
Junior clerks 2 
Draftsman 1 
Typists 2 
Registration officers 2 



























Senior clerk 1 




Ledger clerk 1 
c. EDUCATION DEPARTMENT. 
. Head of the department 1 
Assistant 1 
Errand boy 1 
1.General section. 
Head of the section 1 
Draftsman 1 
1 . General clerical. 
Senior clerk 1 




























Accountant (equivalent to 
a senior clerk) 
Ledger clerk 
1. Bibliographic bureau. 
Bibliographers (equivalent 
to senior clerks) 






Museum keeper (equivalent 
to a senior clerk) 
Office worker 
III. Training section. 


































Name of department 
and position 
School-course 
instructors and errand 
boys 
2. Bureau of physical 
culture. 
Head (equivalent to a 
senior clerk) 
Travelling instructors 
IV. Artistic section. 
Head of the section 








Head of theatrical post 



































Name of department 
and position 
3. Club bureau. 






4. Cinematographic bureau. 
Head 
Travelling instructors, 
mechanics and specialists 
1 
3 
D. LITERARY-PUBLICATIONS' DEPARTMENT. 
Head of the department 
I. General section. 




Senior ledger clerk 





































III. Editorial board. 
Main editor-member of 
the collegiate 
Journal editor(member of 
the collegiate) 








Fiction editor (member of the 
collegiate) 1 
Secretary (member of the 
collegiate) 1 
Editorial assistant 1 
Special editor for 
military literature 1 
Assistants to the latter 5 
Specialist, secretary for 
military-technical publicns. 1 
Senior clerk 1 
Proof readers 3 
Artist-illustrator 1 
Typists 2 
IV. Publication and 
typographic inspection. 
Head for the tech. side 


























1) People, whose rates of pay have not been listed in the 
table, will receive the corresponding rates of pay agreed 
with the relevant Trade Unions. 
2) The Political Administration also has the following 
under its direct control: · 
Cars .•.••..•...•.....•.•.•.•....•.• 3 
Medical orderlies .•..•.•.•..... ." ..• ! 
Trucks .•......•.•.......••. · .•...... 3 
Motor bikes ••.•••.....•..•••••..•.. 6 
Bicycles ••.•..•..•.•.•.•....•..•..•. 8 
Cart horses ..•...•.•..........•.... 10 
Steeds ••.•..••.•••••......•...•.•.• 2 
Steam carria~es •..........••...•... 5 
Buggies .•..••••••.•.•..••..•..•...• 1 
*-in charge of stores, warehouse and fuel; 
**-head of the team of packers; 
***-one to be in charge of periodical publications; the 
other to be in charge of books and brochures; 
****-in charge of theatrical, literary text books, musical 
literature, posters and material for the cinemas; 
*****-in charge of text books, sports equipment, materials 
for artistic work; 
******-in charge of political literature, fiction, 
scientific works and military bibliography. 
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APPENDIX TWO:-
Biographies of a number of the leading figures involved 
in the Red Army's Civil War political apparatus. 
BELOBORODOV, ALEKSANDR GEORGIVICH(1891-1938) 
Beloboro~ was born in October 1891 in Solikamsk 
uezd, Perm guberniya. His father was a worker and, in 
1905, having completed an elementary education, 
A.S.Beloborodov joined the same factory as his dad. 
However, he quickly became alert to the activities of the 
local Social-Democratic organisation and a few years after 
beginning work, he joined the latter. Not long after 
beginning his illegal activity for the Party, Beloborodov 
was arrested in 1908 and sentenced to 4 years 
imprisonment. Like many other leading Bolsheviks who 
found themselves confined, Beloborodov took advantage of 
his incarceration by reading prolifically and completing 
his own process of self-education. Once he was released, 
Beloborodov began to organise a worker's cultural-
educational society, at ~hat time, virtually the only 
legal activity open to the Bolsheviks. However, this did 
not prevent his re-arrest at the outbreak of the First 
World War. Under escort, he was sent to work in a factory 
in Tyumen, but was eventually returned to work in Perm 
guberniya. 
At the outbreak of the February Revolution in 1917, he 
was a member of the Lysvensky Soviet and the latter's 
local Party committee. In April 1917, he was a member of 
the Urals oblast RSDRP committee, as well as being a 
delegate to the April 1917 Party conference and to the 6th 
Party Congress. After the break-up of the Constituent 
Assembly, he was elected a member of the Urals oblast 
Executive Committee, working initially as the latter's 
Deputy-Chairman and eventually becoming the latter's 
Chairman. After the retreat of the Red Army from the 
Urals, he then worked in Perm and Vyatka. At the 8th 
Party Congress, he was elected a member of the Party's CC. 
In April 1919, the Council of Defence sent him to the 
Southern Front. On returning from the front, he was 
appointed Deputy-Chief of PUR in July 1919. In October 
1919, he was then appointed a member of the RMS of the 9th 
Army (South-Western Front). When the latter captured 
Kuban he then became a member of the Kuban Revolutionary 
Committee. In August 1920, he was appointed Deputy-
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Chairman of the Revolutionary Soviet of the Caucasus 
Labour Army, then Chairman of the krai's economic council 
for the the South-West. 
In October 1921, he was transferred back to Moscow, 
where he became Deputy People's Commissar of Internal 
Affairs; in July 1923, he became People's Commissar of 
Internal Affairs. 
During the ideological struggles of the 1920s, Beloborodov 
was a supporter of Trotsky, although he did eventually 
recant his previously 'mistaken' views and, in 1930, found 
himself working in the State Purchases' Committee. At 
this time, he was also a member of the Central Executive 
Committee. Needless to say, given his earlier allegiance 
with Trotsky in the 1920s, Beloborodov was purged in 1938, 
but has been subsequently fully rehabilitated. 
FURMANOV, DMITRY ANDREYEVICH(1891-1926) 
Principally, a writer, Furmanov studied at Moscow 
University between 1921-1914. In 1918, he joined the 
Bolshevik Party and, in September of that same year, 
became secretary to the Ivanovo-Voznesensk guberniya Party 
committee. In February 1919, he was sent to carry out 
political work on the Eastern Front, specifically amongst 
the Urals and Aleksandr-Gay group of troops. From April-
August 1919, he was military commissar to the 25th Rifle 
Division. In August 1919, he became Deputy Chief and, a 
few months later(October 1919), Chief of the political 
department of the Turkestan Front. In March 1920, he was 
sent to work on the RMS of the Semirech Front, where he 
took part in the crushing of the mutiny, which had broken 
out around the town of Verny. In July-August 1920, he 
became military commissar to the 3rd Turkestan Rifle 
Division and, in August 1920, he became Chief of the 
political department of 9th Army. He also became military 
commissar to one of the Red Army's first parachute 
brigades during this year. For his military and political 
services in the Civil War, he was awarded the Order of the 
Red Banner in 1922. From 1921 until his death, Furmanov 
was involved in editorial work and the writing of a number 
of books and stories on the Civil War, most notable of 
which were the following: "Red Descent", (1922); 
"Chapayev", (1923); "In 1918", (1923) and, finally, 
"Mutiny", ( 1925). 
GONCHAROV, NIKOLAI KUZMICH(1886-1970) 
Joined the RSDRP in 1904. In 1917, he was appointed a 
commissar of the Moscow Revolutionary Committee, in charge 
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of t~e Simonov raion in Moscow. In April 1918, he was 
appo1nted a member of the praesidium of the executive 
committee of the Moscow Soviet. In September of that 
year, he was then posted to take charge of the political 
department of the 6th Army. In December 1918 he became 
Chief of the political department of the Northern Front· 
in January 1919, he also became a member of the front's' 
RMS •. From April-October 1919, he became military 
comm1ssar to the 26th Rifle Division. From February-March 
1920, he became a member of the RMS of ·s th Army. In 
March-July 1920, he then became a member of the Military 
Soviet of the the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far 
Eastern Republic and, at the same time of the latter 
appointment, Goncharov also became a member of the Party's 
Far Eastern Bureau and Siberian Bureau. He was placed in 
charge of the Po~itical administration of the Siberian 
troops. He was a delegate to the lOth Party Congress. 
Afterwards, he was involved in a number of Party and 
economic posts. He was also a member of the Party's 
Central Control Commission. 
GOLOSHCHEKIN, FILIPP ISAEVICH(1876-1941) 
Joined the RSDRP. in 1903. His father was a contractor. 
Finished dentist school in 1903. In 1917, he was a 
delegate to the 7th(April) All-Russian Conference and the 
Party's 6th Congress. He was also a delegate to the 
Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets; at this time, he 
was a member of the Petrograd Revolutionary Committee and 
a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. 
In December 1917, he was made a member of the Ekaterinburg 
Party Committee, in charge of the latter's military 
department. In February 1918, he became Urals oblast 
military commissar, a member of the Party's obkom and a 
member of the oblast soviet. In May 1918, he was 
appointed okrug military commissar of the entire region, 
becoming one of the new republic's first ever okrug 
military commissars. From September 1918-January 1919, he 
was political commissar to 3rd Army, (being in charge not 
only of political work amongst the military units, but 
also in charge of political work amongst the local 
civilian population). From December 1918, he was 
appointed to the Party's Siberian Bureau and became okrug 
military commissar for the Urals Military District. He 
was a delegate at both the 7th and 8th Party Congresses, 
at the 8th Party Congress, in actual fact, he was a member 
of the 'military opposition'. Between April-June 1919, he 
was a member of the RMS of the Turkestan Army on the 
Eastern Front. In August 1919, he became chairman of the 
Chelyabinsk guberniya revolutionary committee. In October 
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1919-May 1920, he was appointed a member of the All-
Russian Central Executive's Committee Turkestan 
Commission. at this time, he was also appointed to work 
on the RSFSR's Council of Economy. From 1921 onwards, he 
held_various economic, Soviet and Party posts. He was a 
cand1date member to the CC in 1924 and was a full-fledged 
member of the CC between 1927-1934. At various times, he 
was also a member of the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee and the Central Executive Committee. 
GUSEV,SERGEI IVANOVICH(l874-1933) 
(Real name, Yakov Davidovich Drabkin). Joined the RSDRP 
in 1896. His father was a teacher. During the October 
Revolution, he headed the secretariat of the Petrograd 
Revolutionary Committee. He was a delegate to the Second 
All~Russian Congress of Soviets, elected a member of the 
All-Ru~sian Central Executive Committee. In February-
March 1918, he was secretary to the Petrograd Defence 
Committee; not long after that appointment, he was then 
placed in charge of administrative affairs of the Council 
of Economy for the Northern oblast. In September-December 
1918, he was appointed a member of the RMS of 2nd Army; 
from December 1918-June 1919, he then became a member of 
the RMS of the Eastern Front. From June-December 1919, he 
was then placed in charge of the Moscow defence sector and 
became a military commissar to the Field Staff of the 
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic. From 
December 1919-December 1920, there followed a series of 
_appointments to the RMS 9f the South-Eastern, South-
Western, Caucasus, etc., Fronts. 
From January 1921-January 1922, Gusev was put in 
charge of PUR, as well as being Chairman of the CC's 
Turkestan Bureau. From February 1922-April 1924, he was a 
member of the RMS of the Turkestan Front; from May 1921-
August 1923, he was a member of the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of the Republic. For his military and political 
services to the state, he was awarded 2 Orders of the Red 
Banner(l920, 1922). He was a delegate to the 9th and lOth 
Party Congresses. In 1920, he had candidate membership 
status to the Party's CC. 
In 1923, he was appointed secretary to the Party's 
Central Control Commission and a member of the collegiate 
of 'Rabkrin' and, later, worked in the apparatus of the 
Comintern. He headed a Military-historical commission, 
evaluating the experience of the First World War and the 
Civil War and was a member of the board of the 
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic's ~ilitary­
editorial council. Member of the Central Execut1ve 
Committee. Buried in the Kremlin Wall. 
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KASPAROVA, VERA D.(BORN-? DIED-?) 
There is virtually no biographical information available 
presently on this woman, despite the fact that judging by 
the information collated for this dissertation' she did 
play a prominent role both in the organisation'and 
activity of VBVK and PUR. Other than what has mentioned 
in the body of this dissertation all that can be said is 
the following: ' 
"Vera Kasparova was an old Bolshevik who was in charge of 
work among women of the east for the Party and for the 
~omintern's International Women's Secretariat, beginning 
1n 1921. The Secretariat was dissolved in 1926. 
Kasparova, a leading member of the Left Opposition, was 
expelled at the fifteenth congress in 1927." 
Apparently, also, she was exiled to Siberia alongwith 
Radek and, just before she boarded the train to go into 
exile, is supposed to have said the following about 
Stalin: 
"He is a megalomaniac ... He will shed much blood, ours 
first of all •.• and will destroy the revolution." (Both 
extracts are taken from Saunders, George. "SAMIZDAT. 
Voices of the Soviet opposition." Monad Press, New York, 
1974, p.105). 
KATANYAN, RUBEN PAVLOVICH(1881-1966) 
The son of a teacher, Katanyan studied at Moscow 
University and became involved in the revolutionary 
movement from 1901. On the eve of the 1905 revolution, he 
had already worked in a number of student organisations in 
Moscow and has suffered a term of imprisonment. During 
the 1905 revolution, however, he worked for the RSDLP on 
the Orenburg railroad, then undertook underground work for 
the Party in both Moscow and Tbilisi until 1908, when he 
became editor of the Bolshevik newspaper, "Borba", 
published in Tbilisi. Between 1909-1913, he worked as a 
propagandist and publicist for the Tbilisi Party 
organisation. Between March-September 1917, he was a 
member of the "Novaya zhizn" group of social-democratic 
internationalists, as well as being a member of the 
Central trade Union bureau of Moscow. He played an active 
part in the October Revolution in Moscow and, in 1919, was 
appointed to work in 11th Army on the front. There, he 
edited the local Army newspaper, "Krasniy Voin" and he was 
appointed to direct the work of PUR's Political 
department. In 1920-1921, he was put in charge of the 
CC's agitation-propaganda department. In 1923, Katanyan 
became a deputy of the RSFSR's State Prosecutor. In 1933-
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1937, he then became senior assistant to the State 
P:osecutor of ~he Soviet Union(then, this position was 
f1lled by Vysh1nsky) and played a prominent role in the 
conduct of some of the "show trials" conducted by Stalin 
in the late 1930s. Ironically, he himself was eventually 
arrested in 1938 and was imprisoned in one of the gulags 
by the secret police. In 1955, he was released from 
prison, formally rehabilitated and given a state pension. 
He died in June 1966. 
KHODOROVSKY, JOSEF ISAEVICH(1885-1940) 
Joined the RSDLP in 1903. In 1917, worked as a 
propagandist for the Moscow Committee of the RSDLP, took 
part in the street battles in Moscow during the October 
Revolution. In 1918, he was a member of the collegiate of 
the People's Commissariat of Labour. From December 1918-
March 1919, he was Chief of the Southern Front's political 
department; from January-July 1919, he was also a member 
of the RMS of the Southern Front. In March 1919, he was 
appointed a member of the RMS of 9th Army-a position he 
held until August 1919. In 1920, he was made Chairman of 
the Kazan and Tula guberniya executive committees. In 
1921, he was then made of the. CC's Siberian Bureau. From 
1922 onwards, he held a number of diplomatic posts. At 
various times, a member of the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee. 
KUIBYSHEV, VALERIAN VLADIMIROVICH(1888-1935) 
Joined the RSDLP in 1904. His father was an officer in 
the Tsarist Army. Between 1905-1906, he studied at the 
Military-medical academy in St.Petersburg. In 1917, he 
was appointed Chairman of the Samara committee of the 
RSDLP. He was a delegate at the 7th(April) conference of 
the RSDLP. He then became Chairman of the Samara Military 
Revolutionary Committee and the Party's guberniya 
committee. In 1918, he became Chairman of the Samara 
guberniya executive committee. In the debate on the 
Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, Kuibyshev supported the stance 
of the Left Communists, headed by Bukharin. in June 1918, 
he took part in the defence of Samara from the Czech 
troops. In July-September 1918, he was political 
commissar and member of the RMS of 1st Army; in September-
October 1918 he held the same posts in 4th Army. From 
October 1918: he became Chairman of the Samara guberniya 
committee of the Party. From April 1919, he became a 
member of the RMS of the Southern Group of Armies on the 
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Eastern Front, also holding, at the same time the 
position of Chairman of the Military Soviet of the Samara 
strengthened raion, ("ukrepleniy raion"). From July 1919, 
he was a member of the RMS of the Astrakhan group of 
forces; between August-October 1919, he was a member of 
theRMS of.llth Army. In October 1919, he was appointed 
Deputy-Cha1rman of the All-Russian Central Executive's 
Committee's Turkestan Commission· at that time he was 
also appointed a member of the RMS of the Turk~stan Front, 
a position he held until August 1920. In May 1920, he was 
appointed Chief of the political Administration of the 
Turkestan Front and, in September of that year, the 
RSFSR's representative attached to the Bukhara government. 
In April 1921, he was a member of the praesidium of the 
Supreme Economic Council and, in November, made Chief of 
"Glavelectro". He was a delegate to the 7th and 8th Party 
congresses. From 1923 onwards, he was involved in a 
variety of government and State posts. In 1921-1922, he 
obtained candidate-member status of the CC; in 1923, he 
became a member of the Central Control Commission and, 
between 1923-1926, Chairman of "Rabkrin". In 1927, he 
became a full member of the CC and the Politburo. At 
various times, he was also a member of the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee and the CEC. Buried in the 
Kremlin Wall. 
KUZMIN, NIKOLAI NIKOLAEVICH(l883-1939) 
Joined the RSDLP in 1903. Completed his higher education 
at St.Petersburg University. From November 1917-March 
1918, he served as a commissar on the South-Western Front, 
attached to the latter's staff HQ. From September 1918-
April 1919 and from December 1919-April 1920, he served as 
a member of the RMS of 6th Army. He was decorated with 
the Order for the Red Banner in 1919 for bravery in the 
field. From April-November 1919, he was on the RMS of 3rd 
Army. From April-July 1920, he served as a member of the 
RMS of the Baltic Fleet; from July-November 1920, he 
served on the RMS of 12th Army, becoming assistant to the 
Army's military chief in August 1920. From December 1920-
May 1921, he was Deputy-Chief of the Baltic Fleet's 
political department. He was a delegate to the lOth Party 
congress. For bravery in the field, whilst taking part in 
the crushing of the Kronstadt Mutiny in 1921, he was 
awarded a second Order of the Red Banner in 1922. After 
the Civil War, Kuzmin was used in a variety of Party and 
government posts. 
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MURALOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH(1877-1937) 
Joined the RSDLP in 1905. One of the leaders of the 
October Revolution in Moscow. He was put in charge of the 
Moscow Military District, when the latter was created in. 
May 1918. From August-September 1918, he served on the 
RMS of the Eastern Front; a month later, he was 
transferred to working on the RMS of 12th Army. His 
subsequent Civil War career is unknown. 
During the 1920s, he would appear to have been one of 
the most outspoken adherents of the Trotskyite opposition. 
He signed the "Declaration of the 46". He was expelled 
from the Party as the 15th Party Congress and banished to 
Siberia. In April 1936, he was arrested, sentenced to 
death at the January 1937 "show trial" and shot. He has 
been subsequently rehabilitated. 
OKULOVA, GLAFIRA IVANOVNA(1878-1957) 
Joined the RSDLP in 1899. Her father was a gold 
merchant. She studied to be a school-teacher in Moscow. 
In 1917, she was elected to the praesidium of the 
executive committee of the Yenisei guberniya soviet. In 
1918, she was appointed a member of the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee and a member of the latter's 
praesidium, in charge of the instructional courses for the 
former's agitators and instructors. From December 1918-
March 1919, she was Chief of the Eastern Front's political 
department. From April-June 1919, she was a member of the 
RMS of 1st Army. From June-November 1919, she was both a 
member of the RMS of 8th Army, as well as Chief of the 
latter's political department. From December 1919-March 
1920, she became a member of the RMS of the Reserve Army 
of the Republic(Kazan) and Chief of the latter's political 
department. From 1920-1921, she was involved in political 
work in the transport sector, then held various teaching 
and Party posts. 
POLONSKY, VYACHESLAV PAVLOVICH(1886-1932) 
Joined the RSDLP in 1905,~ initially being recruited by 
the Mensheviks. His father was a watch repairer. Took 
part in the revolutionary movement and was arrested in 
1905 and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Not long 
after the events of October 1917, he quickly left the 
Mensheviks to join the Bolsheviks. He had been a 
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journalist before the October Revolution, contributing a 
number of works to a variety of literary journals of the 
period. During the Civil War, he was placed in charge of 
PUR's Literary-publications' department. 
After the Civil War, his literary career began again 
and wrote a number of works on Bakunin, Dostoevsky, etc. 
Between 1926-1931, he was editor of "Noviy Mir:' and was 
dubbed by Lunacharsky as "a real master of journalism." 
Throughout the 1920s, he poured over a number of 
contemporary problems then facing Soviet literature and 
wrote in support of such writers, as Furmanov, Babel, 
Fadeyev, etc. Although his own literary work was not 
above criticism, Polonsky did much to help the nurturing 
Soviet literary world and he was well-known for his 
reasonably balanced outlook and views on the existing 
generation of Soviet writers. 
RAKOVSKY, CHRISTIAN GEORGIEVICH(1873-1941) 
Born in the Bulgarian town of Kostel. His father was a 
·merchant. From 1889, he took part in the Social-
Democratic movements of a number of countries, namely, 
Bulgaria, Romania, France apd Russia. He eventually 
joined the Bolsheviks in 1918, becoming one of the founder 
members of the Comintern. 
During the Civil War years, Rakovsky occupied a number 
of very important posts in the new Party and government 
administration, eg, as a member of the Party's CC and 
Orgbureau; member of the CC of the Communist Party of the 
Ukraine; member of the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee; Chairman of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom, etc. More 
specifically, during 1919-1920, Rakovsky was Deputy-Chief 
of PUR, a member of theRMS of the South-Western Front. 
In 1923, he was appointed Deputy-Foreign Minister and, 
later, became Soviet Ambassador to both Britain and 
France. 
During the 1920s, Rakovsky was a supporter of Trotsky 
in the power struggle against Stalin and, in 1927, he was 
expelled from the Party's CC and relieved of his duties as 
Deputy-Foreign Minister; at the 15th Party Congress, he 
was expelled from the Party altogether. Up until 1934, he 
lived in Astrakhan and Saratov. After the 17th Party 
Congress, he made a request to the Party's CC to restore 
him his Party membership and he was allowed to return to 
Moscow, where he worked in the area of Soviet health care. 
In 1935, his Party membership was restored to him. At the 
moment of his arrest in 1937, he was working as Chief of 
Administration of the RSFSR Ministry of Health. In 1938, 
he was again expelled from the Party and sentenced to 20 
years imprisonment for his alleged role in the "anti-
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Soviet Right-wing Trotskyite bloc". He died in prison in 
1941. He has been posthumously fully rehabilitated. 
SEREBRYAKOV, LEONID PETROVICH(1890-1937) 
Born in 1890 in Samara, his father was a metal-worker. 
Due to the poor circumstances of his parents, the young 
Serebryakov had to live with a family in Ufa. Eventually, 
when his father had found permanent work in the town of 
Lugansk, they all moved there. However, even so, in 1904, 
Serebryakov st~ll had to seek employment in Baku, where he 
began to read 1llegal Marxist literature and, in 1905, 
joined the Lugansk committee of the RSDLP. 
His first period of arrest occurred not long after his 
membership of the RSDLP; in 1908, however, he was re-
arrested and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment in Vologda 
guberniya. At the end of his senten~e, he travelled all 
over Russia, on Party work, for the next couple of years, 
but this did not prevent him from being yet again arrested 
and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment in the notorious 
Narym region in 1912. He escaped, however, in 1913 and 
the RSDLP sent him to Baku to carry out work there. He 
helped organise a strike there and, for his trouble, was 
re-arrested and sent back to Narym province. However, he 
managed to escape for a second time and fled back to 
Moscow. The authorities re-arrested him again and, on 
this occasion, forced him to stay in Narym province until 
1916. Once his term of imprisonment was legally over, he 
travelled to Petrograd, where he continued to work in the 
Party underground. Completely unexpectedly, he was 
mobilised and sent to Kostroma to serve in the 88th 
Infantry Regiment. This meant that, during the 1917 
February Revolution, Serebryakov, alongwith S.S.Danilov, 
was in an ideal position to help set up the Kostroma 
Soviet of Workers and Peasant Deputies. He then returned 
to Moscow, as a member of the Party's oblast soviet. 
During the 1917 October Revolution, he was a member of 
the praesidium of the Moscow soviet, as well as a 
secretary to the Party's oblast committee and a member of 
the praesidium of the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee. From 1919-1920, he occupied a number of 
important positions, most notably, a secretary to the 
Party's CC, member of the Politburo, a delegate to the 8th 
and 9th Party Congresses, etc. At the end of 1920, he was 
elected Chairman of the Southern Bureau of the Soviet 
trade unions, as well as being a member of the RMS of the 
Southern Front. With units of 11th Army, Serebryakov 
played an important role in the establishment of Soviet 
power in Georgia. 
After the Civil War, he was transferrea to work in the 
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field of ~ransport; in May 1922, becoming Deputy Commissar 
of Commun1cations. From 1925 onwards, he became a 
follow~r of Trotsky and was eventually expelled from the 
Party 1n October 1927. He was reinstated in January 1930, 
though. He was sentenced to death at the January 1937 
"show trial" on charges of espionage, terrorism and 
sabotage. He was executed forthwith. He has been 
subsequently completely rehabilitated. 
SMILGA, IVAR TENISOVICH(1892-1937/1938) 
He was born in 1892 in Liflyandsk guberniya, the son 
of a farmer/landowner. Judging by his own accounts, both 
his father and mother were intelligent people, his father 
being especially fond of reading to the young Smilga 
stories from Ancient Greek mythology. His father was, in 
the words of Smilga himself, an "enlightened democrat". 
According to his own account, Smilga's political 
conscience was first stirred by the assassination of the 
reactionary Education Minister, Karpovich, in 1901 by the 
student, Bogolepov. His family would appear to have held 
something akin to a party to celebrate the event! . Only 
the young Smilga thought it unseemly. However, as he 
began to read intensively, his views began to radically 
change and, by 1904-1905, he was already a convinced 
atheist. His political transformation was completed 
though when his father, who had previously taken part in 
the revolutionary events of 1905, was executed by a 
Tsarist firing squad in 1906. Smilga joined the local 
RSDLP committee in 1907. When he became a student in 
1909, his Marxist outlook was further enhanced. In 1910, 
he was arrested for taking part in a demonstration fn 
Moscow, protesting against the death penalty. He was 
sentenced to a month's imprisonment. In 1911, he was 
again arrested for carrying out underground Party work in 
the Lefortovsk raion and was sentenced to 3 years 
imprisonment in Vologda. He returned from the latter in 
1914 and, just after the beginning of the First World War, 
entered the Petrograd committee of the RSDLP. He was 
again arrested in 1915 and only returned to Petrograd 
after the February 1917 Revolution. 
At the Party's 1917 April Conference, he was elected 
onto the Party's CC, a post he held until 1920. During 
the October Revolution itself, he was Chairman of the 
oblast soviet of the committee of Russian soviets in 
Finland. In this post, he played an important role in the 
Finnish Revolution, at the beginning of 1918. It was also 
round about this time that he was appointed the RSFSR's 
first ambassador to Finland. A month later, March 1918, 
and Smilga was appointed onto.the executive committee of 
the Petrograd Soviet and the editorial board of "Pravda" 
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itself. 
During the Civil War, Smilga was transferred to 
military work, both as a member of various RMS, as well as 
a commander and, of course, Chief of PUR. Thus, 
throughout the Civil War, Smilga served on the RMS of 3rd 
Army(6.7.1918-22.10.1918); the Eastern Front(28.10.1918-
3.4.1919); the South-Eastern Front(l.l0.1919-16.1.1920); 
the Caucasus Front (16.1.1920-21.5.1920); the Western 
Front(30.5.1920-24.10.1920); the Southern 
Front(25.10.1920-10.12.1920) and, finally, back to the 
South-Eastern Front again, (26.1.1921-29.5.1921). His 
appointment as PUR's Chief came on 26th May 1919, a 
position he held officially until January 1921 and, on top 
of all that, Smilga had also been appointed a member of 
the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic (RVSR), 
an appointment which lasted from 8th May 1919 to 23rd 
March 1923. 
After the end of the Civil War, Smilga continued to 
hold a number of very important posts in the state 
apparatus: from 1921-1923, he was Deputy-Chairman of the 
Supreme Economic Council and Chief of the Main 
Administration for Energy. In the autumn of 1923, he 
became Deputy-Chairman of Gosplan, a position he held 
until 1926. Involved in the detailed preparation for the 
first Five-Year Plan, Krzhizhanovsky once said that his 
main assistants in such work were Smilga and G.Sokolnikov. 
Despite his work in helping to compile the necessary facts 
and figures for the First Five Year plan, Smilga was also 
Rector and Professor at the G.V.Plekhanov Institute for 
the National Economy between 1925-1927. 
During the power struggle between Stalin and 
Trotsky, Smilga played an especially prominent part, 
making speeches on behalf of the oppositionists, as well 
as signing all the main documents and statements of the 
latter. Needless to say, this did not endear him to the 
ruling group in the Politburo at the time and following a 
decision of the 15th Party Congress, Smilga was expelled 
from the Party and, in January 1928, was exiled to the 
Siberian village of Kolpashevo. His term of exile forced 
him to reconsider his position within the opposition 
movement and, in 1929, alongwith Preobrazhensky and Radek, 
Smilga signed a petition requesting that the Party allow 
him back into the fold, so to speak. Thus, at the 
beginning of 1930, Smilga found his Party membership 
restored and he was quickly appointed Chief of the 
Mobilisation department of the Supreme Economic Council. 
However, he soon discovered that his former position and 
powers were not being restored to him fully, so he then 
took up literary work and became involved in the 
"Akademiya" publishing house, playing a direct part in the 
publication of a number of works of Saint-Simone, Erasmus 
of Rotterdam, Charles Dickens, etc. 
Following the assassination of Kirov in December 1934, 
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Smilga was arrested on the night of 1st-2nd January 1935. 
In May 1936, his wife, a prominent Old Bolshevik in her 
own right, was a~so arrested. However, despite having 
arrested both Sm1lga and his wife, the authorities soon 
arrested her three brothers, as well, in 1936 and not one 
of them managed to survive the brutal regime of the camps. 
As regards Smilga himself, there seems to be some 
confusion as to the exact date of his death-according to 
two recent articles about him, he died either in January 
1937 or in F7bruary 1938. However, neither of the two 
sources are 1n any doubt as to how he died:he was shot by 
a firing squad. He has only been recently fully 
rehabilitated. 
SMIRNOV, IVAN NIKITICH(1880/1881-1936) 
His father was a peasant from the Ryazan guberniya. 
Due to family circumstances, he was eventually sent to 
work in Moscow, when ~e was only 8 years old, where he 
managed to finish some elementary courses of education 
before being sent to work on the railway. He joined the 
RSDLP in 1899 and p~ayed an active role in the 1905 
Revolution. Before the outbreak of the First World War, 
he had been arrested several times and, in total, spent 
some 6 years of his brief life in Tsarist prisons and a 
further 4 years of internal exile. 
He was called up for military service in 1916 and 
served in Tomsk. At the beginning of the Civil War, he 
·was sent by the Party's CC to work around Kazan; there, he 
was appointed a member of the RMS of the Eastern Front. 
Following the defeat of 5th Army, Smirnov found himself 
being appointed to the latter's RMS, a position he held 
onto until May 1920. However, in December 1919, the Party 
decided to use him in the extremely delicate work of 
organising Party cells in the enemy's rear and he began to 
devote more attention to that type of work than purely 
working in the military sphere. After the defeat of 
Kolchak, Smirnov was appointed Chairman of the Siberian 
Revolutionary Committee. 
In 1921, he was made secretary to the Petrograd Bureau 
of the Party's CC. He worked in that post for 6 months, 
or so, and, immediately after that, was placed in charge 
of the defence industry sector of the Supreme Economic 
Council. In 1923, he was appointed to the post of 
People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs, a post he 
held until 1927. An ardent supporter of Trotsky, Smirnov 
was expelled from the Party at the 15th Party Congress and 
exiled to the Caucasus. However, following his 
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recantation, he was reinstated to the Party in 1930 and 
was re-employed in the economic sector. However, as one 
of the accused in the 1936 "show trial", Smirnov was 
executed by firing squad in 1936. 
SUZDALTSEVA-TAGUNOVA, VALENTINA IVANOVNA(1897-1957) 
From a peasant family. Joined the Bolsheviks in 
August 1917. In 1912, began her studies at the Higher 
Courses for Women in Moscow; in 1915, became a nurse in 
the army. In 1917, she became a member of the Union of 
Working-Class Youth, the "3rd International" brigade. 
Took part in the October 1917 Revolution in Moscow. 
In 1918, she was transferred to work in the 
Commissariats for the Demobilisation of the Old Army and 
Industry in Petrograd. In the spring of 1918, she became 
secretary to the Arkhangelsk Party committee. In August 
1918, she began working in the staff HQ of the Northern 
Front, becoming chairwoman of the Party collective of the 
front's military Party cells. She then headed the 
political department of 6th Army, as well as becoming 
secretary to the Vologda city Party committee. In the 
autumn of 1919, on the instruction of the Party's CC, she 
united the work of the civilian and military organs 
working in the rear of the region of the South-Eastern 
Front. In 1920, she was transferred to work in the 
political department of 9th Army. Between 1920-1924, she 
became Chief of the Agitation-Propaganda department of 
PUR. Afterwards, she was involved in a number of Party 
posts. 
YAROSLAVSKY, EMELYAN MIKHAILOVICH(1878-1943) 
(Real name: Miney Izrailovich Gubelman). His father 
had been a former political exile. Joined the RSDLP in 
1898. In 1917, he became Chairman of the Yakutsk soviet; 
in July 1917, he was transferred to work in the Military 
organisation of the Moscow Party committee. He was a 
delegate to the 6th Party Congress. During the October 
Revolution, he was a member of the Military-Party centre 
and the Moscow Revolutionary Committee. 
During the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, Yaroslavsky 
found himself supporting the Left Communists. In 1918-
1919, he was put in charge of conducting the mobilisations 
of a number of guberniyas for the Red Army. He was a 
member of the Commission for the Struggle against 
Banditism in the Republic. From October 1919-March 1920, 
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he was Chairman of the Party's Perm guberniya committee. 
In April 1920, he was appointed a member of the CC's 
Siberian Bureau. He was a delegate to the 8th-10th Party 
Congresses. At the 8th Party Congress, he found himself 
in yet another opposition group, this time he was a member 
of the "military opposition". Between 1919-1921, 
Yaroslavsky enjoyed candidate-member status of the CC, in 
1921-1922, he was promoted to full membership status. In 
1921, he became secretary to the CC. From 1922 onwards, 
he was involved in a variety of political, academic, 
journalistic posts. From 1923-1934, he was a member of 
the praesidium of the Central Control Commission. He was 
also, at various times, a member of the Central Executive 
Committee and the Party's CC. 
Regardless of what else could be written about 
Yaroslavsky, it should not be forgotten that Yaroslavsky 
played a not insignificant role in the ideological triumph 
of Stalin's cult of the personality, by helping the latter 
re-write the history of the Party in the early 1930s. 
YEFREMOV, DOMINIK IVANOVICH(l881-1925) 
A previously active member of the Petrograd "Union of 
Struggle for the Liberation of the Working-Class", 
Yefremov was a member of the RSDLP since 1902. He was 
also involved in the organisation of "Iskra". In March 
1917, he was involved in Party work in the Zamoskvorets 
region of Moscow, moving onto working for the Party in the 
Sokolnichesk region of the city. From May-September 1918, 
he was secretary to the Moscow Party committee, 
subsequently being sent to the Southern Front. From 
October-December 1918, he was in charge of the latter's 
political department. From January-September 1919, he was 
both Chief of lOth Army's political department, as well as 
being a member of the latter's RMS. At the beginning of 
1920, he was mobilised for transport work and, once he had 
completed a stint there, he then had a variety of Party 
and soviet posts. 
YURENEV, KONSTANTIN KONSTANTINOVICH(l888-1938) 
Real name was K.K.Krotovsky. He was born in the town 
of Dvinsk, Vitebsk guberniya. His father was a railway 
station guard. He received a basic education and, by the 
time he was 16, he was already taking part in illegal 
meetings of the local RSDLP organisation, becoming a 
Page 481 
member of the RSDLP in 1905. In the autumn of 1906 he 
was put in charge of the railway district and the l;cal 
committee's military-revolutionary organisations. In 
March 1908, he was elected a member of the Party's North-
West oblast committee. Not long after that appointment, 
however, Yurenev was arrested and in April 1908 was 
sentenced to 3 years imprisonment in Arkhangelsk 
guberniya. 
In 1911, he returned to St.Petersburg, where he began 
to contribute to the Party newspaper, "Pravda" and the 
journal, "Prosveshcheniye". He also helped in the 
organisation of illegal activity in the Narva region of 
the city. In 1913, alongwith a few others, he helped to 
organise the famous "mezhraiontsy" committee of RSDLP 
members, which tried to cooperate between both the 
Menshevik and Bolshevik factions of the RSDLP. In 1915, 
he was arrested again but, because of the war, sentence 
was never actually passed, so Yurenev was able to carry on 
with his Party work in St.Petersburg. 
After the February Revolution, he was elected a member 
of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd soviet. At 
the First Congress of Soviets, he was elected onto the 
latter's Central Executive Committee, as well. He was a 
delegate to the 6th Party Congress and, at the latter 
Congress, the "mezhraiontsy" decided to formally 
amalgamate with the Bolsheviks. In September 1917, 
attached to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd 
Soviet was a department of the Red Guard. Yurenev worked 
in this and eventually became Chairman of the Petrograd 
Red Guard's Main Staff. At the beginning of 1918, he was 
appointed a member of the All-Russian Collegiate for the 
Organisation and Administration of the Red Army and a 
member of the Collegiate of the People's Commissariat of 
Military Affairs. 
In the spring of 1918, following the transfer of the 
Collegiate of the People's Commissariat of Military 
Affairs from Petrograd to Moscow, Yurenev was appointed to 
head the newly created All-Russian Bureau of Military 
Commissars. In the spring of 1919, he was appointed a 
member of the RMS for the Eastern Front. In the autumn of 
1918, he was appointed a member of the Party's Siberian 
city committee, as well as being appointed to the RMS of 
the Western Front in October 1919. 
At the beginning of 1920, he became a member of the 
Moscow Party committee, working in the Zamskvorets and 
Bauman regions of the city. In the summer of 1920, he was 
elected Chairman of the Kursk guberniya executive 
committee and a member of the praesidium of the guberniya 
committee. In June 1920, he was transferred to the 
People's Commissariat of Military Affairs and was Soviet 
ambassador to Bukhara(l921); Latvia(1922); 
Czechoslovakia(1923); Italy(1924); Persia(1925); 
Austria(1927); Japan(1933); Germany(1937). Like many of 
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his generation of Party leaders and activists, Yurenev was 
to be caught up in the purges and, in 1938, was executed. 
ZEMLYACHKA, ROZALIYA SAMOILOVNA(l876-1947) 
Joined the RSDLP in 1896. From February 1917-August 
1918, she was secretary to the Moscow committee of the 
RSDLP(Bolsheviks). She was a delegate to the 7th (April) 
Conference and the 6th Party Congress. During the 1917 
October Revolution, she was a member of the Military-
Revolutionary Committee of the Rogozh raion, Moscow. In 
August 1918, she was sent to the Orsha to aid in the 
transfer of troops to the Eastern Front. In September 
1918, she was appointed commissar to the Northern-Dvinsk 
Rifle Brigade, then serving on the Eastern Front. From 
January-July 1919, she was Chief of the political 
department of 8th Army. She was a delegate to the 8th 
Party Congress. From October 1919-November 1920, she was 
Chief of the political department of 13th Army. For her 
military and political work in the Red Army, she was 
awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1921. From 
November 1920 onwards, she was involved in a number of 
Party and state posts. In 1924, she was appointed a 
member of the Central Control Commission; in 1939, she 
became a member of the Party's CC. From 1939-1943, she 
was Deputy-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars 
and, at various times, a member of the Central Executive 
Committee of the Party. 
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